The great failure and the beginning of internal crises in Israel

Big failure and shock. This is the most prominent conclusion in all Israeli media and assessments, after the sudden Hamas attack, on the morning of Saturday, October 7, on towns and army bases on the Gaza border and the beginning of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle.

What happened was unprecedented in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it shattered the Israeli military doctrine, which is based on deterrence, early warning, transferring the battle to “enemy” territory, and quick resolution.

The Hamas attack also demonstrates the failure of the Israeli political doctrine towards dividing the Palestinian people, weakening the Palestinian Authority, and claiming that maintaining the division and the Hamas state in Gaza is beneficial to Israel, and that Israel has the freedom to do what it wants in the West Bank, expand settlement and impose a fait accompli by informally annexing areas. “C” and the continued abuse and killing without deterrence.

War in the context of political rift

This war comes in a different context that Israel has never witnessed before, especially in terms of the rift within Israeli society, the sharp disagreements between the military establishment and the government, and a significant decline in the confidence of the Israeli street in the government and its president. In fact, the military and security establishment repeatedly warned the prime minister of the repercussions of the political rift. On the army's readiness for any upcoming war, it expressed concern about the phenomenon of refusal to volunteer for the reserve forces, and claimed that it had begun to affect the fundamental nerve of the army's capabilities and training. This rift will affect the management of the current war and its political and economic implications.

Historically, military failures or successes have had significant repercussions on the political scene in Israel. This is how the security and military leadership turned into political stars after the 1967 War, corresponding to the beginning of the end of the Labor Party’s rule after Israel’s failure in the October War of 1973. Thus, the military failure in the Second Lebanon War in 2006 marked the beginning of the political end for former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Netanyahu is fully aware of this and is following up on the accusations directed against him personally after the army’s failure in the south. After the shock of the Hamas attack, clear and direct accusations were not long in coming to hold Netanyahu personally and his government responsible for the major failure, and to link that with the results of the government’s plan to restrict the elimination of society and the army.

Fuzzy war aims

Since the beginning of the war, the political and military leaders and the media in Israel have declared that the war on Gaza is an “existential war” and that it is a “war on the homeland,” and that they will not accept that the war ends without eliminating the Hamas movement. Declaring these goals and describing the war as existential, in addition to the desire for revenge and restoring Israeli society’s confidence in itself and the army, together constitute an Israeli justification for the attack on Gaza and its people, and announcing the abolition of any barriers or controls for the army forces.

Israel is aware that eliminating Hamas in Gaza is not an easy matter and removing it as a political and military actor from the Palestinian people means destroying the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the official war goals set by the mini-government were more vague and less severe, and were defined as “destroying Hamas’ military and administrative capabilities.”

Managing the war and achieving its political goals requires, from Israel, putting the internal house in order, politically, security-wise and economically, dealing with the home front, and broad diplomatic support, especially American support.

Putting the internal house in order politically

As part of Netanyahu’s attempts to absorb popular anger and sharp criticism, control the collapse of cohesion in society, and attempt to raise collective morale, and in preparation for the next military phase, Netanyahu headed to expand the government and establish a national emergency government, in partnership with the “Official Camp” party led by Benny Gantz, the former Minister of Security. The former chief of staff, and Gadi Eisenkot, the former chief of staff and owner of the Dahiya doctrine. This does not negate Netanyahu’s narrow goals in forming an emergency government, including preventing the collapse of the government, his need for military men at his side in making military decisions, and legitimizing these decisions and the next steps in the war, especially since the security positions of Gantz and Eisenkot do not differ from the positions of the Israeli security consensus.

Unlimited Western support

On the diplomatic side, there was no need in this war for Israel to enlist international support, especially from the United States, its president, and its friends in Europe. All of them mobilized directly and voluntarily to support Israel and adopted its narrative and position. The American administration immediately mobilized to stand by Israel and announced its unlimited support, diplomatically, militarily, and economically. This support does not only reflect a political position, but also indicates American concern about Israel's military situation and the extent of the damage. In this context, we place the United States' decision to send the largest and most modern aircraft carrier to the Israeli coast, and to open an air bridge to transport weapons, even though we are still in the early days of the war and there is no shortage of equipment and weapons in Israel. These decisions reflect unconditional American political and military support, and a true partnership in managing the war, but they may also be an indicator of American concern for Israel’s security, and express the extent of the Israeli failure, as Israeli deterrence is no longer sufficient to prevent any security development on other fronts, nor is it sufficient. The verbal deterrence of the United States, but there is a need to strengthen it with practical steps.

The beginnings of internal crises

Historically, the Israeli tribe unites in times of crises and wars, but this unity begins to erode and crack with the passage of time and increasing losses, human, material, and financial, especially in the event of failure to achieve military achievements. However, in the current war, criticism and crises began to rise after a relatively short period of time from the beginning. War, not to mention directly accusing Hamas of responsibility for the major failure on the day of the attack.

As the war on Gaza entered its third week, signs of disagreements and cracks began to emerge in the management of the war and within the government. The most prominent are the differences between the military level and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the management of the war and field steps, including starting the ground war and dealing with the northern front. We see a state of distrust among the business sector in the government’s management of the economic file, and resentment among the displaced from the southern region due to the deterioration of living conditions and the performance of the ministries.

At the beginning of the third week of the war, the Israeli media began speaking clearly about the existence of serious differences in the military decision-making process in Israel. This began with information about a dispute between Netanyahu and the Minister of Defense regarding the proposal of the Minister of Defense and the Army Command to launch a pre-emptive strike on the northern front, that is, directing a strike at Hezbollah, before the start of the ground battle in Gaza, to prevent it from initiating military action if the ground battle begins. After that, information began to filter out about broader disagreements over the management of the battle and Netanyahu’s attempts to delay the ground campaign, even if that was because of the US administration’s request to try to reach some deal on the issue of prisoners, or because of the need for the United States to arrange its military cards in the region. Then the media made it clear that there is a crisis of confidence between Netanyahu and the military leaders, which is hindering the start of the ground battle.

The crises are not limited to Netanyahu's lack of confidence in the army leaders and the Minister of Security. Rather, there are signs of political disagreements within Netanyahu's government, such that a number of Likud Party ministers have begun to sense the political consequences of the major military failure on Netanyahu's government and the Likud Party, and they see holes in the ship of this government, so they take the initiative to... Disconnecting their political fate from Netanyahu’s fate has apparently been decided. The Ynet website published on Monday that at least three ministers are studying the issue of continuing their path in the government and the possibility of resigning from the government, which indicates the fragility of the current political situation and the decline of the government. Netanyahu's position, especially in light of his full responsibility for the major failure on October 7th.

It is expected that the political rifts and differences within the political and military establishment will widen as the war continues, and may expand, not only because of the major failure and military administration, but also as a result of the government’s confusion in managing civilian files, including the economic file, the file of dealing with the home front, and the large numbers of civilians. IDPs.

Netanyahu is in a clear security, military and political dilemma, and with him the Israeli government. After the first weeks of the war and the space that was given to the government to deal with and manage the crisis, voices of criticism have begun to grow louder in recent days, and a crisis of confidence is unfolding between the political and military establishment, between the business sector and the government, and between the displaced and the relevant ministries. . With the lengthening of the war and the possibility of its expansion, and the increase in material and human losses, these crises will increase and deepen, and their title will be clear, which is Netanyahu and his government.

Despite the major military failure and shock, and similar to previous cases, Israel is moving away from asking the real difficult questions that contributed to this situation, the most important of which are the question of the occupation, the question of the siege of Gaza, and Israel’s strategy to weaken the Palestinian Authority and preserve Hamas’ authority in Gaza. Not to mention the great illusion that economic aspects and a slight improvement of people's daily lives can be an alternative to nationalist demands, that is, the doctrine of economic peace or economic calm in the case of Gaza, which can replace the need for a comprehensive and just solution to the Palestinian issue.

In the current atmosphere in Israel, no one has asked these questions, neither the media, nor analysts, nor politicians, and everyone is just talking about the need to use the maximum levels of violence without any deterrent or restrictions, that is, adopting the security solution to the maximum extent, even though these solutions have failed over the years. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as in the experiences of other peoples.

Source: Arab 48