General outlines of a war plan to change the situation in Gaza

Author

Ron Ben Yishai

Radically changing the situation and stable arrangements in the short and medium term for the Gaza crisis following the war: According to accumulated information, it is possible to begin drawing up the grand plan that directs the security services and, to some extent, also the auxiliary American forces. This plan is based on 5 basic assumptions:

1. The presence of the "terrorist" armies of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, hundreds of meters from the towns in the northern Negev and 70 kilometers from Tel Aviv, constitutes a threat to the security of the citizens of Israel, their sense of security and their ability to lead a normal life, within a normal economy. This threat was actually fulfilled during the October 7 massacre, which was carried out by thousands of motivated and trained armed men, equipped with good equipment. They stormed Israel, and groups of Gazans followed them. The State of Israel and its citizens cannot and do not want to live with this threat, which Iran reinforces and helps it accumulate deadly capabilities. Therefore, it can become more dangerous. Israel must immediately restore three important components of national security: strategic deterrence vis-à-vis the countries of the region, which declined critically on the disastrous Saturday, physical security, a sense of security, and confidence in the state’s leadership and security services.

2. More than two million Palestinians live in the Gaza Strip, most of whom want a normal life with security and a feeling of security. They also need to work and live and have basic but sufficient freedom of movement to access their civil services (health, education, water, electricity, and public services). Now, they are getting the least possible, because “Hamas” is in control, and has imposed a kind of dual authority: a civilian arm that tries to promote the well-being of the population, but it operates under the roof of the military arm, which sees its primary interest in resistance, and is conducting a holy Islamic battle against the Jewish state. The combat operations carried out by the military arm afflict the residents of the Gaza Strip, time after time, with difficult economic and civil crises, and reconstruction efforts return, again and again.

3. Hence, the one who threatens Israel, and also the ability of Gazans to live a normal life, is “Hamas”, and alongside it are the Islamic Jihad and other “terrorist” forces in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the basic condition for changing the situation is the removal of Hamas’s rule and the demolition of the foundation on which the military structures affiliated with it and other organizations stand (the organizations’ jihadist motivation cannot be annihilated, but they can be prevented from organizing into large frameworks that can carry out “terrorist” operations and killing on a large scale. strategic). However, this condition is not sufficient. It must be ensured that Hamas and the other factions will not be able to restore their military and authoritarian capabilities, or establish new structures under cover or with a new product.

4. Political and regional dimensions: There is a reasonable possibility that Hezbollah, and even Iran and other parties in the extremist Shiite axis, will join the fight against us on an additional front in the north, and possibly in the northeast as well. In addition, the Gaza crisis proves once again that Israel needs diplomatic support (legitimacy), logistical support, as well as awareness, and even operational support from the United States (intercepting rockets and missiles). This phenomenon will not disappear, but rather will increase, at least as long as Iran continues to wage a continuous battle against us, the goal of which is to wipe Israel off the map. Therefore, it would be good if we acknowledged this fact and the Americans helped us, without losing our freedom of decision-making and independent security and diplomatic action. In addition, Israel does not want to lose the “Abraham Accords” and the possibilities of normalization with Saudi Arabia.

5. We must acknowledge the fact that until now, no party in the world, including the United States, has any applicable recipe for stable, long-term arrangements for effective confrontation on the Gaza border, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general. The "two states for two peoples" solution in the current circumstances of the Middle East is now more of a hanger than a viable political plan for the foreseeable future. There is also no way to annihilate and end the idea of “murderous extremist Islam,” which aspires to establish a global emirate on the basis of local emirates based on the destruction of infidel states - especially the Jewish state. The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the branches of this movement, and it includes “Hamas” and “Jihad.”

Five objectives for the fight

These are the basic facts that guide decision-makers in Israel when determining the objectives of the war, and based on them, the plan of action for the state and the army must be drawn up. This plan must be implemented in stages: the first stage, the fighting that we are currently witnessing, and the last stage will involve achieving arrangements in the medium term that will allow the army to be returned home. 

These are the goals of the war:

1. An operation similar to the "defensive wall": a comprehensive attack, including a maneuver in the northern Gaza Strip in order to control the area militarily, in a way that allows the collection of intelligence information and its immediate implementation. This aims to stop the firing of rockets on the home front, and to “cut off” and destroy the military capabilities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This is the target of the air strikes currently taking place. Physical control over all of northern Gaza up to the Gaza Strip is necessary to strike fighters and military infrastructure. This is where the actual and symbolic power center of the Hamas regime is located, which will lose its capital.

2. In southern Gaza, Israel is working to achieve these goals precisely, and through other means, based on accurate intelligence available from the Shin Bet and military intelligence.

3. In northern Israel, the army continues its skirmishes with Hezbollah, and with the Palestinians moving from Lebanese territory, and later, perhaps also with armed militias in Syria and Iraq, by seeking to keep the skirmishes below the threshold of war, confining them to the border area, and engaging in days of fighting, no more. The army will continue to maintain its readiness to carry out a large-scale military operation in Lebanon, including a ground maneuver, if orders reach Hezbollah from Iran to launch a comprehensive war. Naturally, Israel would prefer to focus its best forces and resources on the fighting in Gaza in order to achieve quick achievements. But if Hezbollah and the Iranians decide to escalate towards an all-out war, the Israeli army has the ability to fight effectively on two fronts, and on a large scale. This will cause the war to last longer than desired. 

4. In parallel with the fighting in the north and south of the Gaza Strip, Israel will work with the United States and the United Nations on the humanitarian level, to maintain its legitimacy, and the political and logistical support provided by the United States and its allies for military action. This includes establishing humanitarian corridors and safe zones for use by Palestinians who have no connection to the fighting and who have fled their homes after Israel asked them to leave. The influx of displaced people will increase with the start of the fighting, and it is expected that international parties and Arab countries will provide these areas - under the control and supervision of the Israeli army and the United Nations - with the necessary needs of water, food, medicines and essential services, such as electricity (generators) and temporary housing (tents, because winter is coming). .

5. Based on the results that will be achieved on the ground in the first weeks of fighting, Israel must reach decisions with the United States regarding an appropriate “exit plan,” and take all the political steps required to implement it. The plan to exit Gaza and the arrangements for the solution on the ground, after the departure of the Israeli army, must include achieving the strategic goals desired by Israel and the United States in the medium term (5-10 years).

Five strategic objectives

1. The entire sector must become a demilitarized zone, and arrangements and mechanisms are required to ensure this.

2. Governance in Gaza must be civil and professional, not ideological-religious, and non-political. So that his only interest is to ensure the well-being of the Palestinian population. Its powers are based on a broad international legal base, and it must rely on a civilian administration made up of local residents who were not members of the military arm of Hamas or other organizations. The civil administration relies on local police and an international force, whose mission is to enforce the law and implement the arrangements reached at the end of the fighting. Gaza will become a seaport operated under security supervision, allowing the movement of passengers and tourists to and from Cyprus.

3. The State of Israel must establish a warning and defense system on the border that provides safety for the population... Security arrangements must include the establishment of a security zone with an area ranging from one to three kilometres, into which Gaza residents are not allowed to enter without obtaining special approval.

4.The army will not remain in Gaza for longer than is required to achieve its immediate combat objectives and allow for alternative governance in the Strip. However, the army and Shin Bet will retain their right to pursue and thwart “terrorist” attacks, or preparations for war, even after the army returns to Israeli territory.

5. Israel will take into account the strategic interests and considerations of the United States, as well as the internal political considerations, and the religious and strategic interests of the Islamic countries in the region with which we have peace agreements, normalization, and diplomatic relations.