Iran–Israel: An escalation in the form of a lying poker

By ZIAD MAJED

Iran's attack on Israel on the night of April 13-14 came in response to the bombing of its consulate in Damascus on April 1 that left 16 people dead, including Revolutionary Guard officers. This operation raises several questions about the strategy of Tehran and its allies in the region, but also of Jordan, as well as the degree of autonomy of Israel in relation to the American umbrella.

By using more than 200 drones and around a hundred missiles to attack Israel on the night of April 13-14, Iran is sending a clear message. While Israeli strikes against its forces, military centers and supply sites in Syria are not new, the targeting of its consular and diplomatic mission — protected by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 — constitutes a red line. This explains its military response and may call for others, more elaborate if necessary, directed directly from the Islamic Republic or through regional allies and loyal militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.

On the sidelines of this same attack, Iran however made it clear that it wanted to avoid all-out war with Israel, and of course with its American ally. Announced in advance, its response was not intended to inflict considerable damage on Israel or human losses that would justify a new confrontation. Tel Aviv, Washington and their allies had time to shoot down most of the 300 drones and missiles detected unsurprisingly coming from Iranian territory. After these reprisals, Iran is therefore trying to return to the rules of engagement1, the terms of which were violated during the bombing against the consulate. He responded with a show of force in the skies over the region, but without Israeli losses on the ground.

AMERICAN CAUTION

For its part, Israel seeks to take advantage of the situation to distract from its ongoing genocidal war in Gaza and its crimes in the West Bank. He also hopes to mobilize new Western support, some of which he recently lost, or at least unanimity. The fact remains that after this attack, Tel Aviv risks seeing its freedom of movement considerably reduced in the region - that is to say outside Palestine -, while military strikes had until then taken place without fear of retaliation. This new situation should push him to strengthen his coordination with the Americans before launching new attacks against Tehran.

This leads us to another observation: the United States does not want a large-scale regional escalation during a presidential election year and in a very tense international context. They showed that they were ready to defend “Israel’s security” on the ground. Nevertheless, Biden's announcements to Netanyahu show that Washington does not wish to participate in future Israeli operations. The White House prefers that Tel Aviv refrain from reacting and does not seek to involve the United States. The American recommendations consist of remaining within the limits of the confrontation which preceded the attack on the consulate, and of carefully anticipating the consequences of each of the future operations.

The current situation also puts Hezbollah, Iran's main ally, in a very delicate position, as it has been waging a war against Israel on the southern border of Lebanon since October 8, 2023. Just like its godfather, the Lebanese Shiite party does not want a total war. It therefore avoids using its heavy artillery, intended solely to defend its existence and the Iranian nuclear program - of which no one is threatened today -, in order not to provoke devastating Israeli responses. Because the economic collapse, tensions and internal political divisions mean that neither Lebanon nor the base of the “party of God” in the south can assume a new war against Tel Aviv like that of 2006. Yet Israel is gradually increasing the intensity of its attacks. This risks eroding Hezbollah's power of deterrence, hitherto guaranteed by its missiles and its combat preparation, and dragging the militia towards an inevitable confrontation.

JORDAN’S CHOICE

The latest observation concerns Jordan which has seen a number of Iranian drones and missiles crossing its airspace. The Hashemite kingdom participated with the Americans — as well as the French and the British — in their interception. Regardless of the popular indignation that such action arouses in the region, the Jordanian initiative can be explained by the fear of witnessing the transformation of its skies into a zone open to Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Especially if Iran soon entrusts Iraqi militias with the mission of launching drones from the Iraqi-Jordanian border. This eventuality could affect Amman’s ability to maintain a margin of autonomy in its regional diplomatic role, as an ally of the West and “protector of Muslim and Christian holy places” in Jerusalem. It could also threaten its security at a time when the monarchy is concerned about what is happening in the West Bank and plans by the Israeli far right to deport Palestinians to its territory. At the same time, doubts persist – legitimately – about Amman's capacity and willingness to attack Israeli planes, if they ever penetrate its airspace to bomb Iran or its Iraqi allies.

The limits of Israel's compliance with the American "recommendations" in the days and weeks to come remain uncertain. Will he respond to the Iranian attack by going beyond what is “acceptable” in order to regain the initiative? How will Iran react in this case?

The complexities increase and the objectives of the different parties conflict. On the one hand, the supremacist right of Netanyahu's government wants to expand the scope of the war to allow the army and settlers to commit more crimes and expulsions against Palestinians in the occupied territories. On the other hand, the Israeli Prime Minister sees in the current situation an opportunity to weaken Iran and Hezbollah. For its part, Washington is pushing to contain the war and limit the damage in the region, but not in the Gaza Strip. Finally, Tehran and its allies (mainly Hezbollah) are forced to respond to Israeli strikes when they exceed a certain limit, without taking the risk of transforming the situation into an all-out war. If we take all of these elements into account, the risk of a fire on the ground going beyond the calculations and measured responses cannot be excluded.

What is certain is that we are in a phase where violence and clashes – in various forms – will continue for a long time. They will determine the course of events, whether in the countries directly concerned or in the entire Middle East.