Where did they get the theory of "the weak are victorious if they are not defeated"?

The Iranian Foreign Minister recently declared that Hamas had won the last aggression/war! Hamas’s mouthpieces and theorists also come out with a new theory in political science that I have never heard before, which points to the same conclusion, which is “If the strong does not win, then it is defeated, and if the weak does not lose, then it is victorious”!

This theory is very strange to the theories of political science, and is closer to the famous Arab saying, "Explain water after effort with water." The reason for the distortion and invalidity of this theory is that it does not explain the meaning of victory or the meaning of defeat. Therefore, the reader must make a great effort to understand this theory, which is contradictory in its logic, and necessarily submit to the result that its proponents want to promote, which is that Hamas won the last war. As a result, its alleged victory gives it legitimacy to restore its rule over the Gaza Strip, even if the Strip is completely destroyed, and more than a quarter of the population is martyred and wounded!

First, I would like to say that even if Israel did not achieve all of its goals in the last war, and this is relatively true, this premise does not necessarily lead to the assumption that Hamas has won, as Israel could fail to achieve all of its goals at a time when Hamas has lost this battle, as there is no contradiction between the two statements, as the damage that befell Hamas is much greater than the damage and cost that befell Israel.

In fact, political literature measures the meaning of victory and defeat by two basic standards: The first standard is the results. That is, which side do the results favor? The second standard is the costs. That is, are the costs proportional to the benefit obtained by each side in the results of the war? If we apply these two rules to the results of the October 7 aggression, we find the following:

First, the basis of the results of the aggression: In this context, the fragile armistice agreement reflects the results of the aggression, which we see as largely in favor of the occupying state. Even in light of our lack of knowledge of all the provisions of the secret annexes in the agreement, some of which were announced by the Hebrew media, we find the following observations that clearly indicate that the results of the agreement were, overall, in favor of Israel. Among these observations on the agreement:

1- The agreement cut off 16% of the Gaza Strip’s area as a buffer zone.

2- The agreement stipulated the safe exit of more than 18,000 Hamas military leaders under the category of wounded fighters.

3- The agreement did not mention any political provisions regarding the day following the aggression, and it also avoided referring to any political formula that talks about the Palestinian state, the right of return, stopping the escalation in the West Bank, or other legal issues for the Palestinian people.

4- The agreement stipulates a joint Israeli-Arab-international administration of the Gaza Strip. For example, Israel and the United States control who enters and exits the Strip through their security offices in the Strip. American security companies also control the inspection of displaced persons returning from the south to the north. These companies also control reconstruction and the distribution of aid. It may be revealed in the coming days that these companies have settlement programs in northern Gaza.

5- The agreement does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire, and there are no mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire.

Second, the cost base: Although the agreement is expected to succeed in releasing about 1,750 Palestinian prisoners, including hundreds of life sentences, and the agreement succeeded in a temporary ceasefire, we find that these benefits do not equal the size of the great sacrifices paid by the Palestinian people in the war of genocide, where more than 70% of the buildings in the Strip were destroyed, the infrastructure was destroyed, and more than a million Palestinians were displaced from their homes, in addition, of course, to the martyrdom, injury, and loss of more than 200,000 Palestinians. These exorbitant costs take us back to the memory of the Palestinian Nakba in 1948, and these great sacrifices were not matched by benefits of their size, as the agreement did not stipulate a Palestinian state, nor a halt to settlements, or a halt to settler attacks, or the emptying of prisons, or the right of return, all of which are political issues that express the rights of the Palestinian people and their national constants. On the other hand, the agreement does not guarantee a permanent ceasefire. On the contrary, Israeli statements indicate that the occupation is preparing today before tomorrow to resume its aggression on Gaza. Regarding the issue of prisoner exchange, Israel has arrested more than 6,000 Palestinian prisoners after October 7, excluding the prisoners from Gaza. The expected number to be released in the agreement does not equal 15% of them. The agreement excluded discussing the senior leadership prisoners such as Ahmed Saadat, Marwan Barghouti, Hassan Salameh, and others. The agreement also stipulated the deportation of prisoners serving life sentences outside Palestine. This deportation constitutes a dangerous precedent, whereby Hamas recognizes Israel’s right to deport Palestinians, and deprives the captive movement from returning to their homes, children, and homeland.

In the previous context, we find that Hamas absolutely lost its war with Israel, and that its military parade in the ceremony of handing over the Israeli prisoners does not indicate that it has won, as the handover engineers wanted to show the public that they are still there and able to rule Gaza. If the criterion for victory was the survival of the political authority in power after the wars, we would have considered that we have won all our wars with Israel because our Arab and Palestinian regimes continued to rule after 1948, 1967, the Second Intifada, and other wars in which the regimes continued to rule after the heavy losses inflicted on their people.

What prompted me to write about this topic is not my insistence on criticizing Hamas or completely refuting its alleged narrative of victory, as it did in its five previous wars with Israel, but what prompted me to do so is, first, the scientific and combative responsibility that falls on researchers, which forces them to tell the truth before the people, and second, the necessity of stating that we cannot defeat Israel without acknowledging the reality of defeat and loss, as we must acknowledge to ourselves first and to our people second, the reality of the second catastrophe that befell us, so that our mistakes are not repeated and we bear our responsibilities before our people, as a result of engaging in ill-considered military battles and adventures. This is important, and more important than that is that this acknowledgment helps us evaluate our ability to determine the available alternatives that guarantee us reaching national interests at the lowest possible cost.