The reality that Israel is circumventing

Those who promote the "inevitability" of Israel's success in achieving the goals it set for the war stress that without thinking and planning for the "next day," the greatest possibility is that Israel will find itself in a reality no less bad than October 7, 2023...

In the midst of the Israeli consensus on the war against the Gaza Strip, and on the necessity of retaliation against the Hamas movement and the Palestinian resistance for the general outcome of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, there are few voices in Israel that rebel against this consensus and side with reality, and not with the image drawn about it by the political and military leaders and strikers. With their sword, especially in the media.

However, from these few voices we can learn a lot about this reality that is being circumvented. Aside from general or constructive formulations, what is meant here can be represented by addressing two of the many areas that this war sparked and continues to raise great controversy over.

The first area relates to the ground military operation in the Gaza Strip, which is being delayed in carrying out, according to what is being reported by Israeli and foreign media these days. While most media reports and military analysts are preoccupied with the reasons for this reluctance, and what they perhaps refer to as a discussion between the political and military levels and between Israel and the United States, which for the first time in Israel’s history participates in decision-making related to the war in general, and its military operations in particular, it is only concerned with what We know the name that is being circulated for it, which is “the maneuver,” and the military connotations it means that we do not have the necessary means to read, as well as the possibilities that it will succeed in achieving the goals set for it by the Military Ministerial Council, most notably undermining the military and authoritarian capabilities of the Hamas movement, and creating a new security governance system. In the Gaza Strip.

This preoccupation also points to another reason for this reluctance, which is taking into account the danger of combustion in the north, and perhaps in the entire Middle East. Despite all this, it must be noted that these few voices stress, in what may be considered an out-of-touch tweet, the necessity of not underestimating the capabilities of the Palestinian resistance, the depth of its thinking, and the possibility that it has been preparing to confront such an operation for more than a decade, including This would turn it into a deadly trap for members of the Israeli army.

According to Yossi Melman, one of the most prominent analysts of security affairs in Israel, all Israeli scenarios related to the aim of undermining Hamas' capabilities can only be described as pipe dreams. He is not satisfied with this conclusion only in its generality, but also goes into the details of these capabilities, which indicate, according to what he writes, that the movement possesses an arsenal of tens of thousands of rockets and missiles that guarantee it daily launches towards “Israeli territory” at great rates for two consecutive months, not to mention the presence of Armed forces number, according to his estimates, no less than 20,000 fighters, in addition to tens of thousands of other people who have work and employment relations with the Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip and who form a support for the fighters.

The second area is related to the other goal of the Israeli war, which was formulated by the Military Ministerial Council in the phrase: creating a new security governance system in the Gaza Strip. In this regard, it must be noted that even those who promote the “inevitability” of Israel’s success in achieving the goals it set for the war, stress that without thinking and planning for “the next day,” the greatest possibility is that Israel will find itself in a reality no less bad than October 7. October 1, 2023, starting with continued control over the sector, leading to “the emergence of a government vacuum that could be filled by extremist parties from different regions in the Middle East.”

In all cases, the result is a return to “drowning in the Gazan mire.” On the other hand, voices outside the consensus confirm that what Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” demonstrated is that Palestinian awareness of truth and resistance is constant and cannot be changed, just as the Americans failed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, what is required are realistic goals that are not those set by the government.