The Turkish state faces a complex diplomatic and military test amidst the raging war against Iran, as Ankara strives to maintain the policy of neutrality that has characterized its modern history. Observers note that decision-makers in Turkey are recalling the experience of World War II to avoid siding with any party, fearing a repeat of the Ottoman Empire's collapse, which resulted from mistaken strategic choices in the past.
Despite Turkey's efforts to play the role of an influential regional power, especially after the geopolitical changes in Syria in late 2024, it still lacks sufficient economic and military tools to impose its conditions. The air defense crisis stands out as one of the biggest challenges, as the purchase of the Russian S-400 system led to American sanctions that deprived Ankara of advanced technology such as F-35 fighters.
Field developments in March 2026 revealed the fragility of Turkish air protection, as NATO interceptor aircraft took on the task of shooting down Iranian missiles that penetrated Turkish airspace. These missiles targeted vital facilities, including Incirlik Air Base and a NATO radar system, putting Ankara in an awkward position between its Atlantic commitments and its desire not to provoke Tehran.
Analytical sources confirm that Ankara categorically refused to provide any logistical support for the American-Israeli military campaign against Iran and prevented the use of its airspace for offensive strikes. This stance stems from Turkey's desire to maintain a 'competitive coexistence' relationship with its eastern neighbor, a relationship whose roots extend to the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin signed in the 17th century.
The Turkish leadership fears that the collapse of the regime in Tehran could lead to widespread chaos and the influx of millions of refugees across the border, which could destabilize the already strained Turkish economy. Ankara also believes that the existence of a stable Iranian state, even if an adversary, is far better than a fragmentation scenario that could fuel Kurdish separatist tendencies in the region.
Regarding the Kurdish issue, the war in Iran threatened the fragile peace process that began in Turkey in 2025, as Ankara fears that external powers might exploit Iranian Kurds. Turkish officials expressed concern about the Trump administration's intentions to arm Kurdish factions, which could bring tensions with Washington to unprecedented levels and undermine efforts to politically integrate the Kurds.
On another note, the Israeli military rise in the region after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria represents a major strategic concern for Ankara, which now views Tel Aviv as a direct threat. Turkish politicians believe that Israeli movements in Syria and Lebanon aim to encircle and contain Turkey, especially with the strengthening of Israeli defense cooperation with Greece and Cyprus.
Turkish-Israeli rivalry is no longer just a political dispute but has turned into a long-term strategic animosity that is difficult to overcome under the Netanyahu and Erdoğan governments. Ankara watches with concern as Israel transforms into the sole dominant power in the region, reducing Turkey's room for maneuver in the Eastern Mediterranean gas files and the future of the new Syrian regime.
Analyses indicate that Turkey prefers the '2015 nuclear deal' model as a framework for dealing with Iran, rather than the maximum pressure policy adopted by Washington. An Iran constrained by international agreements serves Turkey's commercial interests and opens up economic prospects for it towards Central Asia via the South Caucasus corridors, away from the disruptions of southern shipping routes.
To emerge from this crisis in a stronger position, experts suggest the necessity of accelerating legal and political reforms related to the Kurdish issue within Turkey to fortify the domestic front. Granting broader powers to Kurdish municipalities and enacting laws that allow militants to lay down their arms could close the door to any external attempts to exploit this sensitive issue during wartime.
Ankara must also strengthen security coordination with Baghdad and Damascus to ensure border stability and protect trade and energy routes connecting Turkey to the Arab Gulf states. The stability of Iraq and Syria represents the first line of defense for Turkish national security and prevents these countries from becoming arenas for settling scores between major and regional powers.
Amidst political fluctuations in Washington, it seems that the wisest course for Turkey is to strengthen its ties with European defense structures and NATO, while focusing on building an independent national defense industry. Self-reliance in air and missile defense has become an urgent necessity that cannot be postponed in light of increasing missile threats.
Observers believe that opening the border with Armenia and developing the 'Middle Corridor' could give Turkey a central role in a post-war system based on trade links rather than crises. This strategic step would reduce the Turkish economy's dependence on troubled regions and make Ankara an indispensable bridge between East and West.
In conclusion, a policy of 'tactical hedging' and passive neutrality may not be enough to protect Turkey from impending geopolitical earthquakes, requiring proactive diplomacy and courageous decision-making. Turkey's ability to adapt to the new regional order will determine whether it emerges from this era as a leading power or as a state besieged by crises from all sides.
Merely avoiding being drawn into war is no longer the best way for Turkey to advance its interests in a turbulent neighborhood; rather, it must act proactively to ensure it emerges in a stronger position.
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Turkish Neutrality in the Wind: Can Ankara Survive the Repercussions of the War on Iran?