The absurdity of the relationship between Israel and Hamas

Written by: Professor Alon Ben-Meir
Given that Israel and Hamas cooperate overtly and tacitly on multiple fronts, one would think that they would finally realize that they are stuck and neither can escape from the other. It is time for both of them to come to terms with their inescapable reality and seek a long-term solution to their conflict.

In searching for a solution to the conflict between Israel and Hamas, one has to look at their reality and identify the elements that sustain their conflict and those that maintain a wide range of cooperation regardless of their hostile relationship. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) calls for the destruction of Israel, and Israel considers Hamas a "terrorist" organization that must be isolated and kept under siege. And while both sides "seem" to pitch conviction against the other, they also recognize that they are stuck together. Regardless of their public statements to the contrary, they privately admit that neither of them can get rid of the other. The absurdity of their relationship is that although they know the status quo cannot continue indefinitely, they make little if any effort to change the course of their conflict.

Since Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Israel and Hamas have fought four wars and dozens of violent incidents between them without achieving any lasting gains. Indeed, to the contrary, Israel has repeatedly suffered economic turmoil as a result of intermittent violence and wars, while the Palestinians have suffered widespread devastation, thousands dead, and tens of thousands who will continue to endure years of despair and devastation from war in the aftermath of these violent confrontations.

The conflict between them continues because Hamas wants to preserve its political standing in the eyes of its public by showing militancy and confrontational resistance against Israel in its public statements and actions, and strengthening its role at the forefront of the struggle against the occupation and the blockade. On the other hand, Israel strictly maintains its blockade and control over people and goods at the crossings to and from Gaza, and when necessary uses military force to subdue any major violent provocations by invading Gaza and "mowing the lawn" to prevent Hamas from advancing or revival.

Meanwhile, despite its failure to reap tangible benefits over the years, Hamas still refuses to renounce violence against Israel and continues to build up its arsenal of weapons (mostly rockets). On the other hand, Israel is preparing for the next round of hostilities, but each time it fails to change the dynamics of the conflict in its favour. The paradox here is that while this situation is outwardly perfect, they continue to deal directly but tacitly with each other or through Egypt. They negotiate specific security or economic measures after each war breaks out and reach new agreements on the various conflicting issues that unintentionally arise as a result of the futile reality of their confrontation.
The absurdity or absurdity of the relationship between Israel and Hamas is threefold. The paradox in the first sense is that Hamas was created by Israel itself, which has been confirmed by many senior Israeli military and civilian officials over several years. Former Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, who was Israel's military ruler in Gaza in the early 1980s, told a New York Times reporter that he helped fund Hamas as a "counterweight" to the secular and leftists in the PLO and Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, saying that "the Israeli government She gave me a budget and the military government used to give it to mosques." Among many others, Avner Cohen—a former Israeli religious affairs official who worked in Gaza for more than two decades—told the Wall Street Journal in 2009 that "Hamas, very unfortunately, is a creation of Israel."

The IDF's thinking at the time was that it would be enormously beneficial to Israel if the religiously observant Hamas and the socialist Palestine Liberation Organization continued to fight each other rather than Israel. Certainly, Israel helped transform a "bandit" of Palestinian Islamists in the late 1970s into a relatively large force. And for most Israelis, this fact is either unknown or easily dismissed as a conspiracy theory. The Israeli leaders at that time (Rabin and Shamir) did not know that Hamas would become the sworn enemy of Israel.

The second aspect of the absurd relationship between Israel and Hamas is that while Israel officially refuses to negotiate with any "terrorist" organization, and certainly does not in any way aid or support any of them, it finds itself in a different predicament when it comes to Hamas. Other than occasionally slowing or suspending traffic through the two crossings under Israeli control (Erez for people and Kerem Shalom for goods) due to violent incidents, Israel has no other choice but to allow supplies of food, construction materials, medical equipment, and oil and gas to cross into Gaza. In addition, Israel is funneling money to Hamas from various donors, notably Qatar, while allowing up to 17,000 Palestinian workers from Gaza to work in Israel on a daily basis to ease the severe economic hardships most Palestinians in the Strip suffer from.

And the third is that even though both parties know that they are stuck and must live with each other indefinitely, they still refuse to accept the other's inescapable existence. Speaking to dozens of Israelis and Palestinians about the continuing unstable situation between the two sides, I found little consensus about the nature of any potential solution. However, there was general agreement that neither could get rid of the other. The question is, since they must regularly confront and interact on so many levels, why not seek a permanent solution to the conflict, given their present reality?

The answer is that there are many other elements at play in the conflict that make it so difficult to resolve, including historical narratives, religious connections, psychology, and emotional states whose mitigation are prerequisites for finding a solution. Although all Palestinians share the same historical perspective, sentiments, mentality, and beliefs, the extremism and intolerance of Hamas as they relate to all these elements makes its prospect of moderation more difficult and complex.

Hamas, like most Palestinians, believes in the Palestinians' right to the historical land of their ancestors, demands a Palestinian state on all of historic Palestine (including Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel), and goes further than other Palestinians in insisting that this will be an Islamic state. And although it remains unbelievable for Hamas to give up so much of what it considers to be historical Palestine, they also know deep down that it will be impossible to fully recover it. The most they can hope for is the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders which they have offered on several occasions, and these include the West Bank with some land swaps and all of Gaza.

And as an organization rooted in Islam, Hamas has a strong religious connection to the land. Its charter proclaims its belief that “the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf dedicated to future generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgment,” and Hamas refers to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in fanatical terms as indisputable evidence of its sacred relationship with it.

More than 70 years of bloody conflict that necessitated the drain of heavy human and material resources, suffering and disintegration, certainly left deep and indelible psychological suffering and resistance that continues to haunt all Palestinians, especially the people of Gaza. Regardless of Hamas' obstinacy and missed opportunities over the years, the blockade of Gaza only deepens their psychological trauma and provides a constant reminder of their miserable situation for which they blame Israel.

Finally, any reasoned discourse is overshadowed by the emotional component. Hamas is at the head of the emotionally distraught and exhausted Palestinian population of Gaza, with a deep sense of hopelessness. Day in and day out they are struggling to make ends meet without much relief in sight. Their emotional resistance to the blockade incites hatred against Israel and generates a strong desire for revenge that leaves little room for understanding and reconciliation with the Israeli reality.

Even after the most thorough examination of the above four points, and regardless of Israel's convincing explanation for Hamas' intransigence, one conclusion remains inescapable: Nothing will change the need for reconciliation with Israel. In the last analysis, Hamas must still find a way to come to terms with Israel's existence because neither Hamas nor Israel can eliminate each other's existence - not now, not in ten years, not anytime in the foreseeable future.

To this end, I must ask every member of the Hamas leadership to look in the mirror and ask themselves the following question, and answer it honestly: Under what circumstances and under what conditions, how, when, and by what means will Hamas be in a position to destroy Israel? If they are honest with themselves, the answer will be never at any time.
Maybe it's time for them to be bold and clear. If one day Israel faces a clear and present existential threat, it will unleash all its military power to completely and ruthlessly eliminate the source of the threat that will end the existence of Hamas or any other sworn enemies of Israel.

And every political leader in Israel must also ask a similar question, which is, will there ever be a circumstance under which Israel can completely get rid of Hamas? The answer here would also be an emphatic no. And so, notwithstanding their deep enmity towards each other and their mutually destructive thinking, they are stuck with each other and there is no point in waiting for the day when either can achieve a unilateral and permanent victory over the other. That day will not come, the dynamic of the conflict will not change dramatically, and the potential for recurring violent confrontations is everywhere. Regardless of who will form the next Israeli government, whether Netanyahu or Lapid, public discourse should begin on this issue.

In August, Hamas showed restraint by not joining the Islamic Jihad's missile attack on Israel, which ended in "Islamic Jihad's humiliation" as a result of Israel's retaliation! Hamas has also shown that the interest of the people it rules comes first, and has refrained from joining the recent violent unrest in the West Bank. This may not seem particularly noticeable; However, these events provide an opportunity for both Israel and Hamas to build on.

In the short term, Israel should reciprocate by increasing the number of Palestinian workers from Gaza who can work in Israel from the current number of 20,000 to 30,000 as reported by the Qatari envoy to Gaza Mohammed Al-Emadi who meets regularly with Israeli and Palestinian officials and expediting, whenever possible By transferring money and transporting goods to Gaza. Moreover, Israel should make it easier for Palestinians who need urgent medical care to receive it in Israel, as well as facilitate the exit of Palestinian students from Gaza to universities.

On the other hand, Hamas should not provoke Israel and should continue to gradually moderate its vitriolic public narrative against Israel and rein in Islamic Jihad from provoking Israel. Neither side will lose face by cooperating at this level and gradually expanding their cooperation without much fanfare.

In the long term, Hamas should renew its call for a 15-20 year cease-fire (hudna) and tacitly agree with Israel that during this period it will focus on building the state rather than buying more weapons and missiles to prepare for the next round of hostilities, while distancing itself About Iran. Both Israel and Hamas should develop a credible and mutually acceptable mechanism for this. The idea, in fact, behind the long-term cease-fire is to provide the building blocks for a permanent peace agreement based on a two-state solution negotiated jointly with or separately from the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. In any case, a long-term ceasefire remains a critical first step toward that end.

Hamas signaling its willingness to cease all hostilities is not surrender - it is the moral and most beneficial thing for its people. The same goes for Israel. The notion, for many Israelis, that Hamas simply cannot be reformed is absurd. The same has been said about the Palestine Liberation Organization. Israel has nothing to lose by also indicating that it is open to dialogue with the aim of reaching an interim agreement.

I must appeal to the Hamas leadership to reflect on the plight of its people. Their suffering will not end until the blockade is finally lifted. Instead of training another generation of fighters for desperate battles and sacrificing themselves for the imaginary goal of destroying Israel, Hamas is obligated to think carefully about their future and aspire for a new dawn and a new beginning that they so crave, richly deserve and proud of in their accomplishments, if only they had the chance.

It is time for Israel to confront the reality of Hamas and address the consequences of its creation. Conversely, Hamas has to accept the reality of Israel however unacceptable that may be, simply because they have no other choice.