Hamas follows Arafat's example in war and settlement

I will start this article with a verbatim summary of an article written by one of the most important Israeli journalists, Mr. Nahum Brynea, in the first newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, on the fourth day of the war that Israel called "a spear and a shield".

He says, "Whether we like it or not, in this round, Hamas has established its position as a difficult figure between Israel and Gaza. There is a historical paradox here, as Hamas finds itself and Israel finds itself in the same position Fatah had before the Oslo Accords and mainly after it. At that time, it celebrated “Hamas” in operations, sometimes with the opposition of “Fatah”, sometimes with its approval, and sometimes under its sponsorship. In Gaza, it pushes to boost the economy and normalize life. In Gaza, it sees Israel as an enemy, as well as a partner and support. Twice in "Breaking Dawn" and in "Shield and Spear", "Hamas" chose to stand aside while Israel liquidated senior officials in the Jihad movement. In the army The Israelis understood and assimilated: the ambiguous assessment that if the campaign is not prolonged and complicated, Hamas will remain outside, was correct until yesterday. This is what it was.

Barnea concludes about butter by saying: "Soon, a struggle will begin in the West Bank over control of power, or what is left of it after the end of Abu Mazen's era. Israel will not enjoy forever the geographical division, because relations with Hamas have traces." End quote.
Reproduction of Yasser Arafat

What Barnea went to is not just a jurisprudence, understanding, or appreciation of an Israeli writer or politician. Rather, it is an analysis that the Palestinians circulate in their councils and their non-stop debates about the agendas of the powers and factions, and that Israeli policymakers deal with in their plans for the post-Abu Mazen.

Hamas does not talk about this according to the logic of “help you to satisfy your needs with secrecy.” And because it is a pragmatic political movement that seeks to extend its authority from Gaza to every place in Palestine and exile, it believes that the obligatory passage of a recognized authority over the Palestinian situation as a whole is to present convincing evidence that it is a project of moderation that deserves to bet on it. Its adoption of the slogan of resistance, and even its practice of it directly and indirectly, is a reproduction of the approach of Arafat, who led the resistance in all its forms to lead the negotiations that he bet would lead to an authority on the ground that would develop into a state.

Little by little, when Arafat led the longest and fiercest war with Israel twice, the first in Lebanon and the second in the West Bank and Gaza, where the armed uprising took place, his interpretation of the first was that it was the inevitable passage to enter the political settlement forum, and this is what he was asking for throughout the seasons of the Great Battle of Beirut. As for the second, his interpretation of it was that it was to save the settlement project leading to the state and free it from the clutches of Sharon and Netanyahu, after they came to power in Israel, and their declared program was to eliminate Oslo and its masters and what resulted and what could result from it. And if the Lebanon war and all the military wars that preceded it for decades produced Oslo and his return with his leadership to the homeland, then the second produced the opposite of what I wanted from it, and its direct victims were the makers of Oslo, Arafat, Rabin and Peres, and what Oslo produced in terms of preliminaries was read at the beginning as perhaps lead to a state!!

Returning to "Hamas", I raise a question that cannot be avoided: Is Arafat's experience suitable for Hamas to copy it, to lead it to the top of the Palestinian hierarchy, or to lead it to what Arafat led to?

Is Hamas extending to the West Bank?

Hamas has not disclosed its agenda in this regard, but it does not hide its quest to develop its authority in Gaza from authority over part to authority over all, and from the legitimacy of a fait accompli to constitutional legitimacy. Her position on the first elections indicated a hidden agenda on her part, and her entry into the second elections was a disclosure of the rest of the agenda.

In order to answer the question, Hamas must read Arafat's experience in dealing with the settlement, and the merits he paid for accepting him as a member of its regional and international forum, and above all that.. the Israeli-American, and it must also study the reality of the Palestinian people in the post-Oslo collapse era, i.e. During the time of Mahmoud Abbas, which was long-term and ineffective in the matter of the desired settlement.

If the goal is to sit at the top of the pyramid and the situation is the same, then this is the easiest thing in the process after the weakness, rupture and marginalization of Fatah and the PLO. But if the goal is to achieve the goals of the Palestinian people represented in freedom, sovereignty, independence and return, then what appears in the last third of the journey that Fatah started is in fact a starting point that has gone too far back. Is Hamas aware of the reality as it is, or Only aware of her agenda?

The movement will find itself at the center of a dilemma such as the one in which the Oslo makers found themselves.

Oh God, unless what its president declared in the context of the current round, which is that Israel surrenders!!