The Palestinian resistance operation on October 7, and the Israeli response to it, attracted great attention from the French media, and from a number of analysts and journalists who looked at its background and tried to anticipate the future development of events in the region and at the level of the Palestinian issue.

Below we publish some of the positions of these analysts and journalists as they presented them, without this, of course, meaning that the Institute for Palestine Studies website has adopted them.

“Israel and Palestine: Diplomacy faces an impasse and fissures”[1]

Under this title, Benjamin Koenig, in the Omanti newspaper, on October 10, analyzed the deliberations of the session held by the Security Council on October 8 to discuss current events, and wrote:

“The Western bloc fully supports Israel. For its part, the Global South seems somewhat reluctant to blindly follow a strategy that has proven to fail not only in Palestine. After the Covid-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become an indicator New to global diplomatic divisions: The launch of Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the Israeli response to it reveal these divisions, thirty years after the signing of the Oslo Accords, which were rejected by the Israeli extreme right and rejected by the “Hamas” movement.

On Sunday, October 8, during the emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, currently chaired by Brazil, which includes fifteen members, no country wanted to issue a joint statement, and many countries did not want to condemn the attack on Israel without Under any conditions, despite the United States' call to criticize "the heinous terrorist acts committed by Hamas against the Israeli people and their government." Gilad Erdan, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, also urged council members to "unequivocally condemn the war crimes committed by Hamas." If his American counterpart, Robert Wood, explicitly targeted Russia, the latter is not the only country that does not want to agree with Western positions. Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, for various reasons, refused to take sides, while calling for a halt to the escalation. Russia's ambassador to the United Nations, Vasily Nebenzia, said he had distributed "a message calling for an immediate cessation of fighting, a ceasefire and meaningful negotiations." As for China, which was also criticized by the United States, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged “the parties concerned to exercise restraint and end hostilities immediately to protect civilians,” reminding that “the international community must intensify its contribution to the Palestinian issue.” As for Brazil, “ Its position was more credible (than Russia, China, or the West), as it supported the Palestinian struggle, but condemned the killing of Israeli civilians.”

“The impossible exclusion of the Palestinian issue”[2]

Under this title, the journalist in Le Monde newspaper, Benjamin Barthes, who specializes in the Middle East and the Palestinian issue, published an article on the 10th of this month in which he said:

“The attack launched by Hamas on Israel on Saturday, October 7, highlights the grave responsibility borne by those who bet on the emergence of a “new Middle East,” in which Palestine is relegated to the background...

By taking the step of recognizing Israel in the summer of 2020, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, followed by Morocco, in effect buried the “Abdullah Plan” formulated by the Saudi Crown Prince, which required the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state in exchange for its withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 2017. 1967 (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights). The old PLO was thus deprived of its right to object to Israeli-Arab rapprochement, which represented one of its rare strengths at the negotiating table.

Thus, it seemed that a new era, post-Palestine, was dawning in the Middle East, and we can place its date of birth on March 27, 2022. On that day, Yair Lapid, the then Israeli Foreign Minister, gathered in Sde Boker, 50 kilometers to South of Beersheba, his American counterpart, Anthony Blinken, and the heads of diplomacy in four Arab countries (Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) to talk about Iran, the regional bogeyman, the war in Ukraine, and in a very limited way about the Palestinians... That summit seemed like a pivotal event, and a moment of transformation between... Two worlds. Then the Saudi-American meetings that took place in recent months, with the aim of normalizing relations between the Kingdom and Israel, reinforced this impression. It was said that Palestine was a thing of the past, and its inhabitants seemed doomed to drift off the screen and become irrelevant. It is this illusion that was shattered on Saturday, October 7, in the raid launched by Hamas commandos on southern Israel, which witnessed bombings, bombings and kidnappings, so that the “new Middle East” seemed very similar, unfortunately, to the old Middle East.

After each of the four wars that destroyed the sandbar (2008-2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021), Israel slightly lifted the lid on the Gaza cauldron. Some permits were distributed to workers to go to work in Israel, and some export licenses were given to the last entrepreneurs still active. But every time the lid was put back on [the cauldron], and the pounding of the infernal machine began anew; On the disastrous October 7th, the boiler finally exploded...

Like a hand grenade whose safety valve has been removed, the Palestinian issue is returning to the forefront again. Those who expected its decline bear heavy responsibility for the massacre of October 7 and 8, and for the bloodbaths that followed. As Israel deploys its punitive arsenal, anger may spread on the streets of the Maghreb and Levant countries, and more certainly, it will spread on these globalized sites represented by social networks. This would be second evidence that the Palestinian issue remains a structural element of Arab identity.

It will likely end up re-trapping the Devil of Gaza in his box, with some dangerous villains in tow. But the Palestinian issue will never stop appearing on the surface. Palestinian intellectual Elias Sanbar likes to say that his father told him on the eve of his death in 1967: “Do not be afraid, never be afraid. We are like a thorn in the world’s throat. No one will be able to swallow us.”

“Eliminating Hamas? Israel faces the challenges of the ground operation in Gaza.”[3]

Under this title, the analyst at Radio France considered the possibility of the Israeli army carrying out a large-scale ground operation in the Gaza Strip, and wrote:

“The Israeli army is bombing Gaza, imposing a siege on the Strip, and calling in hundreds of thousands of reserve soldiers. The goal is: eliminating Hamas...but is the political goal, which is eliminating the “terrorist” movement, achievable?

It raises many questions for Israeli leaders who have only bad choices.

The first relates to the human cost of the ground operation: given the human and urban density of the Gaza Strip, which is inhabited by two million people, there will undoubtedly be a large number of casualties on both sides. Hamas is waiting for the Israelis in every alley, in every tunnel, and in every basement. Wouldn't that price be too high?

There is no doubt that Israeli military superiority will allow the destruction of a large part of Hamas' infrastructure: the missile production workshops that regularly rain down on Israel, the tunnels leading to Egypt or to Israel through which Hamas communicates with the outside world, or the stock of weapons and ammunition that the group possesses. The most complicated matter is the arrest of the movement's leaders...

It all depends on what we mean by eliminating Hamas. On several occasions in the past, Israel was able to behead “terrorist” groups without succeeding in eliminating them.

The danger is twofold in Gaza. On the one hand, the price is too high, both for the Israeli army and for the Palestinian civilian population, an outcome that will certainly not be decisive; On the other hand, victory in Gaza would pose other problems.

What will we do in Gaza after eliminating Hamas, even temporarily? Israel has already gone through the experience of occupying the region, and does not have good memories of it. The new occupation is certainly not what the army wants. But can we leave two million people behind? This risks bringing out the worst of Hamas from Israel's point of view.

In 1957, David Ben-Gurion, the founder of the Hebrew state, saw, as stated in the memoirs of the former French ambassador to Israel, Alain Pierre, that “the Gaza Strip represents a disaster for any regime, whatever it may be, whether it is an Israeli regime, or an Israeli regime linked to the United Nations, Or an international system without Israel.” That was 66 years ago, so is it really different?

“The Israel-Gaza War: Towards a turning point in the region?”[4]

Under this title, on the 11th of this month, journalist Johanna Bouquet on Belgian Radio and Television in French, surveyed the opinions of a number of researchers specialized in Middle East affairs. In response to a question about whether the current events since October 7 mean the end of the normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel, Didier Le Roy, a researcher at the Royal Military School, answered: “The signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 launched the normalization processes between the Hebrew state.” And the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. For some time, the question has arisen about who will be the next Arab country to approach Israel, and the next on the list was none other than Saudi Arabia. A few weeks ago, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman confirmed on Fox News that Saudi Arabia And Israel is getting closer every day to normalizing their relations, and it must be said that the primary goal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is to achieve its strategy for the year 2030 to ensure the economic transformation of the Kingdom. For this reason, the Prince stated: “We need a Middle East that is as peaceful as possible and can attract foreign investors.”

But the Hamas attack, which tarnished its reputation at the international level, caused at least a slowdown in the dynamic of rapprochement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Israel, and at the maximum paralysis, so that it will now be more complicated for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to continue its negotiations with the Jewish state, and it has increased. The political cost of such rapprochement is too much...

Professor Emeritus at the Institute of Political Sciences in Paris, Bertrand Barry, comments on this issue, saying: “In my opinion, the game of the Abraham Accords was a dangerous, even perverse game, because it was a game whose rules were to deny the Palestinian issue and put it under the table... and from a certain point of view “What Hamas did in a terrible way was to remind us that the Palestinian problem still exists.” In response to a question about whether the confrontation would expand and witness Hezbollah’s participation in it, Bertrand Barry himself answered: “At the present time, Hezbollah remains somewhat cautious, as it has no interest in rushing into the fire, and for good reason.” , is that Lebanon is plunging into a serious economic crisis; pushing the country into a war with Israel on top of that seems very costly, and the Lebanese people may not forgive the armed group for this matter. And at the heart of the Lebanese political crisis, Hezbollah depends mainly on its integration into the political game Lebanese, and perhaps tomorrow, his total or partial seizure of power in Beirut. Therefore, by entering forcefully, and more directly than necessary, into the confrontation with Israel, he will risk delaying and even destroying his plans.

But whatever Hezbollah's position, Bertrand Badie believes that the Hamas attack will have repercussions on the restructuring of the region, and Lebanon will necessarily be affected by this restructuring.

Regarding the danger of the West Bank igniting, Didier Le Roy answers: “What could change the situation, and what Hezbollah is closely monitoring, is how the West Bank reacts to the Israeli response, as well as, in general, the way public opinion reacts in the Arab countries. There are two scenarios that could take shape: The first is for the Israeli police and the Palestinian Authority to be able to maintain calm in the streets of Jenin, Tulkarm, or even Ramallah: In this case, it would be dangerous for an actor like Hezbollah to jump into the battle and risk An Israeli reaction would destroy Lebanon. As for the second scenario, it would be to follow the call to start the third intifada that Hamas launched very clearly at the beginning of the process. If we witness an anti-Palestinian Authority uprising in the West Bank and a wave of political violence in mixed cities that would... If it leads to a very strong polarization of certain cities in Israel, then Israel will be more weak, and this may be an opportunity for Hezbollah.”

[1] https://www.humanite.fr/monde/attaque-du-hamas/israel-palestine-pour-la-diplomatie-une-impasse-et-des-fractures

[2] https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/10/10/l-impossible-refoulement-de-la-question-palestinienne_6193549_3232.html

[3] https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/podcasts/geopolitique/geopolitique-du-mardi-10-octobre-2023-5498231

 [4] https://www.rtbf.be/article/guerre-israel-gaza-vers-un-tournant-dans-la-region-11269539

By Maher Al-Sharif

Source: Institute of Palestinian Studies