Hebrew Newspaper: Sinwar’s advantage could turn against him, and Israel must exploit it immediately

Amit Yegor

The IDF is currently carrying out an impressive operation on the northern front. In general, everything that the State of Israel sought to do against Hezbollah at the beginning of a comprehensive campaign is now being carried out skillfully, but in a different way; by dividing it into stages, and leaving some “big sticks” to be used later without entering into a comprehensive war.

If we look at the war with a careful eye and a strategic perspective, we will find that the current time represents the best opportunity to exploit the successes on the northern front to achieve gains in Gaza. Yes, in Gaza. The depletion of Hezbollah’s capabilities does not go unnoticed by Yahya Sinwar and Hamas in Gaza, and it seems that the military “insurance certificate” that Hamas hoped to bring to the battle against Israel in the north to relieve the pressure on Gaza no longer meets the required conditions now, despite the fact that other capabilities remain and are ready for use by the party.

Thus, ironically, the connection between the arenas that we are currently trying to separate may actually serve the Israeli interest in the short term, and weaken Hamas even more. This is the point at which we must “break” the status quo in the Strip, and seek to achieve a decisive victory.

One of the solutions being proposed these days is the so-called “Generals’ Plan,” led by the former head of the IDF Operations Division and later head of the National Security Council, Giora Eiland. The plan aims to cleanse the northern Gaza Strip of militants by forcing them to surrender, and this is done through a complete military siege of the area after evacuating the civilian population, and then this plan can be repeated in other areas of the Strip.

But this Generals’ Plan contains several conceptual and operational failures, and even if it achieves the desired result from their point of view, it will not strategically change the situation in the Strip. My understanding of Hamas and Sinwar is different. While the generals’ plan focuses on reducing Hamas’s ability to rebuild its capabilities during the battle (financing, recruiting fighters, supply, and motivation), my analysis extends more to the strategic realm.

I see Hamas as being driven by only two main logics at the moment: the ability to protect the lives of Sinwar, his family, and the senior commanders who are still with him, and Hamas’s continued control over the population in the Gaza Strip, which will provide it with legitimacy after the war ends and will be a fundamental pillar for its reconstruction and re-growth.

The organization’s main tool is the distribution of humanitarian aid. In contrast to the Hamas leadership’s desire to survive, the military efforts in the Strip are currently being managed according to a “hunting” strategy.

However, Israel has not succeeded in working against Hamas’s ability to govern simultaneously with the Israeli military efforts, and has only now begun to approach this issue seriously, using various methods, and by appointing a special official for this matter, who works within the framework of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. Accordingly, it can be said that the “generals’ plan” suffers from several fundamental flaws:

This plan specifically guarantees more military effort to occupy the land, while the land is no longer an important factor in Hamas’s view, because the issue of occupying the land, in its view, is subject to change in any settlement or deal after the war ends.

The plan does not create a new authority in the Strip, but rather returns the population that can be influenced to Hamas’s hands, and misses the opportunity to establish an alternative government in Gaza.

Implementing the plan requires time, as each stage of this plan requires time to be implemented, and after that, it requires time for the impact to reach Sinwar and his companions. We do not have much time, especially because of the hostage issue.

The occupation of the land is a cause for war according to international understanding, and it will return Gaza to the focus of global attention, especially in the United States, which may see this step as a permanent move by Israel to impose a new reality after the war without coordinating with it. This step could also turn global public opinion against Israel.

Although the plan may be consistent with international law, the law is open to interpretation by lawyers and judges. We have seen this several times since October 7, and although it was clear that Hamas was the one who attacked and committed the “massacres,” the world and international law showed leniency toward it, and this will also happen when the plan is implemented, but in reverse; Israel will be seen as the strong one exploiting the situation in order to achieve a permanent occupation of the territories from the weak, and this proposal may cause concern to neighboring countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which will fear an Israeli move to establish facts on the ground. There is no doubt that after the end of the war, we will want to build a regional alliance with these countries, so, in my opinion, we can act as we did in Lebanon “below the threshold of all-out war” and achieve excellent achievements, without resorting to the step of occupation and military rule, which is considered a “red line,” and restricts the continuation of Israeli operations in Gaza, and hinders our ability to achieve achievements there, and to define the next day in a manner that suits our interests. My alternative proposal (in brief) is to exploit the battle in the north and the interest in that front in order to establish a temporary buffer zone in the north of the Strip as soon as possible, and then to cleanse the areas in the north of the Strip and create “humanitarian bubbles” in which a “different” rule can be imposed on the population, with the primary driver initially being the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the IDF assuming temporary responsibility alongside civilian American security companies and perhaps other regional entities.

These bubbles can be gradually expanded by the population that will want to flee Hamas rule. This strategy will neutralize Hamas (i.e., make it unnecessary), rather than elevating it back to the central position it occupied at the beginning of the war. This neutralization will increase the pressure on the organization and, in my view, will also contribute to progress toward a hostage deal on much better terms for Israel than previously, perhaps including the expulsion of Hamas leaders from the Strip. I suggest that decision-making circles think about this before rushing to adopt the “generals’ plan” on the one hand, and perhaps “press the gas pedal hard” now under the cover of the battle in the north to dismantle Hamas’s governing capabilities as quickly as possible. Now is a very good time to do so.