Negotiating with Hamas.. Why did Trump do it and why did the movement accept it?

News of direct talks between the Trump administration and the Hamas leadership has had a negative impact on many in the region, especially in Tel Aviv.

Tel Aviv was waiting for the gates of hell to open on the movement and its incubator in Gaza, but the gates of hell did not open. Instead, direct talks were held between Trump's envoy, Adam Boehler, and Hamas leaders. Washington under Trump, unlike the Biden era, does not ask anyone for permission regarding what it does or intends to do, even if that "Sunday" is Israel, its pampered protégé.

More important than the horror of the surprise that will unfold later, are the meanings and messages it contains:

First, the Netanyahu government and its coalition, which has angered Trump and his team, are no longer entrusted with managing the negotiations, a matter of great importance to the administration, particularly regarding the "hostages."

Second, any progress on the direct negotiating track between the administration and the movement will not be able to be vetoed or even obstructed by Israel. Like other countries in the world, Israel avoids provoking the "raging elephant in the china shop," even as it enjoys the status of the most favored nation.

Third, the shifts in the positions of the American president and his administration that may come in the coming days. No one, not even the "lying" astrologers, even if they are telling the truth, can predict the shocking surprises they have hidden under their hats.

Other capitals in the region were struck by such news as a thunderbolt, having barely recovered from the shock of the fall of the Assad regime and the arrival of rival Islamist factions to replace it in the "People's Palace" overlooking Damascus. Years of demonization, incitement, persecution, and eradication have been wasted, and Hamas and its sisters, both brothers and sisters, are now looming large on the negotiating table and in international relations, through other gateways.

Why did Trump do what he did?

A question that has troubled observers, including the author of these lines, who were caught off guard by the news. But, in the name of "claiming wisdom in retrospect," we say that Trump is "obsessed" with the issue of the "hostages" and detainees, and that this issue has become linked to his reputation and prestige. He has made promise after promise to "liberate" them and return them to their families.

He knows that Netanyahu does not attach equal importance to this issue, so he decided to take matters into his own hands with his negotiators, rather than leave the matter to Netanyahu and Smotrich and their extremely narrow political, partisan, and personal calculations. This is something Trump neither wants nor tolerates.

There is another dimension, lurking behind the American decision: the man who was described as someone who preferred to deal with the "strong" and conclude deals with them alone, looked at the Palestinian situation and decided to deal with the force that, despite the fifteen-month war, still holds the reins of the land, above and below it, and is holding "hostages" and has the power to decide whether to release them or keep them in their hiding places.

The "practical" and "pragmatic" man, as he is described, did not stand for long in the face of the decisions of his predecessors not to talk to organizations classified as "terrorist," and sent his envoy to Doha. In my opinion, and not all suspicion is sinful, the man mocked what were said to be the "guiding principles" of previous US administrations, prohibiting contact with "terrorism and terrorists," especially since he is fully aware, and has stated this publicly time and again, that the administrations that preceded him not only negotiated with "terrorism," but also supported it and worked to unleash its "genie from the bottle," as evidenced by his accusations that Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton supported ISIS and even worked to create it.

Why did Hamas respond to Washington's call?

I believe the movement has never said it would not negotiate directly with Washington, and that the only red line the movement has drawn in all its literature has been Israel alone. The movement has engaged in contacts with semi-official Americans and European officials of varying levels and profiles, so there is nothing new or surprising about the movement's position.

In addition, the movement saw in the American request an opportunity to mitigate the calculations of Netanyahu and his team, which have prevented and continue to prevent the achievement of final agreements and the failure to implement the agreements concluded, always due to calculations related to the worlds of domestic and partisan politics in Israel.

A new negotiating channel, this time direct, with Washington, will enable the latter to hear from Hamas, not about it, and from the mouths of its leaders, not others. This new channel could provide the American with a different narrative, different from the one Israel has been using to spread lies and black propaganda about the movement, its people, and its cause.

Hamas, too, is keen to be a "second address" for the Palestinian people, after its paths to integration into the first address, the PLO and the PA, were blocked.

Hamas deserves to be recognized "realistically," even if it falls short of formal recognition, and by whom? By a superpower. This is a political achievement for Hamas, and will open new doors, including to other capitals in the Arab region and on the international stage.

Any concerns or caveats?

We will consider what has been attributed to Adam Boehler as if he never said it, especially the part related to the movement's willingness to lay down its weapons and retire from politics. This is "heresy" that cannot be uttered by a rational person. Even if the man did say it, we must consider his motives for saying it, not Hamas's motives for expressing it, especially since he is an envoy of an administration that says whatever it wants, however it wants, without oversight or accountability.

That the movement would express its willingness to lay down its weapons is believable, provided it is accompanied by the establishment of a Palestinian state and a comprehensive political solution. Musa Abu Marzouk previously said something similar. In any case, weapons are not an end in themselves, but rather a means to achieving an end. Weapons are not laid down on the ground or handed over to enemies except in the event of complete surrender, which is not the case with Hamas, as various Israeli and Western sources attest. Weapons and militants can and will be the nucleus of the army of the future state.

As for saying that Hamas has expressed its willingness to retire from politics, this is something I don't think the Americans, or even the Israelis, would consider or demand. Quite the opposite. All the demands made of Hamas focus on transforming it into a political party that integrates into the Palestinian system and abandons the "armed struggle." Nothing else, or more, is required.

What would Hamas do if it abandoned its weapons and politics? Would it transform into an Islamic "proselytizing" organization? Would it become a branch of the Tablighi Jamaat? Would it transform into a charitable-social organization or an Islamic "Caritas"? What would be the envisioned role of a movement without weapons, and especially without politics?

Thousands of comments on this piece of information attributed to the American negotiator have exposed the wretchedness of those who provided it, and have failed to reveal the true position and direction of the movement. I say this without bothering to ask Hamas about the accuracy of what has been attributed to it.

Those who have followed Hamas's direct dialogue with Washington with analysis and commentary are divided into various sects and denominations. Some are "very revolutionary" who don't want the resistance's garb to be soiled, while others are "puritanical" who have long viewed any connection with the "Great Satan" as "a devilish abomination" to be avoided. We respect these people, find fault with them, and forgive them.

Some of them are motivated by concern, jealousy, and legitimate fears based on the experience of direct negotiations between the United States and the PLO. We also respect these people and do not fault them, even if we criticize some of them for assuming the role of "teacher" and "mentor," as if they were dealing with a movement new to politics and national action, whose leaders had not undergone one of the most complex and difficult experiences of indirect negotiations with Israel, and they demonstrated great strength and intelligence.

The bottom line, as we see it, is this: We view the direct dialogue between the Hamas leadership and the Trump administration as a significant turning point and a significant gain for the movement. It is a development that may have repercussions, one that may lead to a breakthrough in the negotiations regarding the war on Gaza, or one that may not lead to this outcome.

The process is important in and of itself, regardless of its outcomes. Its complete success could force Hamas to make unacceptable concessions, while its complete failure would have major repercussions.

This chapter of negotiations may be more difficult than previous indirect negotiations, and dealing with Washington as a mediator may be easier than dealing with it as a direct party and negotiator. Risk is strongly present at the negotiating table, and with it come great opportunities and greater challenges. It is hoped that the movement will succeed in mustering all its experience and energies to emerge from this "birthplace with a lot of chickpeas," or at least, with a little of it. From Al Jazeera