A "STATE and A HALF SOLUTION"

“With the escalation of the intensity of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, and multilateral calls for the necessity of ending it, there has been a return to square one regarding the political settlement of the conflict, represented by the re-emergence of the principle of the “two-state solution,” after it had been absent from circulation for nearly a decade. 

This principle was the basis on which the “Oslo Agreement” was built, and it is based on mutual recognition of the rights of the Palestinian and Israeli parties, and ending the conflict by establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel. 

However, despite the Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel and the guarantee of its safe existence, the establishment of the promised and hoped-for Palestinian state has not been achieved during the past three decades. The main reason for the failure is due to the international community’s acknowledgment of subjecting the establishment of this state to the restrictive Israeli vision for it, under conditions that made Palestinian acceptance of it, result in nothing for the Palestinian people except the transformation of Israeli control over them due to the occupation, into permanent control hidden under the bright title of “the Palestinian state”, but a fat free one.

There is nothing wrong if the Palestinians consider that the strong return of the “two-state solution” project as a basis for a political settlement of the conflict, and the support of this project by various regional and international parties, most notably the current American administration and the European Union, is a positive matter. This return proves that continuing to ignore Palestinian rights and marginalizing the Palestinian issue cannot achieve stability in the region, which means that “resolving the conflict,” and not simply continuing to “manage the conflict,” has become more acceptable in influential regional and international capitals. However, it is necessary not to exaggerate the importance of this return, and to raise Palestinian expectations from it, as if a different breakthrough from what the situation was previously had occurred, and this time it will result in a real and serious effort to establish a state acceptable to Palestinians. 

Although statements about the necessity of finding a settlement according to the principle of the “two-state solution” are coming from all sides, they have not yet departed from the regulating conceptual framework (the paradigm) for implementing this principle, which has governed the actions of these parties since the beginning of its introduction and its demarcation in the “Oslo Accords.” 

This framework can be summarized in the following points:

First, the conceptual framework of the “two-state solution” by the countries of the Western coalition that guarantees the existence and security of Israel, led by America, is not based on the centrality of the necessity of direct and absolute recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. By ending the occupation and obtaining freedom and independence, as an inherent part of the natural right that must be enjoyed like the rest of the peoples of the world. Rather, this framework is based on the centrality of Israel, and the guarantee of its existence and security, as a Jewish and democratic state, which necessitates the establishment of a “Palestinian state” that will rid it of the continuity of loss of security and the foundations of democratic rule in the future. The establishment of a Palestinian state, according to this conceptual framework, comes from achieving the Israeli interest, and not to achieve the Palestinian right.

Secondly, because the Palestinian right is subordinate to the Israeli interest, the Western coalition countries have given Israel the exclusive right to define the “Palestinian state” it wants, and have exerted pressure at times, and neglect at other times, on the Palestinian side to accept what Israel wants. Here it must be remembered that Netanyahu is not the only Israeli obstructionist of the existence of an independent and sovereign state “another one west of the river,” but rather all Israeli governments, since the “Oslo Accords” until now. Rabin, a partner in “Peace of the Braves” who was assassinated on charges of neglecting Israeli rights and interests, was not prepared to accept anything more than an “incomplete state” for the Palestinians, lacking sovereignty, space, and demilitarized. As for Netanyahu, who was and still is at the top of the political pyramid in Israel during the past quarter century, he restricted the “two-state solution” to conditions that are still in effect until now, which are: Israel maintaining full security control over the entire geographical area west of the river, and no sovereignty for any other state west of it. No return to the 1967 borders, no division of Jerusalem, no cessation of settlements, no right of return for the Palestinians to Israel, in addition to the necessity of recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. According to these conditions, Netanyahu is ready to accept expanded autonomy for the Palestinians, which he called “autonomy+” or even “autonomy++.” It is worth noting the fact that with some “cosmetic” modifications to these conditions, a broad majority in Israel, which has been moving toward the right for decades, agrees to them.

Third, as a result of the previous two points, the successive American administrations, which stand at the head of the Western coalition and monopolize the political settlement of the conflict, did not exert any effective and meaningful pressure on Israel to change its position on the desired “Palestinian state” capable of resolving the conflict. Rather, these administrations assumed the role of the agent protecting Israel’s vision, and began defending this vision on a path that focused on “conflict management,” so that it remained a disciplined and low-paced conflict. These administrations and their allies accepted Israel’s imposition of separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip, its continuation of a systematic process of Judaizing Jerusalem and the West Bank, and the ongoing annexation of Palestinian land, and began talking about “a ‘contiguous’ Palestinian state.” Thus, the international ceiling for this “state” began to align itself not only with the Israeli conditions related to its establishment, but also with the Israeli practical steps on the ground, which actually prevented the possibility of its establishment. It should not be overlooked that the former US president’s recognition of the annexation of Jerusalem to Israel, and the deal of the century he announced that gives the Palestinians a “remnant state” consisting of confined and besieged ghettos, are an expression of submission to the Israeli position.

Fourth, the current dispute between the Biden administration and Netanyahu is a tactical dispute, not a strategic one. It is not related to differences in visions about the common goals that unite America and Israel, but rather it stops at the limits of American dissatisfaction with the methodology followed by Netanyahu and his current right-wing government. The American administration, despite its criticism of Israel due to the large number of civilian casualties as a result of its campaign on the Gaza Strip, still rejects the mounting calls for a ceasefire, and supports the continuation of the war, but at a different pace. As for its demand to activate the “two-state solution” and establish the “Palestinian state,” it is still governed by the same old and continuing conceptual framework. This is evidenced by the statements made by President Biden two days ago, after he made a phone call with Netanyahu, which took place after a break in direct communication between them that extended over a period of three weeks. It is clear from these statements that the US President lowered the ceiling of his demands and accepted Netanyahu’s vision of the expected “Palestinian state.” Biden said that “the two-state solution is not impossible with Netanyahu in power,” adding that “there are several types of solutions based on two states,” as there are “countries that are members of the United Nations that do not have their own armies.” Although he neglected to mention the reasons that led those countries to abandon the presence of an army, and whether they were forced to do so, he used an incorrect approach to justify the most important Israeli condition for the establishment of a Palestinian state, which is depriving it of sovereignty.

Finally, the American side emphasizes that it is aware that the time gap between its demand to activate the two-state solution and the implementation of this demand will take a long period of time, and will require the Palestinian side to adhere to the implementation of many conditions, required for rehabilitation as a party that is capable and acceptable to Israel and the Western coalition to undertake the task. After achieving this, there will be the possibility of moving towards implementing the “two-state solution.” Since America will from now on be engaged in the presidential election campaign, and because the possibility of Trump returning to the White House is high, the greatest thing in the American arsenal will be the “Deal of the Century.” This deal seeks to resolve the conflict not on the basis of a “two-state solution,” but rather on the basis of a “state and a half solution.”