Scenarios for Appointing a Palestinian Vice President: Between External Pressures and the National Interest

Amid developments in the Palestinian landscape and growing talk in political and media circles about post-President Mahmoud Abbas arrangements, the idea of appointing a vice president has resurfaced as a step described as "preliminary" to the political transition. This move, however, is not based on an explicit provision in the Palestinian Basic Law. Rather, it is being promoted as a way to pass it through the PLO Central Council through a temporary amendment to the law that would allow the president to appoint a vice president.

Despite the absence of any official announcement on this matter, the momentum of press leaks and regional and international diplomatic activity makes this hypothesis worthy of further study and analysis, particularly given the critical timing facing the Palestinian cause following the aggression on Gaza and the international community's preoccupation with the "post-war" agenda.

First: Backgrounds of the movement

Multiple data indicate that the US administration, with the active participation of some regional parties, is pushing for transitional arrangements within the Palestinian political system, beginning with the appointment of a vice president and later complemented by broader changes within a vision presented under the title of "institutional reform" and the reinstatement of those dismissed from the Fatah movement.

The apparent and confirmed goal is to prepare for the post-Abbas era, but the real essence revolves around reshaping the Palestinian leadership to align with international agendas that seek to subjugate Palestinian decision-making and link it to the so-called "regional solution arrangements."

External pressures have shown clear ill intentions through unacceptable political conditions, including:

• Demand to stop the salaries of prisoners and martyrs’ families.

• Amending Palestinian curricula under the pretext of “incitement.”

• Recognizing Israel as a “Jewish” state.

• Refraining from taking legal action against the occupation in international forums.

Despite all these demands, no political or national price has been offered to the Palestinians in return. There is no talk of an independent Palestinian state, nor even tangible economic support. Rather, everything being proposed falls under the rubric of "political domestication," dismantling the elements of Palestinian national strength and identity, ultimately leading to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, not its resolution.

Second: Appointment scenarios

1. Imposing a deputy through external consensus and internal pressure

In this scenario, the articles of the Basic Law would be amended by the Central Council, granting the president the authority to appoint a deputy. A candidate would then be chosen who enjoys external support, particularly from the United States, and who meets Israeli conditions, even if he or she does not enjoy popular or Fatah support.

This scenario is the most dangerous because it overrides the will of the people, Fatah institutions, and the PLO, opens the door to further division and loss of confidence in the leadership, and transforms the presidency into a tool for implementing external choices that do not reflect the national interest.

2. Fatah National Consensus Scenario

In this option, the idea is presented to Fatah's Central Committee and Revolutionary Council institutions, in parallel with dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) factions. A national mechanism is agreed upon to select a representative who represents a minimum level of consensus and enjoys popular and organizational acceptance.

This scenario is the best for Palestinians because it keeps decision-making within the national fold, strengthens legitimacy, prevents falling into the trap of external dictates, and protects the national movement from division or questioning at a sensitive stage.

3. Symbolic or formal appointment

In this scenario, a deputy is appointed with limited powers but no real role, and real power remains with the president. The goal may be simply to appease external influence, with no real intention of preparing for an orderly transition.

But this scenario does not offer a real solution. Rather, it exacerbates the ambiguity and postpones the crisis to a more dangerous moment, perhaps the moment of the president's sudden absence, which would herald political and constitutional chaos that would be difficult to contain later.

4. Succession scenario under presidential decree

According to the presidential decree issued on November 27, 2024, the Speaker of the National Council shall assume the duties of the presidency temporarily if the position becomes vacant, pending elections. This amendment abolishes the previous legal provision granting this task to the Speaker of the Legislative Council in the event of a Palestinian Legislative Council being inactive. This is a good and acceptable scenario, harmless and popular.

Third: Is there an intention to remove the president?

Despite the Fatah movement and other factions' support for President Mahmoud Abbas's insistence on holding his position and his declared rejection of any attempt to remove him except through the ballot box, the acceleration of external movements and attempts to impose a new reality raise legitimate questions about whether the expected appointment of a vice president is a prelude to the president's removal, whether through direct pressure or through internal preparations leading to his removal under the guise of "health conditions" or a "smooth transition."

Even if this scenario is immoral from a political and national perspective, it is not unlikely within the context drawn up by some international parties that want to re-engineer the Palestinian regime to serve their own projects and not the interests of the Palestinian people. We may find Palestinian figures cooperating in this, but our people will bring it down and the reactions will be unpredictable.

Recommendations

In light of the above, the recommendations that can be made to President Mahmoud Abbas, who has always adhered to principles and rejected humiliating pressures, are:

1. Not submitting to external blackmail, regardless of its form or size, and refusing to turn national demands into a bargaining chip in the hands of parties that do not respect Palestinian rights.

2. The decision to appoint a vice president shall not be taken except through internal Fatah and factional consensus, passed through the movement's institutions and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and accepted by the Palestinian street.

3. Protecting the national project from domestication and liquidation projects that hide behind slogans of “reform,” while their true goal is to dismantle the national identity and liquidate established rights.

4. Calling on Fatah and PLO institutions to convene immediately to discuss mechanisms for strengthening internal unity and outlining the next phase within a purely Palestinian vision.

5. The President must scrutinize all names and ensure that these figures are not part of a regional American conspiracy. The President bears primary and full responsibility if this happens.

A position that makes history

President Mahmoud Abbas said it clearly: "I will not end my life as a traitor."

The challenge today is at its highest. What is required is a national stance that will be inscribed in the Palestinian honor roll, in which the president upholds legitimacy, rejects the imposition of a vice president without the consensus of the Fatah movement and the PLO factions, and blocks attempts to tame and reengineer Palestinian decision-making under pressure and blackmail.

The president who has withstood occupation and pressure for decades can only be expected today to continue on the same path and close the door to any external infiltration or compromise on the principles.

Time is decisive and every passing moment will be recorded... either as an honorable moment or an unforgivable blunder.