Palestinians at a Crossroads

Discussion of the post-Israeli war on the Gaza Strip is not a trivial matter. Rather, it is a foundational step toward a future that signals the demise of the Palestinian national project, especially with US President Donald Trump escaping any constraints. This will be the case unless the Palestinians rectify the situation and begin a comprehensive critical review to learn from mistakes and rebuild this system on new foundations, the primary goal of which is to dedicate all its resources and capabilities to ensuring the entrenchment of Palestinians in their country.

Historical experience teaches us that the most important outcome of wars is not the massacres and horrors they cause. These matters, despite their gravity, are quickly overcome after the wars end, and the focus shifts to addressing their repercussions and coping with their memories. The most important outcomes of wars always result from the shift in the balance of power between the warring parties, which allows the victorious parties to impose settlements that achieve their goals on the losing parties. A study of the history of wars tells us that these settlements are important, because each time they lead to the formation of a new reality. This reality is not limited to the possibility of changing political maps, by altering the borders of countries and completely eliminating others, or by moving groups of people from one region to another, which results in changing the demographic nature of multiple countries. Rather, wars lead to fundamental shifts in political orientations and undermine the national aspirations of many peoples and ethnic groups.

Over the past fifteen months, the attention of various parties has been focused on monitoring the course of the war waged by Israel on the Gaza Strip. This follow-up has been intense, given the severity of the war, its vast scope, the comprehensiveness of its targeting, the high number of civilian casualties, and the magnitude of the destruction it has inflicted on all aspects of life in that limited area, which Israel intended to inflict a major catastrophe on. Israel's goal in this war was not only to avenge Operation Protective Edge, but also to achieve a much more far-reaching strategic goal, one that is always present in Zionist ideology: emptying the land of its Palestinian inhabitants. An opportunity it had always longed for presented itself, and it transformed its revenge into a war of extermination, employing all its foreign alliances and destructive capabilities to transform the Gaza Strip into an area unfit for human habitation, in order to force the greatest number of Palestinians to leave and evacuate the area. Shortly after the war began, discussions began in regional and Western capitals regarding the "day after," i.e., post-war arrangements. Most of these discussions focused on finding an acceptable alternative to govern the Gaza Strip after the elimination of Hamas, which was considered a foregone conclusion. The focus was also on the Israeli government's efforts to prolong the war and its presence in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority's demands to regain control of the Strip, calls from here and there for a regional and international presence, even for a transitional period, and Hamas's efforts to ensure it is not excluded from consideration. Furthermore, the root cause of the conflict, the continued occupation, and the need to find a final and permanent settlement were not addressed. This issue was not given the seriousness it deserved. Were it not for Saudi Arabia's stipulation that normalizing its relations with Israel be coupled with a credible path to establishing a Palestinian state, and others' clichéd appeals and demands for the necessity of establishing such a state, the need to address the conflict's root causes would have been completely absent from the agenda. The course of the war and the future of governance in Gaza have dominated the scene.

Now that a temporary ceasefire "deal" has been reached, it is hoped that if its three phases are implemented, it will lead to an end to the fighting. However, for the war to finally end, it is worth monitoring not only how the future situation in the Gaza Strip will be "arranged"—important as that may be—but also what the war will lead to in terms of an anticipated settlement of the conflict. Wars, not fighting, only end when settlements are reached.

The Difficult Confrontation

Palestinians currently face an extremely complex and difficult reality, which presents them with an exceptional challenge far greater in importance than any they have experienced in the past. Although the costs of their long history of resistance to the British Mandate and the Israeli colonial occupation have been enormous, at every stage of their confrontation, they have been blessed with an effective pillar, or pillars, of support that have helped them persevere, resist, and keep their national cause alive. Now, however, they are facing a series of negative external factors, already in a state of extreme weakness, indicating the loss of any effective external support and their vulnerability to the challenge of imposing a "minimal" settlement that would lead to the liquidation of their cause.

On the Israeli front, the Palestinians now face an Israel that is completely different from what they have experienced in the past. It is no longer left-wing, or even liberal right-wing, after the far right, followers of religious Zionism, whose biblical doctrine centers around the necessity of fulfilling the prophecy of "Greater Israel," gradually infiltrated its political fabric. In 2022, they joined the ruling coalition and controlled its viability. This shift reflected a continued shift in Israeli political orientations to the right and led to a steady shrinkage of the left's electoral base, which is now approaching the point of disappearance. The political weight in Israel is no longer solely right-wing; rather, it is ingrained in a fundamentalist, extremist, and ferocious tendency toward the Palestinians. Within this shift in the political landscape in Israel, a consensual settlement with the Palestinian people leading to a "two-state solution," in the traditional sense of the term, which calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the land occupied since 1967, is no longer realistically achievable. Regarding Jerusalem, there is an Israeli consensus not to relinquish it. As for the West Bank, which has been fragmented by the settlement enterprise and transformed the Palestinian presence into narrow, disconnected enclaves, an absolute Israeli majority demands the annexation of large parts of it to Israel. Meanwhile, the extreme right-wing parties are desperately seeking, using all political and brute force, to implement what they consider a biblical-ideological mission to complete its full annexation as quickly as possible. The Gaza Strip, which Ariel Sharon abandoned but which Israel continues to blockade, was the only geographical area where Israel could potentially allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. Its concern there was focused on ensuring security, which, if measures were agreed upon to ensure this, would enable Israel to rid itself of the Strip and the demographic burden it represents. However, Hamas's control of the Strip since 2007, and its recent "Operation Breaking Dawn" (Al-Aqsa Flood), have reduced this possibility to a minimum, though it has not eliminated it entirely.

On the regional level, it is worth considering that the traditional incubator status the Palestinian cause previously enjoyed within official Arab circles has now declined. The successive conflicts plaguing the Arab world have not only led to the withdrawal of the regional state in pursuit of self-preservation and the pursuit of private interests, but also to the fragmentation of collective Arab solidarity, and the loss of the Arab system's standing and influence in the region to the benefit of non-Arab powers: Iran, Turkey, and Israel. In addition, there has been an escalation of complaints from many Arab capitals about the continued burden of the Palestinian issue, the labyrinth of Palestinian division, and the alliance of Palestinian factions with non-Arab regional powers, particularly Iran. As a result, official circles in most Arab countries have, at best, reduced their approach to the Palestinian issue to risk mitigation. This is achieved through a dual approach: providing the necessary moral support to avoid embarrassment before various internal and external parties, while avoiding actual engagement in a serious defense of Palestinian rights as an Arab nationalist cause.

In addition to undermining Hamas's authoritarian power and exhausting its military capabilities, Israel's interventions in the region following Operation Protective Edge led to the dismantling of the resistance axis, upon which the movement had relied to support its existence and its confrontation with Israel. With the resulting shift in the regional balance of power, the process of shaping a new order in the region has become easier. Since closing the Palestinian issue has become necessary, in order to remove a "chronic obstacle" to restructuring it, any settlement that appears to guarantee the "minimum" of Palestinian rights will fulfill the purpose of Arab capitals. Trump's return to the US presidency is the most significant change at the international level currently, and it will have far-reaching implications for reshaping the region and permanently closing the Palestinian issue. Palestinian and Arab parties have welcomed Trump's active intervention in imposing a temporary ceasefire "deal" in Gaza, seeing it as an early indication of a possible positive shift in his approach to and approach to the anticipated settlement. But optimists should be patient. Trump has a narcissistic personality, and any changes he may have undergone as he enters his second term will be limited to liberation from any restrictions that may have curbed his impulsiveness, even slightly, during his first term, as he aspires to secure a second term. Now, in his final term, Trump will act as he pleases: an absolute ruler who rules by orders and dictates, without restraint or regard for rules. His foreign policy will be governed by "America First," which he will practice with brazen, showy threats and blackmail, issuing accusations and insults, declaring demands and expecting compliance, and imposing sanctions on "disobedient" individuals. Trump is a proven supporter of Israel, though not to the same extent as Netanyahu and his governing coalition. He shows little concern for the Palestinian people and their ongoing plight, nor does he hold much regard for the official Arab regimes, which he considers subservient and guaranteed to be loyal. An exception to this is his appreciation for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, not only for its status as a center of beneficial wealth, but also for its prestige, which qualifies it to play a fundamental and prominent leadership role in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Because he wants to divert attention from the Middle East while he pursues his own central issues, both domestically and elsewhere, this region will receive only brief attention from him, which he will devote to quickly stabilizing it and removing it from his agenda, allowing him to devote himself to more important matters. He believes that the foundation of this stability lies in normalizing Saudi Arabia's relations with Israel, which will lead to the normalization of relations between many Arab and Islamic countries, leading to a fundamental change in the region's reality. Beyond addressing the issue of Iran and its nuclear program, achieving this normalization requires closing the Palestinian issue with a balanced settlement between the Saudi demand for a credible path to establishing a Palestinian state and fulfilling Israel's interest in expanding its territory, which Trump has declared insufficient. Despite the limited content of the Palestinian "Deal of the Century," Trump will not re-present it in its previous form, as it has clearly been diminished by Operation Protective Edge, if not completely eliminated. If he deems it necessary to accommodate the Saudi demand, the best approach Trump can dictate will likely be a scaled-down one, in the form of a promise that could be fulfilled after a long transitional period filled with rehabilitation, passing tests, and obtaining commitments from the Palestinians. This will limit the possibility of establishing a Palestinian entity with some of the trappings of a sovereign state in the Gaza Strip, with the possibility of establishing a future relationship with the remaining Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank. In return, Trump will provide cover for Israel's annexation of a large portion of the West Bank. Since he is dealing with the relevant official Arab parties with a dictated mentality and expects them to comply, Trump's focus will be largely on securing Tel Aviv's approval, which will likely refuse to do so. To "convince" Tel Aviv, Israel will receive a generous package of "incentives," the first of which may be Trump's demand to empty the Gaza Strip of the majority of its Palestinian population. While this demand may seem to some as conclusive evidence that Trump has finally closed the door on the "two-state solution," it may be the wrong pretext for imposing a bad settlement based on that solution.

If a settlement is looming after the war on Gaza ends, these are the most extreme aspects of its features, and everyone whose position in the balance of power has been weakened by the war must pay the price for the resulting settlement.

The State of Palestinian Weakness

For some time now, the Palestinian situation has been steadily increasing in its severity due to a worsening state of exhaustion resulting from the spread of weakness that has become widespread and is eating away at the various structures of the Palestinian system. This situation has led to a continuous decline in Palestinian resilience, reducing to a minimum the possibility of self-sufficiency, after the traditional external support base has evaporated, to effectively and influentially confront the torrent of pressures pouring down on the Palestinian side. Quite the contrary, the current level of deterioration in the Palestinian situation may lead to its vulnerability to these pressures, which could facilitate the passage of a "minimal" settlement for the Palestinian issue by others.

The political system, already constrained by the restrictions of the occupation, suffers from a chronic, intractable condition of calcification that has stripped it of most of its political power and effectiveness. For nearly two decades, this system has been based on a division reinforced by a geographic separation that has rendered it a permanent state of affairs: the Fatah movement governs the West Bank, and Hamas governs the Gaza Strip. Due to the deep-rooted hostility between the two sides, each side's apprehension of the other's intentions, and their mutual opposition to each other regarding the means of confronting the occupation (armed resistance versus peaceful means), each side has tightened its grip on the reins of government in its region and expanded the penetration and control of this regime's system over its citizens. As the level of authoritarianism of both sides of the political system has increased, the elements and tools of political action have been absent: there are no effective parties, no elections, no legislative authority, no independent and effective judiciary, no free media, and no independent means of oversight, accountability, and review. Political life has been completely extinguished, as the political community has been reduced to a mere sliver of space, excluding many segments of society. This has led to widespread public frustration, and the community has dwindled to a mere embrace of supporters of both sides. This has fractured it, leading to a state of extreme polarization and fanaticism. Political debate has become a mere sterile polemical debate that quickly descends into squabbling, filled with mutual accusations and denunciations that reach the level of accusations of treason. Political participation has transformed from an open space for influence and change into a mere means of mobilizing a superficial sense of allegiance and support, on the one hand, and marginalization and exclusion, on the other. As the regime's sustainability has become the primary priority that drives the awareness, direction, and actions of its officials, whether in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, political discourse has become populist, burdened with the repetition of clichés and traditional slogans that slide from top to bottom, with a narrative programmed to inflate a sense of self-importance and achievement, satisfy the desires of the masses of supporters by telling them what they want to hear, rather than what they should hear, and provide them with ammunition to confront the "others." The internal Palestinian political scene has become increasingly entrenched, with those "for" and those "against" being closed off, after the process of closing off any space for serious discussions and meaningful revisions of political goals and paths was completed.

The political system is stuck in an intractable crisis, exacerbated by the ongoing Israeli targeting of it and the decline in international and regional financial support. As a result of Israel's destructive war, the Gaza Strip has become a disaster area, requiring everything to be rehabilitated and rebuilt. This will not only place pressure on whoever will govern it in the coming days, but will also determine the nature of the "minimal" settlement for the Palestinian issue, which the United States is preparing to negotiate. In the West Bank, external circumstances have conspired against the already troubled regime, which is now struggling to ensure its continued survival, having become increasingly unable to fulfill its internal obligations. The worsening financial crisis has led to collapses in vital areas of life, such as education, health, social services, and economic life. It is imperative to note that the collapse of Palestinian society's resilience under occupation, albeit to varying degrees between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, will have profound repercussions for the Palestinians' ability to endure and persevere, and to avoid emigrating from the country. What can be done? Perhaps one of the most important conclusions drawn from Operation Protective Edge and the devastating war on Gaza that followed is that the conflict will continue for a long time and will not be resolved by a knockout blow, but rather by an accumulation of points, at the core of which lies strengthening the Palestinians' ability to remain on their land, after the risks of emigration from the country increased due to Israel's systematic destruction of livelihoods, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The goal of keeping Palestinians in their country, with the cumulative interventions it requires to improve various aspects of life, is the most important Palestinian strategic goal in the coming period. Over more than half a century of occupation, Israel has pursued a systematic policy, reinforced by various repressive means, to prevent Palestinian escalation and replace it with an Israeli escalation to establish an alternative reality in the occupied territory. It has achieved undeniable successes. It is necessary and important to recognize that these successes have been aided by Palestinian engagement in a long and bitter internal conflict that has consumed, and continues to consume, a substantial portion of the energy and self-reliance that should have been directed toward confronting Israeli schemes. Now, with the mounting and intensifying external pressures on the Palestinians, and the growing likelihood of their success in tampering with their fate, the Palestinian situation has reached a critical crossroads: either to continue the same current path of conflict, the negative consequences of which are evident, with both sides of the internal conflict, each in its own way, seeking to achieve its own survival interests, slipping into a race to accommodate the anticipated "minimal" settlement proposals, ensuring continued existence at the expense of the other; or to change course and move toward the necessity of rectifying and addressing the internal situation to restore what is possible of self-resilience before it is too late.

Recovery will only be effective if the Palestinians confront a fundamental reality they have often avoided: the minimum ability to repair the collapsed internal situation will not be restored, and an acceptable response to the intensifying external pressures will not be possible if the Palestinian political system persists in its current state. If national considerations are to prevail over factional interests, a fundamental and profound change in the nature of its structure and working methods is necessary. This change goes beyond the previous superficial and formal amendments, which were primarily intended to conceal its continued existence. It is essential that change come through two interconnected and interconnected interventions: one immediate and focused, focused on stopping the bleeding, and the other more comprehensive and far-reaching, targeting a radical treatment of the disease and rehabilitation. Achieving this immediate intervention requires reinstating the amended Basic Law of 2003 and forming a non-factional national salvation government that will block foreign interference in the arrangements for the "day after" the war on Gaza, end the division, and restore the geographical unity of the political regime's jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This government, which must be formed and whose composition determined by Palestinians, is an absolute necessity to ward off the risks of intervention currently facing the Palestinian situation. It is also a fundamental requirement for mobilizing the necessary regional and international support to meet the demands and requirements of the difficult phase ahead, foremost among which is withdrawing the pretexts used to obstruct the rapid commencement of the reconstruction process in the Gaza Strip and effectively confronting calls to displace the majority of its population.

Although it would be better for Palestinians to take the initiative to form and empower this government, rather than procrastinate and then succumb to external pressures, which would further weaken Palestinian resilience and capacity, achieving this goal, if achieved, should not mean the end of the road to reforming the Palestinian situation, but rather its beginning. Strengthening the Palestinians' survival on their land now requires more than simply forming a government based on new principles, as important and necessary as that is. It also requires a serious review that breaks the factions' monopoly on the political sphere and reaches a general Palestinian agreement related not only to the requirements for improving the performance of the political system, but also to the feasibility of its existence. It has become clear that it is no longer feasible to continue accepting many hypothetical wishes as established facts upon which to build a surplus of exaggerated expectations. It is time to stop self-deception and undertake a profound Palestinian self-examination to clarify the limits of the acceptable goal, not the hoped-for one, and to develop an appropriate political program to pursue it. To clarify, Palestinians are sharply divided over the means of achieving the goal of resolving the conflict. They have recently agreed that this goal is the implementation of the "two-state solution" and the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. However, they recognize that the possibility of achieving this goal has ceased, as the "two-state solution" no longer means dividing Mandatory Palestine into two states, but rather dividing the West Bank into two parts. However, is this solution still acceptable and pursued with sustained determination? If the answer is yes, then the leaders of this regime must not continue to evade the people, but rather confront them with the truth, accept that a possible settlement will be at the "minimum level," devote efforts to improving its terms, and reduce the portion of the West Bank that will be annexed by Israel. If this expected outcome of the "two-state solution" is not acceptable, then it is necessary to oppose this option and move in a different direction that seeks the establishment of a single state. This does not require the continued existence of a Palestinian Authority, whose existence would hinder the possibility of achieving this path. However, if continued adherence to the "two-state solution," knowing that it will not lead to the outcome consistently promoted in slogans, but rather to a reduced form of it at best, is merely a pretext for ensuring the regime's continuation, in the unlikely event that a regional or international shift occurs and shifts the balance, then the regime's continuation as it is, even in this case, is no longer feasible. It is incapable of achieving the promised statehood or fulfilling the basic obligations necessary to enable the continued steadfastness of the people in the country. Therefore, while the regime must remain, its current version is no longer useful except for the continued realization of factional interests. This requires a comprehensive critical review to learn from mistakes and rebuild this regime on new foundations, the primary goal of which is to dedicate all its resources and capabilities to ensuring the Palestinians' stability in their country. This will not be achieved if the regime remains monopolized by factional polarization, which has been the cause of its continued ossification and diminished resilience. For the Palestinian political system to begin its recovery, it must become more effective, more participatory, and more representative. It must also maintain an organic and positive relationship with society, rather than one of superiority and authoritarianism that robs the majority of Palestinians of the positive energy needed to contribute to protecting the national project. This system must shift from focusing on internal disputes that alienate external parties essential to supporting the Palestinian cause, to a serious effort to return to the path of accumulating friends, both regionally and internationally. This requires a clear political program, credibility in political engagement, utmost transparency in managing financial affairs, an unwavering fight against the roots of corruption and administrative laxity, and a dedicate effort to halting the collapse of essential aspects and sectors of society, most notably health and education.

However, this system will not change itself on its own, as this would harm the interests of the groups that control it and benefit from it. Therefore, it needs to transform the whispered discontent within society regarding its failures into organized pressure demanding change. Although this transformation is difficult to achieve, given the closed political tools and the demise of political life in the country, the resurgence of a pressing political movement is not impossible. Indeed, it has become a necessity, dictated by the gravity of the enormous dangers facing the Palestinians and their cause. While the objective of the current external pressures on the two poles of the Palestinian political system is to weaken it and push it to make concessions, the objective of the internal pressures is to strengthen it to confront these pressures and resist the concessions demanded of it.

Ali Jarbawi: Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Birzeit University.