Is Israel Entering a Phase of Full Fascism?

The crisis Israel is experiencing today does not represent a break from its political history, but rather an extension of a long process of reshaping the state according to the requirements of the colonial-settler project. The recent crisis between the Israeli government and the Supreme Court does not appear to be merely a legal dispute over institutional powers, but rather reflects a deeper conflict over the nature of the political system taking shape within Israel. The escalating questioning of the court's decisions, and the calls from figures in the Netanyahu-Ben Gvir-Smotrich coalition to limit its powers or override its rulings, cannot be read in isolation from the path that began before the war of extermination on Gaza, when Benjamin Netanyahu's government proposed its project to reshape the judiciary and subject it to the hegemony of the executive branch. In early 2023, Israel witnessed the largest wave of protests in its history, in objection to what was called the "judicial reform." The objection at that time was not limited to opposition parties, but extended to academic, economic, and military circles, and reached thousands of reserve soldiers who warned that undermining the independence of the judiciary threatens the cohesion of the state and its institutions. When the war of extermination on Gaza broke out, this conflict temporarily receded under the weight of military mobilization, but it did not end. Rather, it has returned today in a more acute form, having become more linked to the future of the ruling coalition itself. However, reading this crisis requires caution against falling into a common assumption, which is that Israel was a stable "democratic" model and then today began to deviate towards absolute authoritarianism. This description ignores the fact that the Zionist project, since its inception, was based on a colonial-settler foundation that cannot be democratic, and that the Palestinian people were never part of the "democracy" that has long been marketed as Israel's distinguishing feature. Since its establishment at the expense of the rights of our Palestinian people, their land, and their resources, state institutions have been associated with colonial settlement, land confiscation, occupation, racial discrimination, denial of national rights, and attempts to erase Palestinian identity and liquidate the national cause. Therefore, the ongoing transformation is not Israel's transition from "democracy" to fascism, but rather its transition from a colonial-settler system that maintained, within Israeli society itself, a degree of institutional balances, to a more extreme system, in which even those internal constraints that regulated the relationship between authorities and gave the state an institutional image before the world are receding. However, stopping at the constitutional crisis alone is not enough to understand the Israeli scene. Despite the sharp division between the government and the opposition over the judiciary and the limits of executive power, the political stances and electoral programs of most Zionist parties reveal an almost complete consensus on the fundamental issue, which is the rejection of the establishment of an independent, sovereign Palestinian state in accordance with international legitimacy resolutions and international law. More importantly, this consensus is not limited to internal issues, but extends to the core of the conflict with the Palestinian people. All Zionist parties, although they differ in language and style, agree on rejecting a full withdrawal from the occupied territories, maintaining Israeli control over Jerusalem and most of the territories and its right to expand settlement in Area C according to the Oslo Accords, and over borders, crossings, security, and natural resources, while proposing different formulas for a limited-power Palestinian self-rule, based on managing the population within separate geographical enclaves, in addition to special arrangements for the Gaza Strip that do not stem from ending the occupation, but from reorganizing its administration and the continued risks of displacement, especially in the Gaza Strip and refugee camps in the West Bank. This means that the conflict within Israel is not a conflict between a peace project and an occupation project, but between different visions for managing the colonial-settler project itself. Therefore, relying on changing the government alone, or on the results of the upcoming Knesset elections next November, as an entry point for a fundamental change in Israeli policy towards the Palestinian people, finds no support in the declared political programs of all Zionist forces, and may thus be a political distraction that some want to be preoccupied with. Hence, the question today is not limited to whether Israel is heading towards a constitutional crisis, but whether it is entering a new phase in the development of its political project, in which even the institutional constraints that governed its internal structure for decades recede, in favor of a more integrated model between settler colonialism, extremist religious nationalism, and the concentration of executive power. This transformation may have another equally important dimension. With the growing critical voices against Israel within American society, especially among younger generations, in academic circles, and within increasing sectors of the Democratic Party, the Israeli right may seek to fortify its political project internally, and reduce any institutional constraints that could limit its policies, in preparation for dealing with an international environment that may become less lenient than it was in past decades. In this context, the executive branch's overreach may not be merely an internal matter, but part of a strategy aimed at strengthening the government's ability to confront any future external pressures. It is still too early to definitively state that Israel has indeed entered a phase of full fascism, but the indicators warrant serious consideration. When the judiciary becomes a target for delegitimization campaigns, when state institutions are reshaped to serve a racist ideological project, and when extended war is used to enhance the concentration of power and weaken oversight, the matter goes beyond the limits of traditional political disagreement, to reflect a transformation in the nature of the system, increasingly acquiring authoritarian and fascist characteristics in its political structure and practices. What is happening today does not change the essence of the colonial-settler project upon which Israel was founded, but rather reveals it more clearly and frankly. What was presented for decades as a "democracy oasis" is today exposed by its internal contradictions, while the Zionist consensus continues to deny Palestinian national rights and reject any political project that could lead to any historical settlement that would undermine their colonial project. From here, the ongoing transformations within Israel not only necessitate a re-reading of the nature of its political system, but also a review of many of the assumptions that governed Palestinian political thought over the past decades. If Israeli disagreements revolve around the form of government and the mechanisms of power distribution, while the rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state remains a consensus among all Zionist forces, then the Palestinian national liberation project is required to rebuild its strategy based on this reality, not on betting on changes in Israeli governments, but on strengthening broad Palestinian national unity, investing in transformations in the international system, strengthening common solidarity with all progressive forces around the world, including anti-Zionist Jewish forces, and continuing the political, legal, and popular resistance struggle until the end of the occupation and the embodiment of the right to self-determination and an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. * Member of the Fatah Movement's Advisory Council.