The decree-law on referring officers with the rank of brigadier general to early retirement constituted a partial reform to address the issue of the imbalance in the accumulation of senior ranks.

The decree-law was incomplete and carried within it the aim of killing the decree-law itself when it stipulated the exception in Article Four thereof.

Excluding officers who hold the rank of brigadier general and occupy a leadership position gives the possibility of interventions, appeasement, and mediation to keep those close to them.

The decree-law was generous in terms of the mechanism for calculating retirement salaries and benefits, but it increases the burden on the public treasury and the retirement fund.

The Thabat Center for Research and Opinion Polls has issued the third policy paper in its 2025 series. These papers address domestic and foreign policy issues of concern to Palestinian society and decision-makers.

introduction

President Mahmoud Abbas's issuance of a decree-law retiring officers with the rank of brigadier general in the Palestinian security forces into early retirement reveals two points: first, the president's desire for reform in the security sector, and second, an existing flaw in the security sector's structure, particularly regarding military ranks and their large number within security institutions.

Although this step will eliminate some of the existing flaws in the "inverted pyramid" organizational structure of the security sector, this reform process will not be successful without a comprehensive overhaul of the security sector, to prevent a recurrence of the issue of retiring a large number of officers in this manner, given the extremely difficult financial situation. Twenty years ago, Al-Quds newspaper reported that President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decision to retire 1,000 officers on April 4, 2005, the beginning of his presidential term. Twenty years later, he decided to retire a large number of officers with the rank of brigadier general, and there is talk of retiring officers of various ranks in the coming days.

This referral to retirement comes amidst multiple Arab pressures to reform the Palestinian Authority, represented by the demand of the emergency Arab Summit "Palestine Summit" (and noting that reform efforts within the State of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Organization are necessary steps to enable Palestinian national institutions to perform their duties effectively in the face of challenges, maintain the unity of national decision-making, and enhance the Palestinian people's ability to persevere and achieve their legitimate aspirations for freedom and independence). At the same time, it appears to come amid preparations for the transition of power and the distancing of centers of power and influence from using the remnants of their extensions in the security services.

International experiences in the security sector reform process indicate that the success of the reform process depends on the availability of four supporting conditions: (1) The reform process must be comprehensive and gradual at multiple levels. (2) It must establish a new doctrine based on the concept of the interests of citizens and the protection of democracy, not only the protection of the security of the state or the ruling party. (3) The security apparatus reform process must be part of an integrated strategy to strengthen the rule of law and raise professionalism, accountability, and transparency in the work of state agencies in general. (4) There must be political will and an agreed-upon work program among the various parties to the reform process in general and security sector reform in particular.

This paper aims to contribute to the discussion on security sector reform, in a way that serves the interests of citizens. This reform must be sustainable and prevent a recurrence of crises. It must establish rules and mechanisms that prevent the calcification of security sector institutions, on the one hand, and maintain the renewal of professional leadership in accordance with Palestinian law and the professionalism of security institutions, to maintain public order and protect citizens' interests. It must also offer recommendations that contribute to enhancing professionalism in the work and system of the Palestinian security sector.

This paper concludes that comprehensive reform of the Palestinian security sector requires legal, institutional, and cultural changes. It also identifies critical issues and offers targeted recommendations to enhance transparency, professionalism, and alignment with democratic governance. These reforms also aim to build a security sector that is accountable to civilian leadership, committed to public service, and based on the rule of law.

The law referring officers to the rank of brigadier general... a partial and incomplete reform

The decree-law on early retirement for officers with the rank of brigadier general in the Palestinian security forces, issued by President Mahmoud Abbas, constituted a partial reform to address the issue of the overcrowding of the senior rank of brigadier general in the security services. Under the decree-law, approximately 1,500 officers holding this rank were referred, noting that some had been eligible for the rank of major general years ago based on the time scale used for moving from one military rank to another. This decree-law only addressed those over the age of 55, although there are also others under the age of 55 who hold this rank; some of whom are unemployed or lack a place within the "structures" of the security institutions.

The decree-law was also truncated and carries within it the killing of the purpose of the decree-law itself when it stipulated the exception in Article 4 thereof: “Officers who hold the rank of brigadier general and occupy a leadership position in the organizational structure shall be exempted from the provisions of Article (3) contained in this decree-law by a decision issued by the Supreme Commander of the Palestinian Security Forces for this purpose.” This gives the possibility of interventions, appeasement, mediation or the whims of some security forces leaders to keep those close to them without professional foundations under the heading of work necessities.

In contrast, the decree-law is generous in its mechanism for calculating retirement pensions and benefits for those covered by its provisions. The retirement pension will be linked to the last salary received, unlike the Retirement Law, which stipulates that the retirement pension is based on the average of the last 36 salaries, with the addition of the period required to reach the mandatory retirement age of "sixty years" stipulated in the General Retirement Law. This means that the maximum retirement pension will be 80% of the last salary received by the retired officer under this decree-law. While the financial outcome of this decision is fair to retirees, it increases the burden on the public treasury, the General Retirement Fund, taxpayers, and future generations. Therefore, decisions related to group retirement require further financial analysis and actuarial study of such retirement.

Areas of reform in the security sector

There is no doubt that the implementation of security sector reform is not solely dependent on the will and determination of the Palestinian Authority. Success or failure here depends not on the government's own capabilities, but rather on external actors such as the international community, donors, and Israel, particularly given the Israeli occupation's policies aimed at weakening the PA and its institutions.

Any plan to reform the Palestinian security sector that aspires to succeed, transform the reform process into a reality, and prevent a recurrence of the failures of the reform process that began in 2005 requires careful and in-depth consideration of the reasons for the failure that plagued the implementation of the reform process. It requires learning from these failures to overcome the obstacles, challenges, and difficulties that hindered the implementation of the planned reforms, and drawing inspiration from the strengths that accompanied the successes achieved.

It also requires that the reform process be implemented within a clear, comprehensive vision, including a program supported by specific measures, according to precise timelines and assignments to specific entities with the authority to implement reform and corrective measures. This reform process also requires community participation to strengthen popular ownership, which requires the defense of reform by various societal groups. This is to limit resistance from groups and individuals affected by the reform, especially since they are usually members of the influential elite and those holding the reins of decision-making.

The six areas of reform required within the framework of a comprehensive security sector reform process include: (1) Security policy document. (2) Legislative reform. (3) Institutional reform. (4) Political reference. (5) Parliamentary and administrative oversight. (6) Promoting a culture of protecting democracy among members of the security establishment.

(1) Security Policy Document

Over the past thirty years, official Palestinian authorities have not adopted a security policy document (white paper), which includes the guiding principles of the security doctrine, the national security policy, and the pillars of national security that govern the work of the security establishment. This document serves as an expression of the state's general policy to ensure control and stability of the internal and external security of the state and society. This document is supposed to define the security doctrine of the security establishment, which includes the threats and challenges facing Palestinian security. It is supported by the enactment of laws, and is based on the needs and priorities of internal security at each stage, in application and implementation, and takes into account the regional and international reality and numerous external commitments.

Recommendation: 1. Adopt the security policy document (white paper) as a comprehensive national reference for integrating the work of the security sector agencies and institutions and aligning them with the general policy of the State of Palestine in accordance with the political phases. 2. Adopt the security doctrine by a decision of the Palestinian government, clarifying the challenges, threats, alliances, and their forms. For example, Israel poses an existential threat to the Palestinian people, which is a fundamental issue in the nature of the security doctrine. However, the cost of eliminating this danger is greater than this threat, which requires that the security policy document address this threat and how to reduce and mitigate its risks to Palestinian security.

(2) Legislative reform

The consistency of legislation with the Basic Law and with each other, and the avoidance of adopting legislation that contradicts each other, constitutes a fundamental element in the process of legislative reform of the security sector. In 2005, the Legislative Council adopted the Security Forces Service Law No. 8 of 2008. However, in 2007, Decree-Law No. (11) of 2007 was issued regarding Preventive Security, which contravened the principles established by the Security Forces Service Law. The Decree stipulated that the head of the Preventive Security Service would assume the presidency of the agency for four years, extendable for one year. The Security Forces Service Law, meanwhile, stipulated that the heads of the main security agencies (Internal Security, General Intelligence, and the Commander-in-Chief of National Security) would serve for three years, extendable for an additional year.

The General Intelligence Law of 2005, which stipulated that the term of the head of the agency (3 years + 1 year), was amended in Decree-Law No. 4 of 2023 for an unlimited period, many years after the expiration of the legal term of the head of the agency. The amendment of the Security Forces Service Law in 2024 also contravened the original Palestinian legislator's intent, which was included in the Security Forces Service Law of 2005. The time limits for ending the term of the heads of the security agencies were abolished, the service term of those with the rank of brigadier general or higher who head a security agency was extended for an additional three years beyond the mandatory retirement age of sixty, and a new agency was added to the main agencies, which plays a pivotal role in producing leaders of the security agencies.

Recommendation: (1) The necessity of reviewing security legislation in line with the Security Forces Service Law of 2005 and correcting all situations that arose as a result of subsequent amendments. (2) Completing the construction of the legal system for all security and military agencies and bodies, including the issuance of laws regulating the work of each agency and the organizational regulations stipulated in the laws and work manuals related to the work of the security agencies. (3) Limiting the term of all heads of security agencies and bodies to three years, with the possibility of extending them for only one year, even if they are under the legal mandatory retirement age of sixty years, in accordance with the General Retirement Law.

(3) Institutional reform

This aspect includes five main issues. The first examines the entirety of the institutions that comprise the security sector, with a view to re-integrating a number of security agencies to achieve operational harmony and prevent conflicts of authority. In this regard, the Security Forces Service Law was issued in 2005, consistent with President Mahmoud Abbas's vision at the beginning of his term. These include the National Security and Internal Security Forces, in addition to the General Intelligence Service. However, the decree-law amending the Security Forces Service Law for the year 2024 added a new agency, the Presidential Guard, on the one hand, and modified the nature of the authority of some security agencies, on the other.

Second: Reviewing the organizational structures of military and security agencies, institutions, and bodies. Over the past few years, significant progress has been made in approving and regulating structures within the security agencies, and in developing job descriptions that align with the functions assigned to each security and military agency. However, it appears that the accumulation of senior military ranks has eroded these structures, making it necessary to revisit the sustainability of work and hierarchy in accordance with the general rules of hierarchy within the military apparatus.

The third issue relates to senior leadership and supervisory ranks to prevent the continued existence of an inverted pyramid within the security establishment. Despite the irregularity of the publication of promotions for officers and personnel of the Palestinian security forces, the widespread accumulation of senior military ranks within the security services has contributed to the continued existence of an inverted pyramid within the security establishments, as the number of officers is higher than the number of individuals and non-commissioned officers. This stems from two issues: (1) The security establishment's continued reliance on graduates of military and police colleges, whether from Al-Istiqlal University or colleges abroad, without taking into account the necessary numbers, on the one hand, and the appointment of prisoners and detainees to the officer category, on the other hand. (2) The continuation of promotions based on chronological merit without implementing the provisions of Law No. 8 of 2005 regarding promotions to senior ranks, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 39, 40, and 41 for lieutenant colonels, colonels, and brigadier generals, and the provisions of Article 42 of the original law regarding the rank of major general, which has created a large number of these ranks.

Fourth: The continued appointment of heads of security agencies and military bodies from outside them. The appointments of heads of security agencies since 2007 indicate that the president has appointed most of the heads of security agencies, whether subordinate to the Minister of Interior or subordinate to the president, from outside the same agencies. This has frustrated officers in the upper ranks, leading to a decline in competitiveness among officers or a desire to maximize their work and discipline, due to the lack of hope of reaching the highest ranks within the same agency. Furthermore, no clear governance rules have been established for the mechanism for appointing heads of security and military agencies, which would enhance the integrity of appointments at this level of senior ranks in the security sector.

Fifth: It relates to the extension of the term of the heads of security agencies. The term of some heads of security agencies has extended to approximately 18 years in recent years, others to approximately 16 years, and some to eight years, which has prevented a number of officers in these agencies from transferring or assuming senior management. Furthermore, Decree-Law No. 7 of 2024 amending the Security Forces Service Law No. 8 of 2005 allows, by decision of the Supreme Commander, the extension of the service of any officer holding the rank of Major General or above, after reaching the age of sixty, for a period not exceeding three years, provided that they hold one of the following positions: 1. Commander-in-Chief, Commander of the National Security Forces, and Commander of the Military Intelligence Service. 2. Commander of the Presidential Guard. 3. Directors-General of the Internal Security Forces.

Moreover, extending or prolonging the tenure of security chiefs prevents renewed vision and the ability to keep pace with technical and technological developments. It also fosters frustration among senior officers, reducing initiative. This will likely result in security chiefs remaining in office for many years, especially since some of those appointed in the recent wave of security chief appointments are in their early fifties.

Recommendations: First: Integrate a number of security agencies to achieve harmony in work and prevent conflicts of authority. 1. Integrate the Intelligence Service and the Preventive Security Service into an agile, professional, and effective information service, whereby officers and personnel of the Preventive Security Service are distributed among the General Intelligence Service and the Palestinian Police Service according to their specialization, field of work, and the tasks assigned to them in their original agencies, in accordance with the Security Forces Service Law. 2. Incorporate all military agencies into the National Security Service, including the Military Intelligence Service, the Presidential Guard, and other military bodies.

Second: Review the structure of the security services and establish the job grade (military rank) with the job description in each military agency and body after the merger process, in a way that regulates the existence of senior salaries in the security services and determines their number for each agency and body so that they become fixed and do not increase.

Third: 1. Review the recruitment mechanisms in the security and military establishment by determining the desired annual number of graduates of military and police colleges, whether at Al-Istiqlal University or colleges abroad. 2. Change the rank categories when recruiting college graduates, starting with the rank of assistant, to ensure the ability to benefit from those joining the security services in field work, while adopting and adopting a system and financial benefits that grant them salaries or pensions equivalent to the rank of lieutenant in the old financial system. 3. Implement the provisions of the law related to promotions to senior ranks in accordance with the provisions of Articles 39, 40, and 41 regarding colonels and brigadier generals, and the provisions of Article 42 of the original Law 42 regarding the rank of major general, to prevent the escalation of the number of military ranks and in line with the structure and needs of each agency and body. 4. The necessity of linking the promotion of officers from the rank of lieutenant colonel to major general by selection, subject to the fulfillment of the conditions of "qualification and vacancy." 5. Adopt professional and competent standards in the selection of members of the security services, and prevent the interference of their members or officials in politics.

Fourth: 1. The necessity of establishing an integrity committee for appointments in the security sector, independent of the executive branch, and made up of influential figures, headed by the President or a Supreme Court judge, and a number of others known for their integrity and professionalism, who will be appointed for a specific period of time to consider nominations for positions as heads or general managers in the security and military agencies. 2. The necessity of “taking into account” the appointment of heads of security and military agencies and bodies from among the members of the agency or authority, in order to enhance competitiveness among officers in the same agency, and for efforts to be made by officers to be chosen to head the agency or authority.

Fifth: The necessity of adhering to the periods specified in the Civil Service Law for the Security Forces, the special laws for the security services, and the provisions of Article 42 of Law No. 8 of 2005 regarding service in the security forces, and canceling the amendment made pursuant to Decree-Law No. 7 of 2024 regarding amending the Service Law in the Security Forces.

(4) The political reference “the civilian reference for the security sector”

Political authority means that the government is responsible for security policy and its authority is based on the philosophy that political bodies are primarily representatives of the people, as they are directly elected or approved by the elected body that represents the will of the citizens or are authorized on their behalf. The security establishment is subject to the command of the political authority, regardless of the political color of the government, and implements its instructions (the security services do not interfere in political decisions, and the heads of the security services do not assume political or partisan duties). The loyalty of the security establishment and its members is to the constitution, and it maintains the democratic system and serves the interests of the citizens.

This means that the Minister of Interior and the Minister of National Security are responsible for the work of the security establishment, in accordance with the will of the Palestinian legislator in the Security Forces Service Law. The concept of the Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Security Forces, as stipulated in Article 39 of the Amended Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority, has two implications. First, it refers to the head of state, regardless of whether he has military experience. Second, it refers to the head of state having the authority to declare war and peace, as is the case in the international context from which this title is derived. This definition indicates that the army reports to the Minister of Defense, who is responsible before Parliament or has obtained the confidence of Parliament. The same applies to civilian security agencies such as the police and civil defense. General Intelligence, on the other hand, reports to either the President or the Prime Minister, who is the head of the executive authority and is responsible for declaring a state of war and peace, depending on the nature of the political system. However, the amendment made pursuant to Decree-Law No. 7 of 2024 amending the Security Forces Service Law grants the Commander-in-Chief executive powers that fall under the purview of the minister(s) responsible before Parliament. This also contradicts the meaning of the text contained in Article 39 of the Amended Basic Law of 2003.

Recommendations: 1. The necessity of abolishing the texts related to the reference to the Supreme Commander stipulated in Decree-Law No. 7 of 2024 amending the Security Forces Service Law No. 8 of 2005.

2. Re-authorize all security institutions and military bodies, with the exception of the General Intelligence Service, to the Palestinian government through the Minister/Ministers of Interior and National Security.

(5) Parliamentary and administrative oversight

Palestine faces the problem of the absence of a legislative council (parliament), which is supposed to monitor the work of the government and state institutions. Meanwhile, the Central Council has failed to fulfill its duties, in accordance with its decision at its thirty-first session, held on February 6-8, 2022, regarding the necessity of the Central Council exercising its constitutional powers and oversight mandate over the executive bodies of the PLO, its agencies and institutions, the Palestinian National Authority, and the work of unions, syndicates, and associations in accordance with the laws regulating their work.

In contrast, the State Audit Bureau has made significant progress in implementing the provisions of Article 31 of the State Audit Bureau Law and its amendments, which stipulate that all security agencies are subject to the oversight of the State Audit Bureau. As for some exceptional cases consistent with the nature of the special tasks of the security apparatus, although they are not subject to the oversight of the agencies referred to in this clause, they are subject to a special type of oversight, the nature and mechanisms of which are determined by law.

Recommendation: 1. The necessity of holding general elections, particularly legislative elections, or activating the Central Council for Government Oversight, including security institutions, to enhance parliamentary oversight of government and security sector activities. 2. Developing the role of the Financial and Administrative Audit Bureau in overseeing the security sector.

(6) Strengthening the culture of protecting democracy among members of the security establishment.

Article 89 of the Palestinian Security Forces Service Law refers to the concept of the public interest: "A public position in any security force is an assignment for those in charge, the goal of which is to serve the nation and citizens in the public interest, in accordance with the laws, regulations, decisions, and instructions. Officers must observe the provisions of this law and the regulations, decisions, and instructions issued pursuant thereto." The same article stipulates that officers must implement orders issued to them accurately and faithfully within the limits of applicable laws, regulations, and instructions. Every officer bears responsibility for the orders he issues and is responsible for the proper conduct of work within the limits of his jurisdiction. Protecting democracy also means that the policy of mobilization and moral guidance within the security services adopts the concept of commitment to the rule of law, Palestinian human rights and dignity, and prohibits manifestations of partisanship or politicization among security personnel, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 90 and 169 of the Security Forces Service Law, and prohibits engaging in politics, expressing political opinions, or belonging to parties or associations with political objectives.

Despite significant efforts by the Ministry of Interior and security and military agencies and bodies to provide training on the Code of Conduct for Security and Military Services and integrity issues, it is unclear whether any effort has been made to promote a culture of public interest that protects democracy, especially given that many recent speeches and videos indicate a lack of this culture among a number of officers and personnel in the security services.

Recommendation: 1. The need to review training and education mechanisms within security sector institutions to enhance the culture of protecting democracy among security personnel, including respect for the rules of public law and the protection of public freedoms. This includes amending laws related to the work of security and military agencies and bodies. 2. Preventing the involvement of officers and personnel of security agencies in partisan activities, and preventing the participation of security chiefs in partisan and official political institutions.

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