Washington and the Arab Plan for Gaza... between reconstruction and political rearrangement

Riyadh witnessed rounds of Russian-American negotiations, which addressed several issues in the region, including the situation in Gaza, and the Palestinian issue in general, according to press sources. These negotiations came at a sensitive time, as Russia seeks to strengthen its influence in the Middle East, and send specific messages to the United States about reorganizing the region. Despite the divergent positions of the major powers, these meetings may have a direct impact on how Washington deals with the Arab proposals regarding Gaza, and open the way for new negotiating opportunities that may take into account the interests of the various parties in the region.

Despite the EU’s public and verbal support for the two-state solution, its positions often lack practical action on this issue, given the ongoing Association Council with Israel. Regarding Trump’s plan for Gaza, the EU has not shown any serious action against it, but rather has been hesitant to support the Arab plan, reflecting its diminished role due to Trump’s attempts to marginalize it, as was evident at the recent Munich conference.

Although the PLO will participate in the Arab summit in Cairo next week, it will be absent from a mini-Arab summit with the participation of eight countries, which will be held on Friday, in a move aimed at reorganizing the political scene in Gaza, before the Arab summit in Cairo next week. This initiative comes within the framework of reconstruction attempts, but at the same time it carries strategic dimensions that should not intersect with American and Israeli interests, which raises fundamental questions about the extent to which Washington will accept this plan in the event of Arab agreement on it, which requires challenging American dictates, and the extent to which the Americans are prepared to abandon their declared vision for Gaza, which includes brutal scenarios such as displacing the population.

Although it is unusual for the Palestine Liberation Organization or the Palestinian Authority to be excluded from such meetings, especially when it comes to discussing fateful issues such as the Trump plan, the absence in Riyadh may be the result of differing positions with some of the participating Arab countries, or perhaps due to the lack of internal consensus on how to deal with international and regional pressures, which is reflected in the Palestinian side’s ability to influence such forums under these circumstances.

However, in light of the current international reality, the American position can be inferred by comparing it to the way Washington dealt with other files, such as Ukraine and Zelensky, where the United States played a dual role represented by intensive military and political support accompanied by imposing a special vision for how to manage the crisis in a way that serves its interests, a principle that depends on exhausting those who cooperated with Washington throughout the history of its relations with them until they are exhausted. The question here is, will Washington adopt a similar approach in Gaza, so that it supports the Arab plan, provided that it remains under its direct supervision and serves its interests, or will it work to empty it of its content, as it did with many previous political initiatives?

Since the Trump administration presented its Middle East plan, the forced displacement of Gazans has been among the scenarios promoted as part of the implementation of the New Middle East Vision. Despite the change of administrations in Washington, the US approach to the Palestinian issue has not changed much, as it continues to seek to impose a reality that serves Israel, whether by supporting Tel Aviv militarily, politically and economically, or by obstructing any efforts that might lead to the unification of Gaza and the West Bank under a sovereign Palestinian leadership represented by the PLO, and lead to the embodiment of a continuous and sovereign Palestinian state. Therefore, even if Washington does not explicitly reject the Arab proposal, it is likely to work to modify it to become a tool for implementing Israeli policies.

The main challenge facing the Arab countries is to achieve a delicate balance between their desire to rebuild in order to prevent displacement to their lands and ensure their national security, and to prevent Gaza from turning into a new arena of conflict on the one hand, and American and Israeli pressures seeking to keep the Strip in a state of chronic weakness on the other hand, or to renew the war on it according to Netanyahu’s desires to ensure his survival in his position, unless the United States pushes for a change in the form of the occupation government.

Given previous experiences, any Arab initiative that does not have American support will be subject to abortion or distortion because the Arabs have previously agreed to follow a path of non-confrontation. The success of the plan also depends on the acceptance of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which may not be guaranteed, especially if a Palestinian committee independent of the Palestinian Authority government is imposed, reflecting the desire of some Arab countries to reduce the influence of the current leadership of the Authority, in order to serve the attempt to impose their vision of a “renewed authority” that will be acceptable to the United States.

As for Israel, it is unlikely to support any formula that restores Palestinian political and geographical unity.

If the United States has treated Zelensky as a functional card in Ukraine, it may do the same with some Palestinian parties that will be used to manage Gaza, without giving them any real margin for independent decision-making.

This raises questions about the independence of the proposed Palestinian committee, and whether it will turn into another functional entity that serves external agendas instead of being an expression of the Palestinian will with reference to the PLO and the independence of its national decision.

In this context, the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, mediated by Egypt and Qatar, may play a pivotal role in determining the future of Gaza. If understandings are reached on the ceasefire and post-war management, this may affect the extent to which the various parties accept the Arab plan. However, if the negotiations continue to falter, any political initiative will remain hostage to the reality on the ground.

With the continuation of the annexation and settlement expansion policies adopted by Israel in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, with American support, this expansion does not stop at the borders of displacing Palestinians from Gaza, but rather includes its plans to target Palestinian camps in various occupied territories, which poses a major challenge to our Palestinian people in preserving their identity and existence on their land, in the face of what seriously threatens the unity of the Palestinian land and people through attempts to embody the Greater Israel settlement project.

The continuation of these policies makes broad Palestinian national unity more important than ever, as efforts must be intensified between the various Palestinian factions, independents, and civil society to ensure that these schemes are confronted. By strengthening the unity of the Palestinian national ranks, clear vision, programs, and tools that must be characterized by development, change, and non-stagnation, and understanding the nature of the necessities of correct political positioning in light of the ongoing transformations in international relations and enabling our people to stand firm and confront, we can stand up to the major challenges surrounding the Palestinian cause, and begin to achieve our national independence, justice, and freedom for our people.