There is no doubt that the educational umbrella known as private schools, and foremost among them what I call elite schools, is the second educational umbrella in terms of the number of students enrolled in them, after the largest educational umbrella, government schools affiliated with the occupation municipality and its education ministry, which control them from A to Z, in terms of funding, salaries, buildings, teachers, administrations, activities, events, and curriculum.
 This educational umbrella, which manages private personal schools, associations, and ecclesiastical and endowment institutions, accounts for 38% of the total students in Jerusalem. Therefore, it has been targeted by the occupation government and its security and police apparatuses, especially if we know that among the 17 committees appointed by the occupation government to manage the affairs of the eastern part of the city, headed by former security officers, and regarding education, there is a five-member committee responsible for education in Jerusalem, the occupation municipality and its education department, the police, the "Shin Bet," and the Prime Minister's Office.
 Therefore, the pursuit of education in Jerusalem, with its various umbrellas, especially those affiliated with Islamic endowments and private schools, was at the top of the occupation state's priorities. It sees in their curricula, education, administrations, and teachers a danger to the occupation state, in terms of narrative, history, geography, and educational content, which they consider inciting and denying the existence of the occupation state, and not recognizing its right to exist. It also calls for "glorifying terrorism," resistance, martyrs, and prisoners.
 From here, we found that the occupation, since 2011, has sought to impose its control over private schools and intervene in the curriculum they teach (the Palestinian curriculum), using the weapons of funding and renovation. These schools resorted to taking funding from the occupation municipality. Some considered it a right for these schools, while others saw it as an entry point to control the curriculum of these schools, and that the occupation is not a charity or social affairs organization, and does not provide money for free. Therefore, this money became like a sword hanging over their heads.
 I remember that the amount spent on these private schools during that period was 30 million dollars annually, and meetings were held with the Minister of Education of the Authority and its Prime Minister at that time, to provide this amount to these schools, and to get them out of the "cocoon" of "blackmail" by the occupation municipality.
 But the Authority always promises and does not fulfill its promises, and there was great fear among the administrations of these schools that abandoning this money would deepen their crises and needs if the Authority did not fulfill its obligations towards these schools, and indeed their fear was justified.
 In this article, I do not want to delve into the continuous attack on these schools, where the threat of withdrawing licenses for these schools has become one of the titles of threat and blackmail if they implement the Palestinian curriculum in their schools.
 Many private schools in Jerusalem, which are called "elite" schools, and which are witnessing great pressure from students' parents to enroll in them, based on visions that they are the most educationally qualitative and the best in the educational environment, and the most competent administrations and teaching staff, even though the tuition fees of these schools are the highest, but parents want to invest in their children through knowledge, and therefore they do not want to teach their children in schools affiliated with the Ministry of Islamic Endowments "Palestinian Authority." Here there are many considerations that led to these schools being expelling teachers and students, and government schools, even though their tuition fees are considered symbolic compared to private school tuition fees, but there are considerations related to the quality of education, the "Israelization" of the curriculum, and prioritizing activities and projects at the expense of educational quality, and this does not negate that some of those who want to teach their children in private schools are not due to the factors I mentioned, but some consider it part of "prestige" and social status, as well as the multiplicity of options for these schools, through more than one educational system, not limited to the Palestinian Tawjihi system.
 There is no doubt that these schools suffer from a lack of buildings, as the Jerusalem municipality does not grant the necessary licenses to open new schools, outside of teaching the Israeli curriculum, but rather places many obstacles and impediments in front of these schools in obtaining licenses. Therefore, we find that the pressure on these schools may result in problems with parents, as the limited admission and great pressure and difficulty of choices create crises and open the door for some to say that these schools are open to a specific group of students.
 From this standpoint, great pressure must be exerted by the bodies supervising these schools on the Jerusalem municipality and European countries, which sell us slogans and statements, and which continue to "look" at what is known as phrases of international legitimacy and the right to education, which fell at the gates of Sheikh Jarrah, with the demolition of buildings belonging to UNRWA, and the confiscation of its land leased from the Jordanian government in 1952, in order to establish a settlement on its land, called "Ma'alot Dafna," 1410 settlement units.
 And in order to clarify matters, I believe that it is the duty of the administrations of these schools and their educational authorities to issue a statement to the public, clearly stating that they wish to accommodate all students in Jerusalem, but the objective circumstances are beyond the will of these schools, as no licenses are granted by the occupation municipality to establish new school buildings that can accommodate the increasing number of students. The school buildings have remained as they are, and therefore the margin allowed to accommodate new students is limited, as priority is given to school students who are siblings and graduates of these schools, and they do not accommodate or accept students for social, sectarian, tribal, or geographical considerations, but rather they are open to serve all residents of the city from all its social classes, regardless of religion and beliefs.
 From my point of view, trials and reactions should be based on evidence, facts, and realities, and not on hearsay, or on projecting our feelings and emotions onto our preconceived notions.
They are academic institutions that we must preserve, support, and remain a banner and a beacon for preserving our curriculum, identity, culture, and existence in our Jerusalem.

Today, Gaza is no longer merely a battlefield or an urgent humanitarian issue; it has transformed into a political and legal laboratory where new models for conflict resolution are being tested, re-marketed under the title of "long-term peace." However, this peace, as presented in international circles, is not based on ending the occupation or enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination, but rather on re-engineering the political and security reality in the Strip, within an equation that combines administrative peace and power peace, with a clear marginalization of the aspiration for an independent Palestinian state.
In this context, old ideas formulated since the beginning of the millennium are being brought to the forefront, which treated Gaza not as an integral part of a national liberation project, but as a densely populated area requiring administration and security control under external supervision.
What is being proposed today as "transitional administration" or a "technocrat committee" is not a product of the recent war, but a reproduction of approaches that view governance as a technical function, not a political practice stemming from popular will.
Administrative peace implicitly assumes that the core of the Palestinian crisis lies in "poor governance," not in the continuation of the occupation.
Hence, political representation is replaced by unelected functional structures, deriving their legitimacy from international acceptance rather than from the people.
These structures are not asked to defend national rights or represent the general will, but to manage the population: crossings, services, relief, and reconstruction, within a pre-drawn political ceiling.
In contrast, power peace constitutes the security aspect of this equation.
It is a peace conditioned on disarmament and on subjecting the Palestinian security sphere to strict oversight, through international arrangements or regional understandings.
Here, sovereignty, especially in its security dimension, transforms from an inherent right into a "deferred reward," granted only if the Palestinian side adheres to the imposed conditions of stability. Thus, disarmament is not a transitional step towards statehood, but a permanent tool to keep it deferred.
More dangerous than the reduction of powers is what this model entails in terms of re-dismantling the Palestinian geopolitical landscape.
Gaza is treated as a separate unit with its own governance system, which opens the door for generalizing the same logic to the West Bank later, transforming Palestine into a collection of administrative entities, each with its own permanent "transitional" arrangements, instead of being a single state under occupation striving for liberation.
This project is given moral cover today through humanitarian discourse, benefiting from the unprecedented catastrophe experienced by the Strip.
Amidst widespread destruction, displacement, hunger, and infrastructure collapse, people's primary concern becomes survival before any political discussion.
Here lies the ethical and political dilemma: utilizing real human suffering to pass arrangements that may shape the destiny of the Palestinian people for decades.
What is imposed in a moment of weakness may become a permanent framework for political life.
From the perspective of international law, any transitional phase under international supervision is supposed to have a defined goal and timeframe, and its purpose is to enable the people under occupation to exercise their full right to self-determination.
But what is proposed for Gaza today is closer to models of "modern guardianship": local administration in form, and effective external control in essence, with deferred sovereignty without a clear time horizon.
Therefore, the fundamental question is no longer: Who will administer Gaza administratively?
Rather, the more dangerous and deeper question is:
Is Gaza intended to be the nucleus of an independent Palestinian state, or a permanent laboratory for administrative peace and power peace, or the end of the Palestinian national project, at the hands of Israel and Hamas?
The answers to these questions will determine not only the future of Gaza, but the fate of the entire Palestinian national project.

The idea here is not to issue a moral judgment on Fatah or Hamas, nor to solely blame either of them for the current state of the Palestinian situation, but rather to attempt to read the national experience from a deeper analytical angle: the angle of the "foundational act" produced by major movements at a critical historical moment, which then transforms over time into a structural imprint that reshapes the entire political sphere and stamps the movement itself with a character difficult to escape. In comparative literature, these moments are described as "critical junctures": moments that not only change the course of politics but also create new paths with self-reliance, constrain subsequent choices, and make the foundational act a silent reference for everything that follows.

In this sense, the Oslo Accords can be viewed as the foundational act for the Fatah movement in the contemporary era, not because it was necessarily a "moral error," but because it restructured the entire Palestinian political sphere. Oslo was not merely a negotiating track, but the establishment of a new governance model: authority without sovereignty, an economy dependent on donors, functional security under occupation, and a transition from the logic of a liberation movement to the logic of daily administration of the population. This transformation produced a hybrid political structure: neither a viable state nor a liberation movement capable of open engagement. Over time, the crisis of this path was no longer its faltering, but that it itself became the only possible policy, the source of legitimacy, and the horizon of thought. Thus, the Oslo imprint became attached to the Fatah movement as the movement that ushered Palestinians into an open transitional authority phase without a sovereign horizon, and the accompanying representational fragmentation, erosion of the meaning of liberation, and structural dependence on external arrangements.

In contrast, Hamas has historically been associated with the pivotal act of October 7th, as a moment that broke the logic of containing and normalizing the conflict, and reintroduced the Palestinian issue to the heart of global politics, but at an unprecedented human and political cost. This act was not merely a military operation, but a pivotal event that escalated the conflict to an extreme: a comprehensive war on Gaza, a global test of law and ethics, and a re-raising of the question of the day after, implying who governs? Who represents what? And what form can the national project take after the destruction? In this sense, the name Hamas is no longer separate from "Al-Aqsa Flood" as a historical defining act, just as Fatah is no longer separate from Oslo. Here, the issue is not intentions, but the trajectory effect: a single act that reshapes the field and places the movement in a position from which it cannot disengage, whether in defense or in criticism.

Many experiences show that major movements are often historically defined by a single moment: the African National Congress by the liberation of South Africa, the Algerian National Liberation Front by the war of independence, Sinn Féin by the transition from arms to settlement, the British Conservatives by Brexit, the Israeli Labor Party by Oslo, and Likud by redefining Israel as an expansionist nation-state. In all these cases, the foundational act becomes a source of legitimacy, then over time transforms into a structural burden when historical conditions change and the movement remains captive to its initial mark. At this point, the question is no longer: who was right? But: is this movement still capable of producing a new horizon that transcends its foundational act?

Talking about "post-" in the Palestinian context seems much more difficult than in other contexts, including the Israeli one, because this question is not posed on politically or sovereignly stable ground, but on an open historical void. In most other contexts, "post-party" is discussed within an existing state with established institutions. When "post-Likud" or "post-Netanyahu" is said in Israel, the discussion takes place within the framework of a complete state: the army, economy, judiciary, and general political identity all remain, and the disagreement remains confined to the directions of governance, not the existence of the entity itself.

As for the Palestinian case, the discussion about "post-Fatah and Hamas" does not take place within an existing state, but within an incomplete national project and a political entity that has not yet formed. The parties here do not compete to manage a stable state, but effectively act in place of the absent state. Fatah bears the burden of external representation and the structure of authority under occupation, while Hamas does not merely represent an opposition party, but a governing structure in Gaza and a military bearer of resistance. Therefore, thinking about "post-them" is not received as a normal political transition, but as a possibility of a comprehensive void in the basic functions that the state is supposed to perform: political representation, governance, negotiation, defense, and the organization of people's daily lives. In such a context, "post-" does not seem like a transition within an existing system, but a leap into the unknown, affecting the entire structure of the national project itself, not just the balances of power within it.

The matter becomes more complex because the Palestinian field is governed by the condition of occupation. In the absence of sovereignty, politics becomes laden with existential functions: survival, protection, recognition, and representation. In such a context, groups tend to cling to what exists, no matter how problematic, because the alternative seems like an existential risk, not just a political adventure. In Israel, one party can be replaced by another without fear for the continuity of the state; in Palestine, it is feared that "post-" would be a collapse, not a transition.

Furthermore, the Palestinian experience is burdened by a memory of accumulated setbacks: settlement failures, collapse of unity, siege, wars, and erosion of representation. This memory makes the political imagination poor and burdened with caution. The question becomes not "what is the better alternative?" but "do we even have the luxury of experimentation?". In such a climate, thinking about "post-" becomes a symbolic gamble, because it opens up possibilities of chaos as much as it opens up possibilities of renewal.

Based on this, a thesis can be formulated that the Palestinian political system has entered a phase of "deadlock of the ruling duality": where Fatah and Hamas, despite their fundamental differences, have become prisoners of two historical junctures that they are no longer able to overcome or produce a new meaning for national action outside their shadow. Fatah is governed by the Oslo structure and its accumulated institutions, affiliations, and political economy, and Hamas is governed by the moment of Al-Aqsa Flood and the existential questions it opened regarding cost, capability, protection, and meaning. Both possess historical legitimacy, but this legitimacy has become more past-oriented than performative; it is based on what was, not on what can be achieved in post-disaster conditions.

Here, the question of "post-Fatah and Hamas" arises not as an exclusionary call, but as a structural question about the ability of the existing duality to produce a viable national strategy. The intention is not the end of the two movements, but the end of their monopoly over the horizon and meaning of Palestinian politics. "Post-" means opening up a new horizon for representation, thought, and organization, transcending the Oslo/Al-Aqsa Flood equation as the limits of what is possible.

The actual entry into this phase can be tested through concrete indicators, not slogans: the erosion of the two movements' ability to monopolize the definition of "national," and the search by broad sectors, especially young generations, for alternative forms of representation; the emergence of organizational or intellectual initiatives that transcend polarization and speak the language of the project, not the language of the axis; the shift of public debate from the question of "who is with us?" to the question of "what is a viable strategy?"; and the revival of the demand to rebuild national representation on comprehensive and democratic foundations as an existential condition for any new project.

If these indicators are realized, we will have effectively entered the "post-Fatah and Hamas" phase, not as a political vacuum, but as a horizon for re-establishing Palestinian politics outside the captivity of old junctures. Remaining within the duality, however, means recycling the same history: authority without sovereignty on the one hand, and resistance without a unifying political horizon on the other, while the societal cost continues to rise and the margin of meaning and hope shrinks. This dilemma becomes more dangerous in light of profound and alarming global transformations, not least the escalating trend towards the "privatization" of the international system, as reflected in Trump's policies, and the increasing indications of the formation of a multipolar world order, with its repercussions for the Global South, at the heart of which lies the Palestinian issue. In a world where the moral and legal framework that governed the post-Cold War era is disintegrating, and the value of the weak in power calculations is declining, the ability to rebuild the political self becomes a condition for survival, not an intellectual luxury. At such a moment, the question of "post-Fatah and Hamas" becomes not a mental exercise or a desire for rupture, but an existential necessity: a question of how Palestinians can regain their ability to imagine their future, formulate their project, and carry their cause beyond a duality that has exhausted its historical energy, in the face of a world that pushes them, time and again, to the brink of erasing meaning before erasing place.

Since his ascent on the broken stairs of the international body, and his public reprimand of it for its obsolescence, corruption, and expiration, the man with the inflated ego has turned his cheek to the people, and began to walk proudly on earth, as if there was no one else in it; he wages wars, seizes people's properties, and threatens those who oppose him with malicious taxes, transforming the halls of politics into a casino where he alone forms the "Peace Council" to be an alternative to the international body, drafting its charter, and determining the price of admission tickets to it.
Like an elephant entering a pottery shop, Trump began to break the rules of right and justice and the values of humanity, acting like an actor in a long "Western" film, playing the role of the villain who shoots from atop his horse, and threatens with an "Armada" anyone who disobeys his command, threatening to kidnap leaders and their wives from their bedrooms, if they refuse to hand over the keys to their countries' treasuries and wealth.
In a bold dissection of the global scene, "Mark Carney", the Canadian Prime Minister, in his speech at the Davos Forum, unveiled the veil of values and ethics that had covered the nakedness of the global system for decades, revealing that it was nothing but a lie, hiding behind it the arrogance of power and double standards.
Mistaken is he who thinks that Trump is merely a "passing phenomenon" that will end with his departure; he is the naked face of America that has returned to its former self; a state ruled by numbers, not values. It sells allies in a "liquidation" auction, as happened with "Qasd" when its purpose as a "gun for hire" was exhausted, and feeds Ukraine to the Russian bear when ammunition bills became a burden on the budget, even its allies in "NATO" were not spared from commercial stings and customs duties on wine and champagne.
When Trump forms a peace council, his morals are its charter, and Netanyahu is among its gatekeepers.. then peace be upon the world. The late political fox Henry Kissinger was right when he said: "America's friends should fear it more than they fear their enemies."
Peace be upon the world! It is not just a farewell phrase in a theatrical text, but rather an "obituary" for an international system that has fed on slogans of democracy and human rights for decades, until Trump came to announce the end of the show.

Its properties enjoy international immunity that legally obliges Israel to protect and respect them.

Netanyahu's office confirmed that the occupation would open the Rafah crossing once 'the process of locating the body of detainee Ran Gvili is completed'.

Settlement projects are not merely infrastructure development, but rather part of the occupation's strategy to impose full control over the city.

These moves come amid increasing internal pressure to completely close the detainee file.

Let it be clear that Israeli threats against Gaza will not stop, regardless of any “ceasefire agreement.” Genocide has become the daily reality, and the racist colonial settlement occupation sees the continuation of suffering and siege as the new old normal. This reality must be viewed and dealt with as the product of a systematic policy, because we are facing a society of perpetrators of genocide, not just a fleeting political adversary.

The Rafah crossing is no longer just a border crossing point; it has become a blatant mirror reflecting the nature of the political partnership between Israel and the United States in managing the war on Gaza, not only in its military dimension but in its humanitarian, political, and economic essence. The issue is no longer about technical procedures or security arrangements, but about a policy based on producing and then obstructing promises, and marketing “understandings,” while the siege is effectively managed as a tool of collective punishment.

According to what was revealed by Israeli Army Radio, Israel and the United States reached a preliminary understanding last week to open the Rafah crossing in both directions. However, this understanding, like other previous understandings, did not go beyond media statements, as Israel quickly drowned it with a series of conditions, restrictions, and renewed “security” pretexts, while preparing to hold a meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs (the Cabinet) to “decide the fate” of the crossing. This reflects the occupation's mentality, which views crossings as tools for control and blackmail, not as lifelines for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

This scene cannot be separated from the American role, which has not been a mediator or guarantor, but a full political partner. The United States merely produces vague understandings that are later used to whitewash the occupation's image before international public opinion, without any binding mechanisms or actual pressure. Thus, “American understandings” become a political cover for deliberate Israeli obstruction, while the essence remains the same: keeping Gaza under siege, and managing the catastrophe instead of ending it.

More dangerously, the complicity extends to the post-war phase, where the “second phase” is promoted, promises of reconstruction are launched, and new maps for Gaza are drawn under humanitarian and developmental slogans. However, these promises are made completely disregarding people's rights, and their right to land and to determine the shape of their cities and their future.

What is marketed as a reconstruction project is gradually revealed as a political-economic scheme, in which land ownership is confiscated under pretexts of “organization,” “security,” and “modern planning,” and rebuilding is done according to investment priorities that serve American economic interests and its partners, not the needs of the afflicted residents of Gaza. Thus, genocide and destruction are transformed into an economic opportunity, and the siege is completed with plans to rearrange the place and the people, in one of the most dangerous forms of contemporary colonialism.

In light of these joint policies, a humanitarian catastrophe is unfolding within Gaza City, where the city is suffering from a severe water crisis with its cutoff for the eighth consecutive day. According to the Gaza municipality, more than 85% of the city's area does not receive water, putting hundreds of thousands of civilians at direct health risk, and confirming that the قطع of basic services is not a side effect of the war, but part of a systematic strangulation strategy.

In parallel with this catastrophic reality, statements by Dr. Ali Shaat, head of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, are multiplying regarding the introduction of shelter caravans, the opening of crossings, and the improvement of humanitarian conditions. Despite the reassuring nature of these statements, they clash with the wall of Israeli restrictions supported by the US, and the absence of any real implementation guarantees. Thus, promises turn into tools to buy time and absorb anger, while the residents of Gaza are left to face thirst, hunger, and the collapse of basic services.

In conclusion, what is happening at the Rafah crossing is not a failure of coordination, but a success of a joint policy based on keeping Gaza in a state of permanent suffocation. Israel imposes conditions, the United States provides cover, and the international community merely observes. As for the price, it is paid by Palestinians alone: siege, starvation, land confiscation, and conditional reconstruction formulated outside their will and rights.

The Rafah crossing today is not only closed by gates, but closed by international political will. Its true opening begins by breaking the partnership of occupation and American cover, and restoring rights to the residents of Gaza, before humanity becomes merely a slogan circulated in the media.

End of January is a "security-sensitive period."

By: Murad Farid Hamidane.

Talk of a potential military strike against Iran is no longer just analytical material in research centers or fleeting press leaks; it has become a constant part of the tense regional landscape at the beginning of 2026. American military movements in the region, naval and air reinforcements, and official statements speaking of "strong options" are met with Iranian rhetoric that raises the ceiling of response to the point of considering any attack as an all-out war. Nevertheless, the difference between escalating deterrence and making a decision for war remains clear.

The reality is that the region is experiencing a moment of "acute balance," where military preparations intersect with precise political calculations. The decision for a strike, if taken, is not only about the possibility of military execution but also about the nature of the target: Is it nuclear facilities? Military sites? Specific leaders? It is also linked to the scope of the operation: Will it be a limited, containable strike, or the beginning of an open confrontation that could extend to more than one arena?

It is essential here to distinguish between three scenarios that are often conflated in public discourse. First: a direct and widespread American strike. Second: a unilateral or semi-unilateral Israeli strike. Third: operations below the threshold of war, such as cyberattacks, limited strikes, or covert operations. This distinction is crucial because the probability of each scenario differs radically from the others. An all-out war is not the only option, and perhaps the least likely in the short term, while limited operations remain more feasible because they are less costly and more deniable.

The most sensitive factor in this equation is Iran's nuclear program. Continued enrichment at high levels keeps Israeli and American concerns alive and fuels the rhetoric of a "narrow window of time" to prevent Iran from reaching the threshold of latent nuclear capability. However, concern does not necessarily equate to a military decision. A strike, if it targets nuclear facilities, may not end the program entirely, but it could ignite a wide regional confrontation that would be difficult to contain.

The United States so far appears more inclined to use force as a tool of deterrence and political pressure, not as a first option for military resolution. Washington understands that a war with Iran is not a swift operation, but rather a potential multi-front escalation that could include the Gulf, maritime passages, and perhaps other regional arenas. Moreover, any widespread confrontation would directly impact energy markets and global economic stability.

As for Israel, despite its continuous raising of the warning level, it realizes that the decision for a strike is not only about military capability but also about the ability to withstand subsequent responses. Managing a multi-arena war without sufficient international political and military cover is a high-risk gamble. Therefore, the scenario of a limited strike or undeclared operations remains more realistic than an open, uncontrolled war.

In contrast, Tehran raises the level of threat to fortify deterrence, asserting that any targeting will be met with a harsh response. This rhetoric is not just media escalation, but a strategic message aimed at preventing its adversaries from considering a "clean strike" without cost. Here lies the paradox: each party brandishes force to avoid using it.

The summary of the scene is that the region is not on the verge of an declared war, but it is also not in a state of stability. We are in a phase of escalating deterrence, where elements of pressure are accumulating without yet turning into a decision for a comprehensive confrontation. The most likely scenario in the short term is the continuation of mutual threats, and perhaps an escalation of limited or indirect operations, with the option of a widespread strike remaining a possibility linked to changes in political or nuclear data.

The Middle East today stands on the brink of calculated tension. A miscalculation, or an unexpected incident, could push things onto a different path. But for now, it seems that all parties prefer to keep war as a deterrent option, not as a decision for execution.

Netanyahu linked the reopening of the crossing to two conditions: the retrieval of the last body of a detainee and the disarming of the Hamas movement.

The Gaza Strip has become the most dangerous environment in the world for workers in the fields of media and humanitarian relief.

Gaza is at the heart of the scene once again, all eyes on it, while the West Bank seems absent from calculations. "Gaza first" is not just a description of the war, but a reminder of a recurring political dilemma: saving the Strip without linking it to the West Bank means reproducing a fragmented conflict, instead of a comprehensive solution.

Gaza first, a phrase that returns strongly to the forefront today, not as a description of the war alone, but as a political entry point that brings to mind a previous Palestinian moment whose outcomes have not yet been decided. When we go back to 1994, we recall Yasser Arafat's insistence on including Jericho alongside Gaza in the first agreement stemming from Oslo. This was not a fleeting geographical detail, but a clear expression of a deep fear that the political path would open only through Gaza, and then close before reaching the West Bank. He realized that a fragmented beginning carried within it the risk of turning into a fragmented end, and that if Gaza was left alone, it might become a title for an incomplete solution that would not be finalized.

That fear was not born out of skepticism about the political process itself, but from an early understanding of the nature of the Israeli approach to a solution, an approach based on fragmenting geography and breaking down the issue into separate stages and files, which are easy to control and manage without reaching a comprehensive solution. The formula of Gaza-Jericho First came as an attempt to curb this logic, or at least to restrict it, and to link the Strip to the West Bank from the very first moment. But what was intended to be a transitional beginning, over time turned into a permanent pattern, until fragmentation became a political and geographical reality, not just a possibility.

Today, nearly three decades later, the same scene returns but under harsher conditions. The focus is entirely on Gaza, while the West Bank is absent from the political equation, not by public rejection, but by deliberate neglect. The West Bank is left to swing between accelerating settlement, eroding land, and the absence of a political horizon, as if it is a suspended area outside any conception of a solution. It has no presence in ceasefire formulas, nor in post-war maps, nor in the concepts being circulated about the future of the conflict.

In contrast, Gaza today bears a double burden. It needs to be saved from the clutches of war, and hearts tremble at the mere thought of returning to destruction and death. The overwhelming humanitarian scene draws all eyes to it, and all attention is focused on what will happen there, how it will be managed, and who will control its future. This focus is understandable humanely, but dangerous politically, because it is reproduced without any clear link to the unity of the cause and the path.

In this climate, the Palestinian Authority finds itself once again on the defensive. It is not in a position of initiative, but in a position of seeking to prevent being bypassed. It is called upon when needed, and excluded when concepts are drawn up, and it is treated again as an administrative or security title, not as a bearer of a political project. And as in previous stages, the solution is reproduced from above, without real partnership with those who are supposed to be the owners of the cause.

Israel, for its part, is not driven to seek a solution out of a desire for peace, but because it is now forced to choose, or at least to manage this choice. Today, it deals with an undeclared Palestinian entity, but one that is embodied on the ground as a complete people, whose population is no less than that of Israelis. This demographic and political reality imposes itself, and makes the continuation of the status quo a decision in itself, not a state of neutrality.

In principle, the options are clear. Either full annexation, with all its legal, moral, and demographic consequences, or granting Palestinians full freedom and sovereignty. But Israel, due to its security concerns, wants neither. It does not want annexation at its cost, nor does it want Palestinian sovereignty with its repercussions. And here begins the gray area, where politics is managed through temporary solutions, hybrid arrangements, and formulas that do not state their true name.

From this dilemma emerges what Netanyahu and the Israeli right call thinking outside the box. In essence, it is a search for a creative solution in an unprecedented formula, especially in the West Bank. The focus is not on the land as a political unit, but on population centers. Separating people from land, and managing Palestinians as separate human groups, not as a political community with collective rights. Extended self-rule here, civil administration there, strict security arrangements everywhere, without sovereignty, without a horizon, and without a final solution.

In this context, Gaza once again becomes a laboratory, while the West Bank turns into a postponed file, or a testing ground for new forms of conflict management. And here lies the real danger, not only in the fragmentation of geography, but in the redefinition of the Palestinian issue itself, from a matter of liberation and self-determination, to a matter of population management.

The political warning here cannot be understated. Any path that starts from Gaza, ignores the West Bank, and treats Palestinians as numbers and gatherings rather than as a single political entity, is a path that reproduces the conflict instead of solving it. Gaza deserves to be saved from the war, yes, but saving it outside the context of the unity of the cause will once again make it a gateway to an incomplete solution, which Palestinians are asked to live with as the maximum possible.

History does not literally repeat itself, but it persistently repeats its logic. And unless the logic of the fragmented solution is broken, the same cycle will continue, Gaza first, West Bank suspended, creative solutions without justice, and a reality imposed and then demanded to be accepted. This is not a pessimistic reading, but the conclusion of a long experience that says that what is not politically resolved, is drained over time, until it loses its meaning.

Four citizens were injured after a 'quadcopter' drone attacked the transmission tower above the 'Shawa and Hasri' tower in the city center.

What is happening to UNRWA today will happen tomorrow to any other international organization or diplomatic mission.

A young Palestinian man was martyred by 'Israeli' occupation forces' bullets after his vehicle was shot at.

The attack comes after the occupation forces stormed the community, forced foreign solidarity activists to leave it, and declared the area a "closed military zone" for one year.

In Israeli cells, time does not pass as we know it. No sun enters to announce the morning, and no night falls to grant the body a moment of rest. There, time stops, and the Palestinian body becomes an open space for pain. Silence becomes a daily language, and mere survival becomes an act of resistance. In these places isolated from the world, not only is the Palestinian detained, but their humanity is slowly crushed, as if the prison was created to be another homeland for suffering.
For many decades, detention in the Palestinian experience has not been an exceptional event, but a collective fate that pursues people in their homes, fields, streets, and dreams. More than a million arrests since 1967, numbers that have lost their meaning in the face of the immense pain they contain. Children grew up behind bars, mothers bid farewell to their sons and no longer recognized their features, entire families lived their lives suspended on news of a postponed release. And with October 7, 2023, the gates of hell opened wide.
Inside the prisons, everything changed except the cruelty. Violent raids, screams, beatings, confiscation of everything that connects the detainee to life. Books were snatched from hands, Qurans were confiscated, blankets were pulled away, and even spoons were not spared. Detainees were left with their bare bodies except for their clothes, and with thin bedding that offered no protection from the winter cold, the summer heat, or the harsh ground. Doors were closed on prolonged hunger, and with them, visits were stopped, and families were deprived of seeing their children, as if the punishment was not imposed on the prisoner alone, but on their entire family.
Hunger there is not a fleeting sensation, but a constant companion. Meals are barely visible, undercooked rice, dry bread, an egg shared by more than one exhausted body. Bodies waste away, weights drop, sunken eyes try to cling to life. Food is no longer a right, but a tool of punishment, as Ben Gvir openly intended when he spoke of reducing it as a deterrent. In Israeli prisons, deterrence means breaking the body before breaking the will.
As for illness, it is another story of silent torment. Cancer patients are left to their fate, those with chronic diseases await medicine that never comes, and the injured find only neglect. Water is available for only one hour a day, and hygiene is an impossible luxury, so scabies spread on the bodies of detainees as sorrow spreads in Palestinian memory. Even bathing turned into a means of torture, water cold enough to cause pain in winter, and hot enough to burn in summer.
In this darkness, police dogs are used, and tear gas inside closed rooms. Detainees are forced to kneel, to bow their heads, to raise their shackled hands behind their backs. Intentional humiliation, as if the goal is not just punishment, but the erasure of the human from within. Some could not bear it, attempted suicide, and others emerged as bodies without souls, or never emerged at all.
In the "Sde Teiman" camp, cruelty is embodied in its most horrific forms. There, where there is desert and silence, Gaza detainees are held blindfolded, handcuffed, not knowing if the day has begun or ended. Surgeries are performed without anesthesia, limbs are amputated, bodies are violated, and screams are heard by no one. Even when a brutal sexual assault by soldiers against a prisoner was revealed, Israeli anger was not directed at the crime, but at holding those who committed it accountable, as if Palestinian pain was a detail not worth dwelling on.
Many have died inside prisons since the beginning of the war, some from hunger, some from illness, and some under torture. Names disappeared, and bodies were returned or buried in silence, while the world turns its face away. International law is present on paper, absent in the cells, and the Palestinian human is left alone to face a machine that sees them only as a danger to be broken.
Israeli prisons are not just buildings of cement and iron, but a mirror of an entire system based on dehumanization, on turning pain into policy, and silence into an accomplice. In every cell, there is a story yet untold, a body awaiting justice that never comes, and a faint voice whispering, despite everything, that freedom, no matter how delayed, must be born from the womb of this darkness.

Searching for a "winner" in the Gaza War is a misleading question from the perspective of international law, because armed conflicts are not measured by their military outcomes alone, but by the extent to which the rules of international humanitarian law are respected, legitimate political goals are achieved, and harm to the civilian population is minimized.
According to these standards, the recent Gaza War embodies a model of a legally and strategically failed war, which resulted in severe losses for all parties, without producing a recognized or sustainable victory.

The Palestinian People: The Protected and Violated Victim

Palestinian civilians are classified, under the Fourth Geneva Conventions, as protected persons.
Nevertheless, the Palestinian people bore the brunt of the war, both in terms of human losses and widespread destruction of civilian property and infrastructure.
The nature of the military operations raised serious legal issues related to the principles of distinction and proportionality, which are fundamental pillars of international humanitarian law.
This loss is not only humanitarian but also legal, as it leaves the issue of international accountability open, and holds the international community responsible for failing to fulfill its duty to protect and prevent grave violations.

The Palestinian Cause: Existing Rights and a Stalled Path

Legally, the Palestinian cause has not suffered any diminution in its essence, as the right to self-determination, ending the occupation, and the return of refugees remain fixed rights guaranteed by resolutions of international legitimacy.
However, the war contributed to stalling the political and legal path, and transforming the issue again into a humanitarian relief file, instead of dealing with it as a decolonization issue.
This loss is represented by the marginalization of legal and diplomatic tools in favor of crisis management, a path that prolongs the conflict and does not end it.

Hamas: The Problem of Armed Action Outside the Comprehensive Legal Framework

The war shows that the Hamas movement, despite its continuation as a field actor, found itself in a legal and political dilemma.
The absence of a unified national reference, and the failure to integrate military action within an internationally recognized political strategy, made the movement vulnerable to being held responsible for the human cost, regardless of the legitimacy of resisting occupation in principle.
The loss here is not purely military, but a loss in the ability to transform the legitimacy of resistance into a sustainable legal and political gain.

Israel: Abuse of Power and Limits of Military Superiority

Despite its military superiority, Israel failed to achieve a legal or political victory, as it did not end the conflict, nor did it impose a settlement, but rather faced an escalation in accusations of committing grave violations of international humanitarian law, which may amount to war crimes.
Internally, the war revealed a deep crisis of confidence in leadership and institutions, and externally, it led to the erosion of Israel's legal and moral image, and the widening circle of demands for accountability.
This is a deferred strategic loss, whose effects appear in international legitimacy, not on the battlefield.
Who won then...?!
From a strict legal perspective, no one won. The weaker party paid the highest human price, while the stronger party lost part of its international legitimacy. In contemporary wars, the erosion of legitimacy is more dangerous than the decline of power.
How can losses be minimized...?
Unifying Palestinian political representation within a recognized legal framework.
Subordinating any armed action to national interest calculations and respecting the rules of international law.
Activating international accountability mechanisms instead of merely rhetorical condemnation.

How can losses be compensated?

Legally: by internationalizing violations and prosecuting those responsible.
Politically: by restoring credibility to a solution based on ending the occupation.
Humanitarianly: by reconstruction that ensures human dignity and does not reproduce fragility.
In conclusion: The Gaza War proves that military force, when separated from law, loses its strategic meaning. The real question is no longer who won, but: who has the ability to return the conflict to its just legal path, instead of leaving it hostage to open cycles of violence?

For a long time, digital illiteracy was treated as synonymous with not using technology, or ignorance of computer and internet basics. The “digitally illiterate” person was someone who didn't own a device, or didn't know how to open their email, or interact with a digital platform. This definition was logical in a time when technology was a relative luxury, or exclusive to a certain group, or an option that could be dispensed with.

But this understanding is no longer sufficient in the age of artificial intelligence.

We are living in an era where refraining from using technology is no longer possible, and where everyone, without exception, has become a forced user of digital tools. Here, digital illiteracy has not disappeared, but rather changed its form.

Contemporary digital illiteracy does not mean the absence of use, but rather its superficiality. It is not manifested in staying away from technology, but in being dependent on it without understanding. A person who uses AI tools daily, without understanding their mechanisms, limitations, or biases, may be more digitally illiterate than someone who uses them less, but with greater awareness.

In this context, the fundamental question becomes:

Are we using artificial intelligence… or are we being used by it?

New generations, born into the heart of the digital environment, are often described as “the most technologically savvy.” However, this description hides a deep problem. Familiarity with screens does not mean the ability to think critically, and speed of interaction does not mean understanding algorithms. Digital illiteracy today is not related to age or access, but to the nature of the relationship with technology.

In the age of artificial intelligence, digital illiteracy takes on more dangerous dimensions. Tools are no longer limited to searching or communicating, but now produce texts, analyze data, and participate in decision-making. Anyone who treats these outputs as definitive facts, without verification or questioning, falls into the heart of digital illiteracy, even if they appear technically advanced.

Here, digital illiteracy intersects with education, culture, and ethics. The absence of questioning skills, verification, formulating requests, and understanding context makes artificial intelligence a tool for reproducing ignorance, not for expanding the horizons of knowledge. The most dangerous forms of digital illiteracy today are those that hide behind the language of modernity.

In the Palestinian and Arab context, this problem becomes more complex. The introduction of technology into schools and institutions does not necessarily mean combating digital illiteracy, unless it is accompanied by building critical awareness and educational methodologies that prioritize thinking over copying, and understanding over consumption. Technology without awareness can deepen dependence instead of reducing it.

Digital illiteracy in the age of artificial intelligence is not a lack of skill, but a flaw in awareness; it is not a problem of tools, but a problem of understanding. Today, it is more dangerous than traditional illiteracy, because it operates covertly, producing the illusion of knowledge instead of knowledge itself.

Here, progress is not measured by the number of applications we use, nor by the speed with which we interact with smart tools, but by our ability to control our relationship with them. In a world driven by algorithms, awareness becomes the dividing line between empowerment and illiteracy, and between the human who uses technology and the human who is swallowed by it without realizing it.

Firefighting teams worked to prevent the fire from spreading to nearby homes, after the government had previously ordered the demolition of the compound and its evacuation of residents.

Dr. Ibrahim Freihat: The goal of these movements is political and psychological pressure to improve negotiation terms with Iran, not an automatic move towards war.
Dr. Raed Al-Dabai: Political and military indicators do not suggest an approaching comprehensive war with Iran, but rather conflict management within calculated levels of escalation.
Adnan Al-Sabah: The United States seeks to encircle Iran through its regional surroundings by inciting various parties against it and attempting to fragment neighboring countries.
Dr. Hassan Ayoub: Subduing Iran without a comprehensive war remains possible amidst transatlantic political and military mobilization and weak international reactions.
Dr. Raed Abu Badawiya: What is happening is not a prelude to a major war, but rather a calculated tension management that achieves maximum political benefit for the United States at minimum military cost.
Daoud Kuttab: What is happening is part of the maximum pressure policy to improve negotiation terms with Tehran and perhaps reach a formula close to the previous nuclear agreement.


Ramallah - Exclusive to "Al-Quds"-

 The region has recently witnessed a remarkable escalation in American military movements, including the dispatch of warships, the transfer of weapons, and a rise in the rhetoric of US President Donald Trump, who has hinted at a military option against Iran. This has brought back widespread questions about the nature of these movements and whether they are a prelude to an open war or part of a more complex political pressure game.
The readings of a number of experts, political analysts, and university professors, in separate conversations with "Al-Quds", converge on the view that these movements cannot be separated from the context of managing the conflict with Tehran. Military buildup and media escalation are seen as negotiating tools aimed at improving negotiation terms, deterring the adversary, and keeping it under constant pressure, without necessarily being drawn into a comprehensive military confrontation with high regional and international costs.
In contrast, estimates vary regarding potential scenarios. Some favor the continuation of managed containment and escalation policies, while others do not rule out limited and painful strikes within a controlled political and military ceiling. Still others believe that Washington is working to manage a wider network of regional and international conflicts to serve its strategic goals, as part of a long-term struggle that extends beyond Iran to affect the shape and balances of the international system.

Military Tools for Negotiation Management

Dr. Ibrahim Freihat, Professor of International Conflicts at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, explains that the dispatch of American naval vessels to the region, the transfer of weapons, and the escalation of political rhetoric hinting at a military option against Iran do not necessarily mean an imminent military strike. He emphasizes that these movements are primarily part of the negotiation process tools and not an inevitable indicator of a military confrontation.
Freihat points out that what is happening in terms of military preparations and escalatory statements is understood within the framework of what is known as "the threat of using force," which is a common method in international negotiation management and is often more effective than the actual use of force.
He clarifies that the goal of these movements is political and psychological pressure to improve negotiation terms with Iran, not an automatic move towards war.
Freihat indicates that the threat of force constitutes an essential part of the ongoing negotiation process between Washington and Tehran, which, according to the American vision, revolves around a number of issues, primarily the Iranian nuclear program, the missile program, in addition to economic aspects, and what the United States can gain economically if understandings or agreements are reached.

Decisive Moments at the Last Minute

Freihat affirms that the decision to launch a military strike or not is not made in the early stages, but is usually decided at the very last moments, perhaps just minutes or hours before the start of any potential operation.
He notes that negotiations remain open and continuous until the last moment, in parallel with full military readiness, so that all options remain on the table until the final decision is made by the top of the decision-making hierarchy.
Freihat explains that military preparation, including planning, transferring weapons, and equipping forces, is an inherently continuous process that serves the purpose of threatening the use of force, without necessarily implying an intention to actually use it.
Freihat points out that even the American leadership itself, including the US President, would not have decided on the option of a strike or not at this stage, but rather continues to receive reports, assessments, and various options until the decision is made at the last minute.

Limited Military Action

Regarding potential scenarios, Freihat suggests that if military action were to be resorted to, it would be limited in terms of time and scope, in line with the current US administration's pattern, which is not inclined to engage in long-term wars or "nation-building" projects.
Freihat explains that any potential strike would be short-term, lasting hours or days, with clear beginning and end.
He points out that Iran, as the weaker party in this equation, often ceases escalation when the American side stops, and that any potential Iranian responses would be limited and directed towards specific military targets, such as military bases in the region, with limited impact that does not escalate to the level of a comprehensive regional war.
Freihat explains that the current weakness of Iran's regional allies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, reduces the likelihood of conflict expansion and reinforces the assessment that any potential military confrontations, if they occur, will remain within narrow and calculated limits, without sliding into a wide regional war.

Hybrid Warfare and the Attempt to Weaken the Regime

Dr. Raed Al-Dabai, Professor of Political Science at An-Najah National University, believes that the United States is not heading towards a comprehensive conventional war with Iran, but is actually managing a long-term conflict based on the logic of hybrid warfare, aimed at exhausting the Iranian regime and containing its regional and nuclear behavior, without seeking to overthrow it by direct military force.
Al-Dabai explains that this American option is based on a deep understanding of the nature of the Iranian regime, which possesses a highly cohesive security structure that controls the political, security, and economic decision-making joints simultaneously.
Al-Dabai points out that the centers of power in Iran, especially the Revolutionary Guard, do not operate merely as security agencies, but represent a "state within a state," possessing vast economic influence that has enabled the regime to build a parallel economy capable of circumventing sanctions and continuing under accumulated pressures.
Al-Dabai clarifies that American decision-makers realize the limited reliance on internal change in Iran, given the reality of an opposition suffering from severe structural division and lacking a unifying leadership or a coherent alternative political project.
Al-Dabai notes that the Iranian opposition, despite its media and political presence, has not yet succeeded in acquiring effective pressure tools, such as long-term general strikes or comprehensive civil disobedience, that could paralyze state institutions or break the regime's security grip, making the scenario of rapid internal change unrealistic from the American perspective.
He points out that the United States has chosen to expand the scope of hybrid warfare against Iran, through a mix of targeted financial sanctions, diplomatic pressure, cyber warfare, and information warfare, in addition to using indirect regional arenas to raise the cost of Iranian behavior, without sliding into an open confrontation.
Al-Dabai notes that this strategy does not aim to overthrow the regime, but to weaken its ability to maneuver, restrict its regional influence, and keep it under constant and systematic pressure.
Al-Dabai affirms that Washington takes into account Iran's possession of unconventional deterrence capabilities, which allow it to create high levels of instability, whether through threatening maritime straits, primarily the Strait of Hormuz, or influencing global trade and energy markets, or through its regional networks.
Al-Dabai indicates that the regional environment does not seem prepared for a decisive war; Israel, despite its escalatory rhetoric, may not be ready for a long and multi-front war, while Gulf states do not show a desire for an open military confrontation that could threaten their economic security and internal stability.

Calculated Levels of Escalation

In his reading of potential scenarios, Al-Dabai explains that political and military indicators do not suggest an approaching comprehensive war with Iran, but rather conflict management within calculated levels of escalation.
Al-Dabai considers that the first and most likely scenario is the continuation of managed containment and escalation policies, where the United States continues to raise the level of military, economic, and political pressure, while avoiding direct confrontation, with the aim of deterring Iran and changing its behavior, while maintaining indirect communication channels to prevent an explosion.
The second scenario, according to Al-Dabai, is a limited or selective strike, a precise cyber or military strike, in the event of a development that Washington considers a crossing of red lines, such as a qualitative nuclear escalation or a direct targeting of American or Israeli interests.
Al-Dabai believes that this type of strike does not aim to change the regime, but to re-establish the balance of deterrence and send a calculated political message, while ensuring the containment of any Iranian response.
Al-Dabai points out that the third scenario is based on an indirect horizontal escalation led by Iran, through its regional tools or threatening international navigation and energy, without direct confrontation with the United States, reflecting the traditional Iranian response logic of expanding the conflict arena and raising its cost for adversaries.
Al-Dabai believes that the scenario of an open confrontation remains the least likely, given that all parties realize that the cost of a comprehensive war would be exorbitant and uncontrollable, suggesting the continuation of a long-term crisis managed by hybrid tools combining economic pressure, political exhaustion, limited military deterrence, and a struggle of wills, without a final military resolution.

Militarization of the World

Writer and political analyst Adnan Al-Sabah confirms that since October 7, 2023, the United States has been rapidly moving towards the militarization of the world, seeking to achieve its strategic goals by exploiting crises and conflicts in various regions of the globe. He points out that Washington is working to transform seas and international waterways into military zones under its influence.
Al-Sabah explains that the United States has recently militarized the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Black Sea, in addition to using the war on Gaza as an entry point to strengthen its naval military presence, as part of a broader plan aimed at transforming the world into a network of American military bases, not only in the context of confrontation with Iran, but to seize all global spheres of influence.
Al-Sabah indicates that Washington exploits every event and every regional tension to ignite conflicts and turn different regions into hotbeds of conflict, noting that it seeks to create internal conflicts within the regions themselves, as it is trying to do in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, by turning it into a conflict between Eastern and Western Europe.
Al-Sabah points out that the United States is also fueling tension in the South China Sea through Taiwan and countries surrounding China, as well as inciting Argentina against China, and inciting countries like Japan and South Korea, which serves its strategy of exhausting major powers.
Al-Sabah clarifies that Washington does not work to extinguish conflicts, and even if it sometimes intervenes to calm some of them, it is temporary and according to its interests, as happened in some conflicts between India and Pakistan, or between Thailand and Cambodia.
Al-Sabah points to the United States' continued ignition or fueling of other conflicts, such as the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia, and conflicts in Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan, with the aim of weakening everyone and later controlling the outcomes of these conflicts.

Manufacturing Wars Between Different Parties

Regarding Iran, Al-Sabah affirms that the United States will not go to direct war with it unless a suitable internal opportunity arises, consisting of an internal Iranian action and forces capable of influencing that Washington can support and rely on.
Al-Sabah notes that American policy is based on manufacturing wars between different parties, then intervening at the appropriate moment to impose control, as it did in Syria, when it allowed the parties to the conflict to exhaust each other before intervening and imposing its will.
Al-Sabah believes that the United States seeks to encircle Iran through its regional surroundings, by inciting various parties against it, attempting to fragment neighboring countries, and moving towards Azerbaijan, making Iran surrounded by parties that can form a spearhead for implementing American goals, as part of a long-term strategy for managing conflicts rather than directly engaging in them.

"Peace Through Strength" Strategy

Dr. Hassan Ayoub, a writer, political analyst, and specialist in American affairs, confirms that the administration of US President Donald Trump has entered a new and advanced stage of implementing the "Peace Through Strength" strategy, noting that Trump's traditional slogan "Make America Great Again" is no longer merely political or economic, but has become coupled with the use of hard power as a central tool for achieving American goals.
Ayoub explains that what American policy is witnessing today represents a clear re-production of the neoconservative approach during the era of former President George W. Bush, but with two fundamental differences; first, avoiding involvement in a direct and widespread military invasion of targeted countries, and second, abandoning the traditional liberal discourse that justified interventions under the banners of spreading democracy and human rights, in favor of explicit discourse based on imposing will by force.
Ayoub clarifies that this strategy began to materialize in South America, especially in Venezuela, before branching out into two main directions aimed at bringing about far-reaching geopolitical changes, even if at the expense of traditional US allies in Europe and the Middle East.
The first direction, according to Ayoub, is an attempt to seize Greenland, while the second and more dangerous direction is to deliver a decisive military strike against Iran.
Ayoub points out that the central goal of this approach is to establish an international system based on "naked power" without controls or restrictions, in a preemptive step aimed at hindering or delaying the formation of a multipolar international system in which China and Russia are decisive powers.
Ayoub believes that according to this perception, subduing Iran, whether through a widespread military strike or through a serious threat of force, is an essential condition for the success of this American strategy.
Ayoub notes that the military scenario could take the form of a large-scale strike accompanied by intelligence operations inside Iran to ignite a state of chaos, leading either to a reshaping of the Iranian regime to serve American interests, or to transforming Iran into a failed state.

Subduing Iran Without a Comprehensive War

In contrast, Ayoub affirms that the scenario of subduing Iran without a comprehensive war remains possible, given the transatlantic political and military mobilization against Tehran, and Washington's exploitation of the weak international reactions to previous experiences, such as dealing with the Venezuelan issue.
Ayoub points out that the Trump administration does not pay real attention to the calculations and concerns of its regional allies, especially the Gulf states and Turkey, in contrast to almost complete coordination with its most important ally, Israel.
Ayoub considers that Tel Aviv is the second, and perhaps first, beneficiary of any American move against Iran, given the transformation of the surrounding countries into fragmented entities or failed states, which opens the way for long-term Israeli hegemony over the region.
Ayoub notes that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's statements about Israel's status as a major regional, and perhaps international, power reflect this path, pointing out that Tel Aviv's pursuit of military independence from Washington is consistent with a clear Israeli priority of destroying Iran or overthrowing its regime, which increases the likelihood of an American military strike, and makes the question not about whether it will happen, but when, and whether developments might prevent it.

Calculated Strategic Maneuver

Dr. Raed Abu Badawiya, Professor of International Law and International Relations at the Arab American University, confirms that the escalating American threats of war against Iran do not reflect actual readiness for a comprehensive war or a decisive strike that would overthrow the Iranian regime. Rather, they fall within the framework of a calculated strategic maneuver aimed at delivering a painful and limited strike, with carefully planned timing and objectives, without sliding into an open confrontation.
Abu Badawiya explains that the administration of US President Donald Trump understands a number of strategic realities that make the option of overthrowing the Iranian regime unrealistic at the present stage, most notably the absence of a ready political alternative that can be relied upon, and the danger of any internal collapse in Iran that could lead to uncontrollable regional chaos, in addition to the United States' unwillingness to bear the political, military, and economic costs of re-engineering a country the size and complexity of Iran.
Abu Badawiya clarifies that the proposed American option is to deliver a strong blow without seeking regime change, in a way that re-establishes American hegemony, imposes a new ceiling for Iranian regional and nuclear behavior, and also uses this blow domestically in the United States and Israel as proof of firmness and the ability to impose deterrence.

Brinkmanship

Abu Badawiya believes that this approach clearly reflects a policy of "brinkmanship" rather than a decision for war, meaning approaching confrontation as much as possible without jumping into the abyss.
Abu Badawiya points out that the most likely scenario is the execution of a limited but painful American, or coordinated American-Israeli, military strike targeting sensitive military installations, strategic infrastructure, and specific missile or cyber capabilities, provided that the operation is short-term, with a clear political ceiling, without declaring war or ground involvement.
Abu Badawiya believes that this strike will carry multi-directional messages: to Iran with the aim of curbing its regional and nuclear ambitions, to the world to confirm that Washington is still capable of dictating the rules of the game, and to Israel through direct support that serves Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amidst internal and electoral calculations.

Calculated Iranian Response

Abu Badawiya expects the Iranian response to be calculated in turn, through a symbolic or indirect response, and through regional pressure tools without crossing red lines, in order to maintain the balance of deterrence and prevent sliding into a comprehensive war.
Abu Badawiya affirms that what is happening does not constitute a prelude to a major war, but rather a calculated tension management that achieves maximum political benefit for the United States at minimum military cost, by weakening Iran without overthrowing it, and striking it without bearing the consequences of the post-strike period, in a fragile international system that cannot withstand a large-scale explosion.

Improving Negotiation Terms

Writer and political analyst Daoud Kuttab confirms that the threats made by US President Donald Trump to wage war on Iran, in parallel with sending warships to the region, reflect a high level of seriousness, but do not necessarily mean a move towards a widespread and comprehensive war at the current stage.
Kuttab explains that the American military buildup falls within the framework of the maximum pressure policy, with the aim of improving negotiation terms with Tehran, suggesting that Washington and Iran will seek a formula of understanding close to the previous nuclear agreement that Trump tore up during his first term, in response to Israeli pressure led by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Kuttab points out that this agreement may return to a pivotal position in any future negotiations, with amendments related to Iran's ballistic missile program alongside the nuclear file.
Kuttab clarifies that Iran, given its limited ability to fully protect its airspace, may not be willing to make concessions on the missile issue.
Regarding potential scenarios, Kuttab expects an increase in the level of American military pressure to achieve a negotiating breakthrough, with the possibility of a limited and rapid strike to demonstrate American seriousness without sliding into a comprehensive confrontation.
Kuttab believes that the majority of Arab and Islamic countries, in addition to influential currents within the Republican Party, do not support waging a short or long war with a country that is not in direct hostility with the United States, which reinforces the hypothesis that the current escalation remains within the limits of political and military maneuvering.

The news of the agreement of the Arab lists in the interior brought renewed hope after years of division that led to the fragmentation and loss of votes, which deprived the Arab voice of its presence and influence. In contrast, the sole beneficiary of this was the extremist right-wing parties, which were able to decisively form a rigid and extremist government that practices hooliganism, enacts racist laws and legislation, and ignites crises within the Arab community with its components and factions.
The agreement of the Arab lists carries dimensions beyond just the political electoral context. This joint unity means fortifying the internal front, strengthening the power of Arab presence, enhancing public awareness, and combating scourges, foremost among them the acts of killing and crime that have become the greatest danger facing the Arab community, threatening its unity and common destiny, amidst deliberate inaction by the authorities responsible for combating crime in the Arab sector.
A racist view intends for crime to escalate and the pace of killing to increase in the Arab community. For this reason, crime-fighting agencies are negligent, and the competent authorities remain silent, leaving the Arab community in the interior in a confusing state, amidst the division of Arab parties which led to a decline in their influence in decision-making centers. Meanwhile, the racist right took this as an opportunity to enact laws and legislation specifically targeting Arabs, and this would not have happened without the division and lack of unity of the active Arab parties in the Arab community within the entity.
Amidst the growth of racist right-wing parties, the rise of fascist discourse, slogans calling for hatred, and legislation in the occupation Knesset, it is imperative for Arab parties to unite, not only because they are targeted, but to ward off dangers from the Arab masses, and to elevate the status of Arab representation as a present force with influence, and to be a guarantor in confronting crime and societal targeting, in addition to defending political, educational, and other life rights.
The unity of Arab parties is an important step towards the retreat of the extremist racist right, and it is a decisive force not only in the ballot box but in various fields and issues that concern the Arab community in the interior. So, congratulations to you, our people, on your unity and cohesion that will strengthen the Palestinian Arab presence on its land and homeland. S

Informed sources in Washington reported that American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner held talks in Tel Aviv with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Saturday, as part of American efforts to push for the implementation of the second phase of the understandings related to the ceasefire in Gaza. These moves come at a time when Washington is working to market a comprehensive political and security plan to manage the post-war phase, amidst clear discrepancies regarding implementation mechanisms and their implications for the humanitarian situation in the Strip.

The White House spoke of a twenty-point plan (which President Trump had launched from the White House on September 29, 2025, in Netanyahu's presence), while details were leaked about a "new Gaza" to be built from scratch: residential towers, data centers, and coastal resorts. A discourse closer to an investment brochure than a humanitarian project, ignoring that Gaza is not an empty land but a wounded society, exhausted by bombing, siege, and mass killings. Thus, reconstruction turns into a political tool, conditioned on Israeli security and the disarmament of Palestinians, not on their national rights.

In the background, the issue of the body of the last Israeli hostage, Ran Gvili, surfaces, which the Israeli government uses as a pretext to slow down any humanitarian relief for Gaza. However, leaks reveal that Washington exerted direct pressure on Israel to reopen the Rafah crossing, not in response to the needs of more than two million besieged people, but as part of a comprehensive political deal announced from Davos, far from Gaza and its people.

According to experts, the reopening of the crossing, as its details become clear, is not a restoration of Palestinian sovereignty nor an actual lifting of the siege, but a re-production of a more complex system of control and surveillance: remote Israeli monitoring, electronic device inspection, prior approvals, and nearby military deployment. A crossing without Israeli soldiers in the picture, but with a full security grip behind the scenes.

Even the management of the crossing was entrusted to an old international framework (the EU mission) with limited Palestinian security participation, in a tested formula that previously failed and ended with the closure of the crossing after weeks. All this suggests that what is marketed as a humanitarian step is merely a temporary security arrangement, subject to cancellation at any moment, according to the Israeli political mood.

As for the shocking numbers of casualties in Gaza, which have exceeded 71,000 killed since October 2023, they only appear as footnotes in the Western narrative, always accompanied by phrases of doubt, while the initial Israeli narrative is re-established as the sole starting point for history.

The second phase that Washington is talking about practically means a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces, in exchange for the disarmament of Gaza and the handover of its administration, in an equation where the Palestinian issue is reduced to a security matter, and popular will and the right to self-determination are excluded. It is a peace intended to be born conditional, fragile, and subject to the logic of power, not justice.

Recent American moves indicate that Washington's approach to the Gaza file has focused more on managing the post-war phase than on addressing its causes. The proposed reconstruction plan is presented within a comprehensive political and security package, linked to the reordering of authority and disarmament, not to lifting the siege or ensuring civilian rights. This interconnectedness reflects an American orientation to stabilize through long-term control tools, amidst questions about the ability of this approach to produce sustainable calm.

Experts also believe that opening the Rafah crossing in this manner reveals the essence of the next phase as control without direct occupation, and siege without tanks at the gate, or what is considered an updated version of conflict management, not its resolution. The most dangerous aspect is that these arrangements are presented as Israeli concessions, while in reality they are a consolidation of a broader control network, managed internationally and implemented by Israel. In such contexts, humanitarian language becomes a cover for a harsh political reality, reproduced in the name of peace.  

Trump does not stop astonishing with his controversial and amusing words and actions at the same time. He summoned the emperor from the belly of history, "The Armada," in the context of intimidating Iran and threatening to crush it, claiming to be victorious for the protesters against the regime.
"The Armada" was the largest Catholic Spanish fleet in that era of colonial history, which attacked Protestant England in the sixteenth century, as Philip II was determined to subjugate England, losing most of his soldiers, which paved the way for the "British Crown" to become the superpower, whose sun never set on its colonies for about two hundred years after the defeat of the "Spanish Armada."
Among the ironies of the man fascinated by his power, and possessed by overflowing narcissism, is that while he formed a peace council, he does not stop igniting fires and practicing thuggery in the manner of "Pirate Morgan" who attacked pirate ships and stole them, under the pretext that he attacks thieves to achieve justice!
Between forming alleged peace councils and beating the drums of war, Trump appears as "Don Quixote" in the age of "cyber" and "internet," chasing windmills, which shows him as a man still living in the sixteenth century.        
Under the weight of feeling proud of his excess power, the man with the volatile mood misses that history only repeats itself as a comedy, and that the winds that destroyed Philip II's fleet may not this time bring what his warships and aircraft carriers, which are flocking to warm waters, desire.

The targeting of a civilian car bearing clear markings led to the killing of independent photojournalists, despite the ongoing ceasefire.

Anyone who tried to reach us was shot. And whoever replaces him will be killed.

The current scene in Gaza today expresses the reality of Israeli political failure.

Israel is on its way to rapid demise, and the nation remains.