The Palestinians do not disagree, despite their many walks of life, backgrounds, and differences, that the normalization of any Arab or friendly country, before and without at least ending the occupation and embodying freedom and independence for the State of Palestine, supports the occupation government and encourages it to continue implementing its plans to achieve the rest of its goals, which revolve around the establishment of “Israel.” "Grand" from the river to the sea, with the smallest possible number of Palestinians. In order for this to be achieved, we need to confiscate the land, settle it, and Judaize it, and expel its residents and gather them in ghettos separate from each other, until a suitable opportunity is available to displace those who did not immigrate to escape the hell of occupation, and in search of opportunities for a decent living.
But the Palestinians, and here I specifically mean the leaders, forces and political elite, disagree on how the normalization of more countries can be prevented, and on the reaction to this normalization when it occurs. Differing opinions on normalization There is an opinion that normalization is a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and the highest Arab interests, and it must be dealt with on this basis in a way that imposes a rupture.
Another opinion is that the hardline position on normalization in the absence of the Arab project and the spread of normalization isolates the Palestinians and weakens them despite their weakness. Therefore, normalization must be dealt with on the basis that politics is the art of the possible, and if it cannot be prevented, it can be dealt with to reduce its harms and multiply its benefits. There is a third opinion that stands in the distance between the two positions. On the one hand, he believes that normalization is a betrayal, and that accepting it, coexisting with it, or covering it up helps it happen more quickly and annex new countries, but without necessarily meaning a firm rejection of normalization means breaking with the normalizers. Because this position isolates the Palestinians, there is a difference between agreeing to normalization, even by covering it up, and rejecting it while maintaining relations at a certain level with the normalizers. With the aim of influencing them and preventing them from continuing to descend further and further down this path. We must not forget that normalization between leaders and governments does not extend to the people. There is sweeping Arab popular rejection in various Arab countries that have normalized, are on their way to normalization, or are rejecting it. This requires continued interaction and coordination with forces and movements that reject normalization. Because the bet is on her and the future is hers.
We also noticed that the Palestinian leadership dealt differently with the countries that normalized. It boycotted Egypt after the peace treaty, and was at the forefront of the front of steadfastness and confrontation. Then it went beyond this position and described the Arab Emirates as treason when it normalized. It was merciful towards Moroccan normalization, and now it seems More compassionate and willing to engage in the process from the beginning, as it deals with the possibilities of Saudi normalization. This reflects the deterioration of the Palestinian position in light of the division and loss of compass and vision after the adopted strategies reached a dead end, based on several issues, including the need of the Saudi rulers for Palestinian cover due to Saudi Arabia’s historical status and its future ambitions to play a global leadership role.
The Palestinian leadership takes a position opposite to its traditional positions, as it does not want to repeat its position towards the UAE, and on the one hand, it is betting on the impossibility of normalization now due to the obstacles that stand before it, and this is a good thing, as it is not easy to achieve normalization under the current Israeli government, and thus gain Saudi Arabia, Saudi aid to the authority that was cut off some time ago has resumed, and there is news that it will resume. On the other hand, if normalization occurs, it will be present in light of a Saudi promise that the Palestinian issue will be present without clarifying how, and here the seriousness and complexity of the matter appears.
It is noteworthy that the Hamas movement dealt differently with regard to the normalization of Morocco, when a delegation headed by Ismail Haniyeh visited Morocco after normalization, and met with Prime Minister Saad Eddine Othmani because he belongs to a Brotherhood party, and this weakened its principled position on normalization. A Palestinian delegation to Riyadh and a position between two ceilings. News agencies and many media sources indicated that a Palestinian delegation will leave for Saudi Arabia to discuss the Palestinian demands that were previously presented to Riyadh, which are based on two levels and two ceilings at the same time: the first is principled or ideal, as it is described, and it demands that it adhere to it. Israel joined the Arab initiative before Saudi normalization with it, and the other was described as realistic, trying to reproduce the past and the bad experience of the Oslo Accords under conditions worse than before.
This appears in the talk about an initial commitment to the Arab initiative (and this is rejected by the Americans, as was shown in the meeting that was described as tense that was held in the Jordanian capital between a Palestinian delegation and the American official Barbara Leaf, and of course rejected by Israel) to be achieved during a transitional period that will last for several years, and it is natural for it to begin. Those seeking normalization within the realistic ceiling that will become the maximum of the Palestinian position, provided that the deal being negotiated includes provisions and steps regarding settlement, such as freezing it and not establishing new settlements, in addition to expanding the powers of the Authority in Area C, and returning to the Israeli government’s commitment to previous agreements. , especially with regard to Jerusalem, opening the American consulate in Jerusalem and the PLO office in Washington, strengthening the authority militarily, security-wise and economically, and international recognition of the State of Palestine.
Refuting the leadership’s position on Israeli-Saudi normalization. The leadership’s position can be refuted with the following:
First: Betting on not concluding the deal does not constitute sufficient proof of the validity of the position; It is true that it is unlikely to reach a deal quickly, but the issue does not only extend to two possibilities without a third: either the success of the deal or its failure. Rather, there is a third possibility that is still the most likely, which is that the qualitative breakthrough will not happen now, but that gradual steps will be taken on its way, for there actually is. Various Saudi-Israeli relations, military, security, technological and economic, are taking place constantly, many of them under the table, and many times above it, and Emirati, Bahraini and Moroccan, especially Bahraini, normalization cannot happen without a Saudi green light. In this context, there are sources that confirm that Riyadh has taken the decision to make a strategic peace with Israel, and that the search is now on the conditions, details, and appropriate time. Also, the danger of the option of betting on a settlement does not begin if it is achieved, but rather since falling captive to this illusion that wastes time and efforts, and causes fragmentation and the division. Since the birth of the illusion of a negotiated settlement after the October War, decades have passed in which the settlement has not been achieved, and the issue has become at its worst stage, and is vulnerable to liquidation under the name of settlement.
Second: The success of the deal, with Palestinian cover, without Israeli commitment to the Arab initiative, especially the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders; It means participating in settling the issue, even if it involves agreeing to the fourteen points that the media reported were Palestinian demands. Major mistakes committed by the Palestinian leadership: This situation brings us back to the major and strategic mistakes that the Palestinian leadership committed on the eve and after the Oslo Accords, and is still committing them in a worse way than before, despite the disastrous results resulting from them, which are:
First: imagining the possibility of reaching a settlement with the Zionist entity that achieves the limit. The minimum Palestinian rights, through negotiations, concessions, and proof of good conduct and merit; This is because the Zionist movement and its embodiment tool, Israel, have proven a million times that it is not ready to change its radical program, characteristics, and racist settler-colonial formative nature, and does not accept compromise solutions, and what sometimes appears in the programs of Israeli governments as flexibility, differences in programs, or a willingness to negotiate, is a change in methods and forms of dealing. There are plans to achieve the same goals, which are “Greater Israel” with a large Jewish majority.
Second: Negotiations do not depend on the intelligence, experience, and abilities of the negotiators, as this is a secondary thing that may improve or make the matter worse. Because the outcome of negotiations depends mainly on the balance of power and the factors and variables affecting them, it is not possible to achieve at the negotiating table what cannot be achieved with your strength on the ground. Therefore, if the balance of power is imbalanced against you, it is never appropriate for you to negotiate.
Third: The negotiations are supposed to be based on an agreed-upon final goal and a clear and binding reference, such as international law and United Nations resolutions. As for engaging in negotiations for the sake of negotiations; That is, the woman herself, as happened before and may happen later, it is a negotiation controlled by the strong party, and even if contents are agreed upon in favor of the weak party, the strong party does not adhere to them when implemented. As we have noted, not all Israeli governments have adhered, in varying forms, to what they signed in Oslo, starting from the government of Yitzhak Rabin, which signed the agreement and violated the Israeli commitments in it, to the governments of Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Ehud Olmert, which go beyond the Israeli commitments in Oslo, and demand full fulfillment of the commitments. Political, security, and economic, all the way to the governments of Naftali Bennett and Benjamin Netanyahu, which clearly embrace the establishment of “Greater Israel.”
Fourth: One of the biggest mistakes committed by the Palestinian negotiator is that he started the negotiations from a low ceiling, and not as he should have adhered to the higher ceiling until the enemy was ready to reach a settlement. Rather, he acted every time by starting with a low ceiling, and then lowering his ceiling continuously without compensation from the occupation. It also appeared that the Palestinian negotiator gave up his highest negotiating ceiling from the beginning, as we noticed in what happened, especially by beginning to recognize Israel’s right to live in security and peace without Israeli recognition of any of the Palestinian rights. The Rabin government recognized the PLO, and the protocols of the meeting that were approved in it. Oslo Accords finally published; It indicates that the establishment of a Palestinian state was not on the cards for Rabin and Peres, and that the Israeli concessions made in Oslo were too many. Because it gives up Israeli land and rights in exchange for Palestinian promises that are not guaranteed to be adhered to.
In this context, when the holder of the ideal and realistic ceilings begins, he will begin in practice with the realistic ceiling, and will end with something less, to accepting what the Israeli government is proposing with some formal improvements, which is limited self-rule in exchange for a commitment to perform a security role to protect the occupation. We must not discount the fact that there are American, European and Arab efforts that have been made and will be made to convince Netanyahu to make an amendment to his government, and to include Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid or one of them instead of Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir. This, if it happens, will increase the possibility of concluding the Saudi-Israeli deal without fundamentally raising the possibility of it.
From the ceiling of the Israeli position on Palestinian rights, a new Israeli government will be a more flexible form, but it will fundamentally adopt the content of the same Israeli position seeking annexation, Judaization, and displacement. We must remember that the Palestinian and Arab position began with adopting the liberation and return program until the June defeat, then Khartoum’s Nos (no reconciliation, no recognition, and no negotiations) based on the slogan of removing the effects of aggression and forgetting the Nakba of Palestine, to accepting negotiations, leading to the conclusion of the individual Camp David Accords and the Oslo Accords. And Wadi Araba, to propose the Arab Peace Initiative, which represented a concession on the origin and roots of the conflict that began in the year 1948 and not in the year 1967, and this was not for the sake of its adoption by Israel, which on the second day of its Arab approval launched a massive aggression against the Palestinians, but rather for compensation from Saudi Arabia and the Arabs.
To the Americans, the September 11 bombings were carried out by Saudis and Arabs, and after that the Arab initiative was turned upside down from complete withdrawal in exchange for normalization and complete peace, to normalization with Israel without its withdrawal or even its commitment to withdraw from the occupied territories. Rather, it increased intransigence and extremism, revealing its plans. Aggression and racism like never before.
The position required: Normalization of any Arab, Islamic, or friendly country without ending the occupation is a betrayal of the Palestinian cause, and must not be accepted, dealt with, or covered up, especially in light of the Kahanist government that rules Israel, but this requires deepening relations with the Arab peoples, and does not mean estrangement. With the countries that normalized, and which can normalize, given that the rupture cannot prevent normalization from occurring, and its harms are greater than its benefits, but it means making the utmost efforts to convince them not to normalize, and if they normalize, work to link the continuation and improvement of relations between them and Israel and the cessation of aggression. Settlement, racism, ending the occupation, and changing the Israeli position on Palestinian rights, and not accepting the matter even before it happens.
We have an example of this represented by the “cold peace” that Arab countries established with Israel, such as Egypt and Jordan. Despite the necessary rejection of normalization and work to stop and cancel the signed agreements, there is a difference between normalization and trade-off.
Here, it is not true that politics is the art of the possible; That is, accepting reality as it is, but it is the art of achieving the best possible; That is, dealing with reality in order to achieve the maximum possible and achieve it, and change it and not perpetuate it. Of course, if the Palestinian position had been unified and effective, and based on a comprehensive vision and based on a national and realistic program capable of dealing with reality in order to change it and not surrender to it, the matter would have been different, and normalization could have been stopped, especially since Israel is going through an unprecedented crisis, and that the region and the world They change, and we must change in order to have an impact and achieve what we want, not for the change to come at our expense.
