The investigation by the Israeli General Security Service (Shabak), which was published this evening, Tuesday, revealed a series of intelligence and operational failures that allowed Hamas to carry out the attack of October 7, 2023, despite the availability of initial information indicating the movement’s intentions, which the service failed to analyze, draw lessons from, and translate into practical measures.

The investigation concluded that the Shin Bet "failed" in its primary mission of preventing the attack, but at the same time tried to place some of the responsibility on the political leadership, noting that government policies contributed to the escalation of the danger without taking preventive measures.

The head of the agency, Ronen Bar, admitted that the Shin Bet had failed to prevent the attack, saying: "We did not prevent the massacre, and I will carry this burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life." The report explained that the agency had not treated the information it had with the necessary seriousness.

The internal investigation conducted by the agency stressed that "if the Shin Bet had acted differently, the attack could have been prevented," adding that the investigation "requires a comprehensive review to reach the truth and correct errors."

The report showed that the Shin Bet had information since 2018 about a Hamas plan for a comprehensive attack on Israel, known as the “Jericho Wall,” but it was not considered a central threat. The investigation explained that this plan, which was reassessed in 2022, was not included in the agency’s reference scenarios, and was not treated as an actual plan for a future attack.

It also noted that the agency received “weak warning signals” starting in the summer of 2023, but did not interpret them correctly and did not take preventive measures based on them. The investigation also noted that the failure to accurately analyze the available information hindered the Shin Bet’s ability to make proactive decisions to prevent the attack.

He explained that one of the fundamental mistakes was in assessing Hamas's intentions, as the agency believed that the movement was focusing on strengthening its influence in the West Bank while seeking to maintain calm in Gaza, which led to a miscalculation of its preparations for a broad attack.

The report, in which the Shin Bet included part of its investigation, stated that “the fact that the agency did not consider a large-scale Hamas attack a realistic scenario, along with its assessment that the movement was focused on the West Bank and preferred to keep Gaza as a quiet arena, seriously affected the ability to make sound decisions throughout the period leading up to October 7, and especially on the night of the attack.”

The Shin Bet admitted that its ability to gather intelligence in the Gaza Strip had been severely damaged in recent years, noting that the decline in freedom of Israeli security action inside the Strip had led to a reduction in its human resources there.

The investigation revealed that the Shin Bet lost its network of agents inside Gaza after a failed operation in Khan Yunis in 2018, the exposure of which led to the elimination of key intelligence sources for the agency inside the Strip. Despite attempts to rebuild the network, the report noted that the agency "faced significant difficulties in operating agents inside Gaza effectively."

The investigation, parts of which were revealed by the Shin Bet, stated that the agency possessed advanced intelligence sensors, which it obtained from special operations, but they were not exploited in the best possible way, and were not analyzed in a way that would allow reading Hamas’s true intentions before the attack.

The investigation also revealed failures in coordination between the Shin Bet and the IDF, as responsibilities were not clearly defined between the two sides regarding intelligence gathering and early warning between the Shin Bet and the IDF's Military Intelligence Division ("Aman").

The investigation found that "the distribution of responsibilities between the IDF and the Shin Bet regarding intelligence in Gaza was not good, and due to the relative advantage of each of the two agencies, it should have been determined that the IDF is responsible for warning of war, while the Shin Bet is responsible for warning of operations on the border."

The investigation revealed that on the night of October 5, 2023, there was initial monitoring of unusual activity in northern Gaza, and the information was passed on to intelligence agencies in the army, but the Shin Bet did not consider it an imminent threat.

On the evening of October 6, 2023, the agency sent a new warning to the army about “unusual activation of Hamas observation posts,” but it was not considered evidence that the movement was preparing for a large-scale attack.

At 03:03 a.m. on October 7, the Shin Bet sent an intelligence report that it classified as a “warning,” noting unusual activity that might indicate an offensive intent, but did not lead to any substantial change in the level of operational readiness.

At 4:30 a.m., the head of the Shin Bet held a meeting with the agency's regional commanders, where several scenarios were presented, including the possibility of a "limited infiltration or kidnapping," but the possibility of a large-scale attack was not treated as a serious option.

The investigation indicated that the agency's assessments continued to adhere to the idea that "Hamas does not want a broad escalation," even though field evidence indicated the opposite, which constituted one of the grave errors that contributed to delaying the Israeli response.

Criticism of the political leadership and lack of response to warnings

The investigation did not limit itself to criticizing the internal performance of the apparatus, but also placed blame on the political leadership, noting that the “calm” policy pursued by the Israeli government allowed Hamas to build up its military power in an unprecedented manner.

The investigation found that Israel allowed the continuous flow of “Qatari money” into Gaza, which strengthened the movement’s ability to plan and arm. The investigation found that the Shin Bet repeatedly warned the government about the erosion of Israeli deterrence and the escalation of threats, but failed to convince the leadership to take proactive measures.

The Shin Bet considered that this led to the danger being magnified until the attack occurred. The report also indicated that the government's policy of "threat containment", instead of carrying out preemptive strikes, was one of the main factors that led to the deterioration of the security situation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Shin Bet stressed that it had begun implementing a series of reforms to prevent the recurrence of such failures in the future, including the establishment of an internal oversight unit to strengthen oversight of the agency's performance, improving the process of gathering information in Gaza, and enhancing intelligence cooperation with the Israeli army.

The investigation also indicated that the Shin Bet will work to develop "new warning models" in cooperation with the army, to ensure an immediate response to any signs indicating imminent threats.

But the investigation did not provide clear answers to some basic questions, such as the accuracy of the intelligence provided by the "agents inside Gaza" before the attack, and whether some of them were misled or were working as double agents for Hamas.

At the end of the report, in which the agency included some of what was included in its investigation, the agency indicated that despite the failure revealed by the investigation, it is “strong and stable and will continue its work to protect Israel’s security,” stressing its commitment to carrying out the necessary reforms to prevent similar failures in the future.