Israel-Hamas prisoner swap deal: Stalemate reigns supreme under Netanyahu’s motives

According to most Israeli media outlets, it was known in advance that the trip of the heads of the Mossad and the General Security Service (Shabak), David Barnea and Ronen Bar, to Cairo last weekend, in order to resume the exchange deal talks between Israel and Hamas, was fruitless and would not bring any new tidings.

Over the weekend, Israeli media reported a sharp clash between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the heads of the security establishment over their rejection of their recommendation to move forward with negotiations. However, the heads of the security establishment have not come out publicly against Netanyahu, with the exception of slight hints in this regard from Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant, whose positions seem to be in line with those adopted by the security establishment.

As Nahum Barnea, the chief political analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth, wrote, American, Egyptian and Qatari mediators, as well as the heads of the Israeli security establishment, are convinced that a prisoner exchange deal that would change the face of the war is on the agenda, and the one holding it back is Netanyahu, who has decided to thwart any progress and seems to be doing so alone. He is no longer fighting for his views, but rather clinging to them. The dialogue between the political and military echelons, which preceded every decision by Israeli prime ministers in the past, including Netanyahu, has stopped and is no longer taking place. An Israeli source familiar with the decision-making process testified that Netanyahu has changed, has stopped listening, is convinced of the path he has chosen to take, and is determined to drag Israel with him (August 4, 2024).

Haaretz military analyst Amos Harel believes that Barnea and Bar's trip to Cairo to hold talks with the heads of Egyptian intelligence appears to be a formal step to clear their conscience on Netanyahu's part, especially against the backdrop of preparations for an Iranian counterattack, with prior knowledge that they will return empty-handed.

Harel points out that Netanyahu is in an unprecedented state of euphoria, indicating that he is convinced that recent events, from the applause of the US Congress in Washington to the assassinations of Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, prove that he is right all the way. Accordingly, his political moves are becoming more extreme. Meanwhile, the campaign that Netanyahu is inciting against the heads of the security establishment continues in full force, but it is also directed at other goals, the main goal behind which is to undermine the legitimacy of the protest movements against the failure to reach a swap deal, led by the “Brothers in Arms” movement (August 4, 2024).

Instead of taking the positions of the security establishment into account, Netanyahu, according to Harel, is resorting to the path of replacing the leaders of this security establishment, as expectations have increased regarding his intention to dismiss Defense Minister Galant from his position and replace him with Gideon Sa’ar. People close to the prime minister hint that he will not be satisfied with this dismissal, as he also dreams of systematically beheading other leaders in the leadership of the security establishment, including the dismissal of the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Herzi Halevi, and the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar. Then he will hold them responsible for the failures of October 7, 2023, for which he refuses to bear any responsibility.

Ron Ben-Yishai, a military analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth, confirms that there has been a stalemate for about two weeks (August 3, 2024) regarding the release of the Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip. The main reason for this, according to sources in the Israeli security establishment, is Netanyahu's clear demand to prevent Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters from returning to the northern Gaza Strip by stationing the Israeli army in the Netzarim Corridor and the Israeli army in the Philadelphi Corridor under the pretext of preventing Hamas from regaining its strength and communicating with the outside world.

Although the main motive that Netanyahu is waving around, claiming that he is behind his demand, seems to be a military strategic motive aimed at preventing Hamas from regaining its structure and strength in the Gaza Strip, there is - in Ben-Yishai's reading - another more important motive, which is internal political, represented by Netanyahu's fear of the collapse of the coalition and the government if he agrees to the proposal of the security establishment and the President of the United States to evacuate the Netzarim Corridor that separates the northern Gaza Strip from its center and south, and the Philadelphi Corridor that separates Egypt from the Strip.

In other words, Netanyahu fears that National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, and a number of members of the far right will withdraw from the government if the exchange deal is approved, which gives up these two strategic sites in the Strip, which would allow the end of the war.

At this point we must point out the following:

First, regarding what Netanyahu and his spokesmen describe as a strategic military consideration behind the obstruction of a swap deal under the proposed proposal, most Israeli military analysts point out that senior security officials, led by Defense Minister Galant, Mossad chief Barnea, Shin Bet chief Bar, and the head of the Prisoners and Hostages Authority in the IDF Command, Maj. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Alon, are convinced that Israeli control over the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridors can be relinquished, at least temporarily, to enable a swap deal, and that the IDF will have no difficulty in returning and taking control of them if Hamas violates the agreement or if the need arises. They stress with one voice that meeting Hamas’s demands regarding the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridors will enable a swap deal in which at least children, women, the wounded, and the elderly will be returned, and that there is a good chance for a comprehensive deal in which all the abductees, living and dead, will be returned.

Secondly, Ron Ben-Yishai revealed that what the heads of the security establishment, especially Mossad chief Barnea, are asserting about the chances of a deal is based on a specific reason: the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh removed “one of the most negative figures in the negotiations over the kidnapped soldiers.” In Ben-Yishai’s words (apparently quoting Barnea), “Haniyeh, contrary to his smiling and moderate image in the eyes of the world and the Americans, has constantly tried to create obstacles and add additional demands to the mediators in the deal, and at times he has been even stricter and more demanding than Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza. Removing him from the path could certainly facilitate the negotiations, according to the assessments of senior intelligence and security officials in Israel.” Ben-Yishai adds: The mediators, Egypt and Qatar, may know this, and perhaps alongside them the American envoy and CIA director William Burns, but the leaders of the Israeli security establishment know this for sure. They are first-class professionals, and they understand things no less than Netanyahu, and perhaps even more than him.

Third, in any case, it seems so far that Netanyahu has no intention of backing down from his position. Reports in most Israeli media outlets confirm that Netanyahu’s behavior is frustrating US President Joe Biden and his Vice President Kamala Harris, as well as the Europeans and Arab states that support the United States. It must be noted that for all of them, the most important goal of the deal with Hamas is not only the release of the kidnapped soldiers, as Israel wants, but also ending the war of destruction in the Gaza Strip, and perhaps also ending the fighting with Hezbollah and reaching a political settlement that prevents a comprehensive war in the north.

Fourth, as we mentioned, there is a current stalemate in everything related to the exchange deal between Israel and Hamas, but despite that, this does not affect the United States’ readiness to join in helping Israel repel the expected attack by what is described as the Shiite axis of resistance, in response to the assassinations in Beirut and Tehran.