South Lebanon and Gaza between the dialectic of unity of fronts and tactical independence

As negotiations on a ceasefire on the southern Lebanon front heat up, questions are being raised about Hezbollah’s willingness to accept a separate agreement on the situation in Gaza, which could reshape the resistance’s strategies and affect the positions of regional and international parties on the one hand, and the continuation of the humanitarian tragedies in the Gaza Strip in the face of the brutal aggression of genocide, displacement and starvation. Since the beginning of the confrontation, Hezbollah has raised the slogan of unity of fronts as a means of increasing pressure on Israel and preventing it from dividing the confrontations or exploiting the circumstances of each front separately. However, with the growing international pressure and the increasing humanitarian cost, it seems that the party is facing major challenges in re-evaluating this strategic link without submitting to a negotiating path under fire as Netanyahu wants. Rather, the speech of its new Secretary-General emphasized Lebanon’s sovereignty and considering Tel Aviv equivalent to Beirut in the missile strikes it is carrying out, making it a costly matter for the occupying state, especially in the north and in terms of the economic losses on the one hand, and the unprecedented human losses among the occupation soldiers on the other.

Hezbollah’s rhetoric has long relied on strengthening the connection between Gaza and southern Lebanon, within a larger vision of what has been called the axis of resistance. This connection reflects the party’s ideological and political framework, which views the Palestinian cause as the center of the conflict with the Israeli occupation state. However, the complexity of the field conditions may make maintaining this connection costly at the present time. Accepting a separate ceasefire may be seen as a tactical necessity to avoid a comprehensive escalation that could drag Lebanon into an unwanted confrontation that would place Hezbollah in a position of responsibility before some other Lebanese parties that promote a surrender mentality, which could put Lebanon at risk of a civil war incited by forces that we used to call isolationist forces in the past, which have spared no effort in opposing the Lebanese national movement and the Palestinian revolution since the 1970s.

In contrast, abandoning this linkage poses internal challenges to the party with its popular base, which expects a firm stance on Gaza. Moreover, its regional allies, such as Iran, Syria, and other pro-Iranian movements in Yemen and Iraq, may view any step toward a separate agreement as a sign of a decline in the unity of what has been agreed to be called the axis and the unity of the arenas.

Hezbollah has several scenarios in dealing with this dilemma. On the one hand, the party may seek to present a convincing discourse to its supporters stating that accepting a separate ceasefire does not mean abandoning Gaza, but rather is part of a long-term strategy in the concept and practice of resistance to the Zionist project on the one hand, and to strengthen the role of Iran and Russia in the region on the other hand. The party may also demand international guarantees obligating Israel not to violate the agreement, which would give it a justification to deal with this option without giving up its principled positions, although nothing would oblige Israel to deal with any future guarantees.

On the other hand, the party may use its current position as a pressure card to obtain greater political and security gains, whether in Lebanon or at the regional level. These gains may include ensuring the continuation of its role as protector of southern Lebanon and avoiding any agreement that limits the resistance’s ability to respond to Israeli threats, and also preserving the Iranian role in the region, which is pursuing its project.

The visit of US envoy Amos Hochstein to Lebanon comes in the context of these sensitive negotiations, where the US side is focusing on calming tensions, preventing regional escalation, and achieving a political achievement for the outgoing administration, especially in light of the tense situation in Gaza. The Lebanese demands, which include strengthening the role of the Lebanese army and protecting infrastructure, may be in line with some of Hezbollah’s aspirations, but they remain conditional on the extent of the guarantees provided by international parties.

On the other hand, Israel insists on ensuring its freedom of military action in the region, and Netanyahu believes that any agreement concluded now may be considered a concession to the Biden administration, which contradicts his ambitions that seek to achieve strategic achievements with an ally more committed to Israel’s interests without Trump’s conditions. Therefore, the tactic of delay and maneuver is one of Netanyahu’s tools to strengthen his positions locally and internationally.

Which raises questions about the possibility of reaching an agreement that satisfies all parties at the present time. In this context, the role of major countries, such as Iran and Russia, remains decisive in directing the course of negotiations and influencing Hezbollah’s positions, due to Iran’s desire to strengthen its position in any negotiations related to the nuclear file later, and Russia’s desire with Chinese support for a policy of pressure on the United States in light of the crisis in the Ukrainian file.

With the escalation of diplomatic efforts, it seems that the coming days will bring answers about the future of southern Lebanon and its relationship with Gaza. The American partnership may force Israel to accept the formula of an agreement with Lebanon, in return for this partnership and this support being translated on the ground by enabling Israel to implement its project known as the Generals’ Plan, which aims to divide Gaza geographically and confine it to a narrow area not exceeding 200 square kilometers, while isolating the northern region and tightening the siege on it. These plans do not only aim to achieve field gains, but also to impose a new political reality that serves its settlement vision and Israel’s expansionist goals, including, of course, the project of annexing settlement areas from the West Bank that Trump considers legitimate, and the price may be through a deal that Trump presents in the Negev lands that are within the lands of the Palestinian state according to his concept of it.

Hezbollah, which is facing internal Lebanese and regional pressures, will try to balance its positions to maintain its image as an effective resistance movement without compromising its grand strategies. Ultimately, the question remains: Can a stable truce be achieved without harming the principle of unity of fronts, or will tactical imperatives impose a new path that could reshape the equation of the conflict, especially with Trump taking over the reins of the White House soon?