Lessons of the "Flood" and its Repercussions (1)... A Saying on Victory and Defeat

Although the "war" that has been going on since the "flood" has not yet ended, the scene today has enough clarity for some evaluation to extract lessons and morals that may be useful in the coming days and for future events. It also has enough ambiguity for us to realize that what we will come up with now is not final, and certainly not everything.

It is important for anyone who "takes on" talking about the current situation in the region to realize that starting to talk about the "flood", despite it being a pivotal moment in the movement of the issue, is not cut off from the tree of history. Separating it from the context of the issue contains a great deal of "cognitive" injustice to the truth, and historical injustice to the "victim". We are facing an exceptional matter, yes, but it is not abnormal. Equating exceptionality with abnormality is either ignorance in the case of innocence, or collusion in the case of bias. The flood and what followed it are nothing but a link in a Zionist imperialist aggression against Palestine and the region, and this aggression has been confronted for more than a century.

It is also important, perhaps even more important for those who deal with this topic, to be careful about a kind of intellectual neutrality and psychological coherence that makes him closer to the observer than to someone immersed in the event, and distances him from doing so as a defeated person who only sees the strengths of his enemy, or as a victor who only sees his own strengths.

What has happened so far represents a real and radical revolution, not only in strategy but also in symbolism and meaning, which is no less important. We are facing a scene that is intertwined and complex, but it is more “real” and clearer. In this scene, we are faced with a different Gaza and a different Palestine, as well as a different Israel, a different Arab “state,” a different occupation, a different West, a different public opinion, and a different resistance, and in parallel with all of that, we are faced with a different culture and a different intellectual.

In a quick scan of the scene, Gaza is killing, destruction, genocide, sacrifice, steadfastness, transcendence and entry into the conscience of all that is human. Palestine is the compass of man to his humanity, the lever of noble values and the herald of a better world order, and a transition from the (Palestine) issue to the (Palestinian) ideology. Israel is uniquely "superior" in criminality, and sits in the position of the criminal before the international judiciary and the court of history, and has a different "global" awareness of it. A completely exposed West, the one that presented itself as a civilization, civility, democracy and human rights, has revealed its other face as a criminal and a killer (or assistant killer) of children and humanity. An Arab "state" that exists to be defeated, paralyzed and motionless, and if it acts, it is in the opposite direction, it is against the "nation", so its people have accepted that there is no need to appeal to it, it is at its best when it is still, perhaps this will decipher part of the "code" of the lack of pro-Palestine demonstrations in the required manner in the Arab state, it is "sleeping, may God curse the one who awakens it." Syria is a dramatic upheaval in the scene, a regime that most of what is inside it indicates the necessity of its departure, and a "nationalist" political position that distorts the picture and slows down thinking about it. What should have gone has gone, and there are doubts about the coming of what should come, and doors are open in all directions.

In terms of awareness and meaning, there is a different saying about victory and defeat, and there are ambiguous boundaries between it and loss. Loss is a balance of power and defeat is a decision. Loss becomes defeat if its owner considers it the end of the matter and is “comfortable” with it. Defeat is “comfortable” and victory is “tiring.” In not acknowledging loss is the beginning of the road to defeat, and the worst thing about defeat is denying it because that blocks the road to the victory of those who come. In acknowledging defeat there is some victory because it contains something of handing over the banner to those who come.

Loss is a context, defeat is stillness and an end, and the loss that does not lead to defeat is a catch of breath, an insistence on continuing, and an affirmation of the goal. In this sense, we can understand the language that was used in the aftermath of the June 1967 war, such as “setback” (loss), and considering the survival of the regime (or its preservation) an “achievement” as long as it insists on confrontation, despite the painful blow to the army and the state, because what followed that war was a rejection of its results, an insistence on confrontation (Khartoum’s “no’s”) and preparation for it (the war of attrition).

The October 1973 war can also be considered a complete defeat, because it was crowned by normalization, and normalization is not only adopting and celebrating the defeat, but carrying it and handing it over, complete and undiminished, to future generations in the form of an achievement. It is not only abandoning the "weapon", but also guaranteeing that abandonment, believing in it and bequeathing it. This is exactly what Sadat meant when he said that the October War was the last of the wars, and this explains the position of the Arab "state" on what happened and is happening in Gaza and Palestine.

Comparing the 1967 and 1973 wars is a complete dramatic scene. You lose but are not defeated, you win and are defeated. You hold funerals on the occasion of not being defeated (despite the loss) and you celebrate your defeat (despite not losing). The logic of merchants, not the logic of history.

In both of these wars, the relationship between inputs and outputs becomes more complicated. In 1967, because you lost but were not defeated (you did not decide to be defeated), the compass continued to work as usual, the enemy remained the enemy and the ally remained the ally. But in the 1973 war, because you used your failure to lose as a justification for your defeat, and in order for defeat to appear as victory, the enemy had to be replaced and the allies changed, and you became, at best, a “mediator” between your new friend (your former enemy) and your nation (your former) current neighbors.

This also applies to the Syrian case; in the confrontations that have taken place since 2011 between the regime and its opponents, the regime has lost a lot, as has the opposition: hundreds of thousands of victims, millions of refugees, and the near-total collapse of the state. But all of this did not translate into a defeat for the regime until it decided to do so without losses at the end of 2024.

Defeat has two requirements and a decision, an achievement, or what appears to be so (an image of an achievement), and "courage" or what appears to be so, to convince oneself before convincing others, that the decision to "surrender" was a decision of wisdom and not weakness, and it is not a decision of defeat but rather a decision of half-victory that is completed by its meeting with the half-victory of one's enemy, to become a complete victory for two friends. (To solve the complexities of what may exist of abstraction, one can imagine the October 1973 War).

Returning to the flood and its repercussions, the Israeli achievement did not rise to the level of victory despite being a clear achievement, because the achievement turns into victory when there is a corresponding defeat that the opponent acknowledges and complies with its data, so there is no victor without a defeated one, and the absence of defeat is the absence of victory.

Victory is also linked in history to achievements coupled with morals and the values of chivalry, gallantry and tolerance. This did not happen in the case of Israel in this war. Rather, the exact opposite happened, an achievement coupled with brutality, crime, baseness and deception.

This is what makes the statement that if the "aggressor" does not achieve his goals, he is "defeated" or as if he is, and that if the "resistance" prevents its enemy from achieving his goals, it is victorious, a statement that contains a lot of truth. The loss of the aggressor is part of his defeat unless it is coupled with the complete elimination of his enemy, and the loss of the resistor is part of his determination and proof of his continuation if he does not stop. The loss of the aggressor is a departure from his "obvious" state of superiority, and the loss of the resistor is part of his "obvious" state of weakness, which is also given in advance, and does not mean much if the act of resistance continues.

It is important to take into consideration that talking about loss, achievement, defeat and victory, in the case of Israel, carries additional meanings; Israel is a state unlike any other state, and the Israeli is a human being unlike any other human being. We are talking about an exceptional state and an exceptional human being. These people were designed to excel, and the image of excellence for them is an indicator of their existence, and loss is something foreign to them. Therefore, what is considered a loss for a “normal” state is greater than that for Israel, and Israel’s failure in something is more serious than that because loss and failure are two things “foreign” to it, as is supposed, and they are ultimately an image of defeat for a state that is supposed to be invincible.

Perhaps this explains Israel's complete blackout of its losses in this war and its clear highlighting of its enemy's losses, as well as Hezbollah's full disclosure of its losses. We are faced with two parties, one of which, "Israel", is keen not to show its losses because it understands loss as weakness, and for it it is one. It does not want or accept to appear weak, and is keen to show the losses of its enemy, "the resistance", which it understands as weakness and evidence of its "savagery", which it understands as strength. In return, Hezbollah considers its disclosure of its losses to be an honor to them from a religious perspective, and highlights its readiness to sacrifice and its insistence on continuing despite the losses. It is a war of image and a war of meaning, and it is no less important than a war of weapons in its contribution to achieving victory or defeat.

Finally, in clarifying the meaning of (meaning), the role of the intellectual emerges. The role of the intellectual who interacts with his cause, even when he shows the enormity of the loss, is not to push it towards defeat, especially since experience has proven that defeat does not stop losses in the Palestinian case. We sometimes find ourselves in front of an intellectual who is difficult to understand whether he expects defeat or wishes for it. The intellectual who considers himself the bearer of Palestine, the cause and the meaning, is supposed to keep victory in mind, and then say whatever he wants.