Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad: The repetition of Israeli claims regarding Hamas's readiness for a new round of fighting is used as a pretext to push for field movements in search of a political "victory". Talal Awkal: What is happening reflects an Israeli insistence on military decisive action and disregard for political paths, which portends further escalation and deterioration in Gaza in the coming period. Hani Abu Al-Siba': Changes within the leadership of the Hamas movement, including the return of Meshaal, may reflect a tendency towards addressing the sector's crises through the political path. Dr. Aql Salah: These mobilizations do not mean the imminent outbreak of a comprehensive war, but rather their use as a deterrent and a means of pressure while maintaining military readiness for broader scenarios. Majed Hudaib: The method of announcing the mobilization and marketing it as part of a psychological war targeting the people of the sector and Hamas aims to create a state of confusion and internal division. Sari Sammour: The nature of American intervention will determine the form of escalation, whether it is a widespread war that may reach the level of genocide or merely tactical strikes and military maneuvers. Ramallah - Exclusive to "Al-Quds" - With the Israeli occupation moving to deploy six military divisions around the Gaza Strip, in a step that reflects unprecedented field preparations, fears are escalating about the possibility of the aggression expanding into a comprehensive war and the return of a comprehensive war of extermination on the Strip, and perhaps a return to displacement scenarios and the occupation of the Strip, which constitutes another suffering for the residents. According to writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors, in separate interviews with "Al-Quds", this mobilization comes in parallel with a hardline political and media discourse that promotes the possibilities of confrontation, which reinforces the impression that the coming period may witness a shift in the nature of military operations since the ceasefire agreement came into effect in October 2025, which is already witnessing daily violations. These reinforcements, according to writers, analysts, specialists, and university professors, were accompanied by strict field measures, including expanding the scope of control over the land, tightening the siege, reducing the flow of humanitarian aid, in addition to disrupting any international arrangements for managing the sector, which indicates a trend towards imposing a new reality through military tools and multi-level pressures, beyond mere defensive preparations. On the other hand, they believe that these mobilizations may be linked to internal political calculations led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in an effort to achieve electoral, political, and security gains. They point out that between scenarios of gradual escalation or limited operations, Gaza remains open to possibilities that portend complex field developments in the coming period. A serious trend towards resuming military operations. Writer and political analyst Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad believes that the escalating Israeli mobilization around the Gaza Strip reflects a serious trend towards resuming military operations, in light of a widespread incitement campaign led by the Israeli government, army, and media, in addition to some leaders of Israeli parties, who promote a narrative that the Hamas movement has regained its strength, is recruiting new elements, controls daily life, confiscates aid, and refuses to hand over weapons. Awad explains that this incitement is accompanied by dangerous field steps, including the so-called demarcation of the "Orange Line", which expands the scope of Israeli control beyond the "Yellow Line", meaning the occupation of more than 60% of the Gaza Strip. Awad points out that Israel announced the prevention of the "Stability Force" and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza from entering the Strip, in the context of dedicating full control over various aspects of life. Israel effectively controls Gaza. Awad clarifies that Israel effectively controls all humanitarian and living aspects in Gaza, starting from closing crossings and restricting the movement of individuals, to sharply reducing the entry of aid, as the number of trucks decreased from about 600 to less than 50 trucks, which reflects a systematic policy of tightening. Awad confirms that the repetition of Israeli claims regarding Hamas's readiness for a new round of fighting is used as a pretext to push the military establishment towards field movements, in search of a political "victory", especially in light of internal pressures on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faces criticism for not achieving a tangible achievement in Gaza, with Hamas remaining a key player in the administration of the Strip. Awad suggests that any upcoming escalation may not be like previous wars, but rather may take the form of "selective strikes" or rapid operations, considering that this mobilization involves great risks and open possibilities for widespread escalation. Attempts to achieve victory before the upcoming elections. Awad points out that Israeli goals go beyond the military dimension, to include the pursuit of a "victory" before the upcoming elections, and the consideration of re-establishing settlements in Gaza, in addition to economic and investment interests related to trade corridors and regional projects in which Gaza may be a pivotal part. Awad believes that Israel also seeks to separate Gaza from the West Bank, and prevent the internationalization of the issue, by keeping the Strip under its direct control and turning it into an internal matter, warning that these indicators may portend difficult days ahead, in light of plans that may include the displacement of residents and the re-imposition of full control over the Strip. The war that did not stop on Gaza. Writer and political analyst Talal Awkal confirms that Israel did not stop its war on the Gaza Strip, but rather continued its policies aimed at thwarting the so-called "Trump plan", and disrupting the implementation of the requirements of its first phase, despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's earlier announcement of approval. Awkal explains that Netanyahu's approval of the plan was merely a tactical step, as it was clear that he was betting on its failure, and was working to undermine any path that might limit Israel's freedom of action within the Strip. Awkal points out that Netanyahu adheres to the policy of "permanent war" as a fixed approach, in an attempt to achieve a military victory that he has not been able to achieve on any of the fronts he has moved between in the past period. Awkal believes that in light of the relative calm on other fronts, Netanyahu seeks to escalate the situation in Gaza, by gradually increasing the pace of operations, starting from assassinations and tightening the siege, leading to a stage that may approach a "war of extermination". Awkal points out that the Israeli government announced that the mission of disarming Hamas and eliminating it will be entrusted to the Israeli army, confirming the trend towards military decisive action. Awkal clarifies that Israel refused to allow the entry of the National Committee concerned with the administration of Gaza, as well as representatives of the peacekeeping forces, in a step aimed at blocking any international or regional arrangements that might restrict its movements or impose obligations on it within the framework of the proposed plan. He points out that although some estimates believe that Netanyahu is exploiting the preoccupation of the United States and mediators with developments in the Gulf region, the matter goes beyond that to "American complicity", which allows Israel to move freely in the Strip without actual restrictions. Awkal confirms that this path indicates that escalation is imminent, and that the ultimate goal is to impose full control over the Gaza Strip, considering this the "only victory" that Netanyahu can market internally. He warns that achieving this goal would undermine any political horizon related to the establishment of a Palestinian state, pointing out that this trend constitutes a central goal for various segments of the Israeli political scene. Awkal believes that the continuation of these policies reflects an Israeli insistence on resolving the conflict militarily, while ignoring political paths, which portends further escalation and deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in the Gaza Strip in the coming period. Activating "Order 8". Writer, political analyst, and specialist in Israeli affairs Hani Abu Al-Siba' believes that there are a number of field and political indicators that suggest the approaching return of fighting in the Gaza Strip, in light of escalating demands within the Israeli military establishment to resume operations, and several sessions held within the "Cabinet" to discuss this option. He explains that among the most prominent of these indicators is what Hebrew news websites reported about the re-activation of "Order 8" for calling up reserve forces, in addition to calls launched by the Israeli Minister of Settlement to begin establishing new settlements within the Strip, in a step that reflects a strategic trend that goes beyond mere military operations to reshaping the geographical and political reality in Gaza. Abu Al-Siba' points out that the Hebrew media recently returned to talking about the "growing strength of the resistance", claiming that it succeeded in recruiting thousands of elements and rebuilding part of the tunnel network, despite the Israeli army's control over about 59% of the Strip, and the continued tight siege imposed on it. Attempt to cut off "oxygen" from the resistance. Abu Al-Siba' points out that the resistance's recent response on May 2nd, in which it refused to hand over its weapons in exchange for reconstruction and postponing this file until the final solution, was considered by Israel a violation of the truce agreement and a justification for returning to fighting, especially in light of hardline positions within the government, where both Ben Gvir and Smotrich expressed their rejection of the truce, considering that it gives "oxygen" to the resistance. Abu Al-Siba' points out that there are estimates that the changes within the leadership of the Hamas movement, including the return of Khaled Meshaal, known for his political diplomacy, to the presidency of the movement, may reflect a tendency towards addressing the sector's crises through the political path, which is supported by the statements of the movement's spokesman Hazem Qassem, who confirmed that the resistance will not repeat the experience of 1982 in Lebanon, when weapons were handed over and the camps were later subjected to massacres. Abu Al-Siba' confirms that the possibilities of resuming the war remain, and even represent a desire for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but regional developments, most notably the possibility of renewed confrontation with Iran, may lead to a postponement of this scenario. Attempts to erase the repercussions of October 7th. Abu Al-Siba' points out that the sector, after the cessation of rocket fire for more than half a year, and the continued siege from various sides, no longer poses a direct threat, but the Israeli right-wing government believes that the repercussions of October 7, 2023, cannot be erased except through a new escalation, which may take the form of widespread military operations that bring more destruction and losses. Mobilization as a psychological warfare tool. Writer, political researcher, and professor of comparative political systems Dr. Aql Salah emphasizes that the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip has not actually stopped, but has taken different forms and tools, pointing to the continued shelling, assassinations, and targeting of police stations and patrols, in addition to carrying out special operations, and the presence of "cooperating militias" that carry out field missions with the support and protection of Israeli aircraft. Salah explains that the escalating Israeli military mobilization around the Strip represents a psychological warfare tool, aimed at exerting military pressure to obtain political concessions from the Hamas movement, especially in the file of disarming the resistance, a goal that Israel failed to achieve during the war. Salah points out that these mobilizations seek to push the Hamas movement to accept American-Israeli conditions, with the threat that all options, including military escalation, remain open in case of rejection. Weakening the capabilities of the resistance. Salah points out that these mobilizations may be used to carry out a multi-pronged attack simultaneously, with the aim of weakening the capabilities of the resistance, in parallel with supporting cooperating militias to carry out assassinations within the areas controlled by Hamas, to avoid the risks of occupation forces being captured or directly targeted in areas of resistance influence. Salah explains that these mobilizations carry a dual message; the first is directed at Israeli society to show the army's readiness to wage a new war despite its involvement on other fronts, and the second is directed at the international community to prepare it for the possibility of the war continuing or escalating. Salah points out that these mobilizations do not necessarily mean the imminent outbreak of a comprehensive war, but can be used as a deterrent and a means of pressure while maintaining military readiness for broader scenarios. Salah links these mobilizations to internal Israeli political calculations, especially with the approaching elections, considering that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to achieve tangible achievements, in light of his declining popularity after failures on other fronts such as Lebanon and Iran. An attempt to boost political capital. Salah points out that the move towards Gaza, as the weakest front, may constitute an attempt to boost political capital, in addition to maintaining the cohesion of the right-wing coalition, including figures such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir. Regarding the expected scenarios, Salah believes that the most likely scenario is Hamas's rejection of the demand for disarmament, due to its political and national dimensions, which will push Israel to carry out limited and calculated ground military operations, aimed at increasing pressure through temporary incursions, supported by intensive air and artillery strikes targeting a "target bank" that has been updated after the current truce period. Improving negotiation terms. Salah clarifies that this pattern of operations aims to improve negotiation terms and impose new security arrangements, considering that military mobilization constitutes a central "pressure card", and a real test of Hamas's ability to withstand politically and militarily. Salah confirms that the continuation of this approach means that the cycle of escalation remains open, considering that the only solution lies in ending the occupation and recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people, and reaching a long-term truce, otherwise the region will remain vulnerable to repeated waves of escalation, in light of Israel's reliance on the "big stick" and hardline political discourse to achieve its goals without sliding into a comprehensive war at the present stage. The possibility of preparing for a long-term war. Writer and political analyst Majed Hudaib believes that the recent Israeli military mobilization cannot be considered a routine measure, but rather represents a multi-dimensional strategic signal, involving military, political, and psychological messages. Hudaib explains that the military significance of this mobilization may reflect actual readiness to carry out a ground invasion of the Strip, or a shift in Israeli doctrine from managing the conflict with the Hamas movement to an attempt to resolve it and end its existence, in addition to the possibility of preparing for a long-term war that may extend beyond the electoral deadlines within Israel. Hudaib points out that this mobilization sends messages to three main parties; first, the Hamas movement, as part of pressuring it during the ongoing negotiations, second, the Israeli public, to show that the army still retains its deterrent capability and has not been affected by what is being raised about failures, and third, what is known as the axis of resistance, as a sign of Israel's readiness to engage in confrontations on several fronts, in an attempt to consolidate the image of the "invincible army". Psychological warfare targeting the people of Gaza and Hamas. Hudaib points out that the media and psychological dimension constitutes an important pillar in this mobilization, as the method of announcing and marketing it falls within the framework of psychological warfare targeting the people of the Gaza Strip and the Hamas movement alike, with the aim of creating a state of confusion and perhaps internal division, whether at the popular level or within the structure of the movement, especially in light of growing voices criticizing the continuation of the war and questioning its feasibility. Military readiness. Hudaib proposes three main paths regarding the possible scenarios, the first is the "pressure scenario", where Israel keeps its forces on standby while carrying out limited air strikes or qualitative operations, with the aim of achieving political or security gains without sliding into a comprehensive war, especially in light of its awareness of the complexities after any ground invasion of costly political implications, as well as international reservations, especially from the United States, in light of the continued proposal of the "Trump plan". The possibility of carrying out a limited military operation. As for the second scenario, according to Hudaib, it involves carrying out a limited military operation, including localized ground incursions in some areas, met by withdrawal from other areas, with continued air strikes, assassinations, and targeting of facilities that Israel considers a potential threat. This scenario, according to Hudaib, aims to restore deterrence, especially in light of Israel's belief that Hamas is trying to reorganize its ranks and strengthen its control over the vital aspects of life in the Strip. The possibility of a comprehensive war breaking out. Hudaib points to the third scenario, which is the most dangerous, and remains linked to the possibility of a comprehensive war leading to a complete occupation of the Gaza Strip, but Hudaib rules out this option at the current stage, suggesting that it will only materialize if negotiations completely collapse, the role of mediators declines, and the level of internal pressure in Israel rises, in addition to a significant field escalation. Hudaib points out that the current field indicators do not support the hypothesis of moving towards a comprehensive war, explaining that the absence of measures such as evacuating settlements in the Gaza envelope, or a widespread call-up of reserve forces, or operating field hospitals, indicates that matters are still within control, which reinforces the likelihood of the "pressure without war" scenario as the closest option at the current stage. The return of war depends on the American position. Writer and political analyst Sari Sammour believes that the continuous Israeli threats towards the Gaza Strip, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu along with political and military leaders, come in the context of an attempt to impose what is called "disarmament", pointing out that what Israel failed to achieve on the ground it seeks to impose through negotiations, and with the failure of that, it returns to threatening to resume aggression, "which has not actually stopped". Sammour explains that the issue of launching a large-scale military campaign on Gaza remains dependent on the decision of the American administration, wondering whether it will give Israel the green light for a comprehensive invasion or be content with allowing limited operations. Sammour points out that the nature of American intervention will determine the form of escalation, whether it is a widespread war that may reach the level of genocide as happened previously, or merely tactical strikes and military maneuvers. Moving to the second phase without implementing the requirements of the first. Sammour points to several possible scenarios, including the possibility that the current threats are a pressure tool at the negotiating table to push the Palestinian side to accept Israeli conditions and move to the second phase without implementing the requirements of the first phase, and in line with what is known as the "Trump plan". Sammour points to the possibility of expanding Israeli military operations, based on statements by Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir about the expectation of a multi-front war breaking out in 2026, including Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria, in addition to the West Bank. Sammour also proposed a third scenario, which is that the United States controls the pace of escalation, by preventing a comprehensive war and contenting itself with intensifying assassinations and increasing their pace for a limited period, despite the devastating effects it may have on the population in the Gaza Strip. The field may hold surprises. Regarding the resistance's ability to confront, Sammour believes that the picture is still unclear, stressing that the field often holds surprises. Sammour emphasizes that Israel has consistently targeted civilians, especially displaced persons in harsh humanitarian conditions, with a severe shortage of water and food, which makes any new escalation have a high human cost. Sammour points out that the Israeli assessment is based on the world's preoccupation with other issues, especially with Iran, which may reduce international pressure on any new military operation in Gaza. Sammour rules out that the resistance will make fundamental concessions, due to the lack of real guarantees, especially since Israel "always looks for pretexts to continue aggression". Sammour believes that the escalation may remain limited if other fronts witness dramatic developments, such as the expansion of confrontation with Iran or Lebanon, which may push Israel to redistribute its forces and focus on other fronts, while keeping pressure on Gaza within certain limits.