A lesson for those who want to learn

History does not repeat itself except for those who do not learn from its lessons.

The surprise in revealing the secret negotiations taking place between the US administration and the Hamas movement is that it surprised Palestinian circles that should not have been surprised by the existence of such a channel that was expected, not only because US policy is based on pragmatism that aims to achieve benefit in the easiest way, but also because these circles had previous experiences in secret negotiation channels with previous US administrations, and also in the famous Oslo channel.

It is useful to start by presenting the following observation: Wherever there are declared political negotiations to resolve a thorny conflict, it is useful to search for the secret negotiation channel, because there is always a channel, if not secret channels, in which the bulk and core of effective negotiation between the main parties takes place, calmly and deliberately. Since the announced negotiations are exposed and closely followed by the media and public opinion, the negotiating parties are exposed to pressure, and usually tend towards rigidity and intransigence in their demands, which leads to the loss of the flexibility necessary for the success of the negotiations. As for the secret negotiations that take place away from the spotlight, follow-up and monitoring, they allow the parties to overcome the pressures they are exposed to in the open negotiations, and open the way for them to fathom the true intentions of each other, and allow them to discuss more comfortably the details of their mutual demands, and open a wider space for them to give and take and make mutual concessions. The secret negotiation channel is what is often relied upon to reach an agreement. As for the announced negotiations, they are nothing but the framework that gives the real, secret negotiations the necessary cover to proceed without attention.

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It is known that the declared goal of both parties, the Israeli and the American, in addition to other parties, to end the devastating war on the Gaza Strip, is summarized by ending the existence of "Hamas" as an armed resistance movement to Israel, and ending its control over the Gaza Strip. But it is clear that the massive destructive force that Israel has used so far on the Strip has not achieved the desired goal. Although it has been able to weaken the movement militarily, it has not been able to eliminate it as a resistance movement, nor has it been able to end its actual control over Gaza. Hamas remains present, is working to restore its entity, and is still, after all that has happened, the only internal force controlling the Strip, and has the “disruptive ability” to any future arrangements for its administration, if it does not obtain its participation in them, or at least its approval. Not only that, but the resumption of the temporarily halted war, at the same pace and even at a higher pace, does not promise anything more than inflicting more destruction and suffering on Gazan civilians, and does not guarantee achieving the desired goal. Rather, it will lead to turning the war into an open battle of attrition with a renewed and long-term Israeli occupation. Although this situation does not harm the far-right currently ruling Israel, and rather serves its goal of restoring settlement in the Gaza Strip, the resumption of war does not serve Trump’s goal of imposing long-term stability in the Middle East, allowing him to focus on more central and urgent issues to achieve his project of restoring the position of “America First” in the world.

If the war fails to eliminate Hamas, there are two methods that the US administration is employing, in an interconnected manner, to achieve the goal: The first method calls for the complete removal of Hamas from the future Palestinian political scene, by completely excluding it from working in the Palestinian arena, especially in its current center of support, the Gaza Strip. To achieve what the war failed to achieve, Trump announced the necessity of evacuating the Strip of all its residents, and emptying it by expelling them abroad without return, under the pretext that it has become an area unfit for human habitation. Under this flimsy pretext, Trump concluded that getting rid of Hamas and ending its rule over the Strip requires that there be no Palestinian presence in it in its entirety. This is the only guaranteed way to get rid of all elements of the movement, as the survival of one Palestinian in Gaza may lead to the survival of one of its elements, which will eventually rebuild itself. It is worth acknowledging that Trump’s conclusion was correct, as ending Hamas’s presence in the Palestinian arena requires closing this arena completely. Was Trump serious in proposing this method? Was he aware of the impossibility of accepting it from the various Palestinian, regional and international parties? Regardless of his intentions and visions, Trump achieved the purpose of this proposal, which is to exert maximum pressure on the opposing parties and confuse them. It is a skillful negotiating tactic to raise the ceiling of your demands to a higher level than the ceiling that could be imagined from the opposing parties, putting them directly in a defensive position, in order to extract the highest possible concession value from them. In order for the scene to be complete and the required concession to be obtained, the far-right Netanyahu government received Trump’s project to eliminate Hamas by expelling the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip with great support, as it is the best possible option to achieve the goal of emptying the Strip and regaining control over it. With the license that Trump granted to the idea of expelling the Palestinians from their homeland, this government began to take measures and put in place measures to transform this crazy idea into a reality that it has longed for. The restrictions on the continued living of the Gazans, the prevention of the entry of aid, and the rejection of the Arab plan for reconstruction are only parts of a systematic policy to transform the idea of expulsion into a reality, under the malicious name of “voluntary migration.” The second method is similar to the first in the radicalism of its proposal, but it goes in the opposite direction, which is to include the Hamas movement in the future Palestinian political scene, by containing and absorbing it within the Palestinian political arena, instead of excluding it from it. This option may be preferred by the US administration, after warnings that excluding the movement from the Palestinian political scene may have unwelcome repercussions from many "soft" countries in the region, which means regional instability, rather than stability. In addition, the requirements of containment and absorption will require it to make fundamental adjustments to its vision, program, and methods of work, which means adopting a new relationship with Israel, which means that the containment approach achieves the desired strategic goal better, faster, and with less effort and cost than exclusion. Under the item of discussing the issue of releasing Israeli-American hostages held in Gaza, the US administration opened a direct dialogue with the Hamas movement. If there are those who are hopeful and consider that this dialogue is merely limited discussions limited to a specific issue, they are completely wrong. This dialogue will most likely include much deeper issues, at the core of which will be the issue of absorbing the movement into the future Palestinian political scene, with Hamas shifting to political work completely and closing the door on its military activity.

There are those who bet that the Trump administration cannot make a deal with Hamas, but if it achieves its goal, why not? These people must ask themselves: What is better for this administration, to follow the first method that will not take off and will not succeed, or to achieve the desired goal through the second method? It is important to remember what Shimon Peres said in the past, that the best way to manage the conflict is to bring the PLO inside, instead of keeping it outside. It may be Hamas’s turn now. There are also those who bet, on the other hand, that Hamas cannot go in the opposite direction of its current position, which is to continue its adherence to the option of resistance. However, these people must be aware that Hamas is a political movement, and that the goal of political movements is to ensure survival and do whatever is necessary to continue. As is known, Hamas includes a strong pragmatic current that was able to make changes in its vision and make adjustments in its program, which were necessary to cross previous difficult junctures. It is also worth noting that after facing this bitter war, the movement faces a difficult future situation whose repercussions must be taken into account. It has lost much of its own capabilities and the effectiveness of its allies in the regional arena, and is exposed to a barrage of pressure factors that threaten to continue to pursue it until it achieves withdrawal or changes its course. The PLO fell under a series of successive pressures after its exit from Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982, which ultimately led it to the Oslo Accords with Israel. What is happening now with Hamas is similar, but with the difference that reaching the same result will not require a period extending to a decade. The conditions of the region and the world have changed for the worse for the Palestinians, and there is no longer much room for maneuver. What leverage will Hamas have to preserve its existence after its stock of hostages is exhausted, in one way or another?! The ongoing secret negotiations with the US administration are opening an outlet that may be the most important for the future of Hamas. 

It goes without saying that the process of transformation for any political party requires providing incentives that guarantee its continued survival. The current push by regional and international parties, led by America, towards the necessity of holding Palestinian elections in the near future, and showing signs of Palestinian approval of this, may be the new approach and the promised sign to absorb the Hamas movement not only as a party in the future Palestinian political scene, but may also open the way for it to control it. All of this is contingent, of course, on providing the required compensation. ***

The options are becoming narrower for all Palestinian parties, and with them the paths are becoming clearer. But the paradox remains that the Palestinian parties, instead of drawing lessons and mending the internal rift to more effectively confront the imminent dangers facing the Palestinian cause, still insist on antagonizing each other, and going to the "guillotine" in succession, with warm cheers from those waiting!