Hebrew media sources reported that the Israeli occupation army is currently deploying six military brigades to operate inside the Gaza Strip, a clear indication of its intention to stay for extended periods. The sources explained that the nature of the current troop rotation reflects a strategy aimed at solidifying an intensive military presence, far from the idea of an imminent withdrawal.

In the coming days, the paratrooper brigade is expected to enter the Strip to replace one of the reserve brigades that has completed its combat missions. These movements come as the occupation continues to rearrange its field operations to ensure the continuity of military operations and security control over key points in the Strip.

In a related context, the 205th Brigade recently concluded an intensive two-month combat tour, its sixth tour since the outbreak of the war in October 2023. Elements of this brigade moved between battlefronts in the southern Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon, reflecting the operational pressure on combat units.

Reports from military personnel involved in operations deep inside Gaza quoted them as saying that Hamas is making significant efforts to rebuild its military capabilities and reorganize its ranks. They indicated that the resistance is still trying to regain the initiative in areas from which the army withdraws or reduces its presence.

To reinforce this control, the occupation forces have begun converting their military positions from temporary defensive points to permanent and fortified strongholds. These points are concentrated in the buffer zone between the border and what is known as the 'Yellow Line,' a line defined by previous understandings for partial withdrawal.

The sources stated that dozens of permanent military points have been built in recent months, with the aim of establishing a stable and isolated security zone. These facilities provide a logistical and security environment for the stationed forces, facilitating rapid incursions when needed.

Despite talk of 'tactical achievements,' the political and military leadership in Tel Aviv realizes that Gaza is not an isolated arena. These leaders believe that the ability to decisively win the battle against Hamas is closely linked to rapid developments on other fronts.

The Lebanese front plays a pivotal role in determining the size of forces allocated to the Gaza Strip, especially with the continued fighting outside the Litani River area. Ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Iran also affect the distribution of Israeli military resources and the prioritization of its field objectives.

Military assessments indicate that the failure to resolve the situations on multiple fronts complicates the task of reaching a final and decisive outcome in Gaza. The occupation army finds itself forced to distribute its efforts between confronting Hezbollah in the north and pursuing resistance cells in the south.

Currently, most Israeli military efforts are focused on the northern front, where Hezbollah continues to target residential areas and military bases. This escalation comes in response to continuous Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement announced earlier this year.

Military commanders express growing concern about the threat of explosive drones launched by Hezbollah, warning that this tactic could spread to the Gaza Strip. This concern explains the massive investments the occupation is pouring into monitoring the southern borders and preventing smuggling operations through tunnels or land corridors.

The occupation authorities sent a clear message that the army is prepared to return the Gaza Strip to intense fighting if diplomatic paths falter. Sources confirmed that plans are ready to recall forces transferred to Lebanon and return them immediately to the Gaza front if necessary.

It is worth noting that the genocidal war waged by the occupation with American support has left tens of thousands dead and wounded, most of them women and children. Despite a ceasefire agreement in effect since October 2025, Israeli violations have not ceased, leaving more victims and destruction.

Recent statistics indicate that more than 800 Palestinians have been killed since the presumed truce began, as a result of daily shelling and suffocating siege. The humanitarian suffering in the Strip continues amidst the destruction of infrastructure and the prevention of essential aid from reaching besieged populations in displacement centers.

The current troop rotations indicate Israeli preparations for a prolonged and intensive stay within the Gaza Strip, with military points being converted into permanent strongholds.

Hebrew media sources reported that the United States is moving towards a gradual and calculated field escalation with Iran, amidst widespread anticipation within the security establishment in Tel Aviv for a decisive decision from President Donald Trump. The report, issued by 'Israel Hayom' newspaper, indicates that the region stands on the brink of a new phase of confrontation that may go beyond the limits of traditional skirmishes to a direct military clash.

The sources stated that the current strategy of the Trump administration relies on the principle of slowly 'heating up the atmosphere,' a method that differs from previous rounds characterized by swift and sudden strikes. Through this tactic, Washington aims to test Iranian reactions and measure Tehran's ability to withstand increasing military pressure in vital waterways.

The recent tension began to escalate following statements by President Trump in which he openly questioned the Iranian regime's ability to impose a real blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. This skepticism prompted Tehran to respond quickly by publishing detailed maps showing the deployment points of its naval forces and missile platforms, warning against any American attempt to violate the maritime sovereignty it claims in the region.

In a move considered a clear field challenge, the US Central Command announced the passage of two warships through the strait without regard for Iranian warnings. This field movement put Tehran in a dilemma of response, as it sufficed with limited targeting of some ships and sites in the UAE, clearly avoiding direct confrontation with American bases or Israeli targets.

Analysts believe that current Iranian behavior reflects a deep desire to avoid sliding into a full-scale war that could have dire consequences for the internal system. Nevertheless, Tehran is trying to maintain a minimum level of deterrence to ensure that American forces do not overstep their operations, with full awareness of the exorbitant cost of any large-scale escalation at the present time.

Regarding the Israeli role, the report clarified that Tel Aviv is not currently playing the primary driver of these events, nor has it yet entered the direct targeting circle by pro-Iranian militias. However, the Israeli leadership remains on high alert, emphasizing that any conflagration in the Gulf region will have direct repercussions on the northern and internal fronts.

Estimates from informed sources indicate that the most likely scenario is a continued gradual and escalating exchange of blows between Washington and Tehran. The report confirms that Trump views confronting Iranian influence as a 'historic mission' from which he will not back down, making the option of using overwhelming military force a strong possibility on the table.

In the decision-making corridors in Tel Aviv, any upcoming American-Iranian confrontation is seen as a golden, irreplaceable opportunity to deliver devastating blows to the nuclear project and vital facilities inside Iran. Military circles also believe that Tehran's preoccupation with confronting Washington will weaken Hezbollah's capabilities in Lebanon, facilitating the Israeli army's mission to neutralize its missile threats.

The report concluded that the current phase is merely a prelude to a larger military operation that could radically change the political and military map in the Middle East. The US administration, according to these data, seeks to quickly resolve the conflict if it erupts, to ensure that it does not turn into a long-term war of attrition that drains resources and capabilities.

The American president will not back down easily, and resorting to greater military force against Tehran is now just a matter of time.

The Israeli occupation's Magistrate's Court in Ashkelon, on Tuesday, issued a decision to extend the detention of Brazilian activist Thiago de Avila and Spanish activist of Palestinian origin Saif Abu Kishk for an additional six days. This decision comes days after occupation forces intercepted the 'Global Freedom Flotilla' in international waters and took the activists to interrogation centers, where they are scheduled to remain in detention until May 10, under the pretext of completing investigative procedures.

For its part, the defense team from the 'Adalah' Legal Center affirmed that the arrest operation lacks any sound legal justification, noting that the court responded to the occupation authorities' request despite no formal charges being brought against the detainees. The lawyers stressed that the activists were intercepted in international waters off the coast of Crete, more than a thousand kilometers from the Gaza Strip, raising major questions about the jurisdiction of the Israeli judiciary to prosecute foreign nationals who were abducted outside its territorial jurisdiction.

Regarding the detention conditions, the 'Adalah' Center revealed that the activists were subjected to harsh and inhumane treatment inside the occupation's cells, including complete solitary confinement and exposure to strong, continuous lighting around the clock to prevent them from sleeping. Human rights reports also stated that the detainees are handcuffed and blindfolded during transfers and even during medical examinations, which constitutes a blatant violation of international conventions concerning prisoners' rights.

In protest of these arbitrary practices, de Avila and Abu Kishk have been on an open hunger strike since April 30, consuming only water to express their rejection of the illegal detention. In response, the occupation authorities attempted to justify their actions with claims about the activists' involvement in activities linked to hostile parties, allegations that the defense refuted entirely, describing them as an attempt to legitimize the piracy that occurred on the high seas.

On the international level, the incident sparked a wave of diplomatic condemnation, with the Spanish government describing the arrest of its citizens in international waters as an unacceptable and illegal act. In a related context, Italian authorities announced the opening of an official investigation into the circumstances of the incident, given that the interception and boarding operation targeted a boat flying the Italian flag, which gives the case international legal dimensions that may pursue the occupation in foreign judicial forums.

Adalah Center announced that it is in the process of appealing to the Central Court to challenge the decision to extend the detention, demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all activists who were detained during the humanitarian mission. Occupation forces carried out a large-scale piracy operation last week targeting 21 boats within the Freedom Flotilla, carrying approximately 175 activists of various nationalities seeking to break the naval blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip.

These developments come at a time when the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip is intensifying, having entered its seventeenth year, leaving unprecedented humanitarian disasters, especially in light of the ongoing war of extermination that has led to the displacement of millions. The movements of the Freedom Flotillas are considered a symbolic and practical attempt to highlight the suffering of the Strip's residents, but they always face violent military responses from the occupation authorities who seek to isolate Gaza from the outside world.

The continued detention of the activists falls under the pretext of completing the investigation without any legal basis or formal charges being brought against them to date.

While the world is preoccupied with the repercussions of the war on Iran, whose embers still glow beneath the ashes, settlers are busy accelerating the pace of their plans according to the "Decisive Plan," which they practice daily through acts of killing, intimidation, land confiscation, and burning of property. Through these actions, they aim to displace people from their land after turning it into uninhabitable areas.The international silence on these crimes fuels them and encourages the commission of more.The young martyr Nayef Samaro is not the first, and will not be the last, in the series of killings perpetrated by terrorists, confident in their ability to escape punishment.The savagery of the settlers calls for urgent international intervention that goes beyond crosswords and the rhetoric of expressing concern, which whets the appetite of the killers more than it deters them and curbs the ferocity of their savagery.

The recent Fleet of Steadfastness, composed of dozens of ships and hundreds of foreign solidarity activists, came as an expression of the will of free peoples in confronting the barbarism and genocide practiced by the occupation army against our people in the Gaza Strip after October 7, 2023. The International Court of Justice described the occupation's practices as genocide and also included the war of starvation within its scope. The International Criminal Court considered that the occupying state practices war crimes and crimes against humanity, and has issued two arrest warrants against both Netanyahu and Gallant, who have become wanted by international justice. The International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion in June 2024, considered the occupation's practices from 1967 until the moment the decision was issued as illegal, and the occupation was described as military and settlement-based, practicing racial discrimination, and in October 2025, the crime of genocide was added. Many international human rights and humanitarian organizations have issued numerous statements and positions confirming the involvement of the occupying state in the crime of genocide. This was due to the role of human rights organizations and civil society, which exposed the occupation's practices and carried out distinguished professional work through documentation, filing cases, media activism, and using pressure and influence on members of parliaments and governments in many countries around the world. The role of human rights organizations has been strengthened through international popular solidarity forces composed of a wide spectrum of non-governmental, human rights, trade union, political, and media organizations. These components, including the student movement, especially in American universities, played a distinguished role in strengthening the Palestinian national narrative and dismantling the Zionist and racist narrative. The interception of many blockade-breaking ship campaigns through piracy by the occupation navy, and the arrest and abuse of some activists, did not deter other fighters from trying again and again with the aim of breaking the blockade and exposing the occupation's practices to public opinion as hostile to democracy and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and imposing collective punishment on them. The recent Fleet of Steadfastness, which was intercepted by the occupation's naval warships near the Greek coasts, is distinguished by the fact that it came at a time when the media is preoccupied with the American and Israeli war on Iran and the Israeli war on Lebanon, in an attempt to exploit the media preoccupation to complete the liquidation of the Palestinian issue through the continued siege and aggression on Gaza, and the continuation of settlement accompanied by settler attacks in the West Bank. The violent reaction by the occupation's naval warships against the Fleet of Steadfastness by storming the ships, assaulting solidarity activists, arresting some of them, and interrogating them reflects the occupying state's concern about this qualitative and distinguished movement, which included activists, diplomats, journalists, members of parliament, trade unionists, and others. The occupying state has shown not only that it does not care about international law, but also that it does not care about the reactions of the countries from which these activists came, which are influential and weighty countries in international relations, which reflects the extent of the isolation experienced by the occupying state as a rogue state that systematically and organizedly bypasses the human rights system. The occupation's aggression against the Fleet of Steadfastness should push the countries of the world to impose measures of boycott, sanctions, and divestment on the occupying state, which has become a threat to the global human rights and humanitarian system, and not only to the Palestinian people. The hesitation to cancel the European partnership agreement with the occupying state and stop military and trade relations, in addition to the continued unlimited American support, encourage the occupying state to continue committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Palestinian people and the peoples of the region. It has become necessary to build on the achievement made by the activists of the Fleet of Steadfastness by continuing to expose the falsity of the Zionist narrative and contributing to its international isolation. The activity of international popular solidarity forces with the cause of our people is a crucial and pivotal factor towards stopping all attempts by the American administration aimed at undermining the role of international justice, by threatening judges and the High Commissioner for Human Rights because of their principled and moral positions condemning the occupation's crimes and championing the rights of our people by ensuring their right to self-determination in accordance with international law. The implementation of accountability mechanisms is one of the important axes in which human rights organizations succeeded in exposing the racism and fascism of the occupation, and in turn strengthened the justice of our people's cause. All greetings to the activists of the Fleet of Steadfastness who set an example in sacrifice and struggle for the values of freedom and dignity expressed by our people through their steadfastness, sacrifices, and continuous struggle.

At a highly sensitive time, the announcement of the "National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip" as a temporary professional framework reflects an attempt to reorder priorities in a pressing humanitarian reality, where relief and the restoration of services take precedence over other political and conflict issues. The statement issued by the committee sets clear determinants for its role; it is, according to its description, not a political or representative entity, but rather an executive tool of a technocratic nature. However, this proposal, despite its apparent validity, cannot be separated from the broader political context, nor from the moment it was imposed as an available option. The proposal of a "professional administration" model in the Palestinian case does not come from a vacuum, but is often a response to a dual pressure: internal, resulting from the inability of the divided political system, and external, directly related to donor calculations and post-war arrangements. From this perspective, the committee not only represents an attempt to improve administration but also reflects a search for an "internationally acceptable" formula for managing a transitional phase without clear political resolution. The repeated emphasis on "neutrality" and "non-factional representation" reveals as much as it reassures; for neutrality in an environment saturated with polarization is not a self-existent state, but a position that is challenged by all parties. Consequently, the committee will find itself, sooner or later, in the heart of contention, even if it tries to remain outside it. Furthermore, linking its success to the trust of citizens and the cooperation of national forces places it before a complex test; because these factors are not technical but eminently political. No trust is built without tangible results, and no cooperation is achieved without political cover or understanding, even if undeclared. More importantly, limiting the committee's role to relief and services, despite its necessity, may turn into a double-edged sword: it gives it an opportunity for rapid achievement, but at the same time, it may be used as an entry point to manage the existing reality instead of changing it, i.e., indirectly entrenching the division under the guise of "professional administration." In this context, the technocrat committee cannot be viewed as a completely neutral solution, but rather as a political option managed by non-political tools. It is an attempt to circumvent the impasse through administration, not to fundamentally dismantle it. Therefore, the closest assessment to reality is that the committee's success – if achieved – will be a limited functional success, alleviating the severity of the humanitarian crisis, but it will not address its political roots. As for its failure, it will not be merely an administrative setback, but will be additional evidence that managing division cannot be a substitute for ending it.

Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad: The repetition of Israeli claims regarding Hamas's readiness for a new round of fighting is used as a pretext to push for field movements in search of a political "victory". Talal Awkal: What is happening reflects an Israeli insistence on military decisive action and disregard for political paths, which portends further escalation and deterioration in Gaza in the coming period. Hani Abu Al-Siba': Changes within the leadership of the Hamas movement, including the return of Meshaal, may reflect a tendency towards addressing the sector's crises through the political path. Dr. Aql Salah: These mobilizations do not mean the imminent outbreak of a comprehensive war, but rather their use as a deterrent and a means of pressure while maintaining military readiness for broader scenarios. Majed Hudaib: The method of announcing the mobilization and marketing it as part of a psychological war targeting the people of the sector and Hamas aims to create a state of confusion and internal division. Sari Sammour: The nature of American intervention will determine the form of escalation, whether it is a widespread war that may reach the level of genocide or merely tactical strikes and military maneuvers. Ramallah - Exclusive to "Al-Quds" - With the Israeli occupation moving to deploy six military divisions around the Gaza Strip, in a step that reflects unprecedented field preparations, fears are escalating about the possibility of the aggression expanding into a comprehensive war and the return of a comprehensive war of extermination on the Strip, and perhaps a return to displacement scenarios and the occupation of the Strip, which constitutes another suffering for the residents. According to writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors, in separate interviews with "Al-Quds", this mobilization comes in parallel with a hardline political and media discourse that promotes the possibilities of confrontation, which reinforces the impression that the coming period may witness a shift in the nature of military operations since the ceasefire agreement came into effect in October 2025, which is already witnessing daily violations. These reinforcements, according to writers, analysts, specialists, and university professors, were accompanied by strict field measures, including expanding the scope of control over the land, tightening the siege, reducing the flow of humanitarian aid, in addition to disrupting any international arrangements for managing the sector, which indicates a trend towards imposing a new reality through military tools and multi-level pressures, beyond mere defensive preparations. On the other hand, they believe that these mobilizations may be linked to internal political calculations led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in an effort to achieve electoral, political, and security gains. They point out that between scenarios of gradual escalation or limited operations, Gaza remains open to possibilities that portend complex field developments in the coming period. A serious trend towards resuming military operations. Writer and political analyst Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad believes that the escalating Israeli mobilization around the Gaza Strip reflects a serious trend towards resuming military operations, in light of a widespread incitement campaign led by the Israeli government, army, and media, in addition to some leaders of Israeli parties, who promote a narrative that the Hamas movement has regained its strength, is recruiting new elements, controls daily life, confiscates aid, and refuses to hand over weapons. Awad explains that this incitement is accompanied by dangerous field steps, including the so-called demarcation of the "Orange Line", which expands the scope of Israeli control beyond the "Yellow Line", meaning the occupation of more than 60% of the Gaza Strip. Awad points out that Israel announced the prevention of the "Stability Force" and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza from entering the Strip, in the context of dedicating full control over various aspects of life. Israel effectively controls Gaza. Awad clarifies that Israel effectively controls all humanitarian and living aspects in Gaza, starting from closing crossings and restricting the movement of individuals, to sharply reducing the entry of aid, as the number of trucks decreased from about 600 to less than 50 trucks, which reflects a systematic policy of tightening. Awad confirms that the repetition of Israeli claims regarding Hamas's readiness for a new round of fighting is used as a pretext to push the military establishment towards field movements, in search of a political "victory", especially in light of internal pressures on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faces criticism for not achieving a tangible achievement in Gaza, with Hamas remaining a key player in the administration of the Strip. Awad suggests that any upcoming escalation may not be like previous wars, but rather may take the form of "selective strikes" or rapid operations, considering that this mobilization involves great risks and open possibilities for widespread escalation. Attempts to achieve victory before the upcoming elections. Awad points out that Israeli goals go beyond the military dimension, to include the pursuit of a "victory" before the upcoming elections, and the consideration of re-establishing settlements in Gaza, in addition to economic and investment interests related to trade corridors and regional projects in which Gaza may be a pivotal part. Awad believes that Israel also seeks to separate Gaza from the West Bank, and prevent the internationalization of the issue, by keeping the Strip under its direct control and turning it into an internal matter, warning that these indicators may portend difficult days ahead, in light of plans that may include the displacement of residents and the re-imposition of full control over the Strip. The war that did not stop on Gaza. Writer and political analyst Talal Awkal confirms that Israel did not stop its war on the Gaza Strip, but rather continued its policies aimed at thwarting the so-called "Trump plan", and disrupting the implementation of the requirements of its first phase, despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's earlier announcement of approval. Awkal explains that Netanyahu's approval of the plan was merely a tactical step, as it was clear that he was betting on its failure, and was working to undermine any path that might limit Israel's freedom of action within the Strip. Awkal points out that Netanyahu adheres to the policy of "permanent war" as a fixed approach, in an attempt to achieve a military victory that he has not been able to achieve on any of the fronts he has moved between in the past period. Awkal believes that in light of the relative calm on other fronts, Netanyahu seeks to escalate the situation in Gaza, by gradually increasing the pace of operations, starting from assassinations and tightening the siege, leading to a stage that may approach a "war of extermination". Awkal points out that the Israeli government announced that the mission of disarming Hamas and eliminating it will be entrusted to the Israeli army, confirming the trend towards military decisive action. Awkal clarifies that Israel refused to allow the entry of the National Committee concerned with the administration of Gaza, as well as representatives of the peacekeeping forces, in a step aimed at blocking any international or regional arrangements that might restrict its movements or impose obligations on it within the framework of the proposed plan. He points out that although some estimates believe that Netanyahu is exploiting the preoccupation of the United States and mediators with developments in the Gulf region, the matter goes beyond that to "American complicity", which allows Israel to move freely in the Strip without actual restrictions. Awkal confirms that this path indicates that escalation is imminent, and that the ultimate goal is to impose full control over the Gaza Strip, considering this the "only victory" that Netanyahu can market internally. He warns that achieving this goal would undermine any political horizon related to the establishment of a Palestinian state, pointing out that this trend constitutes a central goal for various segments of the Israeli political scene. Awkal believes that the continuation of these policies reflects an Israeli insistence on resolving the conflict militarily, while ignoring political paths, which portends further escalation and deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in the Gaza Strip in the coming period. Activating "Order 8". Writer, political analyst, and specialist in Israeli affairs Hani Abu Al-Siba' believes that there are a number of field and political indicators that suggest the approaching return of fighting in the Gaza Strip, in light of escalating demands within the Israeli military establishment to resume operations, and several sessions held within the "Cabinet" to discuss this option. He explains that among the most prominent of these indicators is what Hebrew news websites reported about the re-activation of "Order 8" for calling up reserve forces, in addition to calls launched by the Israeli Minister of Settlement to begin establishing new settlements within the Strip, in a step that reflects a strategic trend that goes beyond mere military operations to reshaping the geographical and political reality in Gaza. Abu Al-Siba' points out that the Hebrew media recently returned to talking about the "growing strength of the resistance", claiming that it succeeded in recruiting thousands of elements and rebuilding part of the tunnel network, despite the Israeli army's control over about 59% of the Strip, and the continued tight siege imposed on it. Attempt to cut off "oxygen" from the resistance. Abu Al-Siba' points out that the resistance's recent response on May 2nd, in which it refused to hand over its weapons in exchange for reconstruction and postponing this file until the final solution, was considered by Israel a violation of the truce agreement and a justification for returning to fighting, especially in light of hardline positions within the government, where both Ben Gvir and Smotrich expressed their rejection of the truce, considering that it gives "oxygen" to the resistance. Abu Al-Siba' points out that there are estimates that the changes within the leadership of the Hamas movement, including the return of Khaled Meshaal, known for his political diplomacy, to the presidency of the movement, may reflect a tendency towards addressing the sector's crises through the political path, which is supported by the statements of the movement's spokesman Hazem Qassem, who confirmed that the resistance will not repeat the experience of 1982 in Lebanon, when weapons were handed over and the camps were later subjected to massacres. Abu Al-Siba' confirms that the possibilities of resuming the war remain, and even represent a desire for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but regional developments, most notably the possibility of renewed confrontation with Iran, may lead to a postponement of this scenario. Attempts to erase the repercussions of October 7th. Abu Al-Siba' points out that the sector, after the cessation of rocket fire for more than half a year, and the continued siege from various sides, no longer poses a direct threat, but the Israeli right-wing government believes that the repercussions of October 7, 2023, cannot be erased except through a new escalation, which may take the form of widespread military operations that bring more destruction and losses. Mobilization as a psychological warfare tool. Writer, political researcher, and professor of comparative political systems Dr. Aql Salah emphasizes that the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip has not actually stopped, but has taken different forms and tools, pointing to the continued shelling, assassinations, and targeting of police stations and patrols, in addition to carrying out special operations, and the presence of "cooperating militias" that carry out field missions with the support and protection of Israeli aircraft. Salah explains that the escalating Israeli military mobilization around the Strip represents a psychological warfare tool, aimed at exerting military pressure to obtain political concessions from the Hamas movement, especially in the file of disarming the resistance, a goal that Israel failed to achieve during the war. Salah points out that these mobilizations seek to push the Hamas movement to accept American-Israeli conditions, with the threat that all options, including military escalation, remain open in case of rejection. Weakening the capabilities of the resistance. Salah points out that these mobilizations may be used to carry out a multi-pronged attack simultaneously, with the aim of weakening the capabilities of the resistance, in parallel with supporting cooperating militias to carry out assassinations within the areas controlled by Hamas, to avoid the risks of occupation forces being captured or directly targeted in areas of resistance influence. Salah explains that these mobilizations carry a dual message; the first is directed at Israeli society to show the army's readiness to wage a new war despite its involvement on other fronts, and the second is directed at the international community to prepare it for the possibility of the war continuing or escalating. Salah points out that these mobilizations do not necessarily mean the imminent outbreak of a comprehensive war, but can be used as a deterrent and a means of pressure while maintaining military readiness for broader scenarios. Salah links these mobilizations to internal Israeli political calculations, especially with the approaching elections, considering that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to achieve tangible achievements, in light of his declining popularity after failures on other fronts such as Lebanon and Iran. An attempt to boost political capital. Salah points out that the move towards Gaza, as the weakest front, may constitute an attempt to boost political capital, in addition to maintaining the cohesion of the right-wing coalition, including figures such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir. Regarding the expected scenarios, Salah believes that the most likely scenario is Hamas's rejection of the demand for disarmament, due to its political and national dimensions, which will push Israel to carry out limited and calculated ground military operations, aimed at increasing pressure through temporary incursions, supported by intensive air and artillery strikes targeting a "target bank" that has been updated after the current truce period. Improving negotiation terms. Salah clarifies that this pattern of operations aims to improve negotiation terms and impose new security arrangements, considering that military mobilization constitutes a central "pressure card", and a real test of Hamas's ability to withstand politically and militarily. Salah confirms that the continuation of this approach means that the cycle of escalation remains open, considering that the only solution lies in ending the occupation and recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people, and reaching a long-term truce, otherwise the region will remain vulnerable to repeated waves of escalation, in light of Israel's reliance on the "big stick" and hardline political discourse to achieve its goals without sliding into a comprehensive war at the present stage. The possibility of preparing for a long-term war. Writer and political analyst Majed Hudaib believes that the recent Israeli military mobilization cannot be considered a routine measure, but rather represents a multi-dimensional strategic signal, involving military, political, and psychological messages. Hudaib explains that the military significance of this mobilization may reflect actual readiness to carry out a ground invasion of the Strip, or a shift in Israeli doctrine from managing the conflict with the Hamas movement to an attempt to resolve it and end its existence, in addition to the possibility of preparing for a long-term war that may extend beyond the electoral deadlines within Israel. Hudaib points out that this mobilization sends messages to three main parties; first, the Hamas movement, as part of pressuring it during the ongoing negotiations, second, the Israeli public, to show that the army still retains its deterrent capability and has not been affected by what is being raised about failures, and third, what is known as the axis of resistance, as a sign of Israel's readiness to engage in confrontations on several fronts, in an attempt to consolidate the image of the "invincible army". Psychological warfare targeting the people of Gaza and Hamas. Hudaib points out that the media and psychological dimension constitutes an important pillar in this mobilization, as the method of announcing and marketing it falls within the framework of psychological warfare targeting the people of the Gaza Strip and the Hamas movement alike, with the aim of creating a state of confusion and perhaps internal division, whether at the popular level or within the structure of the movement, especially in light of growing voices criticizing the continuation of the war and questioning its feasibility. Military readiness. Hudaib proposes three main paths regarding the possible scenarios, the first is the "pressure scenario", where Israel keeps its forces on standby while carrying out limited air strikes or qualitative operations, with the aim of achieving political or security gains without sliding into a comprehensive war, especially in light of its awareness of the complexities after any ground invasion of costly political implications, as well as international reservations, especially from the United States, in light of the continued proposal of the "Trump plan". The possibility of carrying out a limited military operation. As for the second scenario, according to Hudaib, it involves carrying out a limited military operation, including localized ground incursions in some areas, met by withdrawal from other areas, with continued air strikes, assassinations, and targeting of facilities that Israel considers a potential threat. This scenario, according to Hudaib, aims to restore deterrence, especially in light of Israel's belief that Hamas is trying to reorganize its ranks and strengthen its control over the vital aspects of life in the Strip. The possibility of a comprehensive war breaking out. Hudaib points to the third scenario, which is the most dangerous, and remains linked to the possibility of a comprehensive war leading to a complete occupation of the Gaza Strip, but Hudaib rules out this option at the current stage, suggesting that it will only materialize if negotiations completely collapse, the role of mediators declines, and the level of internal pressure in Israel rises, in addition to a significant field escalation. Hudaib points out that the current field indicators do not support the hypothesis of moving towards a comprehensive war, explaining that the absence of measures such as evacuating settlements in the Gaza envelope, or a widespread call-up of reserve forces, or operating field hospitals, indicates that matters are still within control, which reinforces the likelihood of the "pressure without war" scenario as the closest option at the current stage. The return of war depends on the American position. Writer and political analyst Sari Sammour believes that the continuous Israeli threats towards the Gaza Strip, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu along with political and military leaders, come in the context of an attempt to impose what is called "disarmament", pointing out that what Israel failed to achieve on the ground it seeks to impose through negotiations, and with the failure of that, it returns to threatening to resume aggression, "which has not actually stopped". Sammour explains that the issue of launching a large-scale military campaign on Gaza remains dependent on the decision of the American administration, wondering whether it will give Israel the green light for a comprehensive invasion or be content with allowing limited operations. Sammour points out that the nature of American intervention will determine the form of escalation, whether it is a widespread war that may reach the level of genocide as happened previously, or merely tactical strikes and military maneuvers. Moving to the second phase without implementing the requirements of the first. Sammour points to several possible scenarios, including the possibility that the current threats are a pressure tool at the negotiating table to push the Palestinian side to accept Israeli conditions and move to the second phase without implementing the requirements of the first phase, and in line with what is known as the "Trump plan". Sammour points to the possibility of expanding Israeli military operations, based on statements by Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir about the expectation of a multi-front war breaking out in 2026, including Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria, in addition to the West Bank. Sammour also proposed a third scenario, which is that the United States controls the pace of escalation, by preventing a comprehensive war and contenting itself with intensifying assassinations and increasing their pace for a limited period, despite the devastating effects it may have on the population in the Gaza Strip. The field may hold surprises. Regarding the resistance's ability to confront, Sammour believes that the picture is still unclear, stressing that the field often holds surprises. Sammour emphasizes that Israel has consistently targeted civilians, especially displaced persons in harsh humanitarian conditions, with a severe shortage of water and food, which makes any new escalation have a high human cost. Sammour points out that the Israeli assessment is based on the world's preoccupation with other issues, especially with Iran, which may reduce international pressure on any new military operation in Gaza. Sammour rules out that the resistance will make fundamental concessions, due to the lack of real guarantees, especially since Israel "always looks for pretexts to continue aggression". Sammour believes that the escalation may remain limited if other fronts witness dramatic developments, such as the expansion of confrontation with Iran or Lebanon, which may push Israel to redistribute its forces and focus on other fronts, while keeping pressure on Gaza within certain limits.

The destruction in Gaza, the economic war and violent barbaric attacks in the West Bank, and the broader shifts in the international system, including the ongoing regional war in the Middle East, have led to a profound regional reshaping that necessitates a serious review of the Palestinian national project. The ongoing war in the Middle East is likely to lead to further changes in the balance of power and alliances, and as a result, Palestine may no longer remain at the center of regional political attention as it once was, given the emergence of many competing priorities.The Palestinian leadership must recognize that a passive approach or gradual partial changes based on a fragile consensus are no longer viable. There is a real risk of the Palestinian national project being further marginalized, and perhaps even forgotten, during the upcoming wave of regional reshaping.This paper proposes a framework for repositioning the Palestinian issue at this difficult stage, and re-highlighting it through a process aimed at renewing the Palestinian governance system, thereby rebuilding trust in the leadership among citizens and regional and international partners alike. This framework aims to better serve the Palestinian people, restore credibility, and lay the groundwork for achieving genuine self-determination.The proposed framework is based on axes of political, financial, and administrative reform, and reform of governance and law that promotes decentralization and economic transformation. The proposal also calls for the reform of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian National Council, the launch of a comprehensive national dialogue involving all components of Palestinian society, and a return to elections, leading to the establishment of a modern state system that represents the Palestinian people and effectively responds to their needs.IntroductionThe destruction in Gaza, the escalating international recognition of the State of Palestine, and shifts in regional policies have all necessitated a re-evaluation of long-established national assumptions. The international community is increasingly demanding a unified Palestinian leadership and a credible reform plan, and more importantly, Palestinians themselves are demanding change after long years of political stagnation, internal division, economic suffering, and a growing sense of isolation.Recent proposals from the United States, Europe, and key Arab countries point in one direction: the reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single legitimate Palestinian government, but only after serious and credible reforms are implemented. These proposals also speak of a path that could lead to the achievement of Palestinian self-determination after a series of reforms.This moment represents a rare opportunity for genuine renewal for Palestinians if it is handled with national awareness guided by unity, clarity, and a sense of urgent need for change. Waiting is no longer a viable option.Governance ContextThe Palestinian Authority was established in 1993 as a temporary arrangement that was supposed to last only three years, paving the way for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Three decades later, the state has not been realized, and Palestinians continue to live under Israeli occupation within limited self-rule.The Palestinian political and legal structure consists of three overlapping institutions: the Palestine Liberation Organization, the State of Palestine, and the Palestinian National Authority. These entities share leadership, budgets, and institutions with a lack of clarity in the boundaries between them, which has weakened governance, reduced accountability, created confusion in responsibilities and decision-making, and burdened the general budget.No general Palestinian elections have been held since 2006, and citizens' trust in the leadership and public institutions has significantly eroded. In addition, many senior government and security positions have been filled based on political loyalty rather than professional competence, leading to an inflated government apparatus and increased pressure on an already fragile economy.Salaries for essential workers such as teachers, doctors, nurses, and police officers have also been paid partially and irregularly for years, leading to a sharp deterioration in the quality and regularity of public services and a further loss of trust in institutions.Citizens increasingly feel that the political system no longer works for them, and that they are distant from the political leadership and unable to influence decisions that affect their lives, which necessarily means that the demand for change comes from the street, not just from outside.Why is Renewal Important? And Why Now?Renewal is necessary and urgent for two main reasons; the first is internal, as the Palestinian people have lost trust in their institutions, and a government that does not enjoy the trust of its people cannot lead a national project or effectively negotiate for its future. The second reason is practical, as any attempt to reunite Gaza and the West Bank requires a modern, transparent, and reliable Palestinian governance system capable of managing security, reconstruction, and providing essential services. This need has been emphasized in recent international discussions, including Security Council Resolution 2803 on Gaza.Renewal is not a luxury, but a condition for survival. Without it, the Palestinian national project will face a risk of further marginalization at a moment characterized by great suffering and profound regional transformations.Guiding Principles for the Renewal ProgramAny renewal program must be based on clear and practical principles that protect the public interest and promote national unity. Renewal should be Palestinian-led, focusing on national priorities, with broad popular support, and be inclusive and participatory, involving political parties, civil society, the private sector, women, and youth.Any renewal program must revive democratic life through free and fair elections, an independent and impartial judiciary, a free media, and respect for freedom of expression, while rebuilding trust in institutions through transparency and accountability.In addition, the renewal program must put the state on a path to financial stability, by paying salaries in full and on time, improving the quality of services, and expanding economic opportunities, especially for youth and women.Renewal FrameworkThe vision is to transition from a complex system influenced by political factions to a modern state system based on democracy, the rule of law, accountability, and professional competence.The Palestine Liberation Organization will remain the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but it will not be part of the state structure and will not be funded by the government budget, while public administration and governance will become the exclusive responsibility of state institutions.This is accompanied by the necessity of agreeing on the features of renewal through a comprehensive national dialogue, supported by the United Nations, and based on international best practices.Implementation Path: Comprehensive National DialogueThe comprehensive national dialogue includes all political parties, civil society, the private sector, women, youth, academics, and representatives of various segments of society. The United Nations can be utilized to support this process and ensure integrity and credibility. International expertise can also be drawn upon and benefited from through representatives of governments that have undergone similar experiences monitoring the process or providing prior technical training to those involved in the national dialogue.These dialogues typically last from three to six months, leading to a one-year implementation plan, starting with the drafting of a new constitution and ending with national elections.Reform Axes1. Political Reform and Governance System ReformThe Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, will, according to the proposal, undergo a reform process agreed upon within the framework of the national dialogue. Among the fundamental issues that should be discussed in this dialogue is the question of maintaining the presidential system or transitioning to a parliamentary system.Essentially, there must be a return to local, legislative, and presidential elections, and efforts must be made to hold them within one year of the completion of the dialogue and the adoption of a new constitution. Election dates must also be fixed in law and protected from political interference, and election day declared a national holiday to promote popular participation.Political parties wishing to participate will also have to commit to three basic principles: the existence of a single government with a unified security authority under the authority of the state; the rejection of all forms of violence; and respect for all previous agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization.2. Reform of Relations Between Levels of GovernmentThe government must be brought closer to citizens by empowering local authorities to assume greater responsibilities in providing services, including education, civil police, social services, and traffic management.To achieve this, local authorities should be empowered to access sufficient financial resources, including local taxes and a specific share of national revenues such as value-added tax. The distribution of powers and revenues is determined through national dialogue, based on careful analysis and international experiences.3. Financial ReformThe current financial model is unsustainable, as salaries, allowances, and pensions consume the largest part of the budget. International comparisons indicate that the wage bill in the Palestinian case far exceeds what is expected for an economy of this size, requiring reform to focus on reducing excessive spending, especially in the security sector, where overlapping structures and inflated ranks have led to significant financial burdens. In addition, pension and wage reforms should continue in accordance with existing commitments, including the 2024 program with the European Commission.It is also important for financial reform to separate the budgets of the Palestine Liberation Organization and political parties from the government budget, which is funded by Palestinian taxpayers' money.In addition, the Paris Protocol, which regulates tax arrangements with Israel, requires a comprehensive review, as the existing system allows for repeated withholding of Palestinian revenues without a fair and clear mechanism for dispute resolution, creating a chronic state of financial instability.4. Administrative Reform and Public Sector ReformThe public sector must become more efficient, professional, and accountable. This requires a clear separation between political leadership and administrative functions, meaning that most institutions should operate within a unified and clear government structure.Civil service structures must also be streamlined, so that appointments and promotions are based on competence and performance, not on personal connections or party affiliations. The leadership of the General Personnel Council should be entrusted to a distinguished and non-political professional.5. Legal Reform and FreedomsReform must strengthen the independence of the judiciary and ensure full protection of public freedoms, including freedom of expression, the press, and peaceful assembly. In addition, digital media and civil society organizations must be protected and enabled to operate freely within a clear legal framework. Many of these reforms are already stipulated in agreements with international partners and must be completed within a specified timeframe.6. Economic TransformationA modern economy cannot develop without greater control over borders, the tax system, and access to land and resources, especially in Area (C) of the West Bank. Therefore, there must be a political path that leads the process of gaining full control over crossings and borders in parallel with the economic development process.The private sector must lead the economic growth process, while the government's role is limited to providing an enabling environment, including investment in infrastructure, energy, water, communications, and vocational training, as well as adopting policies attractive to local and international investment.7. Human DevelopmentThe education, health, and social protection sectors form essential pillars in state-building. Education reform should focus on promoting science, technology, and critical thinking, while preserving national identity and Palestinian history. Schools require improved infrastructure, and teachers need continuous professional development. Higher education can be strengthened by merging institutions into fewer, more powerful ones, with a greater focus on scientific research and national priorities.Health sector reform should aim to establish a unified national health insurance system covering all citizens through public and private sector service providers, with the possibility for private insurance companies and private health service providers to complement this system to enhance quality and expand options.Regarding social protection, it must be unified within a single national system characterized by transparency and fairness, based on clear eligibility criteria, so that support is directed to families according to their needs within a coherent national framework.Expected BenefitsThis proposal contributes to restoring the legitimacy of Palestinian institutions and strengthening trust between citizens and the government. It also enhances the credibility of the Palestinian Authority before international partners and will lead to increased political and financial support. It can also contribute to the reintegration of the Gaza Strip within the framework of Palestinian governance and improve economic and social conditions in the medium term.ConclusionNext month, the Fatah movement will hold its Eighth General Conference. As the largest political force in Palestine and the most prominent actor in the governance system, it is the only entity capable of bringing about real change and preserving the Palestinian national project. Despite the decline in trust among Palestinians in the Fatah movement and the lack of transparency, accountability, power transfer, and democracy that its governance has caused, Fatah, as a political and social movement, is capable of creating a situation that brings together all segments of the Palestinian people, due to its intellectual centrism and ability to be open.History will record whether Fatah, which led the national movement for decades, will rise again to steer the Palestinian ship to safety in one of the most turbulent and difficult periods in our history, or whether it will choose to isolate itself from reality and the people and fail, allowing history to write that Fatah was at the helm when the storm swept the ship and sank it.The responsibility today rests with the leadership of Fatah and all those participating in this conference to place the national interest above all else, and to demonstrate the courage and integrity demanded by this moment, which our great Palestinian people deserve.* Former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation

Every Wednesday, the election season in Israel always starts early and heatedly. There are still six months until the legislative elections for the Knesset, but the political arena is witnessing intense activity between alliances and defections left and right. Perhaps this is what distinguishes the Israeli political system, where instability reigns supreme. For example, throughout the short history of the Hebrew state, no party has been able to win an absolute majority (61 out of 120 seats) in the Knesset to form a stable government, as the structure of their electoral system allows for a wide scope for the formation of small parties and obtaining seats in the Knesset, which facilitates repeated divisions within a single party. Consequently, the issue of forming a government is almost impossible without forming coalitions with small parties, and at the same time, it makes the collapse of the government very likely when there is a disagreement over any small point. And because the obsession with overthrowing Benjamin Netanyahu has been the primary goal of opposition leaders in Israel for a decade until today, there are no clear ideological differences or even alternatives to political and security plans. The most prominent and powerful event on the scene is the alliance that occurred between the two poles of the opposition, Naftali Bennett, the former Israeli Prime Minister, and Yair Lapid, to form a single party called "Together." This is not new between the two men. It happened previously in 2022 when Bennett formed the Israeli government, which included a strange and contradictory mix of different political rivals in everything except one goal, which is the same reason for the current alliance: overthrowing Benjamin Netanyahu. This government carried the reasons for its failure from day one due to the fundamental ideological contradictions between its poles. The strange thing is that the most prominent reason for its fall was the withdrawal of members of Bennett's own party and their joining the opposition with Netanyahu. What is new this time is the increasing pragmatism of "Naftali Bennett," as it seems clear that the two years he spent away from politics, he thoroughly studied how to avoid falling again before his old boss and ally, Netanyahu. Bennett knows very well that it is not easy to defeat a fox like Netanyahu, who has managed to engrave his name among the most important Zionist leaders of all time. His political history is equivalent to a quarter of Israel's history since its ill-fated establishment. Netanyahu has created a political situation in Israeli society where more people reject him than accept him, but everyone finds no alternative to him. He is the elitist, populist leader obsessed with the media, who addresses the Jewish psyche among both left and right audiences, and knows how to manipulate the strings that touch the Jewish subconscious and the set of complexes it carries, based on the principle of elevating the risks to preserve the throne. Bennett is trying to close the gaps before the fox Netanyahu and woo voters from various directions. He announced four main pillars that he will implement immediately upon successfully forming the next government: First: The government is right-wing Zionist, and therefore will not include Arabs from within because they are not Zionists. Second: Restructuring the Israeli political system so that the term of office of the prime minister is limited to eight years or two terms at most, to win the votes of those who do not want Netanyahu, the longest-serving in the short history of the state. Third: Forming an investigation committee into the events of October 7. This is the weapon he relies on to end Netanyahu's political life, as there is a belief that the current government led by Netanyahu is trying to obscure the facts and avoid the cost of political questions about the security failures in the events of October 7, and that postponing the investigation means never investigating. Fourth: The issue of conscription: This is the complex issue that ignites the internal crisis and causes a division in Israeli society, revolving between the religious parties "Haredim" on one hand and the rest of the societal segments on the other. The former rejects conscription and military service on the basis of the necessity of dividing burdens, as those who study the Torah and pray for the Jews and for the victory of Israel - from their point of view - should not bear an additional burden and fight, while the rest believe that this is an evasion of military service that leads to exhausting reserve soldiers and doubling the pressure on them and exposing them to danger on the inflamed fronts. Bennett wants to get the votes of soldiers and their families. He announced the principle of "giving for taking," meaning that anyone who evades service is not entitled to any financial privileges or government support from the state budget. He reinforced his vision religiously and cited texts from the Old Testament where the Prophet Moses ordered Torah students to participate in fighting. It is noteworthy that Netanyahu responded sarcastically to the Bennett/Lapid alliance with a slogan he raised: They did it once and they'll do it again, and the truth is that his unspoken words are: They failed once and they will fail again. Netanyahu is playing his game again. He wants to confine the elections between two teams: a national right led by him and a treacherous left led by Bennett.

Prominent Brazilian activist Thiago Avila has lost his mother, while he remains missing behind the bars of Israeli occupation prisons, following his arrest as part of a campaign targeting solidarity activists in the Freedom Flotilla. The team managing Avila's social media accounts expressed their shock at this painful news, pointing to the extent of psychological suffering the activist will face when he learns of the news while in captivity. The team issued an urgent appeal to the international community to strengthen solidarity and demand the immediate release of Thiago and his colleague Saif Abu Kashk to enable them to bid farewell to their loved ones.

In the context of legal procedures, an occupation court decided on Tuesday to extend the detention of activists Avila and Abu Kashk until next Sunday, based on the request of the security services. The human rights center assigned to defend them stated that this extension comes within the framework of restricting international activists who tried to reach the Gaza Strip by sea. These measures face widespread criticism from human rights organizations that view the detention as targeting peaceful humanitarian work.

Occupation forces carried out a widespread arrest operation last Thursday, targeting about 175 activists of various nationalities, while they were on board the Freedom Flotilla ships. The flotilla, which consists of about 20 ships, aims to break the suffocating siege imposed on the Gaza Strip and deliver essential relief aid to the residents. These international popular movements come amid the continued strict restrictions imposed by the occupation authorities on the entry of basic and medical supplies into the besieged Strip.

It is worth noting that the operation to intercept the flotilla took place in international waters off the Greek island of Crete, hundreds of kilometers away from the occupied Palestinian coasts. This measure represents a significant escalation in the pursuit of international solidarity activists, as the arrests took place at a much further point compared to previous flotilla interception operations. Human rights demands continue for the need to protect activists and ensure their safety, while emphasizing their right to express their solidarity with the Palestinian cause and reject the illegal siege.

We can only imagine the extent of grief Thiago will feel when he learns of the death of his beloved mother; we rely on everyone's solidarity to strengthen the support network and demand his immediate release.

Official circles in Beirut are dealing with extreme caution and clear reservation regarding American proposals for a direct meeting between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These moves come amid escalating political and military pressures accompanying the stalled negotiations under Washington's sponsorship, with Lebanese fears of an explosion of internal divisions.

The US administration is pushing for accelerated political and security negotiations, but the Lebanese leadership believes that any early meeting, while military aggression continues and large areas in the south are occupied, would be political suicide. Informed sources confirm that prudence is currently the master of the situation to avoid giving the occupation diplomatic gains without tangible returns on the ground.

In this context, sources revealed that the US Ambassador to Beirut, Michel Issa, tried to promote the idea of a tripartite meeting bringing together Aoun and Netanyahu in the presence of President Donald Trump at the White House. This proposal aims to find a direct entry point for launching comprehensive negotiations, but the Lebanese response was conditional on ending aggressive military manifestations first.

The US Embassy had previously linked Lebanon's obtaining international guarantees for its full sovereignty to holding this direct meeting. The American side considered that such a meeting could open the door to final security and border arrangements, in addition to the flow of humanitarian aid and reconstruction funds with a direct guarantee from Washington.

For his part, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun quickly set a clear ceiling for these proposals during his political meetings at Baabda Palace, emphasizing that the top priority is to stop the aggressions. Aoun clarified that his country is proceeding with negotiations because there are no alternative options, but he stressed that the goal is complete withdrawal, the return of prisoners, and the establishment of stability.

Political observers believe that negotiations have not actually started yet, and what has happened so far is nothing more than preparatory sessions between ambassadors in Washington. Beirut fears that any ill-considered meeting could give Netanyahu a free political achievement that he has not been able to achieve through the military machine in the southern field.

Analyses indicate that the Lebanese state fears that rushing into summit meetings could lead to serious internal tensions that might open the door to security strife. Therefore, the government insists that any high-level meeting must be the culmination of successful negotiations that achieve a complete withdrawal, and not just a ceremonial photo serving external agendas.

Beirut also adheres in its diplomatic discourse to the Arab Peace Initiative approved at the Beirut Summit in 2002, which links normalization to a comprehensive withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. This commitment represents a bulwark against pressures trying to drag Lebanon into separate paths away from established national and patriotic principles.

In an attempt to find a diplomatic solution, proposals are currently being discussed to avoid a direct meeting by holding separate bilateral meetings between the Lebanese and Israeli presidents with the American president. This scenario aims to avoid embarrassing President Aoun internally and maintain the cohesion of the Lebanese political front while awaiting the maturation of initial security understandings.

On the technical front, preparations are underway for a third round of meetings at the level of Lebanese Ambassador Nada Hamadeh and Israeli Ambassador Yehiel Lit in the American capital. These rounds aim to establish a technical framework for direct negotiations at the level of military delegations, away from the pressing political spotlight that could hinder the process.

On the ground, occupation forces continue to violate the truce announced since mid-April, with ongoing bloody shelling and destruction of homes in border villages. This escalation on the ground further complicates the Lebanese position and makes the idea of sitting with Netanyahu unacceptable popularly and politically at present.

The Lebanese state finds itself facing difficult choices amid the imbalance of power and the massive destruction inflicted on infrastructure and civilians. Nevertheless, the primary bet remains on the ability of the Lebanese negotiator to extract a ceasefire without making political concessions that affect national sovereignty or legitimize the occupation.

On the other hand, Hezbollah's position is unequivocally against any form of direct negotiation, considering it a concession that benefits Tel Aviv. Despite this rejection, the party expresses support for diplomatic paths led by the state, provided they lead to an end to aggression and the implementation of clear agreements that preserve the country's dignity.

In conclusion, Lebanese authorities affirm that openness to negotiation does not in any way mean moving towards normalization, but rather it is a necessity to end the war. The Lebanese ceiling remains firm on the need to separate the technical security track from major political steps that require national consensus and regional conditions completely different from the current situation.

The timing is currently unsuitable for any meeting with Netanyahu before a security agreement is reached and Israeli aggressions against the country are stopped.

Foreign Policy magazine painted a bleak picture of the future of the Gaza Strip, describing the current situation as a complete political and security stalemate that threatens to keep the region in a state of permanent instability. The analysis published by writer John Haltiwanger indicated that the current US administration has so far failed to provide a clear vision to overcome the deadlock that followed the announcement of the fragile ceasefire, which has led the political process into a vicious cycle.

The article highlighted the escalating crisis facing the peace plan proposed by US President Donald Trump, especially after Hamas adhered to its position rejecting disarmament before the complete withdrawal of the Israeli occupation army from the Strip. This fundamental contradiction in visions led to a complete paralysis in the implementation of the 20-point American plan, which was announced last September, putting the Strip in a dangerous state of stagnation.

According to the analysis, the challenge of disarmament has become the main obstacle preventing any progress on the ground, as the movement controls parts of the Strip while the occupation continues its presence in other wide areas. The US administration appears to lack an alternative strategy to deal with this reality, especially with Washington's increasing preoccupation with other regional issues, most notably the escalation with Iran.

For his part, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed that the core of the agreement is primarily based on disarming Hamas, considering it the central issue for a solution. Despite Rubio's attempts to create an atmosphere of optimism by talking about promising indicators, the data on the ground indicate the exact opposite, as Hamas refuses to give up its weapons until the Israeli withdrawal phases are completed.

In contrast, the Israeli government adopts a rigid stance that rejects any military withdrawal before ensuring the complete disarmament of Palestinian factions, which creates a gap of distrust that is difficult to bridge. This stark contradiction in preconditions has made it impossible to move to advanced stages of settlement, leaving civilians in Gaza to pay the price of this ongoing political impasse.

Shira Efron, an official at the American Rand Corporation, reinforced this argument by describing the situation as moving one step forward and two steps back, pointing to the absence of genuine will among the concerned parties. Efron, who resides in Tel Aviv, believes that Israel, Hamas, and even the Palestinian Authority are not actually seeking the success of the plan as much as they are trying to avoid blame for failure and shift it to the other side.

The plan was supposed to enter its second phase last January, which includes the formation of an interim technocratic government and the actual start of extensive reconstruction operations. However, none of these goals have been implemented, as the government has not started its work and the reconstruction wheel has not begun, despite the implementation of some limited aspects of the first phase related to prisoner exchange.

With this paralysis continuing, international and UN warnings are escalating about the possibility of the fragile truce collapsing and fighting resuming more widely and fiercely. UN officials warn that failure to resolve the disarmament issue could lead to a renewed explosion of the situation, putting Gaza at a critical crossroads that threatens a renewal of comprehensive conflict at any moment.

The entire agreement depends on the disarmament of Hamas, but the reality on the ground contradicts American optimism in the absence of a clear strategy to overcome the stalemate.

Informed sources have revealed intensive political moves by Yasser Abbas, son of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, aimed at securing a seat for him in the senior leadership bodies of the Fatah movement. This step comes at a sensitive time for the Palestinian Authority, as a succession struggle looms with the approaching date of the movement's General Conference in Ramallah.

Yasser Abbas, 64, is expected to run for membership in Fatah's Central Committee, the highest leadership body in the movement, during the conference scheduled for mid-May. This conference is the first of its kind in nearly ten years, making it a pivotal moment in shaping the power map within the Palestinian political system.

Yasser Abbas, who for many years was known as a businessman managing huge investments in the tobacco and contracting sectors, has recently begun to appear publicly in an unofficial political capacity. He has been seen on several official occasions accompanying his father, including foreign visits that included meetings with international leaders such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

Sources reported that the President's son held a series of meetings in recent weeks with leaders of the security establishment in the West Bank, as well as representatives of the Prisoner's Club and influential forces in the Palestinian street. These meetings aim to rally the necessary support before the vote of approximately 2,500 conference members to elect the new leadership.

Reports indicate that President Mahmoud Abbas, who has turned 90, has begun to assign sensitive tasks to his son, most notably entrusting him last year with overseeing the Palestinian weapons file in Lebanese camps. Although Yasser has not previously held any official position in the Authority or the movement, his escalating influence has sparked widespread speculation about his preparation to succeed his father.

In contrast, these moves have been met with muted and public criticism from within Fatah circles, where opponents believe that promoting the President's son to the scene may deepen the crisis of trust between the street and the leadership. They warn that the absence of general elections since 2006 makes any change in leadership through appointment or inheritance popularly unacceptable.

Sabri Saidam, a current member of the Central Committee, commented on these reports by indicating that the movement's internal regulations allow any member who meets the conditions to run. Saidam expressed hope that the upcoming conference would inject new blood into the leadership to confront the complex challenges facing the Palestinian cause at the current stage.

The Palestinian Authority faces accumulated crises, including declining popularity and escalating accusations of corruption, as well as a suffocating financial crisis resulting from Israel's withholding of tax revenues. In light of this reality, observers believe that Yasser Abbas's entry into politics may further complicate the scene rather than provide solutions to existing crises.

Critics believe that the Abbas family has exploited its political influence to promote its commercial interests in the West Bank, accusations that Yasser and his brother Tareq have always denied. However, the link between money and power remains a weakness exploited by opponents to question the legitimacy of any future political role for the President's sons.

Prominent names in the succession race include Hussein Al-Sheikh, Secretary-General of the PLO Executive Committee, and Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in Israeli jails. Barghouti enjoys overwhelming popularity in opinion polls, making any attempt to impose an alternative a daunting task for the presidential institution in Ramallah.

Political analyst Reham Odeh indicated that Yasser Abbas's success in reaching the Central Committee does not necessarily mean his popular acceptance in any future presidential elections. She explained that the Palestinian street looks forward to a comprehensive democratic process that ends the state of political stagnation that has lasted for nearly two decades.

The Palestinian Authority was established under the Oslo Accords as a temporary entity, but over time it transformed into a permanent administration facing existential challenges amid settlement expansion and the collapse of the peace process. The current leadership struggle further increases the uncertainty about the future of the Palestinian national project.

Sources within Fatah described Yasser Abbas's potential role as merely the 'beginning' of a plan aimed at bringing him to the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This path would grant him legal and political influence that extends beyond the movement's boundaries to represent the Palestinian people in international forums.

While the President's office remains silent regarding these reports, anticipation remains the dominant sentiment awaiting the outcome of the Fatah conference in May. The results of this conference will have a significant impact on determining whether the Authority will move towards radical reforms or continue its approach of maintaining the status quo by rotating positions within the inner circle.

Abbas is trying to poke holes in Fatah's ship by installing his son as an heir, and the movement's men must confront and reject this.

Political and intelligence circles within the Israeli occupation state are experiencing a state of anticipation and concern regarding the path the American administration is taking in its dealings with the Iranian file. Observers believe that negotiations between Washington and Tehran have reached a dead end, which has placed President Donald Trump before a series of options, all described as 'bad' and difficult to implement.

In this context, General Eldad Shavit, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and former head of the research department at the Mossad, stated that Trump is trying to market an image of 'victory' to the American public and the world. Trump claimed in his statements that the pressures succeeded in destroying Iran's military power, but the reality indicates that there is no basis for this narrative given the continuation of field challenges.

Shavit pointed out in an analysis published by Hebrew media that the fundamental question lies in the extent of Washington's actual control over the scene; if Iran has truly been defeated, why does it refuse to submit to American conditions? And why do commercial ships still face direct threats in international waterways, exposing freedom of navigation to constant danger?

The American administration faces a real dilemma in the Strait of Hormuz, which has become a focal point in the current conflict, where experts believe that any miscalculation or misinterpretation of military movements could lead to a wide-ranging conflict. This scenario completely contradicts Trump's electoral promises in which he pledged to avoid engaging in long and costly wars.

Intelligence sources believe that Iran is trying to delay reaching a partial agreement through calculated escalation, to present it later as a limited measure aimed at protecting its interests. This tactic puts Washington in a defensive position, where it is content with managing the current crisis instead of finding radical solutions that completely end Iran's nuclear ambitions.

For the Israeli side, the danger lies in the possibility of Trump accepting a partial agreement that may seem strategically weak, which gives Tehran an opportunity to gain time. Tel Aviv fears that this path will lead to Iran retaining its enriched uranium stockpile, allowing it to quickly restore its nuclear capabilities in the future.

Shavit believes that American action against nuclear components or Iranian pressure tools in the seas may be seen in Washington as an attempt to regain the initiative. However, these limited military steps may not achieve their desired goals, but may give Tehran an additional incentive to escalate in other regional arenas where it has strong influence.

Israeli concerns are mainly focused on two central questions: the first relates to the fate of the technical nuclear capabilities that Iran currently possesses, and the second relates to the Lebanese arena. Tel Aviv is carefully monitoring Washington's attempts to prevent regional escalation, fearing that this may come at the expense of the vital security interests of the occupation state.

The analysis clarifies that what Trump might consider a major political achievement serving his campaign, may represent a dismal failure from the perspective of military leaders in Israel. The primary goal for the occupation is not merely to bring Iran back to the negotiating table, but to permanently strip it of the ability to possess a military nuclear weapon.

Amidst the ongoing crisis, the American president finds himself in a political 'trap', as Tehran does not respond to his basic demands, while internal and external pressures on him increase. It has become difficult for the White House to present the current situation as a clear diplomatic success, especially with the Strait of Hormuz turning into a powder keg ready to explode.

Intelligence readings indicate that the coming days will be decisive, as Trump may be forced to make military decisions he did not want in order to break the stalemate. The American desire to avoid war clashes with a field reality that forces it to act to protect its international prestige and ensure the security of navigation in the most important global energy corridors.

Sources confirm that Israel is pushing for no concessions on the enrichment issue, considering that any American retreat on this file would represent an existential threat to it. Israeli circles demand the necessity of strict international guarantees that prevent Iran from rapid recovery after any potential agreement, which seems out of reach at present.

In conclusion, the complex scene shows that the options available to Washington are narrowing day by day, while Iran continues to use its naval and nuclear power cards to maneuver. This situation puts Israeli interests at stake, awaiting the outcome of upcoming American moves amidst mutual threats.

What can be considered a political achievement for Trump, may be considered an unsatisfactory result in Tel Aviv, which fears the retention of Iranian nuclear capabilities.

German Foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul, explicitly expressed his support for the continued presence of Israeli army forces in specific areas of southern Lebanon, considering it a necessary step to secure northern Israeli areas from Hezbollah attacks. This stance came during a press conference held in the capital Berlin with his Israeli counterpart, Gideon Sa'ar, who is on an official visit to Germany to discuss regional developments.

The German minister stressed the necessity for the Lebanese government to act decisively to implement measures to disarm Hezbollah, while at the same time condemning the military operations carried out by the party against Israeli targets. Despite his support for the Israeli military presence, he warned against ending the conflict by targeting Lebanese civilians or turning their country into an open war zone.

For his part, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar claimed that Tel Aviv has no expansionist ambitions in Lebanese territories, and that ground operations are limited to purely defensive objectives. Sa'ar indicated that settlers in the north are living in a difficult security reality, claiming that the ground incursion aims exclusively to provide them with protection and prevent border threats.

In a related context, Wadephul expressed his hope that the ongoing negotiations between the Lebanese and Israeli sides would succeed in reaching a sustainable agreement that protects civilians from both sides. He affirmed that the sight of young generations in Lebanon growing up amidst the rubble of destroyed homes is morally unacceptable and will not contribute to enhancing Israel's long-term security.

On the ground, sources reported that the Israeli occupation army carried out about 60 aerial and ground attacks on various areas in Lebanon during the past twenty-four hours. These aggressions resulted in the martyrdom of five people and the injury of others, amidst the continued aggression that has been escalating significantly since the beginning of last March.

In contrast, Hezbollah announced the execution of 17 military operations targeting gatherings of occupation soldiers, military vehicles, and tanks in contact areas in southern Lebanon. Field sources confirmed that these operations came in response to continuous Israeli incursions and attempts to establish new military points within Lebanese territories.

Reports indicate that the occupation army continues systematic demolition operations and the bombing of residential blocks in border towns, despite a fragile ceasefire agreement. The occupation has established a buffer zone up to 10 kilometers deep, where the presence of residents or journalistic teams is prohibited, deepening the humanitarian crisis in those areas.

Occupation forces also imposed what they called the 'Yellow Line,' a field demarcation that separates dozens of southern villages from their geographical surroundings and the rest of the Lebanese regions. These measures come as part of attempts to impose a new geographical and security reality by force, amidst international silence regarding these violations that affect Lebanese sovereignty.

According to the latest statistics from the Lebanese Ministry of Health, the toll of victims of the Israeli aggression since March 2nd has reached about 2,700 martyrs, in addition to more than 8,200 injured. These figures illustrate the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe caused by the intense and continuous shelling of residential areas and civilian facilities in various governorates.

On the political front, it appears that the ceasefire agreement reached in mid-April is facing the risk of complete collapse due to repeated Israeli violations. Despite the extension of the agreement until this May, military operations and the partial occupation of some southern villages are still ongoing, emptying the agreement of its content.

HUMANITARIAN suffering continues in southern Lebanon with Israel's insistence on continuing its scorched-earth policy and destroying the infrastructure of border towns. The international community is cautiously monitoring the outcomes of these developments, amidst conflicting German diplomatic statements and the reality on the ground imposed by the occupation.

It is unacceptable for the young generation in Lebanon to grow up amidst the ruins of their parents' homes, and this will not make Israel safer.

By: Said Arikat

May 6, 2026

News Analysis

Washington, D.C-The quiet insertion of a senior operative from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) into Donald Trump’s Iran negotiating team is not a routine staffing decision. It is a revealing moment—one that exposes the deeper ideological architecture driving U.S. policy in the Middle East. Nick Stewart’s appointment to Steve Witkoff’s team signals not a turn toward diplomacy, but a consolidation of a long-standing agenda rooted in confrontation, coercion, and alignment with Israeli strategic priorities.

To understand the significance of this move, one must first confront what FDD is and what it represents. Established in the aftermath of 9/11, the organization has consistently positioned itself as a hardline advocate for militarized U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Critics have long argued that FDD functions less as an independent think tank and more as an ideological extension of Israeli security doctrine. Its intellectual framework has repeatedly mirrored the priorities of successive Israeli governments, particularly in its uncompromising stance on Iran and its rejection of Palestinian political claims.

Beyond its policy advocacy, FDD’s influence is inseparable from the network of donors who have sustained and amplified its reach. Chief among them was the late casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, alongside his wife Miriam Adelson. Adelson, until his death in 2021, was one of the most prominent financial backers of hawkish pro-Israel causes in Washington, and a central figure in Republican political funding. Miriam Adelson has since carried forward that role, emerging as one of Donald Trump’s most significant donors in the 2024 presidential election cycle. Their financial support has not only underwritten institutions like FDD but has also helped align political power, policy advocacy, and ideological messaging in ways that continue to shape U.S. Middle East policy at its highest levels.

This alignment has had tangible consequences. During Trump’s first term, FDD played a pivotal role in shaping some of the most consequential—and controversial—decisions in modern U.S. Middle East policy. Chief among these was the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. While presented as a recognition of “reality,” the move effectively endorsed Israel’s unilateral claim over the contested city, disregarding decades of international consensus and diplomatic precedent. FDD figures were among the most vocal proponents of this shift, lobbying aggressively within the administration and framing it as both strategically necessary and morally justified.

The embassy move was not an isolated act. It was part of a broader policy package that systematically dismantled the already fragile infrastructure of U.S.-Palestinian engagement. The closure of the American Consulate in East Jerusalem—an institution that had operated for more than 130 years as a direct channel to Palestinians—was another decisive step. Its absorption into the newly relocated embassy symbolized the erasure of a distinct American diplomatic presence in Palestinian affairs. Once again, voices aligned with FDD supported the move, arguing that separate diplomatic tracks for Israelis and Palestinians were unnecessary—a position that effectively denied the political reality of occupation.

Equally consequential was the Trump administration’s decision to cut off all U.S. funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). This move targeted one of the most critical lifelines for millions of Palestinian refugees across the region. FDD had long campaigned against UNRWA, portraying it as an obstacle to peace rather than a humanitarian necessity. The funding cut not only exacerbated an already dire humanitarian situation but also aligned with a broader effort to redefine—and ultimately diminish—the Palestinian refugee issue itself.

Against this backdrop, Stewart’s appointment takes on a deeper meaning. It suggests continuity, not change. It indicates that the same ideological forces that shaped Trump’s earlier Middle East policies are once again asserting influence—this time in the context of escalating tensions with Iran.

The timing is particularly telling. Reports indicate that Iran has submitted a proposal aimed at de-escalation and a potential end to hostilities within 30 days. Yet Trump’s response has been dismissive, framing the proposal as insufficient and reiterating a preference for continued pressure. The inclusion of an FDD figure in the negotiating team reinforces the perception that diplomacy is not the primary objective. Instead, the goal appears to be the maintenance—and intensification—of a pressure campaign designed to weaken Iran economically and strategically.

This approach is consistent with FDD’s long-standing advocacy. The organization was a key supporter of the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, a move that dismantled a functioning multilateral agreement in favor of a “maximum pressure” strategy. The results of that strategy are now evident: increased regional instability, accelerated Iranian nuclear activity, and a near-total collapse of diplomatic trust.

What makes the current moment particularly dangerous is the convergence of ideology and power. When a think tank with a clear and consistent bias toward confrontation gains direct access to policymaking, the line between analysis and advocacy becomes blurred. Policy is no longer shaped by a balance of perspectives but by a singular worldview—one that sees compromise as weakness and diplomacy as concession.

The broader implications extend beyond Iran. They speak to the erosion of U.S. credibility as a neutral actor in the Middle East. Decisions such as the embassy move, the consulate closure, and the UNRWA funding cut have already signaled a departure from even the pretense of balance. The re-emergence of FDD’s influence risks further entrenching this perception, making it increasingly difficult for the United States to function as an effective mediator in regional conflicts.

Moreover, the reliance on ideologically aligned institutions raises fundamental questions about the policymaking process itself. To what extent are U.S. foreign policy decisions being driven by national interests, and to what extent are they shaped by external agendas and lobbying networks? The case of FDD suggests that these lines are increasingly difficult to distinguish.

In the end, Stewart’s appointment is not just about one individual or one negotiation team. It is about the persistence of an approach that prioritizes pressure over dialogue, alignment over independence, and ideology over pragmatism. If history is any guide, this path is unlikely to produce stability—let alone peace.

Instead, it risks repeating the same cycle: escalation, isolation, and missed opportunities for diplomacy. And in a region already burdened by decades of conflict, that is a cost the world can ill afford.

Informed sources reported that US intelligence assessments indicate that the timeline Iran needs to develop a nuclear weapon has not fundamentally changed since last summer. This assessment comes despite widespread air attacks launched by US and Israeli forces, which were believed to have delayed Iran's nuclear program by up to a full year.

The sources stated that estimates of Tehran's nuclear capabilities have remained largely stable, even two months after the military operations launched by President Donald Trump's administration. This stability in the timeline reflects a significant challenge to the declared goals of the war, foremost among which was to definitively prevent the Islamic Republic from acquiring a nuclear bomb.

Analysts believe that achieving a real and sustainable disruption in Iran's nuclear program requires more than just aerial bombardment, as it necessitates the complete destruction or removal of its highly enriched uranium stockpile. Reports clarified that this goal has not yet been achieved, leaving the program's intellectual and material infrastructure capable of recovery and operation within close timeframes.

Intelligence agencies had estimated, prior to the outbreak of military confrontation in June 2025, that Iran was capable of producing enough uranium for one bomb within a period ranging from three to six months. With the targeting of vital facilities such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, this timeline extended to between nine months and a year, a delay described as 'limited' compared to the scale of the attacks.

In a related context, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed concern over its inability to locate approximately 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. International estimates suggest that these quantities may have been moved and stored in fortified underground facilities in the Isfahan region, following the suspension of international inspections that were previously in place.

IAEA data indicates that Iran's current stockpile of highly enriched uranium could be sufficient to produce about ten nuclear bombs if a decision is made to raise enrichment levels to weapons-grade. This stockpile represents the biggest obstacle to international efforts aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions through traditional military means alone.

For her part, White House spokeswoman Olivia Wells stated that recent military operations succeeded in destroying large parts of Iran's nuclear facilities. Wells affirmed that the Trump administration remains committed to preventing Tehran from acquiring any nuclear weapon, emphasizing that military pressure will continue until all strategic objectives are achieved.

Regarding military objectives, US officials, including Vice President J.D. Vance, explained that the war directly aimed to end the Iranian nuclear threat. However, the disparity in results stems from Israeli strikes focusing on nuclear sites, while US attacks concentrated on destroying conventional military capabilities and defense industry infrastructure.

In an analysis of the situation, Eric Brewer, a former US intelligence analyst, said that Iran still retains essential nuclear materials despite the bombing. Brewer added that Tehran has apparently succeeded in distributing its stockpile to deep and highly fortified sites that are difficult to access via conventional airstrikes, giving it resilience and maneuverability.

Reports indicate that officials in Washington discussed more escalatory options for dealing with this issue, including the possibility of special ground operations. These proposed operations aim to recover or destroy stockpiles of highly enriched uranium located in underground facilities, specifically in the fortified complexes in the city of Isfahan.

On the other hand, Iran continues to categorically deny seeking to acquire deadly weapons, asserting that its program is for peaceful purposes only. Tehran bases its defense on previous reports that indicated the cessation of its warhead development program since 2003, despite continued Western doubts about its retention of files and technical elements from that program.

In conclusion, international experts such as David Albright believe that the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists may have a deeper long-term impact than aerial bombardment. Albright explained that the loss of human technical expertise increases uncertainty about Tehran's ability to assemble an effective nuclear weapon, emphasizing that 'knowledge does not die' but the ability to implement it is severely affected.

Knowledge is not destroyed by aerial bombardment, but technical expertise and the ability to implement are what are affected by the assassination of scientists and the targeting of facilities.

The Greek capital, Athens, witnessed a prominent cultural and political event for the launch of the new book by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Francesca Albanese. The book, titled 'When the World Sleeps – Stories, Words, and Wounds of Palestine,' seeks to shed light on the lived reality of Palestinians, away from narratives that marginalize their human suffering.

During her speech at the ceremony, Albanese sharply criticized the occupation's policies, noting that Tel Aviv seeks to exploit Greece's security concerns to advance its own interests in the region. She affirmed that her book includes ten real-life stories that give Palestinians a voice and clear human features in the face of the war machine that attempts to erase their identity and fundamental rights.

The new literary and documentary work focuses on three core axes, starting with emphasizing the humanity of the Palestinian people and their inherent right to dignity and equality. The book also stresses the necessity of activating international accountability mechanisms against Israeli occupation leaders involved in grave violations of international humanitarian law, while demanding non-selective justice for victims.

Through the chapters of her book, Albanese reviews the details of daily life under the burden of siege and aggression in the Gaza Strip, and the harsh conditions faced by the residents of Jerusalem behind the separation wall and military checkpoints. The book also addresses the escalating violence of settlers and the army in West Bank cities such as Hebron and Nablus, documenting the suffering of children and civilians in those areas.

In a related political context, the UN Rapporteur warned against the occupied Palestinian territories becoming a 'testing laboratory' for Israeli military technologies and advanced espionage software. She explained that these weapons are field-tested on the bodies and lives of Palestinians before being exported and marketed to other countries as products proven effective in the field.

Albanese concluded the event by calling for serious international action to hold accountable governments and companies that conclude arms deals or commercial exchanges with the occupation system. She stressed the importance of investigative journalism and parliamentary inquiries in exposing these abuses, affirming that continued global silence is what fuels ongoing crimes against the Palestinian people.

The occupying state uses Palestinian territories as a laboratory to test its weapons and espionage programs before marketing them globally.

A state of shock mixed with tears prevailed in the Abu Shaar family home in Gaza City, after the mother, Maha Abu Shaar, received a phone call from a lawyer confirming that her son Eid was still alive. This news came after a year and a half of ambiguity surrounding the young man's fate, as the family and surrounding parties firmly believed that he had been martyred during the ongoing war.

The chapters of suffering began on December 15, 2024, when the young man Eid went out to look for a job near the Netzarim axis area in the central Gaza Strip and has not returned since. From that moment, all means of communication with him were cut off, which led the family on an arduous search journey that included hospitals and international Red Cross centers without success, only to later receive unofficial news of his martyrdom.

The mother bitterly recounts how she lived long months of pain, but she categorically refused to perform the absentee funeral prayer for her son, emphasizing that a mother's intuition guided her towards hope. As soon as she heard the lawyer's voice confirming the news, the mother entered a hysterical crying fit, pleading for confirmation of the information that thousands of Palestinian families, who still do not know the fate of their missing children, had been waiting for.

For his part, Saleh Abu Shaar, the prisoner's cousin, explained that the family had knocked on every possible door and contacted various relevant authorities since his disappearance in December 2024. He pointed out that the Israeli occupation deliberately concealed any information about his fate throughout the past period, before recently allowing information about his presence inside its detention centers to be leaked.

The prisoner's father recalled the harsh search journey that led him to the martyrs' morgues in various hospitals in the Strip, where he was looking for any trace of his eldest son among the victims. The father confirmed that the information that reached the family about a month ago began to indicate his presence in 'Ofer' prison, which was officially confirmed through the legal visit and recent contacts made by the lawyer with the family.

In a scene reflecting Palestinian social traditions in dealing with loss, the prisoner's grandfather indicated that the family had already set up a mourning house for their grandson after losing hope of finding him alive. Today, the mourning house has turned into a joyful gathering and the distribution of sweets, amidst wishes that this joy will be completed with Eid's release from captivity and his actual return to his home in Gaza.

The family stressed in their conversation with media sources that their young son does not belong to any political or military organization, and that his departure on the day of his disappearance was motivated by the search for a livelihood in light of the harsh economic conditions. This incident once again highlights the issue of missing persons in the Gaza Strip, which is one of the most complex issues in light of the ongoing Israeli military operations.

Official statistics indicate that the genocide war launched by Israel on the Strip since October 2023 has left tens of thousands of martyrs and wounded, as well as thousands of missing persons under the rubble or in occupation prisons. Thousands of Palestinian families await a miracle similar to what happened with the Abu Shaar family, to end the state of anxiety and anticipation that has been gnawing at their hearts for years.

I never agreed to perform the absentee funeral prayer, my heart always told me that my eldest son was still breathing and would return to my embrace one day.

Former US President Barack Obama revealed the behind-the-scenes pressures exerted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to push Washington towards a military confrontation with Tehran. Obama explained in a recent press interview that Netanyahu presented current President Donald Trump with the same pretexts and arguments he had previously put forward during his presidency, with the aim of inciting a comprehensive war against Iran, affirming that his previous vision regarding these demands remains accurate and steadfast.

Obama expressed deep skepticism about the strategic utility of these moves, questioning whether Netanyahu's objectives truly served the interests of the Israeli people or American national security. He noted that the disagreements between him and the Israeli Prime Minister are historically documented, especially concerning the nuclear deal concluded in 2015, which Obama considered a means to prevent escalation, while Netanyahu sought to undermine it until he succeeded in convincing Trump to cancel it in 2018.

The former president touched upon the catastrophic repercussions that followed the collapse of the nuclear deal, as Iran has since sought to rapidly enhance its nuclear capabilities. Sources indicated that this confrontational path ultimately led to the outbreak of two major military confrontations, the first beginning in the summer of 2025, while the second erupted in late February 2026, reflecting the failure of the maximum pressure policy to achieve regional stability.

In the context of his criticism of the current political discourse, Obama commented on the violent threats recently directed by Donald Trump against Iran, in which he hinted at the annihilation of an entire civilization. Obama considered that such statements lack basic respect for human dignity, emphasizing that the responsibility of American leadership requires protecting innocent people even in countries ruled by autocratic regimes, rather than being drawn into the language of mass destruction.

Obama concluded his remarks by warning against abandoning core values and falling into the trap of arrogance and political selfishness in managing international crises. He warned that the absence of wisdom in dealing with thorny issues could lead to the collapse of the global order in catastrophic and unpredictable ways, calling for the necessity of adhering to human values to ensure that strategic mistakes, for which the entire world would pay the price, are not made.

Netanyahu may have achieved what he wanted, but does this ultimately serve the interests of the Israeli people? I doubt it.

The Israeli government is preparing in the near future to approve a practical decision, the first of its kind, to implement the Economic Corridor Project (IMEC), which was announced by US President Joe Biden in September 2023. This ambitious project aims to create a continental connectivity axis extending from India through Middle Eastern countries to Europe, transforming Israel into a vital land bridge connecting East and West.

The relevant government ministries are currently working to accelerate plans for the Israeli section of the initiative, which includes the construction of a dedicated railway for transporting goods coming from India via Mediterranean ports. The plan is not limited to land transport only, but also includes the extension of advanced communications and energy infrastructure, such as fiber optics and oil and gas pipelines alongside the train route.

A study conducted by the Israeli Ministry of Finance showed the enormous economic potential of this axis, especially in light of the security challenges faced by maritime straits such as Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal. The project seeks to create an alternative geographical route that ensures the flow of time-sensitive goods and avoids delays caused by the closure of international waterways.

Initial estimates indicate that limited implementation of the project is capable of injecting approximately one billion shekels annually into the state treasury from transit and operation fees alone. Experts also expect that the large volume of goods flow will lead to a reduction in the cost of living in Israel, as a result of improved supply chain efficiency and reduced international shipping costs.

As part of the first implementation phase, the Ministry of Transport will begin detailed planning for the construction of a 12-kilometer railway connecting the city of Beit She'an with the Jordan River crossing (Sheikh Hussein). This step aims to complete the railway link with the eastern side, ensuring the smooth movement of trains between Israel and its neighbors in the region within the regional network.

The plans also include a feasibility study to double the railway lines leading to Haifa Port to accommodate the expected increase in cargo shipments. In parallel, work will be done to expand the capacity of border crossings, with plans to increase the capacity of the Jordan River crossing from 50,000 trucks annually to more than 210,000 trucks, along with the establishment of land ports and advanced logistics areas.

On the security front, the government is working to develop advanced technological surveillance systems that allow for precise inspection of trains and shipments without the need to unload them or disrupt their movement. These technologies aim to ensure the security of regional trade and maintain the credibility of the new land route as a safe and fast option for international companies and investors.

For his part, Finance Minister Smotrich affirmed that this project represents a strategic breakthrough that enhances Israel's security and economic standing in the region. During discussions with the Indian side, he stressed the need to accelerate implementation steps, considering that the project aligns with a broader vision that includes joint energy projects such as the proposed gas pipeline between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Israel is no longer a villa in the jungle, but an integral part of the regional economic fabric and a strategic growth engine.

Recent polls conducted by several national public opinion research institutions, including American voters, have shown a sharp decline in public support for Israel. For example, a Gallup poll last February showed that when participants were asked who they sympathized with most, 41% chose Palestinians, compared to only 36% who chose Israel. This contrasts significantly with the results of the same Gallup poll in 2023, where 54% of participants expressed sympathy for Israel, while 36% expressed sympathy for Palestinians. Then, a few weeks ago, the Pew Research Center published a poll showing that 60% of participants had a negative view of Israel. To better understand these changes in voter opinions, the role of Israel's wars with Lebanon and Palestinians in shaping their perspectives, and how voters want the US government and members of Congress to deal with this issue, the Arab American Institute and the organization "Voters for Justice in Palestine," in North Carolina, commissioned "John Zogby Strategies" to conduct a nationwide poll on these issues. The poll included 1001 potential American voters (with a margin of error of +/- 3.2). It is clear that Israeli behaviors are no longer accepted by the majority of American voters, and have even been rejected by supporters of Israel. For example, 41% of voters believe that Israeli actions against Palestinians are "excessive and amount to genocide," while only 32% disagree. The difference among "Democrats" is much larger. Answers to a question about whether the United States should do more to pressure Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian territories show similar results. These issues and others related to Israel's behavior receive continuous opposition to Israel's policies, primarily from "Democratic" or independent voters. This opposition is led by sub-categories of young or non-white voters. There is also a deep demographic divide among "Republican" voters, with young "Republicans" (under 45) holding negative views towards Israel's actions that are closer to those of "Democrats" than to those of older "Republicans." In fact, in almost all survey questions, the only real base of support that Israel can rely on is older, white "Republican" voters. This group constitutes a dwindling minority of the overall electorate. The poll results also show that there are electoral consequences associated with these shifts, as the majority of voters believe they would be more inclined to support candidates who call for reducing or ending military aid to Israel (45% versus 27%), or who reject funding or support from sources associated with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Rejection rates are much higher (more than double) among "Democrats," independents, and non-white voters. The majority of "Democrats," "Republicans," and independents (and all major demographic groups) agree on the need to hold Israel accountable and prosecute it for the killing of American citizens, with 58% of potential voters believing Israel should be held accountable, compared to only 16% who oppose its prosecution. The same applies to Israel's bombing of Lebanon, with potential American voters, by a two-to-one margin, believing that the US administration should do more to pressure Israel to stop the bombing and withdraw from southern Lebanon. By a nearly two-to-one margin, voters express concern that Israel's bombing and occupation of Lebanon harms US interests in the Middle East. In both cases, these percentages apply to all major demographic groups except "Republicans," who are divided on the issue. While voters express clear negative opinions towards Israel's actions and support a US policy that pressures Israel to curb its actions and hold it accountable, the poll also shows that a significant minority (between a quarter and a third of all respondents) honestly admit the need for more information before making decisions on some of the political issues raised. As the midterm elections approach, there are indications that voters' aversion to Israel and its policies is already affecting Congress and the upcoming midterm elections. Last month, 40 out of 47 US senators, who are "Democrats" or allied with them, voted to block certain military supplies to Israel, an unprecedented number of elected officials who have taken such a stance in an election year. This included the majority of Jewish American senators. Dozens of members of Congress have also publicly pledged to reject support from pro-Israel lobbying groups in their re-election campaigns. Although some of these members were previously major recipients of funding from pro-Israel donors. These are important and significant developments, and it is important to note them in the future.

It is not new for Israeli military analysts to warn of the danger of escalation, but what is new is the way this warning is framed, where a tone of genuine concern is mixed with a calculated amount of dramatic suspense, in the context of a clear attempt to rearrange responsibilities, so that Israel appears to be standing on the sidelines observing, not as an active party contributing to shaping the course of events. In many Israeli readings, the Gulf turns into something akin to an open theater, and cinematic metaphors are invoked to describe what is happening, as if we are watching an “action movie on the shores of Hormuz.” However, this language is not innocent; rather, it reflects a mentality that sees war as an event whose rhythm can be controlled, or even exploited, as long as it does not directly rebound on the Israeli interior, and as long as its cost remains distributed across other arenas. Within this narrative, the scene is reduced to one character, Donald Trump, who is presented as the ultimate decision-maker, solely capable of pushing the region into war or bringing it back to calm. This reduction seems convenient for Israel, because it shifts the center of gravity to Washington and reduces its presence as a pressuring party, even though its actual behavior indicates the opposite. In reality, Trump's behavior reveals a clear contradiction between rhetoric and practice; he threatens to destroy Iran, but avoids engaging in an all-out war, and escalates politically and militarily at the same time he seeks a way out. This contradiction cannot be separated from the American domestic context, where war fatigue is increasing, and concerns about its economic repercussions, especially regarding energy prices, are growing. Thus, Trump seems to be seeking a political achievement without being dragged into the cost of war, which is an inherently fragile equation, because it constantly pushes the opposing party to test its limits. In contrast, Iran does not seem far from this logic, as it practices a form of calculated escalation that approaches the brink of confrontation without crossing it. Strikes targeting oil interests or maritime passages are not necessarily intended to ignite an all-out war, but rather aim to establish a deterrence equation and convey precise messages about the ability to inflict harm. However, this type of “critical balance” remains fraught with risks, because the accumulation of calculated steps may at some point lead to a loss of control. In this specific context, Israel appears as an “absent presence” in the discourse, but in reality, it is a key player in pushing towards expanding the circle of tension. Benjamin Netanyahu is not content with supporting the option of confrontation with Iran, but also works in parallel to keep the surrounding fronts in a state of low-intensity ignition, whether in Lebanon or in the Gaza Strip. In Lebanon, the ceasefire cannot be considered effective in the true sense, as strikes continue within carefully drawn limits, keeping the escalation under control without ending it. This situation does not reflect stability as much as it expresses continuous management of tension, where the possibility of sliding into a wider confrontation remains present at any moment, especially given the fragility of the rules of engagement. Between these two fronts, the limits of escalation are not only drawn by field considerations, but also by a broader political ceiling imposed by Washington. The rhythm within which operations move, in Lebanon as in Gaza, is inseparable from the calculations of the American administration, which tries to control the level of engagement and prevent it from sliding into a comprehensive regional confrontation. Thus, the question is no longer only related to what Israel wants or what other powers respond with, but to the extent to which Donald Trump is willing to allow these limits to be crossed, or redrawn according to his interests and internal balances. As for Gaza, matters take on a clearer character, where indicators accumulate of preparations for a new phase of escalation, through escalating political and military rhetoric, and re-proposing objectives that were not resolved in previous rounds. In this context, Gaza does not appear to be merely a separate arena of confrontation, but part of a broader pressure system used within regional calculations, which also applies to the Lebanese front. In this sense, Israel is not content with monitoring the escalation, but contributes to shaping its environment, by maintaining a permanent state of tension that allows it to maneuver, and keeps confrontation options open without bearing the cost of a full-scale explosion. Despite all this escalation, another path, less present in the media, is not absent, which is the continuation of indirect negotiation channels, revealing that the region is not necessarily heading towards an inevitable war, but is experiencing a state of continuous bargaining under fire. Iran links any progress to the lifting of the blockade, while the United States seeks to extract concessions on the nuclear file, while each party uses escalation tools to improve its negotiating terms. However, this overlap between negotiation and escalation creates an extremely fragile situation, where stability becomes dependent on the ability of all parties to precisely control the rhythm, which cannot be guaranteed given the multiplicity of fronts and the intertwining of interests. In light of this, the danger does not lie in a clear intention to launch an all-out war, but in the nature of the stage itself, where contradictory calculations intersect: an American administration seeking an achievement without cost, Iran practicing a policy of brinkmanship, and Israel pushing towards expanding the circle of engagement without being its direct arena. In such an environment, wars do not need major decisions as much as they need a small mistake. Then, the confrontation will not remain confined to the Gulf, and the fronts will not remain separate, but the entire region may turn into an open arena that is difficult to contain or predict its outcomes.

The equation of a ceasefire between America and Iran has been in place for about a month, without the war stopping, neither in words and threats, nor in the blockades of ports by fleets, battleships, and aircraft carriers. The chances of resuming the bombing, almost entirely in the hands of US President Donald Trump, have certainly decreased, so he gave diplomacy and negotiations their full scope, and in case of a stalemate, he would keep the situation as it is, neither war nor peace. He then issued a practical decision to end the blockade on the detained ships - about 400 ships - which had no stake in the raging conflict, and there are about twenty thousand sailors detained there since late February. But Iran clearly announced, more than once, that these ships whose governments are not involved in aggression against it can pass through coordination with the Iranian state, and Indian, Chinese, and Greek ships have done so... etc., meaning that the one detaining the movement of these neutral and peaceful ships is the American fleet that blockaded the blockaded strait. And of course, there is no need for protection from the American navy, as long as Iran agrees to it, and we do not think that the detained ships can risk leaving because America will protect them, but rather when they hear that Iran has agreed to their departure. America will not be able to protect them in that Gulf, and without Iran's approval, these ships will be the biggest losers for reasons related to their large cargo and slow speed. And we do not think that Iran will reject what it requested before, even if it comes from America as a decision from its president Trump, without conditions, because it is not the one that prevents or stops these ships from leaving, but we think that Trump's decision came from this humanitarian exit, and the "Freedom Project" to climb down from the tree, or rather from the trees he climbed to pick their fruits, but when he reached their tops, he discovered that they were fruitless, the enriched uranium tree, the ballistic missile tree, the regime change tree, the terrorist organizations tree, and finally the strait tree. Then he discovered that climbing down was harder than climbing up, not because climbing down is harder than climbing up, but because the costs of climbing down are exorbitant, and that the slogan "America is great again" has fallen, and that the relationship with NATO has unraveled, and that the midterm elections have been decided, and that the only party standing with America is Israel, and not all of Israel, and not all of America.

At a moment when Palestinian political life seems to be reeling between stagnation and erosion, certain electoral processes emerge as a faint pulse attempting to inject life back into the veins. Neither municipal elections nor Fatah movement elections are mere routine organizational procedures; rather, they can be read as signals, however limited, of the possibility of revitalizing a political reality approaching its deathbed.

At the municipal level, elections represent a rare space where citizens engage with politics away from grand slogans and sharp divisions. Here, issues of water, roads, and waste become an entry point for rebuilding trust, even if partially, between people and institutions. When a citizen goes to the ballot box to choose a local council, they are not just exercising an administrative right, but also testing the possibility of change from within the system, instead of being completely beholden to a general state of helplessness.

However, this space, despite its importance, remains limited in its impact if not complemented by deeper reforms. Municipalities, no matter how successful, cannot alone compensate for the absence of a general political horizon or solve the crisis of national representation. Nevertheless, the mere regularity of the electoral process, and the existence of competition, even if partial or constrained, constitutes a break from the long period of stagnation.

As for the Fatah movement, any internal elections carry implications that extend beyond the organizational framework. The movement, which historically formed the backbone of the Palestinian political system, now finds itself facing the challenge of redefining its role and restoring its vitality. Internal elections are not just a mechanism for choosing new leaders; they are a test of the movement's ability to renew itself, absorb transformations, and re-inject internal legitimacy that it has lost over time.

However, the fundamental question remains: Do these elections reflect a genuine will for reform, or are they merely a rearrangement within the same structure? Renewal is not measured solely by changing names, but by the extent of the ability to produce a different political vision, open up to broader participation, and seriously address accumulated crises of trust.

In this context, it is important that Palestinian factions do not become an obstacle to public awareness, or a barrier that limits its ability to interact with political, economic, organizational, and administrative changes. The public is no longer just a passive recipient, but has become a partner in understanding daily complexities and shaping positions. Therefore, what is required of these factions is not to confiscate this awareness or forcibly contain it, but to embrace it and align with its aspirations, thereby ensuring the rebuilding of trust between the popular base and organizational structures, instead of widening the gap between them.

Between the municipalities and Fatah, a complex picture emerges: there is movement, but it is cautious; and there are elections, but they are surrounded by doubts. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that any electoral act, in a context suffering from discontinuity, represents in itself an act of resistance to stagnation.

Perhaps these processes are not enough to save a dying political reality, but they remind us that life has not completely left it yet. In the small details, and in local and organizational ballot boxes, the gradual restoration of a politics that has lost its compass of representation, but has not yet lost the possibility of regaining it, may begin to emerge.

However, this faint pulse, however promising it may seem, will not be enough to bring life back to the Palestinian political system unless it is complemented by its major requirements: free presidential and legislative elections that redefine legitimacy and open the door to a real transfer of power. The problem is no longer just the absence of mechanisms, but the narrow political horizon that has turned the democratic process into an exception instead of a rule.

Any attempt to revitalize the political reality without comprehensive renewal will remain like repairing a cracked surface, while the foundations themselves need rebuilding. Hence, the necessity of encouraging the emergence of new political parties, free from a heavy legacy that has shackled political imagination for decades, and hampered the system's ability to adapt to the profound transformations that have occurred in Palestinian society, both internally and in its relationship with its surroundings.

Flexibility must be the hallmark of this stage, not as a slogan, but as an actual practice translated into programs, policies, and working mechanisms. It is no longer acceptable for traditional movements to merely change their names or recycle their discourse, while their goals and methods remain trapped in the past. Real change requires a radical review: in vision, in tools of political action, and in the form of the relationship with the public.

These movements have accumulated an undeniable legacy of struggle, but over time it has become a burden when surrounded by an aura of sanctity and charisma, making internal criticism difficult and renewal a postponed risk. Herein lies the paradox: while these forces, to varying degrees, realize the depth of the crisis they face, their response is still below the level of the challenge.

But life will not return to the Palestinian political system except through free presidential and legislative elections, with encouragement for the establishment of new parties free from a legacy that may be heavy and an obstacle to change and keeping pace with the transformations that have affected the Palestinian people. Flexibility must be the hallmark of this stage, indeed an existential necessity. Even old movements are required to adopt orientations and approaches that lead to change, not only in their names, but in their goals, methods, and working mechanisms to align with the current stage. The rigid legacy that has acquired sanctity and charisma has made many movements cling to their glories more than they open up to the future, and although there is an awareness within them of this reality, change is still below the required level.

Observers may believe that these entitlements are optional, but organizations, especially Fatah, must realize that maintaining this pattern or reproducing failure will not pass without political cost, but may push the Palestinian people to bypass them if a fundamental change does not occur that creates hope and heralds real capabilities for initiative and rebalancing deterrence with the occupation.

Change does not happen by awareness alone, but by political will and the ability to make decisions that may be costly in the short term, but are necessary for long-term survival. As for merely managing the crisis, or postponing confrontation with the requirements of reform, it will only deepen the gap between the political system and society.

In this context, municipal elections or even internal factional elections seem to be only a first step in a long path. A path that, if not completed by comprehensive rebuilding based on pluralism, renewal, and openness, will remain unable to save a reality that can no longer tolerate further postponement.

The current moment requires not only reform, but political courage that redefines what is possible, breaks rigid molds, and opens the way for new generations with different visions. Only this dynamism can transform faint signals into a real path that restores meaning to politics, trust to society, and the system's ability to continue.

Washington – Said Arikat – 5/5/2026

News Analysis

At a time when the world's attention is focused on the ongoing war and its regional repercussions, a growing wave of violence led by settlers is escalating in the West Bank, taking advantage of the international preoccupation and declining levels of monitoring and political pressure. This reality formed the core of a news analysis published by the American newspaper The New York Times on Monday, May 4, 2026, highlighting alarming shifts in the nature and intensity of the violence, and the political and security environment that allows it to expand without effective deterrence.

The report highlights harsh human scenes reflecting the depth of the daily tragedy for Palestinians in the West Bank, where attacks have transformed from isolated incidents into a near-daily pattern of organized assaults. In the town of "Qasra," the young man Amir Ode was killed, while his father was stabbed and severely beaten, in an incident that encapsulates the nature of the new violence, which is no longer limited to intimidation but has extended to direct killing. Eyewitnesses confirm that settlers are now permanently armed, which has changed the balance of confrontation, leaving local residents unable to defend themselves.

These attacks are not limited to killing but extend to multiple forms of violations, including physical and sexual assaults, burning of property, and theft of land and livestock. In the Jordan Valley, an entire family was subjected to a brutal attack, while other young men were killed while trying to protect their property. These incidents, according to UN data, have led to the killing of 13 Palestinians, the injury of hundreds, and the displacement of hundreds more from their homes in less than two months.

It is noteworthy in this context that the escalation of violence coincides with international preoccupation with the war, raising questions about the relationship between the regional context and the supervisory vacuum exploited by settler groups. Experts believe that these groups consider the current moment an opportunity to intensify their attacks with the aim of imposing new realities on the ground, represented by emptying Palestinian areas and replacing them with settlers, as part of a long-term project to reshape the demographic map.

In contrast, the performance of Israeli agencies, both police and army, faces sharp criticism. Despite announcements of investigations into some incidents, figures indicate that the vast majority of these cases are closed without charges being filed. Moreover, soldiers, who are supposed to be responsible for protecting civilians, often delay intervention or merely observe, and some reports even speak of cases of sympathy or even participation in the attacks.

These security failures intertwine with a broader political context, where parties within Israel accuse the right-wing government of downplaying or overlooking the phenomenon. This accusation is reinforced by statements from some officials who questioned the extent of the violence, despite increasing field evidence. Furthermore, government policies, such as increased security support for settlements, are interpreted by critics as providing indirect cover for these practices.

In this climate, some extremist groups have become bolder in expressing their goals, including openly calling for the expulsion of Palestinians from their lands. This discourse, which was previously circulated in narrow circles, has become more present in the public sphere, reflecting a shift in the general mood within some settler communities.

This escalation in settler violence reveals a structural flaw in the accountability system, where laws become selective tools instead of comprehensive deterrents. The absence of accountability is not limited to administrative negligence but reflects an incomplete political will to confront the phenomenon. With the repeated closure of cases without indictment, a culture of impunity is entrenched, encouraging further escalation. In this context, violence becomes not a deviation from the norm, but an extension of it, within an environment that allows for the normalization of attacks and their transformation into habitual behavior that does not provoke effective deterrence.

International pretexts of major wars lead to a dangerous supervisory vacuum that Israel exploits to entrench a violent settlement reality in the West Bank, where settlers carry out their organized attacks against Palestinians under the direct protection of the occupation army. These practices are not isolated incidents but reflect a systematic structure of violence and impunity, making Israeli settlement a unique case in our contemporary world. In the absence of real international deterrence, these crimes become a tool to reshape geography by force, imposing realities that undermine any prospect for a just political solution.

The escalation of extremist settler discourse raises deep questions about the transformations within Israeli society itself, and the extent to which it accepts or rejects these trends. When exclusionary discourse moves from the margins to the public, and is met with silence or justification, it indicates a change in moral and political standards. This transformation not only affects Palestinians but also reflects on the structure of the Israeli state and its international image. In this climate, it becomes difficult to separate the actions of individuals from state policies, complicating any attempt at accountability or reform.

Since the 1990s, Israel has consistently exaggerated the Iranian threat and presented it as an imminent existential danger, in an effort to divert international attention from its policies on the ground in the occupied West Bank. This security discourse was not merely a strategic assessment but transformed into a political tool to justify settlement expansion and accelerate land confiscation, in parallel with escalating violence against Palestinians to push them towards forced displacement. While the world is preoccupied with monitoring tensions with Iran, the imposition of facts on the ground continues away from accountability, deepening the imbalance of justice and undermining any possibility of peace based on rights.

In the city of Deir al-Balah, specifically inside one of the dilapidated displacement tents, 12-year-old Iyad Jarboa sleeps on the ground next to his paralyzed father's bed. The child's sleep turns into a continuous monitoring mission, as he remains vigilant for any call that might come from his father, Nehad, in the darkness of the night, to fulfill his endless needs in the bitter reality of disability.

Iyad's responsibilities far exceed his young age. In this cramped tent, every simple movement becomes a burden that requires prior arrangement and strenuous physical effort. The child gets up with every movement of his father, whether to adjust his position or to help him relieve himself, making his frail body the main pillar on which the family's survival depends.

With the dawn, a new chapter of daily suffering begins, as Iyad divides his attention between his paralyzed father and his mother, Zainab, who suffers from amputated legs. He moves with skill acquired from the harshness of experience, bringing them water and preparing a suitable place for them, abandoning the childhood dreams he was supposed to live among school desks.

His older sister, Rahaf, 14 years old, shares this heavy burden. She, too, left school to become a second breadwinner. Rahaf shares with her brother the tasks of tidying the tent and preparing breakfast, a forced transformation from a life of books and exams to a life of full responsibility for incapacitated parents.

Providing water is one of the toughest daily battles Iyad faces, as he has to carry six plastic gallons and run after distribution tankers. He covers long distances over soft sand, which increases the weight of the load, and returns repeatedly until he fills the family's simple stock of potable water.

Signs of fatigue and exhaustion are clearly visible on Iyad's face with every trip he makes, but his determination pushes him to continue without stopping. His small body leans under the weight of the heavy gallons, but he fully realizes that the continued life of his parents inside the tent depends entirely on these strenuous steps he takes daily.

After securing water, Iyad heads to the charitable 'Tekkiyeh' to stand in long queues in search of a meal to satisfy his family's hunger. The child stands among crowds of adults and children, carrying his bowl, waiting for his share of food, which represents the only available meal in light of the suffocating siege and dire economic conditions.

Iyad speaks, tears preceding his words, about his buried dream of returning to school and playing with his peers without fear or responsibility. He bitterly says that he deprived himself of his childhood, his friends, and his right to education, only to be the support his parents need in these exceptional circumstances that the Gaza Strip is experiencing.

For her part, the mother, Zainab, expresses her deep pain as she sees her young child performing tasks beyond his physical capacity, especially when he has to carry her or drag her chair over the sand. The mother confirms that Iyad's first awareness was associated with hospitals and the meanings of amputation and wounds, before he understood the meaning of playing or enjoying life like other children in the world.

As for the father, Nehad, who used to manage an art institution before the war and supported dozens of employees, he looks at his son with broken eyes filled with sadness and gratitude. The father wakes up every morning thinking about the burden he places on his child, sadly wondering how this small body can meet all these exhausting needs.

The wheelchair parked at the entrance of the tent has become a symbol of life divided between two bodies exhausted by incapacity, which Iyad skillfully maneuvers to facilitate his parents' movement. The child precisely schedules his parents' outings from the tent, trying to balance the necessity of his mother going to the market and his father's need to breathe fresh air after days of forced confinement.

Despite all these burdens, Iyad tries to steal a few minutes to play with his friends in the camp, where he regains some of his lost innocence. He runs and laughs lightly for fleeting moments, but his eyes remain fixed on the tent, as if an invisible thread always reminds him of his great responsibility awaiting him inside.

The family confirms that this immense pressure has begun to leave clear psychological effects on Iyad, as he suffers from nocturnal disturbances and sudden crying spells. His body screams at night with what he suppresses during the day of fatigue and patience, a natural reflection of the magnitude of the tragedy experienced by a child who suddenly found himself in the role of a head of a family burdened with wounds.

Iyad's day ends as it began, waiting for a new call or an urgent task inside the tent that offers its inhabitants no privacy or comfort. The child's dream remains simple and great at the same time; to see his parents well and safe, and to one day find a way back to the school desks he longs for.

I deprived myself of childhood, my friends, and my education to help my mother and father, and I wish to learn like other children.

Gaza City and large areas of the Strip face a real threat of reaching a severe thirst stage, amid the worsening water crisis and the reliance of residents on limited and unstable sources. Official sources in the Gaza Municipality reported that citizens are currently forced to rely on what remains of desalination plants and groundwater wells that have not been affected by seawater intrusion, especially in the eastern areas and parts of the north.

The spokesperson for the Gaza Municipality, Husni Muhanna, confirmed that these available sources cover only a small fraction of the actual needs of both residents and displaced persons. He explained that the systematic destruction of water networks and main wells has led to a sharp decline in the operational capacity of vital facilities, making water security a difficult daily task.

Field data indicate that some desalination plants in Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Deir al-Balah are still operating at their minimum capacity, but they face significant obstacles related to a lack of fuel and spare parts. This severe shortage of essential supplies and power generators directly impacts the regularity of water pumping operations and its distribution to densely populated residential areas.

Regarding Gaza City, Muhanna revealed that the water crisis, at its peak, exceeded 70% of the population who do not receive water regularly through the dilapidated networks. This reality has pushed the municipality to seek alternative and temporary solutions for water distribution, despite the immense pressures and the difficult humanitarian situation imposed by the continued siege and destruction.

With the approach of summer and rising temperatures, fears of an unprecedented escalation of the crisis are increasing due to rising water demand. Officials warned that if the situation remains as it is without urgent intervention, it will inevitably lead to a widespread thirst catastrophe, threatening public health and increasing the suffering of displaced and resident families.

The Gaza Municipality stressed the need for international action to immediately open the crossings to allow the entry of technical equipment and fuel necessary for the maintenance and operation of wells. It also called for the provision of alternative energy sources to ensure the continuation of a minimum level of basic services, emphasizing that large areas of the city have become completely isolated from the water network due to the total destruction of infrastructure.

The continuation of the current situation with rising temperatures portends a dangerous exacerbation of the crisis, which could lead to a widespread thirst crisis.

Medical warnings are escalating from within the dialysis rooms at Al-Shifa Medical Complex in Gaza City, where patients face a tragic reality resulting from dilapidated equipment and a lack of basic resources. Sources reported that the facility, which has been subjected to repeated shelling, suffers from continuous breakdowns of dialysis machines, putting the lives of hundreds at stake in the absence of alternatives.

In a scene that embodies the scale of the catastrophe, engineering and maintenance teams at the Ministry of Health are forced to race against time to keep the devices operational. Technicians perform complex and urgent maintenance on the machines at the very moment a patient is connected to them, to ensure the continuity of the blood dialysis process without sudden interruptions that could lead to death.

Ma'zen Al-Araishi, Director General of the Engineering and Maintenance Department at the Ministry of Health, confirmed that this reality threatens the lives of about 700 kidney patients across the Strip. He pointed out that the artificial kidney departments in major hospitals such as Al-Shifa Complex, Al-Aqsa Hospital, and Nasser Medical Complex are effectively on the verge of complete cessation of operations.

The continued operation of these devices depends on precise periodic maintenance programs according to international medical standards, where devices must be replaced or maintained after specific operating hours. With these hours exceeded without real maintenance, the devices become out of service, exacerbating the long waiting list for patients whose health condition cannot tolerate any delay.

The crisis is not limited to equipment only but extends to water purification stations, which are the essential lifeline for the dialysis process. This process requires water with very precise specifications, free of salts and impurities, which has become almost impossible to provide due to the breakdown of central stations in the Strip's major hospitals.

The Ministry of Health accused the occupation authorities of tightening the siege on the health sector and preventing the entry of essential humanitarian and medical aid despite existing understandings. This ban includes spare parts necessary for periodic maintenance, as well as filters and chemicals designated for water purification, which paralyzes the entire medical system.

As a result of this severe shortage, doctors were forced to make difficult decisions, including reducing the number of hours of weekly dialysis sessions for patients. After a patient used to receive three sessions, each lasting five hours, the duration has been reduced to only three hours, and in some cases, the number of sessions has been reduced to only two.

Statistics from the Palestinian Ministry of Health indicate that there are about 30,000 patients and wounded currently crowded inside the dilapidated hospitals in the Gaza Strip. These cases are awaiting coordination to travel through crossings to receive treatment abroad, after the local system lost its ability to deal with injuries and critical medical conditions.

This crisis comes at a time when Israel continues to violate the ceasefire agreement that began last October, by launching sporadic raids and changing the agreed-upon field lines. The restriction on the entry of trucks loaded with medical supplies also continues, deepening the wounds of the sector, most of whose infrastructure has been destroyed by the war.

International and Palestinian institutions renew their demands for the necessity of pressuring the occupation authorities to open all crossings, especially the Rafah crossing, to save thousands of lives. Doctors warn that the continuation of the current situation will turn waiting periods into final death sentences for patients who do not have the luxury of time to wait for political solutions.

What is happening is a mass death sentence for patients whose bodies are accumulating toxins as a result of the breakdown of purification stations and the prevention of spare parts entry.

Palestinian citizen Musa Al-Adra, a resident of the 'Rujum A'li' area in Masafer Yatta, south of Hebron, was subjected to a brutal assault by groups of settlers who stormed his home and sheep pen under the cover of darkness. The attackers cut the barbed wire fence surrounding the pen, causing the flock to scatter, while the occupation forces provided the necessary cover for the settlers to carry out their crime without any intervention to stop them.

Al-Adra woke up to the commotion of the sheep and rushed to try and save his only source of livelihood, but he faced an organized and armed gang that abused him and severely beat him. Faced with the large number of attackers, the citizen had no choice but to shout for help from his children and neighbors in the village, who rushed to assist under extremely dangerous security conditions.

During the attempt to confront the settlers, Musa's brother intercepted the attackers with his private vehicle. They responded by stabbing him with a knife and smashing the front windshield of his car before fleeing, taking a large part of the flock with them. Local sources reported that the settlers deliberately inflicted as much physical and material harm as possible on the family to intimidate them and prevent them from defending their property.

After arduous search operations, Al-Adra found only 20 sheep out of more than 200 he owned, with the rest stolen and taken to a nearby Israeli settlement. Among the missing were about 70 lambs that Al-Adra had cared for throughout the year to be used as sacrifices for the blessed Eid al-Adha, incurring heavy financial losses that the family cannot compensate.

In a familiar pattern of procrastination, the Israeli police and army refused to cooperate with the victim despite his immediate call to them at the moment of the attack. Instead, they added to his suffering by detaining him for hours inside the police station in the 'Kiryat Arba' settlement. The occupation authorities initially refused to officially receive his report, a behavior that confirms the clear complicity between the security system and the settlers in the West Bank.

Al-Adra expressed his genuine fears for the lives of his children, noting that he was forced to leave the sheep and return home quickly for fear that the settlers would throw incendiary 'Molotov' cocktails at his house and burn his family. This attack comes less than three weeks after settlers uprooted 50 olive trees from his land, indicating a systematic targeting of his presence in the area.

Human rights data indicates that these attacks fall within an Israeli strategy aimed at weakening the Palestinian economy in areas classified as 'C' to push residents towards forced displacement. These attacks vary between burning crops, demolishing structures, seizing pastures, and killing or stealing livestock, turning the lives of Palestinian farmers into a daily nightmare.

According to data issued by the human rights organization 'Al-Baydar', the phenomenon of livestock theft has seen a dangerous escalation, with settlers stealing more than 12,000 head of livestock since the beginning of 2025 until today. These figures, compared to 1,500 head stolen in 2024, confirm an unprecedented escalation in the economic war waged by settlers against Palestinian pastoral communities.

These attacks are not random; they are organized and politically systematic, aimed at weakening our economy and terrorizing us into displacement, but we will remain steadfast on our land.