Interview with former Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon: “The wrong theory assumed that the Palestinians are not a people. They have proven that they are willing to kill and be killed in order to achieve their independence.”
By Yossi Melman
“As part of a deal that includes the return of the kidnapped people, we must release Marwan Barghouti,” says former Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon, in response to my question. "This is what must certainly be done. Because the recovery of the kidnapped Israelis is the closest thing we can achieve to an 'image of victory' in the ongoing war in Gaza, and because Marwan is the only Palestinian leader who can be elected, and who is capable of leading a unified and legitimate Palestinian leadership on the path to a separation process." Agreed upon on behalf of the Palestinians.
This is the first interview Ayalon has given since the outbreak of war. For the past three months, the man refused to talk about the progress of the battles in Gaza and the northern border. He also refrains from talking about the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, areas he knows well since he was commander of the Shayetet 13 naval unit [the Israeli naval commando], and later, when he was commander of the navy. Ayalon says: “I left the army about 30 years ago, and the Shin Bet about 24 years ago, and I refrained from attending discussion groups and talking about matters that I did not understand properly.”
What interests the man, and by the way, was his only condition for agreeing to be interviewed, is to talk about the “exit strategy,” or in today’s common term, “the day after the war.”
“We will not see in this war a picture of victory,” Ayalon says, “not like the picture that represented the raising of the American flag on the island of ‘Iwo Jima’ at the end of World War II, and not like the picture of Junior Lieutenant Yossi Ben Hanan (who later became a general in The army) raising a Kalashnikov rifle in the Suez Canal, at the end of the Six-Day War. Indeed, it is not like the scene of Arafat’s departure from the port of Beirut towards Tunisia, after the First Lebanon War.
Ayalon says, “The wars of the past that von Clausewitz described in the nineteenth century, in which victory was achieved by military decisiveness on the battlefield, were actually an image of victory that clearly shows that the ‘day after the war’ represents the transition to negotiation between the victor and the vanquished. The war on "terrorism", we will not see white flags being raised. Even Arafat returned after 10 years from Tunisia to Gaza.
What if we eliminate Sinwar? Wouldn't that represent some kind of victory?
“No! Even if Sinwar takes his last breath. If there is someone who thinks that the Palestinians will surrender, he does not know the Palestinians, nor does he know Hamas and the movements of radical Islam in the current era.”
To further clarify his position, Ayalon recalls the moment of the arrest of Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was paralyzed and used a wheelchair. “When he was in prison, we cared about his health. We were afraid that he would die in prison so that he would not turn into a martyr. We, in the Shin Bet, We opposed his release. There were generals on the General Staff who underestimated our position. “What are you afraid of? He is not a leader, he is a poor man in a wheelchair.” In response, I claimed that the concept of leadership in the Arab and Islamic world is something that we do not understand, because we always look at the leader with Western eyes, through his television appearance, his hairstyle, and the tone of his voice.
“We must realize that Sheikh Yassin, as the leader of Hamas who drafted its charter, was in the eyes of the Palestinians, because of his disability and his fragile appearance, very much a symbol of their misery. He was the man who managed to unify the religious, social, political and military leadership that embodied himself. Today, Hamas does not have such leadership, as the military wing practices independent politics, while the social arm, with all its charitable networks, has disappeared. The conflicts existing in Hamas today are between the internal and military arm that imposes its say in Gaza, and the political arm that exists in Abroad, in Turkey, Qatar and Lebanon. Sinwar is the leader of the interior. It is true that there is always existing tension between the military and political arms of Hamas, but cooperation between them has become closer during the Sinwar era.
Divide and conquer
Ayalon looks differently at Israel’s wars in the current century. He says, “The war to establish and protect Israel has been fought for about 140 years, since the migration of the first Zionists at the end of the nineteenth century.” This war continues at different paces, and includes military campaigns, battles, and clashes. In his opinion, what is happening in the past three months “is not a war, but rather an additional battle in the ongoing war that we are waging, in defense of our independence.”
Will we not win this war?
“We won in March 2002: At the Arab League conference, the Arab countries surrendered and raised the white flag. They retracted the Arab League’s decisions of August 1967 in Khartoum, known as the “three noes.” In March 2002, after 35 years of conflict, the Arabs agreed to recognize Israel and establish full relations with it, based on the resolutions of the United Nations and the UN Security Council. Thus, the three aforementioned directives were reformulated in the opposite way: yes to recognition, yes to negotiations, and yes to peace with Israel. The tragedy here is that we "We refuse to acknowledge our victory, and we continue to fight. We have turned the war into a goal in itself."
Do we do this to avoid making decisions?
"Yes. In order to avoid the controversy that is tearing apart Israeli society, the controversy that revolves around the question: What brought us to this land as a people? The Cabinet's decision not to discuss the issue of 'the next day' turns the war into a military conflict without a political compass. We cannot In this case, we know 'victory', which is always formulated in political terms, and the greatest danger that threatens us is that this war turns into a goal in itself. The moment Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot entered the cabinet, and it is clear that their withdrawal from it would lead to undermining the government coalition, it became clear that Internal political considerations. Without categorically formulating the political goal, we will not be able to delineate an exit strategy from the war, as we walk, with open eyes, towards drowning in the sands of Gaza.”
Do you think this is the biggest problem for Israel?
“Yes. In all disagreements, this is the basic problem. If we do not decide where we will go together, and what are the values that unite us, then we run the risk of continuing to fight forever, for nothing, except because wars with others are the stages in which we take a break from fighting.” Each other. The saying 'Together we will win' [the slogan that Israel raises in war], is a correct saying, but it is only true in time of war, when enemies from outside impose on us a national unity that we did not choose. This unity of ours is empty of its content. If it is a way for us to escape from the real debate, which we refuse to have, or cannot engage in, perhaps because the horror of the differences may push us towards civil war.”
Were we close to civil war after Rabin's assassination?
“Rabin was killed only for this reason. Because of his answer to the great question of ‘Who are we, and why are we here?’ Rabin was killed because rabbis issued a legal ruling against him requiring him to be hunted down, and against this background, there was someone who saw himself as a representative of the people, so he executed The murder. I did not realize, until I entered the Shin Bet apparatus [Ayalon was appointed head of the Shin Bet apparatus after the assassination of Rabin], the vast difference and rift that had existed since then and the extent of the change in their depth."
This crisis reached its peak during the past year with the coup against the regime?
“Motivated by arrogance, the right-wing government decided, about a year ago, that the nature of the regime must be changed. Along with the hundreds of thousands who took to the streets in protest, the generals of staff, the heads of the security establishment told the prime minister and members of the cabinet that there is an existing threat on multiple fronts, and that the move to The government is endangering Israel's security. The Defense Minister, in his speech to the nation, defined the dangers of war as 'clear and immediate,' and therefore, he was immediately fired. The Prime Minister and the Prime Minister refused to listen to the matter, and made it clear that the warnings issued by the army were internally politically motivated. Thus, we found ourselves involved in the current war.”
Are you saying that the events of October 7 were the result of this?
“Yes, the collapse was on several levels of wrong theories. First, there was the political theory, which began the collapse of the negotiations at Camp David [with Arafat], which stated that there was no one on the other side to negotiate with, in addition to Barak’s statements.”
Do you think there is someone to talk to on the other end?
“The Palestinian Authority has recognized the State of Israel within the 1967 borders, and has agreed to exchange territories. It has also agreed to discuss the right of return with Israel in the framework of negotiations. We need to talk to anyone who is willing to negotiate with us on the basis of these principles. He was the last to try to push The direction of the move to settle the conflict is Ariel Sharon, who decided to withdraw from Gaza and the northern West Bank because he realized that Israeli society was being lost from his hands, and Ehud Olmert. Since Netanyahu's return to the Prime Minister's office, he has designed 'conflict management' policies through the intentional weakening of the Palestinian Authority. And strengthening Hamas, in order to avoid negotiating with the authority regarding a political settlement.
Is Netanyahu also practicing the policy of divide and rule?
"Indeed. Netanyahu made a mistake in believing that this policy would buy him time, and he refused to see the threat lurking in 'Hamas'. The Shin Bet leaders told Netanyahu: You do not know 'Hamas', and they demanded that he work to weaken it militarily. The political stagnation makes 'Hamas', In the eyes of the Palestinians, they are the only ones struggling to achieve national liberation. Our mistaken theory was based on the assumption that the Palestinians are not a people. If we provide them with economic prosperity, they will give up their dream of independence. Ultimately, the Palestinians define themselves as a people. They are ready to kill and be killed In order to achieve their independence, the 'terrorists' who are killed become martyrs, in their eyes.”
What are other wrong theories?
“There is the intelligence theory, which estimated that Hamas was deterred after the “Guardian of the Walls” campaign in May 2021. We measure the danger by the number of Hamas activists we killed, the infrastructure and weapons, or the tunnels we destroyed, while the Palestinians measure the matter in terms of Content: For these people, the measure is the amount of support they get among the people. After every round of violence, support for Hamas doubles because it is the one fighting the occupation, while the Palestinian Authority, which does not engage in violence, is seen as an agent of Israel. "
Crises entail opportunities
Ayalon also points out that the Israelis do not realize that the world is changing, and that China and Russia are aligning with Iran, creating an axis that challenges the United States. “This is why Biden is changing his policies. He is ready to reconcile with the ruler of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, in order to curb the influence of the counter-axis. He, unlike Netanyahu, realizes that the political process with the Palestinians must be advanced.”
If what you say is true, what will happen?
In "The Day After the War", in your opinion?
“On the way to that day, we reached a T-shaped intersection, with only two exits, and at the present time we refuse to resolve our position, and because of the differences tearing apart Israeli society, Israelis refuse to understand that not making a decision is also a decision. There is another way.” I believe in it. It leads to a Jewish and democratic Israel, guided by the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, a state with a majority of Jews. This process will be long, with many obstacles, and may last perhaps 40 years, and it will force us to make concessions and reach understandings among ourselves. If we proceed on this path The road, we will find the Arab countries that signed the Arab Peace Initiative, and with them the Western democracies, on our side. I assume that this road leads us to a safe, Jewish, and democratic Israel.”
What about the other scenario?
“The other path is the one followed by those who wrongly assume that the occupation is a security asset, and others who assume that we have no right to give up areas of the Land of Israel, even if that leads to endless war. In my view, this perception is Messianic and does not recognize Within the limits of reality. This path leads to the reality of one state, in the region where 7 million Jews and 7 million Arabs live today. This is a violent reality in which Israel will lose its Jewish and democratic identity. This reality takes us back to the Great Palestinian Revolt in the 1930s, which is a religious conflict that polarizes "The most radical and violent groups on both sides."
Ayalon looks with hope to the day after the great crisis on October 7: “The lessons we must draw from the past year are that we must recognize the depth of the divisions that have brought us to the abyss of violence, along with the external danger, and the challenge is to harness this energy.” In a positive matter, to the unity that will lead us to a reality in which people take to the streets, not only to demand the formation of investigation committees and protest against those with whom they disagree politically, but to search for ways to meet, get to know each other, and find commonalities.”
“Crises create opportunities. The October 6 War, in which more than 2,600 soldiers died, taught us that peace with Egypt without Sinai is better than Sinai without peace with Egypt. It is time for us to decide where the October 7 War will lead us.”
Source: Haaretz + Institute of Palestine Studies
