Frankly speaking... about the scenarios of "the next day"

After the provocative statements of US President Donald Trump, which despite their contradictions and changes, tried to make the impossible and what is considered a war crime - the displacement of Palestinians - a matter of debate, and raised the level of danger to an unprecedented level, it is necessary to discuss the scenarios of the day after, as things are no longer after these statements as they were before them.

If the goal is to displace the Palestinians, eliminate Hamas, have American control over the Gaza Strip, and decide on sovereignty over the West Bank after four weeks, as Trump stated, then this makes the next day a foregone conclusion, and this calls for mobilization to resist and overthrow him.

Before these statements, Netanyahu's position was to postpone the decision on the issue of the next day until after the war was resolved, given the Israeli differences and the differences between the Israeli government and the Biden administration, but on the basis of rejecting the continuation of Hamas's authority, and rejecting the return of President Mahmoud Abbas's authority, but after Trump's victory, the issue became resolved.

But the facts on the ground are stronger and more eloquent than the fantasies imagined in the imaginary reality, and they appear through the adherence of millions of Palestinians to their presence on their homeland or to their right to return to it from exile and displacement.

It is a stark fact that the Israeli occupying forces withdrew last Sunday from the Martyrs' Axis, called Netzarim, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed that he could not abandon.

It is a fact that almost the entire world rejected Trump’s statements and called for confronting them, because Palestine is for the Palestinians, Egypt is for the Egyptians, Jordan is for the Jordanians, and Saudi Arabia is for the Saudis. If there is a place for the Palestinians to go, it is to their homes and lands from which they were displaced. The strange and surprising thing is that Trump, who wants to return immigrants to the United States to their countries, wants to deport the original owners of the country to other countries. His new promise is like the Balfour Declaration, in which he gave what he did not own to what he did not deserve.

There are developments and changes that have led to the cancellation or reduction of the possibility of scenarios that were proposed, such as the occupation and settlement of the Gaza Strip, and have been replaced by other scenarios, such as displacement. The following are the expected scenarios:

Scenario 1: The collapse of the ceasefire agreement after the implementation of the first phase:

This scenario is reinforced by the blatant violations of the agreement. Whoever wants to displace the Palestinians and eliminate the resistance, as Netanyahu declares day and night with full support from Trump, does not want to reach a withdrawal of Israeli forces, a sustainable cessation of war, and reconstruction. Therefore, the start of negotiations on the second phase was postponed, and Netanyahu gave instructions to the Israeli negotiating delegation to seek an extension of the first phase or to agree on a transitional phase in which the exchange operations would continue, and not to negotiate the second phase, amid information circulated by Israeli media and political sources that Trump gave Netanyahu the green light to resume fighting in two cases: the first is if Hamas does not implement its obligations in the first phase, which is very unlikely, and the other is if the negotiations do not reach an agreement on the second phase, which is very likely in light of changing what was agreed upon and adding new conditions.

Whoever wants to complete the achievement of the war’s goals, displace the Palestinians, and impose sovereignty over the West Bank or parts of it, will be keen to prevent any opportunity to reach an agreement. If an agreement is reached regarding the second stage, it will be impossible to reach the third stage. Whoever wants to displace the Palestinians cannot facilitate or agree to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

The resumption of war does not necessarily have to take the form of a war of extermination, but it can take the form of a siege, focused and precise military operations, control of the flow of humanitarian aid, and preventing serious movement towards reconstruction, in an attempt to achieve the goals that were not achieved by military war through politics and economics.

In this scenario, the status quo in the Gaza Strip remains as it is, leading to gradual forced migration, and Hamas’s continued control of the Gaza Strip is used as a pretext to continue the war and prevent relief and reconstruction.

Scenario 2: Implementing the Beijing Declaration:

This scenario is based on implementing the Beijing Agreement, especially with regard to forming a national unity government with a national reference, but this scenario is very unlikely, because the war of extermination did not lead to ending the division, and thus in the same context, unity will not be achieved at a time when displacement has become an option, and it must be dealt with very seriously as long as it is proposed by the President of the United States, the most powerful country in the world.

What prevents the implementation of this scenario is that the official Palestinian leadership does not believe in partnership, and does not want to pay the price for it after the Al-Aqsa flood, after the head of Hamas became wanted, and in light of the continued and increasing possibility of resuming the fighting, and with the proposal to displace the residents of Gaza and the lack of clarity about the possibility of rebuilding it in light of the absence of pledges and commitments to that effect.

This scenario could be strengthened if it is accompanied by a political program whose essence is ending the occupation and independence, arming oneself with international law and UN resolutions, agreeing on a long-term truce that will last for years, and being prepared to integrate the military weapons of the resistance factions into a national army subject to the legitimate national leadership in the event that the occupation ends and the establishment of the Palestinian state is embodied. The martyr Yahya Sinwar and other Hamas leaders have previously announced Hamas’s readiness to integrate its military wing into a national army in the event that the Palestinian state is embodied.

The third scenario: agreement on the government of Mohamed Mustafa taking over the management of the sector:

This scenario is based on the Palestinian government headed by Mohammed Mustafa taking over the administration of the Gaza Strip after the war, as is or after amending it, or forming a new government that translates the statements of Hamas leaders that they do not want to participate in the government to save Gaza, and goes so far as to demand that President Abbas re-establish his control over the Strip in order to remove the pretexts from the hands of the occupying state, the United States, and numerous regional and international parties.

I heard directly from a prominent resistance leader that he suggested to Hamas that it agree to hand over the Gaza Strip to the Authority to prove that it does not want the Authority and is keen to save the Strip. If the Authority agrees, that is a good thing, and if it does not agree, as expected, it will bear responsibility before the people and history.

This scenario was unlikely in light of the Israeli government’s rejection of the continuation of Hamas’s rule and the return of the Authority, and it became even more unlikely in light of the displacement proposal, and the fact that the Authority is weak, lost, and waiting.

It is true that Hamas can and perhaps should not rule under the current circumstances, but no one else can rule without agreement with it. It is strongly present and cannot be ignored by anyone.

In this context, I also believe that if Hamas took the initiative to ask the Authority to come to govern Gaza or responded to an initiative in this regard, the Authority would most likely not respond to that, and it would refuse by setting new old conditions, such as one authority, one weapon, and one decision; that is, it would demand the disarmament of the resistance underground and above ground, as the president has repeatedly demanded, but there is no harm in trying until the Authority is put before its responsibilities and the pretexts are removed from the hands of the occupying state and others.

Fourth scenario: forming an administrative committee according to the Egyptian or American vision:

This scenario includes the formation of a committee to manage the sector that is linked to the authority and maintains a degree of independence from it, but derives its legitimacy from it. In this scenario, Egypt and the authority have a greater role than the Biden administration’s vision, as the committee would be truly independent of the authority, which is required to renew itself as a condition for taking over the Gaza Strip in the future, and would be armed with multiple Arab and international forces, including American forces. This scenario is further from being realized than it was during the Biden era, especially after the displacement proposal was raised, and it perpetuates the division and separation of the West Bank from the Strip and opens the door to guardianship and alternatives.

Scenario Five, Displacement:

This scenario derives its strength from the fact that the Gaza Strip has become an uninhabitable area, and if a rescue, recovery and reconstruction process is not initiated without waiting for American and Israeli approval, with an Arab-Islamic initiative supported by supporters of the Palestinian cause throughout the world, there will be a large or gradual displacement using the sea and air with the assistance and facilitation of the Israeli government.

That is, forced displacement is a possible scenario, although it is unlikely, but it could take the form of gradual displacement by facilitating the migration of Palestinians to countries other than Jordan and Egypt.

This scenario includes the possibility of returning settlement to Gaza, as adopted by the far-right Israeli parties, or building a tourist area, according to Trump’s proposal to buy the Strip and the possibility of other parties participating with him.

Scenario 6: Holding Palestinian elections:

This scenario is based on holding elections in which the Palestinian people choose their representatives and express their will, and the winner of the elections is the one who rules. Such a scenario is preferred but unlikely to happen under the circumstances experienced by the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, at least for a period of two to three years if the situation stabilizes in a certain way.

This scenario is rejected by Israel, the United States, and local and regional parties who fear the victory of candidates from the resistance factions and parties hostile to colonial and Zionist plans.

Scenario Seven: Forming a National Front for Change:

This scenario is based on forming a national democratic front that includes all the elements and forces calling for reform, renewal and change, without waiting for the official leadership to respond and open the door for their joining. This scenario is good, but it was delayed a lot, perhaps more than necessary, and it had a greater opportunity in previous years, especially since the decision to cancel the elections in 2021. It is faced with interest groups spread across the factions and influenced by competing regional situations and programs, and by the tendencies of dominance and exclusivity among the large factions that seek to impose the control and dominance of a faction in a way that distances or reduces the role of other factions and groups.

The starting point is a deep and bold review of previous experiences based on the trial of policies and forms of struggle, and the initiation of a comprehensive and continuous national dialogue until lessons and morals are drawn to prevent the reproduction of mistakes and sins, and to crystallize a comprehensive vision based on them, which will be the basis for setting goals and strategies capable of achieving them.

Although it is unlikely that unity will be achieved or that Palestinian consensus will be reached to confront the current dangers, there is a glimmer of hope (the unlikely black swan scenario is unlikely, but if it happens, it will have a major impact) that the Arab summit will rise to the challenge and take practical decisions to rebuild the Gaza Strip and impose unity on the Palestinian factions, as the Arab countries see that their stability, national security and sovereignty are threatened by the extremist Israeli policy that Trump supports and outbids.