Jordan is not an arena for Tehran's settling of scores

The Iranian missiles and drones that targeted Jordan in recent days are no longer mere "military messages" directed at the United States, as Tehran tries to claim. Instead, they have become a direct military assault on the sovereignty of an Arab state, and a deliberate threat to the security of its people, its stability, and its vital installations. The Iranian attack on American forces in Jordan resulted in the death of American military personnel, the loss of another, and injuries to others, while the Jordanian Armed Forces were forced to intercept missiles and drones that entered the Kingdom's airspace and threatened its territories. Thus, the Iranian argument that the confrontation is confined between Tehran and Washington has fallen, because a missile that crosses the Jordanian border and targets a site within the Kingdom is, legally, politically, and militarily, an attack on Jordan, regardless of the nationality of those present within the targeted site. Iran cannot launch ballistic missiles and explosive drones towards Jordanian territory, and then ask Jordanians to deal with it as an Iranian-American matter that does not concern them; Jordan is an independent, sovereign state, and it has the right, like any other state, to determine its relations, alliances, and defensive arrangements, and to host foreign forces under official agreements concluded by its government. Some may politically disagree with the American military presence in the region, and may oppose Washington's policies or wars, but that does not give Iran the right to bomb Jordanian territory. If Tehran allows itself to punish every country that hosts American forces, it is not fighting a defensive war against the United States, but is practically declaring an open war on most countries in the region. The map of American military deployment in the Middle East reveals the extent of selectivity in the Iranian response; American bases and military installations are spread in the Gulf, and at much closer distances to Iranian territory than Jordan, and American aircraft carriers and destroyers move in the waters of the Gulf and the Arabian Sea, not far from the Iranian coasts and the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, Tehran chooses to turn the territories of Arab countries into arenas for revenge and sending messages, because it assumes that attacking Jordan or the Gulf states is less costly than direct engagement with American warships and forces capable of responding forcefully. This is not military courage, but a deliberate distribution of the costs of war to countries and peoples who did not start it and did not participate in making its decision. Therefore, what is required of Jordan, according to Iranian logic, is to bear the missiles and drones, the closure of airspace, the disruption of air traffic, and the endangerment of residents and vital installations, while Tehran reserves for itself the right to determine the time, place, and size of the confrontation. More dangerously, ballistic missiles and drones do not recognize political narratives; a missile may deviate from its course, or its interception may fail, or its shrapnel may fall over a residential neighborhood, a school, or a hospital, and then the "calculated message" turns into a massacre, and Iranian statements of regret will not bring the victims back to their families, nor will the claim of targeting an American base be an acceptable justification to Jordanians. Tehran tries to portray itself as if it has always been outside the regional order that was established by American intervention, but history is more complex than the current Iranian discourse; it is true that Iran was not an official member of the coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003, and did not host American bases for that invasion, but it was the biggest strategic beneficiary of the overthrow of the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Tehran's most dangerous regional enemy at the time. Also, Iraqi parties and forces closely linked to Iran entered the new political system that was established after the American occupation, and then Iranian influence expanded in Iraq unprecedentedly. Before that, Iran practically cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and contributed to supporting the opponents of the Taliban movement and in the political arrangements that followed the fall of its regime; meaning that Tehran dealt pragmatically with American power when it removed two of its adversaries in Kabul and Baghdad and paved the way for the expansion of its regional influence. Therefore, the Iranian regime has no right today to grant itself the authority to punish Jordan because of its defensive relations with Washington, while it benefited from American power when it served its interests. Objecting to the Iranian aggression does not mean defending all American policies, but defending an uncompromising principle: no country should turn the territory of another country into a battlefield for its war or into a mailbox for sending its military messages. The Required Jordanian Response In the face of this aggression, verbal condemnation and summoning the ambassador for protest are no longer sufficient; what is required is for Amman to declare the Iranian ambassador persona non grata, and to request his departure from the country, and to recall its ambassador from Tehran and lower the level of diplomatic relations until Iran offers a formal apology and clear guarantees that the attacks will not be repeated. Some may see that keeping diplomatic channels open is necessary in times of war, which is true in principle, but embassies should not become a cover for normalizing aggressions or reducing their political cost, as necessary communications can be managed through a mediating country, without diplomatic representation continuing as if nothing had happened. Jordan should also request urgent meetings of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, with the aim of condemning the Iranian aggression and establishing gradual diplomatic and economic measures to confront any repetition of it. Protecting Jordan is not just a Jordanian issue, but a test of Arab and Islamic will, and silence about the first missile does not prevent the second missile, but rather encourages its launcher, and it is time for Tehran to realize that Jordan is not an arena for settling its scores with Washington, and that aggression against its sovereignty must entail a real political and diplomatic price that Iran cannot evade behind slogans of "confrontation" and "resistance".