Netanyahu's desperate desire to hold on to the seat begs the question: What will happen on the "day after the war"?

By Alon Ben David

Last week's events in the north were a reminder to us all that the most serious security challenge from Hamas still lies ahead. Half a year has passed since the start of the war, and the remarkable achievements that were at its beginning are being depleted. The political and military leadership are still working as if they have all the time in the world. In fact, things are not like that. You should start by looking north. During this week, the Prime Minister was busy searching for a formula for a law that would guarantee the continued evasion of tens of thousands of Haredim from military service. In the little time he had left, he preoccupied us all with an unnecessary crisis with the last ally we had left.

Salvation in the north will not come from Netanyahu. In his view, the residents of the north can remain in temporary housing, until the time comes for them to enter shelters. The main thing is that the war in Gaza will continue forever. He understood before anyone else that the world would not allow him to occupy Rafah, and therefore, he turned it into the trophy without which “absolute victory” would not be achieved. The artificial crisis created this week with the United States due to the resolution in the United Nations was the worst, and it revealed that Netanyahu is the last person truly concerned with the occupation of Rafah. He only wants to catch up with the "absolute victory" that will never come. Israel rightly wanted a resolution linking the ceasefire to the release of the hostages, but expecting the United States to use a veto against a resolution calling for both is unrealistic.

A leader who really wanted to make a decision against Hamas could have exploited the Security Council resolution: adopting it and declaring a two-week ceasefire, until the end of Ramadan, as a space of time to return the hostages. At the same time, he would have announced that if the UN resolution was not implemented, and the hostages were not recovered by the end of Ramadan, Israel would be free to continue the military operation as it wished. However, Netanyahu is completely unaware. His desperate desire to hold on to the chair distorts his vision. He cancels the delegation's departure to Washington, retreats, and at the same time, denies that he has retreated, then sends it again. He is running the war, but not the war taking place in Gaza.

Shifting forces to the north

Since the start of the battle, Netanyahu has not been the one running it. The army presents plans to him, and he approves them, as was the case throughout the 17 years of his tenure as prime minister. Now, the problem is that the Army General Staff seems to have lost touch with the multi-front picture of war in which we find ourselves.

For 4 months, the army has been immersed in the Khan Yunis tunnels, and is pursuing Hamas leaders. Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip are a double challenge, and they were occupied during half this time. Every day, the army spokesman publishes a new video of a clash with “saboteurs,” but in reality, the army hardly advances in the south of the Gaza Strip. He is waiting for orders to occupy the center and Rafah camps, but these orders will not arrive. Six months after the outbreak of war, the army must present a realistic plan on how to end it.

I believed, and still believe, that subjugating the six Hamas battalions in Rafah and the center camps was necessary to achieve the goal of annihilating the movement’s military power. However, our unnecessary stagnation in Khan Yunis changed the reasons. As it now appears, Israel will not have the legitimacy to occupy Rafah. In these current, less-than-ideal circumstances, the army's goal is to prepare a plan that will lead to achieving goals that are still achievable: occupying the central camps and achieving operational control over 90% of the territory of the Strip. The community in Gaza will be pushed to Rafah and the Al-Mawasi area, and the army will open three corridors dividing the Strip: the corridor now in the Gaza Valley, the Kissufim corridor, north of Khan Yunis, and another corridor south of the city.

Rafah will remain the last area affiliated with Hamas, and about a million and a half displaced people will be over the heads of Hamas leaders. The international community will provide them with food as it wants, and offer alternatives to Hamas rule in Rafah, but the displaced will not return to their homes until the hostages return. At this time, the army can operate freely in all remaining areas of the Strip with a successful operation, as happened in Al-Shifa Hospital. This must be based on storming forces, not on forces remaining on the territory of the Strip, and allows us to transfer additional forces to the northern border.

If at this stage we do not reach an exchange deal in Gaza, this means that we are going to a battle in the north. This battle will need the best forces in the army, as well as a staff that respects its powers at the hands of field officers, and has nothing to do with the failure that occurred on October 7. The exchange of fire we have been conducting with Hezbollah for almost half a year has led to tactical achievements, but the strategic achievement is reserved for Hezbollah: driving the residents of the north away from their homes. The army inflicts damage on sites and activists, killing approximately 350 of them, but in Hezbollah's eyes, this is a price borne in exchange for the achievement.

That must be changed.

Last week, a resident of the North asked me whether they would return to their homes in September 2025. The military must provide us with one answer: yes. At the end of the 1980s, when Israel was still stuck in the security zone in southern Lebanon, the commander of the northern region at the time, Yossi Bild, gave orders to engrave the following address on all military sites: Objective - Protect the towns of the north. It's time to dig it again.