The document was prepared by Avigdor Lieberman as Minister of Defense, as part of his then effort to push Israel into a major war against the Gaza Strip under the claim of eliminating the power of Hamas, “and to ensure that the next confrontation between Israel and Hamas will be the last by launching a surprise, pre-emptive strike.”

At the end of 2016, the former Israeli Minister of Security, Avigdor Lieberman, submitted a “top secret” document to the Israeli political and security leadership, and now claims that he warned of an attack that might be launched by Hamas, and that he accurately predicted a Hamas attack on October 7. . The document stated at the time that the goal of the attack was “to eliminate Israel until 2022, and to liberate all the lands of Palestine,” according to the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, which published the document today, Monday.

The newspaper added that none of the officials who saw this document took it seriously, including the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Israeli Army Chief of Staff at the time, Gadi Eisenkot. It is clear from this document that Lieberman then sought to push Israel into a major war against the Gaza Strip, claiming to eliminate the power of Hamas.

The publication of the document comes in the wake of a tweet published by Netanyahu, the night before last, in which he said that he had not received any warning from security officials, especially the head of the Military Intelligence Division and the head of the Shin Bet, about the Hamas attack on October 7th. Yesterday morning, Netanyahu retracted his tweet and said: “I made a mistake. I apologize,” after severe criticism of him.

The return marches in the Gaza Strip, May 2018 (Getty Images)

The document dealt with assessments of the situation in the Gaza Strip, and Lieberman's position as Minister of Security. It stated that Israel must "ensure that the next confrontation between Israel and Hamas will be the last," and that "only if Israel surprises Hamas with a sudden, preemptive strike" and assassinates most of Hamas' military leaders.

The document added, “Postponing the decision to carry out a pre-emptive strike on Gaza until after July 2017 would be a serious mistake with far-reaching consequences, even worse than the results of the Yom Kippur War (in 1973), with regard to its effects on the home front, on the awareness of the citizens of Israel.” And on the image and status of Israel in the region.”

The document continued, "Hamas intends to transfer the upcoming confrontation to Israeli territory, by pumping large and well-trained forces, such as elite forces, into Israeli territory, occupying an Israeli town, and perhaps several towns, in the Gaza envelope and taking hostages. In addition to targeting them physically, this will lead to... "Severe targeting of the awareness and morale of the citizens of Israel."

The document considered that Hamas had set a goal of eliminating Israel until the year 2022, “during a series of deliberations within the framework of the movement’s ‘Executive Committee’ that took place in Qatar on September 25-27, 2016.” The document stated that Hamas stressed that it needs a "calm-down period" in order to complete building its strength and readiness.

According to the document, “Hamas is interested in making the next war against Israel multi-front, by building other fronts in addition to the Gaza Strip - Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Sinai - and even against Jewish targets around the world.”

The document added that Hamas seeks to expand the ranks of its fighters to “40,000 activists by the year 2020, and strengthening its strength will be in the ground combat system,” and that “in the wake of its increasing economic distress, the movement requested from Iran assistance in the amount of 50-60 million dollars.”

The document stated: “The defensive obstacle being built facing Gaza, and all its means and capabilities, is an important element in the current security strategy facing Gaza, but it cannot constitute a strategy in itself. Contemporary history and past precedents – the Maginot Line, the Mannerheim Line, and the Bar-Lev Line – have proven that walls Fortifications do not prevent war and do not guarantee tranquility and security.”

The document continued: “If Israel waits until it achieves intelligence control and erects a security wall, all of this superiority will be completely reduced in exchange for the increasing strength of Hamas during this period.”

The document concluded that “not taking an Israeli initiative until mid-2017 would be a serious mistake that would lead Israel to a difficult strategic situation. This would lead to an unplanned deterioration, and while in such a scenario Israel would not be able to assassinate the leadership of the military arm.” To Hamas, or worse - for Hamas to open a confrontation at a time convenient for it. I believe that the consequences of such an operation on the part of Hamas would be far-reaching, and in certain respects the consequences would be more severe than the results of the Yom Kippur War.”

Lieberman had resigned from his position as Minister of Security at the end of 2018, and justified this by Israel agreeing to a ceasefire with Hamas and the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip in the amount of $15 million. Netanyahu's office did not comment on Lieberman's document.