The Surprise factor in wars... Gaza as an example

The surprise only lasts for a short period of time after it occurs. This period may be longer or shorter depending on the ability of the person who was surprised by the event to become aware of it and gather himself in preparation for dealing with the new reality.

Someone who is surprised usually goes through a state of shock (Trauma), which in turn, i.e. the shock, requires four stages to get out of it: a state of denial, a state of anger, a state of acceptance of the event, and then a promise to get out of the crisis. The shorter the time between the states of denial and acceptance, the less effective the shock will be, and the faster, better, and less costly the project of getting out of it will be.

But what is certain is that the memory of surprise is embedded in individual memory, as well as in the collective memory of nations. Nations take lessons from the strategic surprises they have encountered, in order to prepare policies and strategies for the future. So, it is truly an inflection point in the path of the lives of nations. But taking lessons and learnings from the past does not protect it from falling into the trap of surprises again. Surprise is the result of the environment and the objective circumstances in which it occurs. Whenever these circumstances changed, the surprise varied and was repeated.

There are many levels of surprise. There is the personal surprise, of an unexpected event. There is a surprise at the nation level. Last but not least, there is absolutely no such thing as a complete and total surprise. There are always signs of something unusual, being ignored, due to arrogance or belittling the other - the enemy. This takes us to psychology.

Human bias

Psychology says that humans are naturally biased toward certain things, such as evaluating, judging, remembering, or making decisions. A person can believe the first news he hears. It is also difficult to change his convictions later. He, the human being, is always searching for arguments that confirm what he is convinced of. The goal is always to simplify the decision-making process, and the most important thing is to save effort and energy. Inactivity is a major characteristic of human life.

Historical examples

Japan's Pearl Harbor surprise against the United States changed America, Japan, and the world as a whole. In this surprise, Japan adopted diplomatic deception with America. Its ambassador in Washington continued to negotiate with the American government, while his country was preparing and carrying out the attack as a result of which America entered World War II, transformed the Far East region, and used nuclear weapons to resolve the war. The results of the attack also changed Japan itself, from an autocratic country to a democracy, after American General Douglas MacArthur helped write the Japanese constitution, including giving women their rights. At that time, MacArthur ruled Japan directly for a short period. The United States still has a military presence in Japan to this day.

The “October War” of 1973 was not as surprising as Pearl Harbor. It was a limited regional war, to stimulate diplomacy. It occurred within a bipolar world system, largely governed by the dynamics of war and peace. But it was a strategic surprise for Israel. It struck the image of its “invincible” army. It equated the quality between Eastern weapons and Western weapons, which made analysts say that what is most important in wars is not “quantity,” nor only “quality.” Rather, “how” must also be included in the equation.

In the “July War” (July 2006) in Lebanon, Hezbollah surprised Israel by kidnapping soldiers and retreated. Israel responded with a war that lasted 33 days, but it was surprised by important things such as: how unprepared the Israeli forces were for this war, how incomplete the tactical and strategic inquiry was due to involvement in the internal uprising in Israel, and how much Hezbollah had prepared for a war it wanted, so it prepared the stage as he wishes.

Hamas' surprise and the Israeli response

In general, nothing is hidden between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The clash continues, even if it is intermittent. Both teams want the maximum number of goals - canceling out the other. There is the most modern army in the world, versus a player from outside the country. Each team plays on the other's weaknesses (Asymmetry). The achievement for each team did not go beyond scoring points in the record of the wars that took place between them. In their previous wars, surprise did not have a strategic dimension in its effects. The clash between them was limited to bombing and mutual shelling, with a change in the Israeli approach at times through a partial ground military entry into the Gaza Strip.

The surprise of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” radically changed the dynamic of the military equation between them. Israel saw that this surprise violated the rules of the grand strategy for Israeli national security, and these rules include: 

waging the war on enemy territory, ending the war quickly because the Israeli interior cannot tolerate a long war, and striking the enemy to a degree that makes it unable to compensate within a short period of time. 

In this context, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation constituted a bigger crisis for Israel than the clash it has been accustomed to with “Hamas” since 2009, but it, that is, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, does not constitute a direct existential threat to the entity of Israel as a state, unless it is repeated and accumulated. Israel did not respond to it immediately as it should have.

In its response to the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, Israel did not respect international law, especially the aspect related to the principle of “proportionality”. 

The war on Hamas is a comprehensive war. It aims most of all to eliminate this Islamic movement, and to create an environment in Gaza that is radically different from what this environment was during the days of Hamas rule. Due to the absence of strategic surprise, Israel intends to create “tactical surprises” by adopting the following approach:

- A media blackout on military operations, including from the Israeli press, except when Israel wants to pass on news that helps its military operations.

Within the Gaza Strip, in addition to air and ground control, Israel exercises what is called “Digital Dominance” by cutting off the Internet, cell phone communications, and everything related to the communications sector. If it allows you to use the Internet from time to time, it will definitely benefit from intelligence by eavesdropping on everything.

Israel collects tactical intelligence whenever it advances on the ground, and has therefore established a special intelligence unit for this war that coordinates between all combat units.

- Israel aims to attack the tunnel system in the Gaza Strip, most of which, according to public sources (sources open to the public), are located in the north of the Gaza Strip. However, the starting and returning points for these tunnels from Hamas fighters are located inside Gaza City, which is the center of gravity of the movement.

Therefore, depending on the progress of the Israeli army on the ground, its soldiers may not be seen fighting inside the tunnels, but they will certainly seek to control their entrances, and strike the entire system that serves them, including ventilation, lighting, logistical matters, etc., in order to bring the Hamas movement to the point of feeling an actual existential threat that will force it to open the door for the exchange of hostages and prisoners.

Source: Alsharq Alawsat / Military analyst