Eisenkot Moves "Second Israel" from the Margins to the Center: A Palestinian Reading of Structural Transformations in Israeli Society

The current Israeli elections transcend the traditional competition between right and left, bringing to the forefront one of the deepest divisions in the Israeli social and political structure: the division between what is known as "First Israel," representing the Ashkenazi elites who founded the state, and "Second Israel," which primarily includes Eastern Jews (Mizrahim), who for decades constituted a broad social base without receiving representation commensurate with their demographic weight. In this context, former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot emerges as a figure different from previous Eastern experiences. The man is not fighting his battle from a position of protesting marginalization, but from a position of seeking to lead the state itself. From a Palestinian perspective, this transformation cannot be read as merely a redistribution of power centers within the Israeli political system, but rather as an indicator of deeper changes affecting the social structure of the state and the limits of its ability to contain its historical contradictions. It is difficult to understand Eisenkot's rise without returning to the experience of Jews who came from Arab and Islamic countries during the first decades of Israel's establishment. The waves of Eastern immigration were absorbed into the nascent state's project, but the absorption process was not equitable with that enjoyed by those who came from Europe. Tens of thousands were housed in transit camps (Ma'abarot), then many were moved to development towns in the periphery, where they took on security and economic roles far from centers of political and economic influence. Eastern culture was also subjected to continuous pressure within the framework of the "melting pot" policy, which aimed to produce a new Israeli identity dominated by a European character, which was reflected in educational opportunities, political representation, and the social status of the children of this group. Despite the gradual improvement in the conditions of the Mizrahim in subsequent decades, Israeli studies and reports issued by research and official institutions, including the Israel Democracy Institute and the Central Bureau of Statistics, still indicate the persistence of gaps in income levels, education, and representation within a number of state institutions, although these gaps have narrowed compared to the first decades of Israel's establishment. Israeli political history has witnessed several attempts to represent the Mizrahim politically, but most of them remained confined to sectarian demands or failed to penetrate the highest decision-making centers. Aharon Abuhatzira, through the "Tami" movement, tried to transform social grievances into a political project, but its impact remained limited. As for David Levy, despite his widespread popularity within the Likud, he was still seen as a representative of marginalized classes rather than a natural candidate to lead the state. Even Shaul Mofaz, who reached the highest military positions, could not transform his security status into a unifying political leadership. These experiences revealed that access to the military establishment does not necessarily mean access to the top of the political pyramid, and that the "glass ceiling" faced by Eastern politicians remained present, albeit to varying degrees, in the structure of the Israeli political system. Gadi Eisenkot represents a qualitative development in this path. He does not present himself as a representative of a sect or ethnic group, nor does he rely on a discourse of grievance, but rather seeks to present himself as a statesman with security and institutional experience that qualifies him to lead Israel in a stage characterized by complex internal and external crises. His descent from a Moroccan family, and his ascent to the head of the General Staff and then to the forefront of the political scene, give his candidacy a symbolic dimension that transcends his person, as it reflects a gradual transformation in the position of "Second Israel" within the state structure. This path also reflects an increasing maturity in the integration of Mizrahi elites within state institutions, so that Eastern affiliation is no longer seen as a structural impediment to reaching the highest leadership positions as it was in previous decades. This model differs from the experience of the "Shas" movement, which built its influence on the religious identity of the Mizrahim. Eisenkot seeks to address the entire Israeli society, not a specific Eastern audience, which gives him a greater ability to penetrate traditional barriers between different social components. The importance of Eisenkot's rise, from a Palestinian perspective, lies not so much in his person as in what it reveals about the nature of transformations within Israeli society. The gradual transition of Eastern Jews from the margins of the political system to its center reflects a change in the balance of social forces, but at the same time it reproduces questions of identity, elite, and the nature of the state. The continued debate about the relationship between Ashkenazi and Eastern elites indicates that the "melting pot" project did not fully succeed in overcoming the cultural and social differences that accompanied the establishment of the state. At the same time, these transformations intersect with other divisions related to religion and secularism, and to the relationship between the center and the periphery, and between the judiciary and the executive authority, which makes the Israeli scene more complex than traditional party competition suggests. Analysis of the numbers: What do opinion polls say? Gadi Eisenkot's rise is not limited to his symbolism as one of the most prominent sons of "Second Israel," but has begun to be tangibly reflected in Israeli opinion polls. Polls published in July 2026 showed that the party he leads is competing with the Likud party for the top of the political scene, with its representation ranging between 21 and 24 seats, compared to 21 to 23 seats for Likud, with results varying between polling institutions. Some polls also showed Eisenkot ahead of Benjamin Netanyahu in the question of "the most suitable person to head the government," an indicator that reflects a shift in the general mood among a segment of Israeli voters in light of the repercussions of the war and the ongoing political crisis. However, these results do not necessarily mean that the path to the premiership has become paved for Eisenkot; the nature of the Israeli parliamentary system makes the formation of a government dependent on the ability of any candidate to build a coalition that enjoys the support of at least 61 members of the Knesset. Therefore, the real challenge for him may remain in engineering political alliances more than winning a number of seats. From this perspective, the polls acquire importance that transcends their electoral dimension, as they suggest that an increasing part of Israeli society is more willing to accept a personality belonging to "Second Israel" in a position of state leadership, a transformation that carries social and political implications that go beyond the immediate party competition. Conclusion Gadi Eisenkot's rise is not merely a fleeting electoral event, but reflects a transformation in the structure of Israeli society and its internal balances. If his potential success expresses the progress of "Second Israel" towards the center of decision-making, it also reveals the continuation of the structural tensions that have accompanied the Zionist project since its inception, and which the policies of integration and assimilation could not fully end. From a Palestinian perspective, the importance of these transformations lies not only in changing faces within the Israeli leadership, but in understanding how elites and power balances within the state are reconfigured, and its reflection on decision-making in conflict, security, and foreign policy issues. Therefore, monitoring these transformations represents an analytical necessity for understanding Israeli society and its future trends, more than it is a monitoring of a fleeting electoral competition.