Operation "Al-Aqsa Deluge": Collapse of the Israeli strategy towards Gaza

On the morning of October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" launched a surprise attack targeting Israeli army positions in the Gaza Strip. It was able to control a large military base and a number of Israeli sites and observation points spread along the borders of the Strip. Commando units affiliated with the movement also took control of about 20 Israeli settlements within the so-called “Green Line.” This unprecedented operation, according to data announced by the Israeli army so far, resulted in the killing of more than 1,200 Israeli soldiers and civilians, and the wounding of about 3,000 people, including many senior officers. Hamas and other factions also captured more than 130 Israelis.

First: Backgrounds of Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood”

The operation, which Hamas called “Al-Aqsa Flood,” came against the backdrop of the continuing attacks carried out by the right-wing government, the most extreme in the history of Israel, which includes hardened settlers, against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, depriving them of their lands in preparation for their confiscation and Judaization, in addition to repeated settler attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque is protected by the Israeli army and security services. During the past weeks, the Israeli government mobilized about 30 battalions of army forces in the occupied West Bank to deter any Palestinian reaction to settler practices, and in preparation for storming Palestinian camps, towns and cities that are witnessing resistance operations against the occupation forces and settlers. As for the Gaza Strip, Israel has continued its siege since 2006, reducing the rights of Palestinian prisoners, increasing their ill-treatment, and refusing to conclude a prisoner exchange agreement, taking advantage of the weakness of the Arab position and the willingness of many Arab countries to normalize relations with it in isolation from Palestinian rights, and away from the land-for-peace formula. .

Second: A series of Israeli failures

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation is of great strategic importance because it establishes a change in the reality that Israel has tried to establish in the Gaza Strip since its unilateral withdrawal from it in 2005. This sudden operation led to the collapse of the Israeli strategy in dealing with Gaza and the rule of the Hamas movement there, as well as the collapse of the “Aqsa Flood” operation. Revealing the catastrophic failure of the various components of the military and security system on which Israel relied to implement its strategy; Which led to it incurring massive human losses amounting to twice its total losses in the 1967 war, the majority of whom fell on the first day of the operation. The failure of the Israeli military and security system exceeded its failure in the October 1973 War, which is known in Israeli terminology as negligence (hamehdal). Whatever the outcome of the war on Gaza, this will have major repercussions within the state apparatus and in Israeli society, and will fuel controversy over who bears responsibility for this unprecedented failure, which resulted in about 4,200 deaths and injuries, in addition to shaking the Israelis’ confidence in their security and military system and its ability. To protect them.

The greatest failure of the security services is recorded in the failure of the Israeli Military Intelligence (Aman) and General Intelligence (Shin Bet) to anticipate the operation or obtain information about it. What increased the bitterness of this intelligence failure, in a country that has long boasted of the strength of its security services and its spying capabilities around the world on both the technical and human levels, is that the failure resulted from the Gaza Strip, which these agencies monitor and collect information about around the clock using various human and electronic means. The second major failure was the fragility of the security wall that Israel built around Gaza, and bet on its ability to prevent Palestinian fighters from penetrating it, as Hamas fighters were able to penetrate it and cross through it in large numbers to more than 20 locations. Since its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel has built a reinforced concrete wall along the Strip’s borders of about 65 kilometers, 7 meters deep into the ground, and 7 meters above it. It has installed the latest electronic monitoring devices on top of it, and has also erected watchtowers on it in various places to monitor... Every movement is behind him.

The third failure was the failure of the Israeli army to protect its military base located near the northern border of the Gaza Strip, and to protect the numerous military points and watchtowers extending along the borders of the Gaza Strip, in addition to its failure to protect more than 20 settlements located on the border of the Gaza Strip, within the so-called “line.” the green"; Hamas military units were able to storm it and impose control over it, causing losses to Israeli army forces and various security services.

It seems that this sudden attack launched by Palestinian fighters, their bold performance, their organizational capabilities, and their military experience, paralyzed the Israeli military and political leadership and caused it to lose its balance. Despite the Israeli army's constant boasting of its constant readiness to confront all emergencies and possibilities and its ability to mobilize enough force to confront any attack within hours of its occurrence, it not only failed to protect its military bases, but also failed to intervene quickly to restore the military sites and Israeli settlements that it took control of. Palestinian fighters continued to move there for no less than two days, while the settlers who were hiding in parts of it cried for help.

The fourth failure was the failure of the Israeli army and various security services to secure the defense of an entertainment party in which several thousand Israeli youth participated. The ceremony was held in an open field a few kilometers away from the Gaza Strip border, near a military base, after its owners obtained all the required security permits. Moreover, the Hamas operation paralyzed the ability of the Israeli military establishment to make decisions and respond to the requirements of the security and military situation, and the confusion extended to other state institutions that were prevented by the shock of the attack from quickly dealing with its results, including the late arrival to the dead and wounded, and the failure to provide Initial information for the families of the dead, wounded and missing, even several days after the start of the operation.

Third: The Israeli government’s reactions and calculations

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, announced after consultations with army commanders and members of the security cabinet that Israel was now in a state of war, and called for an end to the differences within Israeli society. The Minister of Security announced the summoning of more than 300,000 reserve forces in preparation for waging a war on the Gaza Strip and the mobilization of large forces on the northern front in anticipation of the possibility of the military situation erupting on the border with Lebanon and to deter Hezbollah from engaging in the war. On the same day, the Israeli government met and assigned the political and security “cabinet,” consisting of 11 ministers, to make the decision to launch war or a major military operation. The political-security cabinet is expected to determine the war goals and inform the Knesset about this in the next few days.

In light of the shaking of Israeli confidence in the government and the army, demands have increased for the formation of a national unity government or an emergency government. These calls were strengthened after the large scale of losses that occurred among the Israelis became clear, the growing desire to heal rifts and reduce the differences that have afflicted society in the past year, and the need to include experienced leaders in the decision-making circle, especially military personnel, such as Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot. They previously served as Chief of Staff of the Army. Indeed, on October 11, Netanyahu announced the agreement to form a “national emergency” government, with the National Camp party led by Gantz, which has 14 members in the Knesset, joining the government. A war “cabinet” was also formed that included Netanyahu, Gantz, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, while former Chief of Staff Eizenkot and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer were assigned to supervise the “cabinet,” and Gideon Sa’ar also joined the government, as one of three ministers who received positions. On behalf of the National Camp Party.

The new "cabinet" will face difficult decisions; First and foremost is precisely defining the goal of this war. There is almost consensus that it should not be like the previous wars launched by Israel against Gaza, and the strategy towards Gaza and Hamas should be radically changed with the aim of eliminating their rule. However, achieving this goal requires the occupation of the Gaza Strip or large parts of it. Because Israel will not be able to resolve the war from the air, no matter how many facilities and buildings it destroys and no matter how many massacres it commits. If Israel chooses to invade the Strip by land, it will entail heavy casualties in an urban war that Hamas is adept at waging. In addition, the infantry forces in the Israeli army are not prepared enough to fight a ground war. There is a big difference between what they do in the West Bank, where they play the role of the police and face groups that are not militarily trained and use old weapons, and what they may face in Gaza, where the units The military affiliated with Hamas and other factions is experienced in urban combat and has better weapons. It seems that Israel has replaced the development of its ground forces in recent years with investment in the air force, cyber, and intelligence. Therefore, it is likely to delay launching a large-scale ground attack on the Gaza Strip, despite the large forces it is amassing on its borders.

Accordingly, there have been repeated calls in recent days from prominent former military commanders, such as Amos Yadlin, former head of military intelligence, and Yisrael Ziv, head of the army operations room and former commander of the Gaza Division, to use the Israeli Air Force for as long a period as possible to strike the infrastructure of Hamas’ rule. And follow the “suburb” principle in destroying the neighborhoods in which the movement is located, targeting its leaders and members without exception, and paving the way to the greatest possible extent for the ground attack in which the various ground forces formations participate, which may not necessarily aim to occupy the entire sector.

Israel hopes that the invasion of the Gaza Strip or parts of it will lead to large losses among Palestinian civilians and is trying to commit more massacres against them. Which may change the positions of the major countries that currently strongly support Israel. Through the intense aerial bombardment campaign, it apparently seeks to displace the population, and to turn them against a rule that has caused them siege, wars, and disasters, according to Israel, so that the people welcome any alternative rule.

If the war ends without eliminating Hamas’s rule, even if the movement suffers heavy losses, the Israeli leadership will face another catastrophic failure added to its series of strategic failures. The survival of Hamas authority means a return to the situation that existed before the operation.

There is a fear in Israel that the war on Gaza, which is likely to be difficult and long, will lead to the expansion of the scope of confrontations into Lebanon, where tension with Hezbollah increases. Which means that Israel may have to engage in a confrontation on two or more fronts. Which leads to massive losses and major destruction to Israeli infrastructure.

The basic assumption of the Israeli security and political leadership is that Hezbollah will not enter this war, and that its military force is prepared to defend its project in Lebanon, mainly the Iranian nuclear project, and to deter Israel from attacking it. But it also believes that Hezbollah will not prevent Palestinian factions present in Lebanon from carrying out limited military operations across the border, and will maintain the existing deterrence equation between it and Israel without entering into a comprehensive war against it. There is also a fear in Israel that an error in estimates or even in calculated reactions between the two parties could lead to a comprehensive confrontation that they do not want. 

Therefore, Israel will keep its forces on the northern front on alert to deter Hezbollah, and to respond to the limited operations carried out by some Palestinian groups in southern Lebanon.

Finally, the fate of the Israeli civilian and military prisoners held by Hamas represents an important knot in the calculations of the military operation that Israel intends to carry out in Gaza. It is estimated that their number reaches 130 prisoners, at the very least, which is the largest number ever to fall into the hands of the Palestinian resistance in the history of the conflict with Israel. Israeli public opinion attaches utmost importance to their fate, which weakens the Israeli government's action against Gaza. Accordingly, the Israeli government tried to give the impression that it was going towards restoring the prestige of deterrence it had lost, even if that led to sacrificing the prisoners. This position came as a result of its realization that it would not be able to bring them back alive without concluding a deal with Hamas, which would include the release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. The Israeli government is not currently ready to make such a deal.

Operation “Al-Aqsa Deluge” killed Israel’s security, military and intelligence myth, and exposed the fragility of the fortifications and walls it had built to protect itself and isolate it from the besieged Palestinian “other”. There is a basic assumption that Israel still adopts, despite its proven repeated failure, which is that it is possible to continue occupying Palestinian land without paying the price and forcing the Palestinian people to accept this reality. The barbaric and backward instinctive state that prevails in Israel, and the perpetration of more aggression and massacres against the Palestinians, will not subjugate the Palestinian people in Gaza or in other places where they are located, nor will they break their will, and they will continue to struggle to gain their freedom from the occupation, even if Israel succeeds in overthrowing the government. Hamas in Gaza, which is unlikely.

Source: Arab Centre for Research & Studies