Current scene and national destiny

Since Trump's success in the presidential race, and before he entered the White House, major and even pivotal questions have been raised before public opinion about the future of the Palestinian cause, the Middle East, and Israel's position in the region. After Netanyahu was forced to accept the ceasefire agreement and move the wheel of implementing the first phase, questions quickly followed about the fate of this agreement and the possibility of moving towards the second phase, which was supposed to begin negotiating with the publication of this article. Within Israeli society, and compared to the goals set by Netanyahu for his war on the Strip and the slogan of absolute victory, the agreement was considered a political and military failure, while the severity of the escalation of the internal division among the Palestinians was reflected in the position on the war and its results, which contributed to diverting the national compass towards it being a brutal war of extermination, documented by international courts and international public opinion despite its horrific failure to eradicate the will to resist the occupation and the will to survive in the face of ethnic cleansing schemes.

Will the agreement hold? Yes, as long as the reasons that led to its conclusion remain, namely Trump’s insistence on it, the changes in public opinion in Israel, and Palestinian steadfastness, including the continued effectiveness of the resistance.

But will Netanyahu work to sabotage the agreement? He will certainly work to do so, or at least obtain positions from Trump that make the implementation of the agreement consistent with his declared and undeclared goals, which are eliminating Hamas and displacement.

In this context, we can read Trump's "balloon" statements about displacing the Gazans to Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere. This also explains Netanyahu's decision to postpone the start of the second phase negotiations, including his intention to change the negotiating team, until he knows what he will get from Trump.

Trump's priority is towards Saudi Arabia, whether in terms of the economic need for its investments in the United States, or in terms of the normalization deal with Israel, including the possibility of aligning against what can be called the Chinese-Russian-Iranian axis and the priorities that this includes, in terms of containing or striking Iran. Here the question arises: What is the actual price that Saudi Arabia will seek to obtain from Washington and Tel Aviv in exchange for normalization with Israel and investment in the United States, especially after the war? This takes us to the fundamental and complex question with its various dimensions: What is the Palestinian vision that can maintain the vitality of what the war generated in terms of the Palestinian issue being a priority for international attention, whether at the level of popular public opinion or at the legal and media levels? Can this be transformed into binding political positions for the West and the international community? And how can this be achieved in light of more manifestations of the intensity of the division, instead of containing it as an existential requirement due to the war and its repercussions and political risks, not only in the Gaza Strip "displacement", but also in the West Bank, which is the strategic battle to liquidate the Palestinian issue from the point of view of the fascist right-wing extremists inside and outside the Tel Aviv government. Here the million-dollar question arises, and to the extent that a unified answer is given to it, the Palestinians can place their supreme national interests on the table of regional and international interactions. What is our responsibility to achieve this?

Contrary to what would be expected of any Palestinian party to confront the looming dangers, the powerful leadership in the Authority has been drowned in illusion, believing that this might provide a way out. Instead of examining the struggle strategies, in the context of an objective review of the political and struggle options, and the effectiveness of the option of the characteristic that prevailed in the forms of resistance, and agreeing on a comprehensive national vision, it is sliding towards security clashes that have proven to be a failure, not to mention the growing possibility of sliding into a civil war that could result from even thinking about implementing such a security policy in the Gaza Strip.

No regional or international party can take the Palestinian situation seriously unless those who control the Palestinian decision deal with it with the required seriousness on both the internal and external levels, Arab, regional and international alike.

It is quite clear that the real war has actually begun after the ceasefire, and its basic features from Netanyahu’s point of view are to keep the Palestinians drowning in their division, and even push them towards separation, to implement his plans to liquidate the Palestinian cause, whether to install a local governing body in the Strip that is in harmony with the Israeli project, in preparation for creating similar governing bodies in the West Bank cantons, or in terms of displacement, by preventing the restoration of the necessities of life for the people in Gaza, or repeating it in the West Bank camps, at least to liquidate the camps, looking forward at least to liquidating the refugee issue by liquidating UNRWA, the only international body that sponsors the interests of the refugees, according to the United Nations resolutions.

On the other hand, the resistance forces’ haste to despair over the possibility of the president accepting the implementation of the Beijing Agreement, and their haste to wash their hands of it, will certainly lead objectively to the return of the previous formula of government. This will not only disrupt reconstruction, but may also lead to Netanyahu returning to war, even if he avoids diving again into the mire of Gaza and its shifting sands, and in any case continuing his war to uproot the West Bank camps, claiming that he is forced to do so after he has led the Authority into this shameful trap.

The continued absence of a unified leadership within the framework of the comprehensive national institutions, as well as the insistence on avoiding consensus and the absence of any political kitchen, is nothing but a recipe for removing the remaining elements of power, if any of them are still in the hands of those who control the decision, and even squandering what the war has generated of some elements of this power, especially in terms of the changes in international public opinion, and continuing with the policy of appeasing the occupation and betting on Washington. On the other hand, we cannot accept the return of the equation of rule and division as it was before October 7, and we have no alternative to salvation other than what was included in the Palestinian consensus in Beijing. Here, we must focus popular pressure and do everything possible to save the national project and prevent slipping into internal strife that threatens what remains of the most just cause in history. This is the responsibility of millions of Palestinians, and anyone who risks wasting it must be prevented and brought down.