The ‘first day after’ is really what should matter now in Gaza

Various innovative proposals for “the day after” in Gaza have been brought to the table which include the potential involvement in the management of post-conflict Gaza. The latest being Hamas and Fatah having apparently signed a “unity deal” brokered in Beijing along with twelve other Palestinian factions agreeing to form an interim national reconciliation government to govern Gaza. Other recent options focused on ideas ranging from a UN trusteeship as advocated in a recent article of Foreign Affairs, to a transitional administration to govern post-conflict Gaza as explained in a recent Op-ed in the Financial Times.   But winding down combat operations and working towards an immediate, full and complete ceasefire, as contemplated by Phase 1 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2735 of 10th June, 2024, is a necessary precondition to other phases, namely Phase 2, which foresees a permanent end of hostilities in exchange for the release of all remaining hostages still in Gaza and a full withdrawal of the potential next phases, and Phase 3 which proposes a major multi-year reconstruction plan.  While there might be significant differences in precisely what is called for, the “first day after” is really what should matter now. It consists of the end of military operations, which will permit the effective distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale throughout Gaza to all Palestinian civilians. Nothing else will be possibly addressed, much less administered, even on a temporary basis, if design planning does not first and foremost establish the parameters of a military ceasefire and disengagement plan as part of the comprehensive ceasefire deal mandated by Security Council Resolution 2735.

Ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas

What exactly should a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, if a unity deal with the Palestinian Authority is in place, include?  It should first include an understanding to scrupulously observe the agreed ceasefire on land, sea and air, and further require Israel and Hamas to refrain from all military actions against each other from the time of the signing of the agreement, in implementation of UN Security Council 2735.  Principles of separation along precise lines and areas would then have to be specified on a map attached to the agreement. This step would be best handled by a military working group composed of military representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including Hamas, who will agree on the stages of the process. The military working group will work under the aegis of the United States, Egypt and Qatar within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement and should achieve their task within five days. The agreement and the map attached should be signed by the military representatives of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the participation of representatives of the United States, Egypt and Qatar.  End of combat operations and disengagement or separation of forces will begin within 48 hours of the completion of the work of the military working group and the process of disengagement would be completed not later than thirty days after it begins.  Once the basic adherence to the agreed ceasefire is secured, the end of combat operations and respect of the agreement will be guaranteed by a ceasefire observer force to be deployed in Gaza, be it under the authority of the UN Security Council or the General Assembly, or by formal invitation from the Palestinian Authority.  If history in the region and elsewhere can be of help, the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) was established in 1956 through the mechanisms of the Uniting for Peace Resolution with the consent of the territorial authority to monitor the armistice along the Israel-Egypt border. It was a UN General Assembly mission and it ended with the Six Day War in 1967. This option would require all warring parties to agree to a UN General Assembly temporary authority in Gaza and it could not go beyond basic policing powers.  A second option would be to establish a short-term monitoring mission on the model of the small observer force deployed before the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) mission in West New Guinea or following the path of the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia before the deployment of the UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC). For this precursor mission to be created after the ceasefire or disengagement plan, the UN Secretary-General would need a prior agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, including Hamas. The initial authorization would be for six months subject to renewal with the consent of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  The example of the Protocol concerning the Disengagement Observer Force attached to the Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement of 1974 might serve here as a very useful example.  The task of the ceasefire observation force in Gaza would be mainly to use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is precisely observed. Such a force would need to comply with generally applicable laws and regulations in Gaza and not hamper the functioning of local civil administrations or humanitarian organizations on the ground. It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the mission. It will be provided with personal weapons of defensive character which shall be used only in self-defense. The force will be empowered to carry out inspections under the agreement, and report thereon to all parties on a regular basis.  The “first day after” is as important as any “day after.” What makes the first one stand out though, is that it shapes the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in establishing a non-negotiable precondition to peace and security for all in the region.