Syria: Bashar Al-Assad trapped in the heart of the Iran-Israel-Russia triangle

By Eva Koulouriotis

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad inherited the alliance between Damascus and Tehran from his father. Over time, this alliance has become a necessity, particularly with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011. But in the context of the current war in the Middle East, it has become a disturbing burden.

The image depicts several important political figures. It shows portraits of leaders such as the Iranian supreme leader, the Russian president, the Israeli prime minister, and the Syrian president, grouped together on a red background. The various members appear to be engaged in some kind of interaction or reflection, highlighting complex geopolitical relationships. The atmosphere of the image evokes themes of power and diplomacy in a context of international tensions.

On September 17 and 18, 2023, more than 3,000 pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah exploded. Particularly shocking in their scale, these events were the prelude to the Israeli military operation against the Lebanese militia, and sounded the alarm in both Beirut and Damascus.

A month earlier, the director of the General Intelligence Department of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, Major General Houssam Louqa, had made a secret visit to Beirut, where he met with Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem. Louqa had asked Hezbollah to reduce the escalation and not fall into the Israeli trap, given the military risk for both the Lebanese militia and the Syrian regime. Qassem had highlighted Hezbollah’s carefully thought-out, phased strategy and Israel’s weariness after a year of war in the Gaza Strip.

Naim Qassem and Hassan Nasrallah had in fact erred in their judgment by dismissing the risk of an Israeli offensive. The latter was assassinated on September 27, and the Assad regime found itself facing its most complex challenge since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, with the stakes being control of the Syrian-Lebanese border, which is of strategic importance to Hezbollah and the Iranians, but also to Israel.

Hezbollah’s central role

Iranian leaders believe that a crushing defeat of Hezbollah would have negative consequences for their own national security. The Lebanese group’s existence has until now provided a deterrent to Iran and its nuclear program, serving as a frontline of confrontation and a tool for Tehran to blackmail Israel and the United States. The militia has also played a role in providing technical and logistical support to Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. Hezbollah also helped save the Assad regime in the early years of the revolution against him, especially between 2012 and 2015. Tehran therefore considers that the defeat of Hezbollah would pose a risk to its national security and, in particular, to its nuclear program vis-à-vis Israel. This is why continuing to support Hezbollah via the Syrian-Lebanese border is a strategic priority, whatever the cost. A cost that particularly worries Bashar Al-Assad, whose eyes are fixed on Israel.

On the Israeli side, two issues are priorities in the Syrian theater. The first concerns the Syrian-Lebanese border and the second the militias supported by Iran in Syria. These concerns could become more intense given Tehran and Hezbollah’s refusal to accept defeat and make concessions that would encourage the Israeli government to end its military operation in Lebanon. Tel Aviv is, however, aware of the difficulty of continuing its offensive in the short term, after the American presidential election, despite the re-election of Donald Trump. Hence the decision to attack the porosity of the Syrian-Lebanese border, as evidenced by the recent statement by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: "We will cut Hezbollah's oxygen pipeline that connects Iran to Syria1."

Three military scenarios

In practice, three military scenarios are on the table of the Israeli government to obstruct this border. The first consists of extending the Israeli military offensive on land on Lebanese territory towards the Bekaa Valley, the regions of Baalbek and Hermel, to control the border. This scenario appears very costly and complex.

The second consists of launching a new land offensive in the southwest of Syrian territory, towards Quneitra, then towards the west of Damascus, towards Qalamoun and Homs, in order to close the border on the Syrian side. This scenario is constrained by the Russian presence in Syria and its costs would be high due to the strong presence of militias supported by Iran.

The third would be for Israel to intensify its airstrikes on both sides of the border. Since the beginning of the operation against Hezbollah, the Israeli air force has carried out dozens of airstrikes targeting official and unofficial crossing points on the Syrian-Lebanese border. Israel has also assassinated three leaders of Unit 4400, affiliated with Hezbollah and responsible for financing and supplying the group from Syrian territory, the most important of whom, Muhammad Jaafar Qasir, was a close personal friend of Bashar Al-Assad. But the effectiveness of these strikes seems to have been limited.

Based on this observation, Israel warned Assad of the need to take the decision to close these borders. But the latter has not yet responded to this warning, and for good reason.

The Syrian archipelago

The image shows a geographical map of Syria and its neighboring regions. The country’s borders can be seen, with colored areas that could represent different territorial controls or groups. The red part seems to indicate a main territory or one under the control of a certain group, while the yellow and green could symbolize other areas of control or influence. There are also Arabic inscriptions on the map, probably indicating cities or governorates. The geographic labels are arranged in such a way as to give an overview of the regions and important roads in this area.

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At Tehran’s mercy

After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Iran intervened militarily and directly protected Assad. With its support for military figures running for important positions and its relations with the leaders of the security services, its influence has grown within the Syrian regime itself. Tehran has also expanded its relations with major Syrian businessmen close to the regime. This interference has occurred in parallel with the deployment of thousands of Iranian-backed militia fighters from Iraq and Lebanon. Thus, Iran has gradually moved from being an ally protecting Assad to a partner in managing the territory. This reality forces Assad to think carefully before taking any steps that would thwart Iranian interests, including in areas under his control. A possible conflict over a strategic issue with the Iranian leadership could have serious repercussions on the security and economic situation in Syria and, possibly, on Assad himself. Based on these concerns, Assad is knocking on Russia’s door.

This is not the first time that Damascus has asked for Moscow’s help in a crisis involving Tehran and which poses a threat to the stability of the Syrian regime. In his book The Lost Novel, the former Syrian Vice President responsible for foreign affairs, Farouk Al-Charah, evokes the reaction of Hafez al-Assad after the outbreak of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran (1979-1989):

Hafez Al-Assad rushed to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union on October 8, 1980, which he had always hesitated to sign. This move is a response to this new variable.

During a surprise visit to Moscow in July 2023, Bashar Al-Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who told him that the regional situation was deteriorating and that Syria was directly concerned. Yet Russia, despite the war in Ukraine and strategic cooperation with Tehran, still maintains close relations with Israel. Hence the fundamental question for Assad in his dilemma over the Syrian-Lebanese border: Will Moscow side with Tehran, Tel Aviv, or Damascus?

On September 8, in the Masyaf region, Israeli helicopters conducted a military operation against an installation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, presumably manufacturing warheads for ballistic missiles. At the Russian base of Hmeimim, located just a few kilometers from this area, a cautious calm reigned. The base’s S-400 air defense batteries, although having identified the Israeli kinetics, showed no reaction. This is in line with Moscow’s historical tolerance of Israeli airstrikes against Iranian interests in Syria. The Russians distinguish their interests in this country from those of Tehran, with the priority being the maintenance of the Syrian regime, and the preservation of their military bases on the Syrian coast, their only outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. Hence the absence of any notable reaction from Russia.

The Kremlin’s maps

The Soviet Union was not on the list of Iran’s allies before Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power or after. During the first Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union did not supply equipment to Tehran, but supported Baghdad, supplying it with fighter planes, missiles and munitions. It now appears that Moscow and Tehran have a more complex relationship than their politicians let on. Putin claims that the Islamic Republic is a strategic ally of Russia, and the Leader of the Revolution Ali Khamenei emphasizes the friendship with Moscow as well as their rapprochement with “the West.” However, behind these statements, contradictions emerge. For example, regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Tehran supports Moscow significantly, by supplying medium and long-range missiles, drones, and ensuring the transfer of technology to manufacture these drones in Russia. But in Yemen, this alliance differs in nature. Despite repeated requests from the Iranians and the Houthis for the supply of Russian-made Yakhont surface-to-sea missiles, Moscow is still hesitant. This hesitation is also reflected in the supply to Tehran of the S-400 system, which the Iranians still hope to obtain from the Kremlin urgently, particularly after the Israeli airstrike of October 26. Russia justifies its position by the complexity of the situation. Relations between Russia and Iran therefore change depending on the issue, including in the Syrian theater, where Moscow remains in retreat on the Iranian-Israeli conflict.

By connecting the wires coming from Tehran, Moscow and Tel Aviv to Damascus, Syria finds itself facing an equation that threatens the stability of the Muhajirin Palace (the Syrian presidential palace). The Iranians believe that obstructing the Syrian-Lebanese border will accelerate the defeat of Hezbollah and threaten their national security. For their part, the Israelis know that in order to weaken Hezbollah and prevent it from restoring its military capabilities, Assad must close its border with Lebanon. The Russians are not ready to intervene in this conflict. So they are at least trying to understand the intentions of each of the two parties without taking concrete measures, whether to serve as a mediator or, if necessary, to support one of the parties against the other. Assad finds himself alone between an ally who is pushing him into the abyss, another who is observing the scene from a distance and a neighbor who is resolutely serious in his threats.

Assad's Syria is trapped between these three parties. The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah by the Israelis and that of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 4, 2017, by the Houthis—probably with Iranian approval—fuel the latter’s fears. Not to mention that the Israelis consider Assad more than ever, not as a president useful to their interests, but as a threat to their national security and their regional projects. But the decision to get rid of him is only possible with the approval of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Source: ORIENT XXI