Closure of Hormuz and the Stalled Nuclear Deal… Washington Returns to Power Politics and Israel Pushes the Region Towards War

Washington's Message

Washington – Said Arikat – 7/12/2026

News Analysis

The announcement by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy on Saturday evening to completely close the Strait of Hormuz was not an isolated event from the escalating confrontation between Tehran and Washington, but rather appeared to be a direct result of the military and political pressure policy reaching a breaking point. The Strait, which remained open to international navigation despite years of sanctions and tension, has today become a confrontation card used by Iran to say that the continuation of war, threats, and coercion will not go unpunished, and that the repercussions of the conflict will not remain confined within its borders, but may extend to energy markets and the arteries of global trade and the economy as a whole.

In this sense, the closure of Hormuz reveals the depth of the predicament that American policy towards Iran has reached. Once again, relations between the two countries are at a crossroads, but the stalled nuclear deal this time does not seem to stem from technical disagreements over centrifuges or uranium enrichment levels as much as it reflects the failure of the American bet on the possibility of combining military pressure and political negotiation. President Donald Trump's administration seems to be returning to traditional policy based on coercion and force, after the "maximum pressure" policy failed to extract the concessions it promised.

The irony is that Washington is demanding that Tehran return to the negotiating table, while continuing to use sanctions and military threats as key tools in managing the crisis. This is an equation that is difficult to produce a stable agreement, because negotiating under bombardment or the threat of bombardment does not build trust, but rather pushes the other party to seek counter-deterrent tools. From this angle, specifically, one can understand the transition of the Strait of Hormuz from a theoretical threat card to a political and field tool in the confrontation.

Recent statements by senior American officials reveal that Washington has practically begun to move away from the idea of a comprehensive settlement in favor of managing an open conflict, allowing it to maintain economic and military pressure tools without offering a viable political vision to end the crisis. The American discourse no longer focuses on the nuclear program alone, but has linked any future understanding to Iran's regional behavior and the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, thus expanding the list of conditions as negotiations approach a point of understanding.

The American administration is demanding that Tehran officially announce the guarantee of freedom of navigation and an end to targeting commercial vessels. These demands may seem legitimate in principle, but the question Washington avoids is: how did the crisis reach this point in the first place? The Strait of Hormuz was not closed in a political vacuum, and navigation did not turn into a pressure card away from the context of war and escalation. The Strait remained open for many years despite harsh sanctions, before military confrontation pushed Iran to rediscover the strategic value of the most important geographical card it possesses.

From the Iranian perspective, Hormuz is no longer just a waterway, but has become one of the few remaining deterrent cards after years of sanctions, isolation, and military pressure. The announcement of its complete closure reveals that Tehran has decided to move this card from the realm of threat to direct use. If major powers are able to strangle the Iranian economy with sanctions, Iran wants to say that it, in turn, is capable of influencing one of the most important arteries of the global economy.

This does not mean that closing the Strait is a step without risks or that its humanitarian and economic repercussions can be ignored. But it becomes more understandable when placed in its full political and military context. Countries that adopt a policy of coercion cannot assume that the targeted party will endlessly accept playing the role of recipient of blows and sanctions without using the power cards available to it.

In the background of this scene, the Israeli role emerges as one of the most influential factors in pushing the crisis towards the brink of war. The Israeli government has not hidden its opposition to any agreement that eases pressure on Iran, and has consistently considered that exhausting and weakening Tehran is more beneficial than a settlement that gradually reintegrates it into the regional and international system. For this reason, Israel has exerted continuous political and security pressure to keep the military option present in American calculations.

For Israel, Iran remaining under constant pressure is more consistent with its security vision than any agreement that establishes a new regional balance. Therefore, every round of negotiations is subjected to a campaign of skepticism and pressure that pushes Washington to raise its conditions or return to the threat of force. Here lies one of the problems of American policy: that Israel's security priorities have, in many cases, narrowed the margin of American diplomatic decision-making and pushed the Trump administration towards choices that may not serve long-term American interests.

Previous experiences have proven that military force may destroy a facility or delay part of a nuclear program, but it does not eliminate scientific knowledge or erase the political motives behind it. Rather, the continuation of the threat may push Iran to further extremism, and strengthen the voices that believe that possessing more effective deterrent tools is the only way to protect the country from future attacks.

In light of this reality, President Trump's options appear more limited. Returning to a widespread military confrontation carries the risk of the region sliding into a war whose trajectories cannot be controlled, especially after the Strait of Hormuz directly entered the conflict equation. As for accepting a compromise settlement, it may face Israeli opposition and internal American pressure, while the continuation of the current situation means consecrating a policy of "managing the conflict" instead of resolving it.

More dangerously, the Gulf states may be the first to pay the price of this equation. Saudi Arabia, along with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council countries, has come to the conviction that economic development and national transformation projects cannot flourish in a region living to the rhythm of repeated wars. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz places the economies, security, and future projects of the Gulf at risk of a confrontation that these countries were not the decision-makers in igniting.

From here, one can understand the Saudi and Gulf openness to Iran, the expansion of international partnerships, and the endeavor to reduce polarization away from the logic of rigid axes. This does not mean abandoning the relationship with the United States, but rather reflects a growing desire to possess a more independent regional decision, and not to allow the region to once again become an arena for settling scores between major powers or for prioritizing Israel's interests at the expense of Gulf stability.

Ultimately, the dispute is no longer about the number of centrifuges or the amount of enriched uranium. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz confirms that the crisis has turned into a struggle over the shape of the security system in the Middle East, the limits of regional influence, and the role of military force in shaping the future of the region.

If Washington continues to prioritize tools of pressure and war over diplomacy, and if Israel continues to push the American administration towards confrontation and thwart settlement opportunities, then Iran's use of its available power cards will become more likely and dangerous. And then the question will not be when the two parties will return to the negotiating table, but how many crises and wars the region must go through before Washington realizes that coercion does not create an agreement, and that the security of the Middle East cannot be built on permanent war.