Six stations led to the "Al-Aqsa Deluge"

Anyone looking at what happened on October 7, 2023, in the Gaza Strip, is shocked by the “invasion” into the territories occupied in 1948, attacking the settlements, and the “thickening” operation that took place by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Palestinian Hamas movement. The Israeli deaths and injuries number in the hundreds. The subsequent or accompanying taking of dozens of Israeli prisoners or detainees.

In the event of war and the hour of confrontation, they do not exchange blame, and pretend to be united, and this applies to the Israeli opposition, led by Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz. But once the initial hours of confrontation pass, the exchange of blame and the revelation of facts begin. In practice, what happened can be understood through a sequence that illustrates the Israeli failure, both security and politically, and explains how the government of religious Zionist extremists dragged their entity into a series of mistakes. How this government's "imaginations" revealed the reality into which Israel has been drawn, and that Israeli parties warned of the danger of this government. The sequence of events, such as what happened in the Ashkelon area, north of Gaza, can be described in several stages.

The first was that the six prisoners escaped from Gilboa prison, in September 2021, and then the surprise was how the prisoners were able to defeat the technology, cameras, and prison plans described as the most complex. It became clear that the prisoners were able to access, or dismantle, the building plans and draw an escape plan, which was a blow to the saying The invincible army, and a blow to Israeli technology.

The second station was built on the escape of prisoners. The formation of the Jenin Battalion began to support the prisoners during their escape, but their recapture led to the battalion turning to be a kind of resistance, so the phenomenon expanded, forming battalions and groups, which later began to occupy the Israeli army and receive a security focus. Israel, at the expense of the Gaza Strip.

The third stage: the Israeli governments adopt a plan based on dividing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and helping the two authorities to keep each in its place. The authority of the Hamas movement in Gaza and the authority of the Fatah movement in the West Bank, provided that the two authorities remain weak. Israel allowed money from abroad to enter Gaza, eased the siege, allowed thousands of workers to enter from the Strip to work in Israeli projects, and encouraged and coordinated with Hamas through intermediaries for companies in the Strip to work for Israeli factories.

Israel believed that these “arrangements” were sufficient to convince Hamas to calm down. What Israel did not notice is that the suffering of civilians in Gaza does not include the armed wing. The leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, threatened at the end of May 2021, “We will burn everything green and dry” if the problem in the Strip was not solved. He revealed, at the time, that the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ financial, expertise, and intelligence resources were separate from the rest of Hamas’ components in Gaza, and relied on parties including Iran and Hezbollah. But Israel bet that the priority in Gaza was the continuation of Hamas’s authority, even with its state of weakness. It did not take the threat of burning land and land seriously, and did not take into account the consequences of the presence of resources at the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and its armed wings separate from the rest of “Gaza’s finances.” This contributed to the Israeli army relaxing and focusing on the armed groups in the West Bank. Indeed, those targeted by Israel in Gaza were leaders of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas movements who were believed to play a role in mobilizing the West Bank. An example of this is the assassinations committed by Israel last May, and its continued threat to target the leader of the Hamas movement residing abroad, Saleh Al-Arouri, as he is responsible for armed action in the West Bank.

The fourth stop to reach October 7, the Israeli elections, November 2022, which resulted in a government that restructured security and defense in Israel, in a very strange way.

  For example, the Israeli Ministry of Defense has two ministers, one of whom is from the Likud Party, Yoav Gallant, and the second has certain powers within the ministry, Bezalel Smotrich, who came from the religious Zionist movement and has no security experience. Itamar Ben Gvir was appointed Minister of National Security, with the powers to create new forces separate from the army. Not only does Ben Gvir have security or military experience, but his recruitment into the army was previously rejected due to the nature of his behavior and positions. He has a kind of vendetta with the army leaders. Israeli opposition officials, led by former Army Minister Benny Gantz, have warned of the danger of what is happening. On November 26, 2022, he wrote on his Twitter account, “National security - or dismantling security into parts of the forces and establishing an army.” Special for Ghafir milk?” He said that what is happening is the dismantling of government powers into “fragments of ministries,” and that what is happening is “a disgrace that will lead to a security risk.” Former Chief of Staff Guy Eisenkot said that Ben Gvir's assignment of the National Security portfolio was a "sad joke." Indeed, disagreements began within the army and among the ministers in charge of security. Israeli security now has multiple conflicting heads.

The fifth station is the subject of the legal amendments that the Netanyahu government wanted to implement, which would reduce the powers of the judiciary to monitor the government and hold politicians accountable, and increase the authority of ministers in deciding whether to develop settlements and govern the West Bank and the settlements. This led to unprecedented protests in Israel, which included army officers entering the protests and many of them abstaining from serving. In fact, the Minister of Defense, Yoav Galant, was dismissed from his position last March due to his position on the protests, before he was returned to his position after about Two weeks after his dismissal, amid confusion in the Israeli security services.

The sixth station took place on June 3, which may be considered a mini-rehearsal for October 7. That day, an Egyptian policeman entered the Palestinian territories, killed three Israeli soldiers, and spent hours without the Israeli army noticing the death of its soldiers or the presence of an attacker, in a scandalous indication of sagging in this army.

In this sense, the Israelis thought, before October 7, that they had neutralized Gaza, and their government underestimated the possibilities of a Palestinian reaction to the Al-Aqsa incursions and settlement activity. At the same time, the process of leading and managing Israeli security was going through a crisis. Many soldiers were deployed in the West Bank, at the expense of the southern region. While the leadership of the military wing of the Hamas movement works silently, and conducts maneuvers that everyone thinks are close to fantasy, as the training of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades included storming settlements, but everyone considered them a show only. While this was going on, the morale of the Israeli army was declining, due to the political division, the exhaustion of its forces protecting settler “gangs” and their violence in the West Bank, in addition to the lack of consensus between the security leadership.

From "The New Arab"