Hebrew Newspaper: With the momentum on our side, we must combine military and political action

Tamir Hayman

After the series of operational successes in the past week, we must realize that we have not achieved anything. Hezbollah has experienced the most difficult week since the Second Lebanon War [July 2006 War], and yesterday was the most difficult, yet dramatic events still await Israel.

The IDF is striking Hezbollah with blow after blow, and the attack that began yesterday is unprecedented in two respects: The first is intelligence, meaning the accumulation of tireless work since the Second Lebanon War that Nasrallah has not yet discovered. In the second matter, intelligence is the basis; this is evident in the wide-ranging attack directed at sensitive targets and systems of Hezbollah, precision and long-range missiles, medium-range missiles and cruise missiles.

The attacks took place in complex and densely populated areas, and weapons hidden in homes were eliminated. The larger the attacks, the greater the damage to the enemy’s capabilities, and the less flexibility Nasrallah has in his operations. Regarding the damage to capabilities, it is better to be very careful, and not try to determine numbers from now on, and to continue to inflict damage. But Hezbollah has a great ability to inflict great damage on Israel’s home front.

The pace of targeted assassinations, which is much greater than the pace of recovery of Hezbollah’s command and control system, is a very important achievement. After the assassination of Hezbollah’s second figure, Fuad Shukr, Hassan Nasrallah’s close friend and the man who carried out his orders, his authority was transferred to two other people, Ibrahim Akil and Ali Karaki. The first has passed away, while the status of the second is unclear.

The series of assassinations greatly undermines Hezbollah, and these operations must be increased whenever the intelligence opportunity arises. Here, we must emphasize that despite the great damage inflicted on Hezbollah, there are still leaders, and the organization is very large.

However, how can we explain the narrow limits of Hezbollah’s operations thus far compared to its capabilities? It can be assumed that Hezbollah is measuring the losses and assessing the situation; Attacking the chain of command and control may have made the work of this leadership more complicated. But we must not delude ourselves, for within a short time, Hezbollah will understand the reality, and Nasrallah will find himself facing two basic options: The first is to expand the circle of fire and fire on new areas, such as Gush Dan, perhaps in a relatively calculated manner, but more than what we have seen so far. The second is for Nasrallah to understand that he is in a difficult situation and decide to go all the way, and in such a case, we are facing a comprehensive war. A final word about the southern front, and especially the issue of the kidnapped soldiers and the political tool that must complement the military steps; now in particular, and with the momentum we have in the north, we must begin thinking about mixing political action with military action, and identifying the peak point of military action at which we introduce the political tool. If we do not do this now, we will discover, as happened in the south, that the matter is too late. In addition to the moral and ethical aspect, and the difficulty of imagining what the families of the 101 kidnapped soldiers who are still in the hell of Gaza are going through, when they see all the attention directed today to the north, and the fear of removing the issue from the agenda, there is also a strategic aspect. The importance of strategy must be emphasized at a stage like this, and this could also be a strategy to exit the battle from the north and sever the connection between the fronts after the heavy blows Hezbollah suffered. We must create an opportunity, however small, to advance a deal in the south now in particular.