The return of authority to Gaza: a national right or a recycled crisis?

During the eighteen years of division, we have heard the same rhetoric and the same demands, but those who called for it, and the politicians behind them, perhaps did not realize that it is wrong to repeat the same thing, in the same manner, while expecting a different result. In other words, they did not realize that what was not destined to “succeed” for nearly two decades, and under completely different circumstances, may not be destined to succeed now, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that it is not necessarily applicable in this “exceptional” circumstance that the Palestinian territories in general, and the Gaza Strip in particular, are going through.

Amidst the rapid political transformations, calls have once again escalated, and at a higher rate, to hand over power in the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. There is no dispute about the validity of this proposal in principle, meaning that Gaza—like the rest of the Palestinian territories—must naturally be under the jurisdiction of a single authority representing the Palestinian people.

This demand, in turn, opens the door to a fundamental debate and requires fundamental clarifications, primarily regarding the nature and form of the authority sought to be restored, as well as its policy toward a sector exhausted and devastated by the ongoing aggression, and toward the Palestinian issue as a whole, along with its national reference and the source of its legitimacy.

Is talk of the "return of authority" to Gaza a restoration of a previous status quo, or is it talk of a return that represents the fruit or culmination of a new national vision that redefines the role of the authority, any authority, as a comprehensive national executive body, not a bureaucratic or security arm, currently confined to the West Bank, or a functional formation governed by agreements that have restricted its movement and emptied it of its liberating content?

Over the long years of division, the Palestinian Authority has been the subject of constant criticism regarding its management of the national file in general, and the Gaza issue in particular. These criticisms, without confirming their accuracy, ranged from accusations of imposing financial sanctions to an inability to formulate a national plan that enjoys popular acceptance, which includes the Gaza Strip as an integral component of the nation. Based on this, talk of handing over power in Gaza should not be reduced to an "administrative procedure." Rather, it must be understood as part of a clearly defined political project that enjoys national consensus and restores the Strip's position as an effective partner in decision-making and destiny.

If the Palestinian Authority is to be the authority of all Palestinians, then its authority must change, transforming it from an authority that is the product of the Oslo Accords into an authority with a consensual national authority based on the outcomes of a comprehensive national dialogue and a political charter based on the minimum nationally acceptable. This necessarily means rebuilding the Palestine Liberation Organization to become a unifying Palestinian umbrella, and expanding its representation base to include all Palestinian forces and factions that have remained outside it.

Over the past decades, the PLO has suffered from a structural flaw that has affected its pluralistic nature, in addition to institutional paralysis for several reasons, foremost among them the periodicity of the meetings of its governing frameworks, especially the Palestinian National Council, which has only convened during the past three decades in emergency contexts or to accomplish specific tasks, thus limiting its role as the supreme legislative representative body of the Palestinian people as a whole. In addition, there has been an absence of clear and effective mechanisms to hold the leadership accountable or renew its legitimacy. Consequently, the automatic extension of members and leaders without elections or serious consultations has become the prevailing pattern, rendering the PLO lacking true representation and thwarting attempts to rebuild it on a comprehensive national basis.

Accordingly, any transition process should not be conducted on the basis of "one authority replacing another," but rather on the basis of "one authority that includes everyone," representing the will of the Palestinian people in all its components, expressing their shared national project, and opening the way for a genuine political partnership.

Therefore, an authority of this description requires national legitimacy and a popular mandate. Any talk of the Palestinian Authority assuming power in Gaza becomes conditional upon a consensual transitional national dialogue, the formation of a national unity government that represents all, and the burial of the years of division. If holding elections is not possible in the near term due to political complications and the occupation, it may be possible to replace them with possible options. On this basis, this comprehensive national consensus is a way out - temporarily - to reach transitional legitimacy, followed by genuine democratic requirements that restore the Palestinian people's right to choose their representatives.

Therefore, unless the call to hand over power in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority is part of an institutional political reform program and presented within a consensual national context, it will open a new chapter of Palestinian division, one that is more ambiguous and more intractable. This process will be a reproduction of the authority in its current form, whereas what is required is to re-establish it on the foundations of partnership, consensus, and comprehensive national representation, so that it becomes an authority that represents the aspirations of the Palestinian people, capable of mobilizing the street behind it, rather than an authority of self-administration under a specific and pre-defined ceiling.