Hezbollah and the existential challenge

The occupation promotes that its successive strikes were “decisive,” that it was able to “end the organizational leadership structure” of Hezbollah, that it was able to “hit most of its stockpile of long-range, precision missiles” in their storage sites and platforms, and that Hezbollah’s ground capabilities have declined to the point that the occupation is the one threatening a ground operation. There is no doubt that such statements are full of the usual claims about Netanyahu as a person and about the army in this particular war, and are exaggerated. There is no doubt, however, that the strikes were successive and painful for any organizational structure, and that they raise questions about a broad breach and repeated mistakes that allow the occupation to exact a price it has been unable to exact from Hezbollah for 42 years. There is no doubt that the party’s leaders and cadres are the most concerned with responding to this existential challenge today, as the occupation is not coming this time to score points, but to wage a war of liquidation for which it believes its successive strikes have paved the way.

With this existential challenge that is not to be underestimated, we must also build on what has been presented in understanding the components of Hezbollah’s strength, so that we do not fall under the influence of Zionist propaganda discourse or discourse of gloating driven by revenge:

First: Hezbollah is a broad organization with civil, political and military branches. It has educational, youth, scouting and health institutions, as well as a political apparatus and military forces. If the occupation sources estimate its military strength at around sixty thousand, the total size of its cadre exceeds that by far, and this is known to all those familiar with Lebanese affairs. The possibility of this structure being wiped out by sudden strikes is impossible, even if it can be weakened.

Second: Hezbollah has a historical experience that extends over 42 years, and just as it is a human condition that may be affected by the phenomena of aging or flabbiness, which if they prevail, weaken the ability to respond to an existential challenge, this experience can also accumulate experience and confidence, which may increase its chances of responding to the existential challenge.

Third: Hezbollah relies on a broad human environment of its audience, consisting of hundreds of thousands at least in Lebanon, and its geographical depth extends from the southern suburbs to southern Lebanon, and along the Lebanese Bekaa Valley. It does not stand alone in this, but is supported by Lebanese and Palestinian forces such as the Amal Movement, the Islamic Group, the Al-Quds Brigades, the Al-Qassam Brigades in Lebanon, and all the Palestinian resistance factions, which increases the depth of its incubator, its solidarity, and its capabilities. Therefore, the occupation began distributing assassination missiles to those forces as well.

Fourth: Hezbollah is based on an ideological and doctrinal legacy, which the Sunni majority of the nation may disagree with, but this does not mean that it is not a cohesive ideological legacy. It is the legacy that led its cadres and its audience to reconcile with loss and to embrace martyrdom and patience at various stations and stages. Like any ideological legacy, the phenomena of widespread utilitarianism and profiteering constitute a burden on it if they spread; however, there is no doubt that adhering to it and returning to it was sufficient to summon elements of a past will and growing strength over the past forty years.

Fifth: Hezbollah’s alliance with Iran is an organic state, making its Secretary-General an agent for Supreme Leader Khamenei in Lebanon. On this basis, the party was able to expand its financial, human, and armament capabilities. It is not a case of a passing intersection of interests. Iran established this alliance after the Iraq-Iran war to ensure that the war would not return to its immediate region, and that its defense strategy would begin in advanced positions thousands of miles away, in addition to sectarian and ideological considerations, which makes the party, as a sub-state movement, enjoy political support from two states: a host state, the Lebanese state, and a supporting state, Iran. This is an advantage that a political movement rarely enjoys, despite being subject to fluctuations.

In the end, Hezbollah faces an existential challenge, but it possesses great elements of strength that allow it to regain cohesion and respond to this challenge if the will is found and adherence to the ideological heritage is restored.