The Saudi Solution?

By Maria Fantappie and Bader Al-Saif

How Riyadh’s Ties to America, Iran, and Israel Could Foster Stability

Over the past decade, and especially since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, Israel has assumed that its military, intelligence, and technological prowess can buy it allies among the Arab Gulf states. In more recent months, Israeli officials also came to believe that escalation would turn the regional equilibrium in their favor: a wider war between Israel and Iran and its proxies could force the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to finally and fully join with the Israelis.

If war engulfed the Middle East, Israeli leaders thought, the responses of Iran and its proxies to Israel’s provocations would erode the already fragile reconciliation between the Gulf states and Iran, leaving them—and Saudi Arabia, in particular—dependent on security guarantees from Israel’s main ally, the United States. Israeli officials believed that Arab leaders’ opposition to Israeli operations in Gaza and their diplomatic efforts in support of the Palestinians were, ultimately, not their primary concern; their own self-interest was. And thus escalation by Israel would confirm that Iran was the main threat to its Arab neighbors, leaving the Gulf states no choice but to align themselves more closely with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly articulated this calculus in his September speech at the UN, referring to the Gulf states as Israel’s “Arab partners of peace” and called for Saudi Arabia to ally with it to counter “Iran’s nefarious designs.”

Israel’s presumptions, however, have proved erroneous. In fact, Israel’s war in Gaza and the wider region is driving Saudi Arabia and Iran closer together. Israeli operations have indeed targeted some of Saudi Arabia’s enemies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. But the prospect of an all-out war in the Middle East—and Israeli dominance in the region—has put Saudi Arabia on the offensive. Riyadh has proactively recommitted to the cause of Palestinian statehood and sought to keep its strategic options open, engaging with the United States on the one hand and Iran and China on the other. Israel’s escalations against Iran and its proxies will no doubt press Tehran, fearing isolation, to intensify its security talks with Riyadh and, potentially, offer the Gulf states bolder security guarantees. For Saudi Arabia, such guarantees are more important than any intelligence that Israel can offer against Iranian attacks.

To Washington, the Saudi rapprochement with Iran may seem like bad news. U.S. officials, after all, have spent years pushing for Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. But the United States should welcome Riyadh’s pivot. If Saudi Arabia can forge working ties with both Iran and Israel, the country can play a new and useful role in moderating Middle Eastern tensions. It can act as a broker between competing parties, perhaps putting an end to the current Iranian-Israeli tit for tat. The events of the past year have upended long-standing redlines, deterrence parameters, and traditional rules of engagement among foes, and Riyadh is in a uniquely strong position to midwife a better regional order.

MISTAKEN IDENTITY

Israel’s recent show of military might has three main objectives: to incapacitate Iran and its proxies, to showcase Israel’s value as an ally to other neighboring countries, and to force Saudi Arabia to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel by emphasizing Riyadh’s security dependence on Washington. Israeli officials hoped that greater regional insecurity would pressure Saudi Arabia to lean harder on the United States’ security guarantees—guarantees that are, as of now, conditioned on Riyadh’s willingness to eventually normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. Events last spring appeared to support this calculus: as Iran lobbed missiles and drones at Israel, Jordan and other Gulf states cooperated with the United States to intercept them, giving the impression that concerted military cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states was finally in the offing. Back then, escalating against Iran appeared to have delivered results for Israel. By expanding the war beyond Gaza, Israel had provoked Iran into a direct response, and that had pushed the Gulf states to seek further protection under the United States’ security umbrella.

Although Saudi Arabia has been making efforts for years to restore ties with Iran, including a March 2023 deal brokered by China, Israeli officials have always been skeptical that these gestures were serious. Iran, after all, supports nonstate actors that threaten Saudi interests. Iran has also repeatedly criticized Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries for their lack of support for Palestinian statehood. Ironically, Israeli and U.S. officials have often bought into Iran’s criticism, doubting Saudi Arabia’s commitment to a Palestinian state and assuming, in particular, that younger Gulf leaders have little empathy for Palestinian suffering. Over the past year of war, a selective reading of the Gulf states’ actions may have played into this assumption. To many, it seemed that Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), by retaining their diplomatic ties with Israel, were already showing that they prioritized their national security over Palestinian statehood; it also seemed that Saudi Arabia, by negotiating a defense pact with the United States that did not close the door to normalization with Israel, was proving the same.

Saudi Arabia wants to become a key stabilizer in the Middle East.

Yet Israel’s read of Saudi Arabia, in particular, misunderstood the country’s comprehensive strategy. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of its national interest and its support of an independent Palestinian state were never mutually exclusive. Both were part of a segmented strategy that started with the U.S.-Saudi defense deal, to be followed by a discussion on Palestinian statehood in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. Although Saudi Arabia’s priority has been to spare its territory from conflict, Saudi leaders believe that they must lead the region and support a Palestinian state to ensure their national security. Championing Palestinian statehood also offers Riyadh an opportunity to unify the other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE—in hedging between Iran and Israel. It also helps the kingdom renew its role as a regional and global power.

Saudi Arabia wants to become a key stabilizer in the Middle East. To that end, over the past year, Riyadh has left its policy options open. It has continued to engage with U.S. officials on normalization with Israel in exchange for a U.S.-Saudi defense pact, but it premised normalization on Palestinian statehood and kept talking with Iran. This multipronged approach has paid dividends. In August, Riyadh convinced Washington to lift its three-year embargo on selling offensive weapons to the kingdom by leveraging the prospect of normalization with Israel. But by continuing to engage with Tehran, Riyadh was able to secure safe passage for Saudi ships transiting the Red Sea and protect Saudi oil installations against attacks from Iranian-affiliated groups.

Other Gulf states pursued a similar strategy, neutralizing security risks and leveraging opportunities offered by the regional conflict to boost their standing. Qatar did so by mediating between Hamas and Israel. Oman continued its mediations with the Houthis. The UAE used the rotating seat it gained in 2022 on the UN Security Council to push for resolutions calling for a humanitarian cease-fire in Gaza and leveraged its ties with Israel to deliver more humanitarian aid to the region and negotiate a day-after plan.

STATE IN PLAY

But as conflict in the region expanded, Saudi Arabia’s policy risked backfiring, and the country changed course. Israel’s intensifying operations in Gaza and its attacks in Lebanon, coupled with the fresh exchanges between Iran and Israel in September and October, demonstrated that the United States was unable or unwilling to rein Israel in. These escalations also revealed the extent of Israel’s determination to use raw military power to assert primacy in the region and to expose Saudi Arabia’s security vulnerabilities, narrowing Riyadh’s strategic options.

Since September, Saudi Arabia has thus begun to shift from quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy toward more forceful, public criticism of Israel and support for Palestinian statehood. Saudi leaders are showing that they are not willing to be locked into an exclusive alliance with the United States and, by extension, with Israel that would prevent them from forging other alliances. In a key September speech to the Shura Council, the deliberative body that advises the Saudi monarch, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman openly stated that normalization with Israel would be conditional on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In a Financial Times op-ed in early October, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan reiterated this message. 

Saudi leaders have sought to demonstrate their power to organize Palestinian allies by hosting a Joint Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit on Israeli Aggression Against the Palestinian People in November 2023 that convened representatives from more than 50 countries and called for the creation of a Palestinian state. And they have expanded their efforts beyond the Middle East, launching in September the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, which is set to meet again in Brussels in late November. Indeed, over the past months, Saudi Arabia has established a raft of new multilateral coalitions and alliances with other countries pushing for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The cause of Palestinian statehood has also prompted an unprecedented level of coordination between the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia included) and Iran. On October 3, Doha welcomed the newly elected Iranian president to the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Summit, where GCC leaders reinforced their solidarity with the Palestinians and condemned Israeli aggression. On the same day, the Gulf Cooperation Council hosted a rare informal joint GCC-Iranian ministerial meeting, the first in more than 17 years, during which members affirmed the Gulf states’ unwillingness to allow their territory and airspace to be used to launch attacks against Iran. The UAE’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister even recently announced that the United Arab Emirates was “not ready to support” day-after planning for Gaza “without the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

GIFT HORSE

Israel is counting on the hope that its escalations will tip the regional power balance. And it is betting that the United States will eventually be drawn into this dynamic, yielding a weaker Iran and a stable Middle Eastern future anchored by alliances between Israel and the Gulf states. That vision may have underpinned the development of the Abraham Accords, but five years later, it can no longer guide a profoundly transformed region. Israel is much more willing now than it was then to use violence to bolster its deterrence. Saudi Arabia relies less solely on the United States, having diversified its engagements by strengthening its ties with China and stepping up security talks with Iran. The issue of Palestinian statehood can no longer be glossed over. And a Palestinian state cannot be achieved merely by a transaction between Israel and the Gulf states; it has become a global cause led by Saudi Arabia and backed by a wide variety of countries, including Iran.

Although U.S. President-elect Donald Trump may try to pursue normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel following the template of the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia should counter that by advancing a two-state solution right away, before normalization. This may disappoint Trump, but the United States should welcome such a Saudi effort as a way to end the conflict that currently engulfs the region. In fact, the new kind of balancing that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have begun to pursue makes them increasingly well placed to de-escalate regional tensions. They have positioned themselves as acceptable to all regional actors, a position neither Iran nor Israel holds.

For Riyadh to maintain its strategy, it will have to extract security guarantees from Tehran, such as a mutual nonaggression pact. It could then use these guarantees to push Israel to acknowledge that its escalatory strategy is backfiring by strengthening ties between the Gulf states and Iran and diminishing the prospects for normalization with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s efforts to coordinate a coherent GCC position on Palestinian statehood can also help calm regional tensions by pressuring the United States, Europe, and powers such as China and Russia to back their approach to end the conflict in the Middle East. That kind of broad backing could eventually yield a coexistence framework between Israel and Iran with the Gulf states as mediators—a paradigm that requires Israel to halt its provocative attacks and Iran to restrain its retaliatory responses.

Above all, Washington should realize that a stronger Saudi Arabia serves everyone. It can dilute Iran’s power. It can also push Israel to make peace with the Palestinians. In doing so, the Saudis are uniquely positioned to help halt the fighting that has wreaked havoc across the Middle East.