On the Brink of Explosion: How Israelis Read the Escalation... and How They Push Towards It?

It is not new for Israeli military analysts to warn of the danger of escalation, but what is new is the way this warning is framed, where a tone of genuine concern is mixed with a calculated amount of dramatic suspense, in the context of a clear attempt to rearrange responsibilities, so that Israel appears to be standing on the sidelines observing, not as an active party contributing to shaping the course of events. In many Israeli readings, the Gulf turns into something akin to an open theater, and cinematic metaphors are invoked to describe what is happening, as if we are watching an “action movie on the shores of Hormuz.” However, this language is not innocent; rather, it reflects a mentality that sees war as an event whose rhythm can be controlled, or even exploited, as long as it does not directly rebound on the Israeli interior, and as long as its cost remains distributed across other arenas. Within this narrative, the scene is reduced to one character, Donald Trump, who is presented as the ultimate decision-maker, solely capable of pushing the region into war or bringing it back to calm. This reduction seems convenient for Israel, because it shifts the center of gravity to Washington and reduces its presence as a pressuring party, even though its actual behavior indicates the opposite. In reality, Trump's behavior reveals a clear contradiction between rhetoric and practice; he threatens to destroy Iran, but avoids engaging in an all-out war, and escalates politically and militarily at the same time he seeks a way out. This contradiction cannot be separated from the American domestic context, where war fatigue is increasing, and concerns about its economic repercussions, especially regarding energy prices, are growing. Thus, Trump seems to be seeking a political achievement without being dragged into the cost of war, which is an inherently fragile equation, because it constantly pushes the opposing party to test its limits. In contrast, Iran does not seem far from this logic, as it practices a form of calculated escalation that approaches the brink of confrontation without crossing it. Strikes targeting oil interests or maritime passages are not necessarily intended to ignite an all-out war, but rather aim to establish a deterrence equation and convey precise messages about the ability to inflict harm. However, this type of “critical balance” remains fraught with risks, because the accumulation of calculated steps may at some point lead to a loss of control. In this specific context, Israel appears as an “absent presence” in the discourse, but in reality, it is a key player in pushing towards expanding the circle of tension. Benjamin Netanyahu is not content with supporting the option of confrontation with Iran, but also works in parallel to keep the surrounding fronts in a state of low-intensity ignition, whether in Lebanon or in the Gaza Strip. In Lebanon, the ceasefire cannot be considered effective in the true sense, as strikes continue within carefully drawn limits, keeping the escalation under control without ending it. This situation does not reflect stability as much as it expresses continuous management of tension, where the possibility of sliding into a wider confrontation remains present at any moment, especially given the fragility of the rules of engagement. Between these two fronts, the limits of escalation are not only drawn by field considerations, but also by a broader political ceiling imposed by Washington. The rhythm within which operations move, in Lebanon as in Gaza, is inseparable from the calculations of the American administration, which tries to control the level of engagement and prevent it from sliding into a comprehensive regional confrontation. Thus, the question is no longer only related to what Israel wants or what other powers respond with, but to the extent to which Donald Trump is willing to allow these limits to be crossed, or redrawn according to his interests and internal balances. As for Gaza, matters take on a clearer character, where indicators accumulate of preparations for a new phase of escalation, through escalating political and military rhetoric, and re-proposing objectives that were not resolved in previous rounds. In this context, Gaza does not appear to be merely a separate arena of confrontation, but part of a broader pressure system used within regional calculations, which also applies to the Lebanese front. In this sense, Israel is not content with monitoring the escalation, but contributes to shaping its environment, by maintaining a permanent state of tension that allows it to maneuver, and keeps confrontation options open without bearing the cost of a full-scale explosion. Despite all this escalation, another path, less present in the media, is not absent, which is the continuation of indirect negotiation channels, revealing that the region is not necessarily heading towards an inevitable war, but is experiencing a state of continuous bargaining under fire. Iran links any progress to the lifting of the blockade, while the United States seeks to extract concessions on the nuclear file, while each party uses escalation tools to improve its negotiating terms. However, this overlap between negotiation and escalation creates an extremely fragile situation, where stability becomes dependent on the ability of all parties to precisely control the rhythm, which cannot be guaranteed given the multiplicity of fronts and the intertwining of interests. In light of this, the danger does not lie in a clear intention to launch an all-out war, but in the nature of the stage itself, where contradictory calculations intersect: an American administration seeking an achievement without cost, Iran practicing a policy of brinkmanship, and Israel pushing towards expanding the circle of engagement without being its direct arena. In such an environment, wars do not need major decisions as much as they need a small mistake. Then, the confrontation will not remain confined to the Gulf, and the fronts will not remain separate, but the entire region may turn into an open arena that is difficult to contain or predict its outcomes.