Foreign Affairs magazine said that the Israeli army, which intends to withdraw brigades consisting of several thousand of its soldiers from Gaza, instead of signaling the end of the fighting, portends entering a new phase of the conflict, in which what began as a conventional war may turn into something completely different, which is The so-called counter-insurgency campaign.
The magazine explained - in an article written by Colin B. Clark - that the counterinsurgency approach depends on special operations forces, precision strikes and targeted raids, and “for the Israeli army to retain the territory after clearing it of Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) fighters,” in accordance with the advice of American General David Petraeus. Retired and former director of the CIA.
However, this is easier said than done - according to the author - as research conducted on previous counterinsurgency campaigns indicates that such an approach in Gaza would lead to a quagmire that could extend for many years, as Hamas adapts to its new reality by relying on... Its network of underground tunnels, and the use of destroyed infrastructure to its advantage, making it easier to target Israeli soldiers conducting foot patrols.
The writer believes that implementing Petraeus' vision for combating the insurgency in Gaza would be a disaster for the Israeli army, and the Palestinians and others would accuse Israel of reoccupying the lands, and the raids and checkpoints would increase the extremism of civilians, thus marginalizing moderate Palestinian voices, inspiring a far-reaching uprising and motivating the axis of resistance to launch attacks on targets in Israel and elsewhere, that is, a counterinsurgency campaign in Gaza would, rather than end the violence, produce endless war.
Political goals
The Israeli endgame in Gaza remains unknown, but an extended occupation coupled with a counterinsurgency approach could be the next chapter in the conflict, as evidenced by statements by Israeli leaders, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that the war on Hamas will not end until Israel achieves all of its goals.
Defense Minister Yoav Galant said the military campaign “will continue as long as necessary,” and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevy said the war in Gaza would continue “for several months,” but if Israel adopts a counterinsurgency approach, months could easily turn into years.
According to the writer, even without deliberately making this choice, Israel may find itself in it, as happened to the United States in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, where the expansion of missions allowed limited goals to give way to more ambiguous and more ambitious goals.
In Afghanistan, for example, the war began with the intention of destroying Al-Qaeda, but Washington eventually found itself trying to build the state, and in the end failed to achieve both tasks.
Therefore, the quagmire facing Israel in Gaza today - as the author sees it - could end in a manner similar to what it faced in southern Lebanon, where it withdrew after two decades without removing the threat from the Palestinian Liberation Movement fighters, and even with the emergence of a new enemy represented by Hezbollah. Lebanese.
But Netanyahu - as the writer says - has a personal incentive to prolong the war after it became clear that many Israelis want a new political leadership, and therefore he announced that the basic requirements for peace between Israel and the Palestinians are summed up in “the necessity of destroying Hamas, disarming Gaza, and eradicating extremism in Palestinian society.” These are goals, the achievement of which requires years of fighting, and success is not guaranteed in the end.
Four months into the war, some members of the Israeli military leadership are beginning to lose patience with the lack of a coherent political end. Gallant expressed frustration at the lack of a plan for what the conflict would look like other than “destroying Hamas,” saying, “It is the duty of the cabinet and the government to discuss the plan and determine the goal".
Strategic defeat
If the Israeli army adopts a counter-insurgency approach in Gaza, it will be in direct conflict with the political recommendations of the administration of US President Joe Biden, which has warned against occupying Gaza after the war, and is pressing to reduce the military campaign due to the killing of more than 27 thousand Palestinians, many of whom are women and children. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, "In this type of combat, the center of gravity is the civilian population. If you push them into the arms of the enemy, you are trading tactical victory for strategic defeat."
The writer pointed out that Israel does not have a specific political strategy for what will happen after the war, especially since Netanyahu opposes the idea of the Palestinian Authority regaining control of Gaza, in contrast to the position of the Biden administration.
It is likely that Israel will end up patrolling Gaza, while Hamas and other Palestinian groups prepare for a long-term, low-intensity conflict, during which Israel will face hit-and-run attacks, deadly ambushes, and snipers operating from under the rubble of demolished buildings.
It appears that Israel has no intention of winning “hearts and minds,” and that officials, especially Netanyahu and his far-right allies, are ignoring the political aspects of this conflict, presenting Hamas with an opportunity to fill the power vacuum and consolidate and entrench itself in Gaza.
However, if the Israeli army occupies Gaza and moves to the counter-insurgency mission, this will be in the interest of Hamas - as the writer believes - and Hamas’ strategy will be to try to slowly wear down the army until the Israeli public demands withdrawal, and at that point Hamas will declare victory, as happened with the United States in Afghanistan.
It appears that Israel has no intention of winning “hearts and minds,” and that officials, especially Netanyahu and his far-right allies, are ignoring the political aspects of this conflict, presenting Hamas with an opportunity to fill the power vacuum and consolidate and entrench itself in Gaza.
The writer concluded that these are the lessons that Israel was expected to have learned from its experience in Lebanon, and from its previous occupation of Gaza, but the extreme right-wing elements in the Israeli government, which currently enjoy enormous influence, are pushing Netanyahu to consider occupying Gaza indefinitely under the pretext of absence of an appropriate Palestinian government.
No end in sight
Colin B. Clark concluded that if Israel adopts this strategy, it must prepare for a long-term war, and he explained that research he conducted in cooperation with a number of researchers at the RAND Corporation, on all 71 rebellious movements since the end of World War II until 2009, Show that the average length of these conflicts is 10 years, especially with a state sponsor of the insurgency.
Counterinsurgency appears to be an attractive option for Israel because it allows the country's leaders to postpone difficult political decisions and focus instead on short-term military victories.
In their research on counterinsurgency, the author and his colleagues found that militaries that adopted an “iron fist” approach to counterinsurgency by focusing almost exclusively on killing insurgents were successful in less than a third of the cases analyzed, which is less successful than approaches that also focused on mitigating Grievances of the civilian population.
Counterinsurgency seems to be an attractive option for Israel, because it allows the country’s leaders to postpone difficult political decisions and focus instead on short-term military victories, but one of the reasons that put Israel in its current predicament - according to the writer - is that Israeli politicians, led by Netanyahu, constantly delay and refuse for any negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.
Source: Foreign Affairs +Aljazeera
