How will Iran confront the American bulldozer?

US-Iranian relations are approaching a moment of truth. The two countries are on a collision course, and the war of accusations and threats is reaching an unprecedented peak. Estimates regarding the outcome of these relations range from a new agreement that would deduct Iran's credit from the 2015 Vienna Agreement, to the "hellish scenario" promised by Donald Trump to the Iranian leadership, along with a range of options that may combine the two possibilities.

War with Iran is not inevitable, but it would be "foolish" to rule out its likely possibility, according to many observers. This assessment is not based on the Pentagon's preparations and "building the necessary force," but rather on a context that has worsened over the past two years of the "flood," with the advantage favoring a pro-war camp that enjoys positions of influence in both Washington and Tel Aviv. Naftali Bennett's theory is being forcefully invoked these days, stating that it is a priority to hit the octopus's head, rather than simply chopping off its many, extended arms.

The pile of American statements, some of which may contradict each other, suggests that there is a "difference" within this administration, and I would not say a division, between those who want to give diplomacy an additional chance, accompanied by "maximum pressure," and those who want to move directly to the ultimate solution, "burning with fire": talks of additional sanctions, drying up resources, and economic strangulation, accompanied by an intensification of "indirect" negotiation channels, and perhaps direct ones, God knows, in exchange for the mobilization and buildup of hard power elements, including carriers, bombers, and giant bombs, which are being mobilized for the promised day, when Trump decides to open the gates of hell on Iran and its leadership.

While observers and regional and international political circles are betting that the "waving of hell" is nothing more than a negotiating tactic and a form of negotiation under fire, given that the Trump administration does not want wars, and that the man came to the White House promising to make a "peace of power," others believe that the flood of brutality and economic warfare that the administration has unleashed and has swept into on all fronts, and with friends before enemies, makes it difficult to rule out an explosion scenario. The minimum that Washington wants may not meet the maximum concessions that the Iranian leadership is willing to offer, or rather, is able to offer.

The height of weakness and brutality

Iran is entering this heated confrontation with Washington at a peak of weakness, a level it has not reached for a quarter of a century, if not since the victory of its Islamic Revolution. The “flood” and its aftermath have destroyed many of the strengths it had patiently and costly built up over more than twenty years, culminating in the transformation of the region extending from the Caspian Sea to the eastern Mediterranean into a “vital sphere” for its influence and regional role. This has provided it with a rare opportunity for defense and attack, to defend its national interests, or to amplify them, outside its borders and on land that is not its own.

Proxy and authentic wars, fought using non-Iranian tools, until recently occupied a prominent position in power calculations, rules of engagement, and the theory of "mutual deterrence."

All of this has ended, or is nearing its end point after the deluge. Hezbollah is no longer a nightmare haunting Israel, nor has Syria maintained its position as the "crown jewel" of the Shiite axis and crescent. Hamas and the Palestinian resistance are in a "saving what can be saved" position, the Houthis are finding it difficult to protect their capabilities and the heads of their leaders, while Iraq is gradually creeping away from the role that Tehran and its local allies have drawn for it.

There is an “early reading” that suggests that Iran would not have reached this level of contraction and decline had it acted differently in the first year of the flood, proving that the harvest of “strategic patience” may not always benefit the “patient and steadfast,” but may even come back to haunt them with a “strategic defeat” of the heaviest caliber. The saying that “the right decision” loses much of its validity if it comes late and after much hesitation (if it comes at all) is true.

Here are some of what observers—some of them from within the axis—believe are missed opportunities for Iran to build a balance of deterrence with Israel, opportunities that could have been avoided and can no longer be revived.

Among them, its reluctance - or inability - to direct deterrent responses to Israel when it struck its consulate in Damascus, affecting its depths within, and killed Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of the fortified square of its capital. After that, chapters of "self-restraint" and "strategic patience" followed, which were not read in Tel Aviv and Washington as anything other than an expression of "deterrence," weakness, and the continued failed bets on the ability of Iranian "reformists" and "moderates" to spare the country the scourge of greed and brutality that deeply pierce the Netanyahu government and the Trump administration.

Here, we open parentheses to emphasize the urgent need to revisit the investigation into the helicopter incident that claimed the lives of President Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian, particularly in light of the pager and radio incident, which dealt a devastating blow to Hezbollah and nearly caused it to lose its balance.

We say this because we believe that history is not a conspiracy, even if it is replete with conspiracies, especially since we live in an era of "artificial intelligence," sixth-generation warfare, and multi-purpose "cybernets."

We add to the above that Iran experienced the flood, amid internal divisions and disagreements, and preoccupations with the conflicts between reformists and hardliners, while on the opposing front, the position was unified and firm, regarding everything that affected Iran and its allies. This is true during the Biden administration, and it has become even more true with the winds of "Trumpism" blowing over the decision-making institutions in Washington. Iran's enemies quarreled over everything except targeting it, and they were united.

Iranian discourse has remained divided between voices calling for calm, "self-preservation," and "not being dragged into the abyss," on the one hand, and others threatening woe, destruction, and dire consequences, on the other. Neither the former has been effective in curbing the aggressive appetite of Israel and its ally, nor the latter has succeeded in establishing the foundations of mutual deterrence.

Iranian hesitation enabled Israel and the United States to isolate the Gaza front and the support fronts, one after the other. The concept of "unity of arenas" fell and was replaced by the concept of their succession and succession, which evolved according to the requirements of the war and the fronts on the other side. Its proponents got what they wanted, starting with Gaza and not ending with Lebanon, passing through the "reversal of the scene" in Syria, and the exchange of roles in targeting Ansar Allah between the two strategic allies, ending with Tehran being placed in the tightest corners.

Even when Iran was certain that opening support fronts did not stop the barbaric advance on Gaza and its resistance, which was the goal for which the fronts were opened, Tehran adopted the "tactic of saving what could be saved" instead of resorting to what some of its allies were betting on: opening the fronts in their entirety, simultaneously and in parallel, not to eliminate Israel as the overly optimistic ones thought, but at the very least, to reach a "comprehensive deal" that is more just to Palestine and Lebanon, based on an interpretation of the Al-Aqsa flood, not as an end to the road, but rather as a round followed by rounds.

Another indication of this "hesitation" is Iran's behavior regarding its nuclear program, which currently holds a central place in American (say Israeli) strategic thinking. In the context of the "flood," and after voices were issued in the Knesset and Congress calling for the use of "nuclear" against Gaza, it appeared that Tehran was in the process of reviewing its "nuclear doctrine" and had decided to cross the "threshold" and enter the nuclear deterrence club.

Several statements by Foreign Minister Abdollahian, his successor Araghchi, and others have contributed to the belief that Tehran has decided to protect itself by possessing the bomb. As Araghchi stated in the latest edition of the Arab-Iranian dialogue, the doctrine in effect for a quarter century has not deterred enemies, lifted sanctions, or pushed the West to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction. Nor has it convinced influential circles there of Iran's right to possess a peaceful nuclear program, with a full enrichment cycle, under Iranian sovereignty.

These positions created an impression, not dispelled by the hesitant positions of another Iranian faction, that Tehran would conduct its first nuclear detonation before the Biden administration departs, and perhaps during the "soft" period between two administrations. But that did not happen. Iran lost its nuclear umbrella, and its program lost its defensive umbrella after the painful strikes it suffered at the hands of the Israeli Air Force, facilitated by US bases and aircraft carriers deployed in the region.

Today, Iran faces a highly sensitive and complex situation, and is in a weaker position than it was at the time of the Vienna agreement negotiations. The United States is not enthusiastic about negotiations under the P5+1 umbrella, and will not be satisfied with guarantees that its nuclear program will not be weaponized or militarized. Rather, there are voices calling for the dismantling of the peaceful program, stripping Iran of its right to possess an enrichment cycle, and for strict American guarantees and oversight.

It is true that Washington does not treat Iran as a second Ukraine, nor its leadership as "Zelensky 2." However, the truth is that the new administration's approach is pushing it, and Tel Aviv behind it, to go the furthest in stripping Iran of its most potent elements, not only military, but also scientific and technological.

While the Iranian negotiator has succeeded over the past twenty years in separating the nuclear issue from other contentious issues with the West, including the "missile program" and "Iran's destabilizing role," Washington today, under the leadership of President Trump, who "isn't kidding" about his ambition for a third term, wants to place all of these issues on the table for compromise, under the threat of economic strangulation and military hell.

As we have said, this does not mean for a single moment, and should not mean that Washington's dictates to Tehran have become an unavoidable fate, that American pressure will succeed in extracting the gains it and its ally seek, or that it will facilitate the outbreak of a new war in the region, the sparks of which could expand and reach valuable American and "ally" interests. However, the truth is that Tehran is entering its confrontation with Washington today from the lowest point it has reached in the last quarter century, while its rival, in a moment of "deception by power," and Tel Aviv's appetite for rampant violence and the closing of all files until it achieves "absolute victory," not only over Hamas, but also over Tehran itself.

This situation, partly "objective," relates to the balance of power and the critical moment in the system of international relations. However, it is, at least in part, "subjective," and relates to the Iranian regime's performance in the post-October 7 period, where some bets failed, many arrows went astray, and with them, numerous opportunities were lost.

About Al Jazeera

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There is an urgent need to revisit the investigation into the helicopter incident that claimed the lives of President Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Abdollahian, particularly in light of the pager and radio incident, which dealt a devastating blow to Hezbollah and nearly caused it to lose its balance.