Will the Gaza war burn the last bridges between Moscow and Tel Aviv?

By 

Raed Jabr

Relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv were not at their best on the night of October 7, the eve of the situation erupting again between Israel and the Palestinians, and sliding towards the brink of a “major regional war” whose repercussions threaten the region and the world, according to Russian warnings.

Although the positions of the two parties currently reflect a divergence that is considered the widest in the history of relations that began in the early 1990s, what is certain is that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict does not constitute the main reason for this deterioration, but rather a new episode added to the elements of tension that have accumulated severely in recent years. Especially after the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

Serious transformation

In previous years, the Kremlin boasted close ties with Israel. President Vladimir Putin repeated several times the statement that a fifth of Israel's citizens are of Russian and former Soviet origins, which constitutes an important asset to the relations between the two parties. Most notably, Russian and Israeli officials have boasted more than once that official talks between the two parties are conducted in the Russian language, especially in previous stages when Israeli politicians such as Avigdor Lieberman (of Moldavian origin) held prominent government positions.

At that time, Russia did not care much about the fact that some of these people were extremists who called for a “final solution” to the Palestinian issue and supported the worst racist policies towards the Palestinians.

But the serious shift in relations began in 2014, after the ignition of the confrontation with the West, against the backdrop of the decision to annex the Crimean Peninsula, and the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine, which put Russia before broad Western sanctions packages. The second episode of transformation was completed the very next year, in the wake of direct Russian military intervention in Syria.

These two developments resulted in the inauguration of a new, complex and very thorny phase in Russia-Israel relations. On the one hand, Russian circles continued to bet on Israel, the “Russian-speaking friend,” to play an important role in alleviating Western pressures and establishing Jewish influence in the West to reduce sanctions. But on the other hand, Russia has become a “neighbor” of Israel after consolidating the Russian presence in the Mediterranean and deploying Russian military bases on the territory of Syria. This matter carries a number of complications related primarily to the close relationship between Moscow and Tehran, and to the fact that Russia now has direct interests in the Middle East region that cannot be ignored in any political or military move.

Understandings in Syria

In those circumstances, the close relations between Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu helped to arrange understandings that guarantee the interests of both parties, the most prominent title of which was that Tel Aviv does not obstruct Russia’s movements in the region, in exchange for Moscow turning a blind eye to Israel’s steps directed at protecting its interests and security requirements.

This equation quickly produced an understanding related to coordinating the military movements of the two parties. Among its most prominent features is that Russia ensures that the situation in the Golan region does not slide into a path that harms Israeli security. Many remember how Moscow once conducted patrols along the separation line in the Golan, and pledged to ensure Israel's security as one of its main priorities in Syria. In return, Tel Aviv provided guarantees to Moscow not to target military bases and facilities in which Russian forces or trainers are located, or linked to the decision-making, control and management centers of the Syrian government that are operated with Russian assistance, while it reserved the right to direct strikes on airports and facilities used by Iran, or Hezbollah, to transport weapons and equipment to Lebanon. This understanding lived for years during which Moscow turned a blind eye to Israeli strikes inside Syria.

Certainly, these understandings witnessed ebbs and flows, and the situation almost slid more than once towards their implosion, but the speed and accuracy of communications at the highest levels helped every time to overcome urgent crises.

Ukraine war

But the two sides were facing a new turning point in relations after the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The situation coincided with major internal fluctuations in Israel that led to Yair Lapid becoming prime minister. The Russian war in Ukraine caused the largest and most violent shock in the history of relations, especially with the Israeli side’s tendency to direct unprecedented criticism at Moscow. It was accompanied by practical action to support Ukraine by supplying it with some limited arms shipments and extensive humanitarian aid, as well as through the transfer of hundreds of trainers and unit men. Private individuals who, according to some reports, helped Kiev confront attacks by Russian or Iranian-made drones and other military technologies.

There is no doubt that relations before the outbreak of the war were facing challenges, including the difference in Russian and Israeli visions about the Iranian position in Syria, and about scenarios for a final solution to the crisis in this country.

But the differences between Moscow and Tel Aviv came to light in an unprecedented way with the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

At that stage, it seemed that the delicate balance that Moscow had established for years in relations between Tel Aviv, on the one hand, and Tehran, on the other, had suffered a major crack.

In contrast to the “hostile” statements issued by Lapid, for example, towards Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is usually described as professional and cautious in choosing diplomatic expressions, detonated a bomb when he did not feel embarrassed during an interview with an Italian newspaper in criticizing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. And the reference to his Jewish origin, and then Tel Aviv responded to him angrily and considered his statement disgraceful and unforgivable.

The “support” visit made by the Israeli Foreign Minister, Eli Cohen, to Kiev at the beginning of the year was one of the most intense points of tension between the Hebrew state and Moscow, noting that it was the first visit of its kind by an Israeli official at this level to Ukraine since the start of the war.

For its part, Moscow took a serious step toward showing its anger through the decision to close the Russian office of the Jewish Agency “Sakhnot” against the backdrop of accusing it of violating immigration laws, misleading Russians, and adopting illegal mechanisms to transfer qualified people to Israel.

It is true that this crisis subsided with Netanyahu's return to the Prime Minister's Office and his pledge to repair relations with Moscow, but the repercussions of the Ukrainian war were too great for quick settlements to be reached.

The relationship with Tehran

Strengthening the Russian-Iranian alliance has represented the most significant challenge to the attempt to mend relations. Russian experts say that Israel has expanded its activities within the framework of providing Kiev with intelligence information to combat Iranian drones. It began studying providing Kiev with advanced missile systems to confront air attacks. In this context, it seemed that Israel was seeking to examine the repercussions of the “Russian-Iranian alliance” on the one hand, and to work, on the other hand, to expand its activity to examine the capabilities of Iranian aircraft provided to Russia, and other military systems, a large part of which may also be present with “ Hezbollah” in Lebanon.

Russian “punitive” measures against Israel did not succeed in confronting the new situation, including in terms of giving the Syrians free rein to use Russian air defense systems against Israeli attacks, closing Syrian airspace to Israeli warplanes, and activating Damascus’s anti-aircraft missile systems.

All of these measures did not reduce the scale and intensity of the Israeli attacks in Syria, as they took on a dimension that violated all previous understandings, including targeting airports and military infrastructure of the Syrian government.

Against this background, the situation around Gaza exploded, adding a new element of tension that exacerbates the crisis and widens the gap in an unprecedented way between Moscow and Tel Aviv.

It is true that Moscow avoided condemning Israel's actions, and sought primarily to confirm that its close ties with all parties could contribute to playing the role of an acceptable mediator to reduce the severity of the conflict, but Tel Aviv did not forgive the Kremlin for its insistence on confirming and affirming its rejection of the final solution proposed by Israel for the Palestinian issue. Commitment to the two-state solution, and that “no settlement is possible without the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital,” according to Putin’s assertions.

Russian benefits

Experts say the main reason behind Moscow's position is that it currently benefits from distracting attention from the war in Ukraine.

Based on this, the whole world is focused on Israel and the Gaza Strip, which means that Russia now has freedom of action to a large extent, says expert Nikolai Kozanov. He cites, as an example, the fact that Russia was able to abandon the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty relatively quietly - the Duma adopted a law on this matter this week.

Experts also point out that events on the Ukrainian fronts have faded from the front pages of the world, and a debate has begun in the West about how to distribute aid to Israel and Ukraine - all of which is beneficial for Russia.

In addition, Russia had the opportunity to speak with the international community and undermine attempts to isolate it.

It is true that it is difficult to imagine Israel accepting Russian mediation in the ongoing war, but this does not prevent Moscow from accumulating benefits due to the current situation. This explains its movement in the Security Council, and its continuous affirmations about its vision for resolving the conflict in a way that is also consistent with the Russian and Chinese consensus on seeing the features of the new international order

But the focus of some experts on the idea of “Russian benefits” from the worsening conflict does not alone reflect the level of slide that relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv have reached. Here two main factors enter into the debate. The first is the Russian-Iranian relationship, which has reached levels of coordination and alliance, causing Israeli analysts to talk about confronting “an axis that includes Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and many other countries.” Here, it is important to point out that Moscow has moved from ignoring the accusations directed at Iran that it is behind the current escalation, to directly defending Tehran and affirming its refusal to “place the blame” on the Iranians who, as Minister Sergei Lavrov said, “adopt a very balanced position and seek with the countries of the region to... Reducing tension and preventing a slide towards a major regional confrontation.”

The second element relates to the crystallization of a new Russian vision for alliances against the backdrop of the worsening conflict with the West, which means that Moscow has gradually begun to lose interest in establishing difficult balances such as those it has established since the arrival of its military forces in Syria.

Warning of regional war

In general, experts point out that Russian warnings about the danger of a “regional war” are in fact a direct expression of shared positions with Iran, which also does not wish to engage in a broad and comprehensive confrontation, but may be forced to do so if Israel moves towards undermining its regional centers of influence.

This explains, in part, the degree of anger in Israel toward Russia, even though the latter has not officially announced support for Hamas’ positions.

Israeli experts provide some indications that the “cautious” Russian position actually hides current anti-Israel policies, including the fact that Putin is one of the very few world leaders who did not call Netanyahu to condole the Israeli deaths on October 7. It took Putin eight days after that to contact the Israeli Prime Minister as part of a series of contacts he made with regional leaders to confront the possibility of expanding the conflict.

This showed, according to experts, that any actions taken by Russia in the Middle East can no longer be viewed in isolation from the war in Ukraine and Russia's military relations with Iran.

An Israeli expert says that “in Israel in general, expectations are now very modest, and in a direct translation from Hebrew I say that we do not need help - the main thing is that they (the Russians) cause as little harm as possible. “I believe that today is the most accurate position of public opinion and politicians towards what is happening, and Russia’s position on what is happening.”

Burning bridges

This extremely cautious talk towards Moscow was reflected in another way by the ruling Likud Party in Israel, which until recently was Russia's most important friend. One of the party's most prominent leaders, Amir Whitman, declared that Russia "has become an enemy" and pledged to punish it after the end of the battle with Hamas. “Russia will pay the bills,” he said. Believe me (..) Russia supports the enemies of Israel, supports the Nazis who want to commit genocide against the Israeli people.

Whitman added that after the current battle, Israel will not hesitate to “send its forces to Ukraine to punish Russia.”

Some conspiracy theorists in Russia found in the recent destruction of the Orthodox Church in Gaza a message directed at Moscow as “the protector of the Orthodox world.”

It was noteworthy that the targeting of the Church of Saint Porphyry of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which resulted in the killing of eight people, required the strong intervention of the Russian Church, after it had maintained complete neutrality towards the war. The church said in a statement: “The Russian Orthodox Church sympathizes with the brave priests and parishioners of the Orthodox community in the Gaza Strip, sympathizes with the victims and prays that the Lord will strengthen the people of Palestine in the face of the current ordeal.”

In its statement, the Russian Church supported the message of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which described the Israeli air strikes on humanitarian institutions in the Gaza Strip as a “war crime that cannot be ignored.”

This constituted a new indication that the Gaza war may result in burning the last bridges between Moscow and Tel Aviv.