The Palestinian Authority between state and chaos

Written by: Ibrahim Ibrash

The final indecisiveness of the Palestinian leadership regarding the transition from a status of a limited self-governing authority to a state under occupation, even though President Abu Mazen, in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, left the door open to all possibilities, requires a rational and objective approach to the future of the authority and its obligations according to the Oslo Accords, especially since Voices are rising calling for its overthrow, and some are working to weaken it. This coincides with: the escalation of commando operations against the occupation, the increasing state of anger against the authority, continuous Israeli efforts to weaken the authority, the suspension of the political settlement process, the consolidation of division, and the absence of a horizon for the electoral process.

We wrote dozens of articles on the national authority and talked about the subject in dozens of conferences, seminars, interviews and through audio-visual media, in which we said that the self-rule authority restricted by the requirements of the Oslo Accord is not a final or fixed given of our national rewards, but rather it is a temporary condition that can be overcome if there is the national will to change its function. Or by moving to the state or by returning to the state of national liberation, as we distinguished between the principle of the existence of a national authority on the one hand and the mistakes and abuses of the ruling political class on the other hand. However, for some to demand the dissolution of the authority without preparing a national alternative, this will lead to a state of chaos from which only the enemy will benefit. Today, after the passage of lean years, there has been no transition towards the state, nor a return to the state of national liberation, nor the rebuilding and revival of the PLO, nor an end to the division, but rather the authority has become even weaker. The weakness and exposure of its opponents has increased. Some are still calling for the abolition of the authority or working to weaken it!

The effects and repercussions of overthrowing or dissolving the Palestinian National Authority will not be limited to the collapse of the government and its institutions and the consequent cessation of the payment of salaries and the provision of basic services to the majority of citizens, or the end of the Fatah movement’s control over power. The Zionist entity and those with a non-national agenda, and with the state of weakness that the PLO is in, the Hamas movement and its authority in the Gaza Strip remain the main address for the Palestinians, and Israel is ready to deal with this address.

It is not a questioning of the intentions of all opponents of the authority, nor of the intentions of all the armed youth expelled from Israel and sometimes from the authority in the West Bank; The latter accumulated mistakes, which angered many, even those who belong to the PLO and the Fatah movement and defend the principle of the existence of a national authority. However, it is not guaranteed that weakening or overthrowing the authority serves the national interest in the absence of a national alternative to replace it.

There are three active political parties in the political scene: Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the opposition forces - without ignoring other forces, including Arab and regional countries, that work in secret and without official addresses. Israel has well-known goals, and it is hostile to the Authority as well as its opponents, even if it coordinates tactically with some of them, because it considers every Palestinian an enemy to it, just as it views the West Bank as part of (the Land of Israel) and will not give it up to anyone. As previously mentioned, although it sees itself as a national achievement and gain and is supported by a large segment of the people, but what about the opposition parties?

The word or term “opposition” in the Palestinian case is ambiguous and ambiguous. If most of the opposition forces declare their hostility to Israel and stand against the authority, they do not agree on everything else, nor do they have any vision or strategy for the post-collapse period.

Under the heading of the opposition, the ropes are mixed with bombs, in which:

1- Activists and civil actors who oppose the authority because of its violations of freedom of opinion and expression, or the existence of corruption in it, or against some of its political positions, but they are not against the principle of the existence of a national authority, and among them are those who belong to the Fatah movement and the organization's factions.

2- Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and they say that they are part of the Fatah movement, and the latter is the one that leads the authority!

3- Hamas and Islamic Jihad, with their hidden differences and disagreements. They are also committed to a truce with Israel in the Gaza Strip and binding on them even in the West Bank and the 48 areas.

4- The Islamic Liberation Party, which tweets alone and disagrees not only with the authorities, but with all other opposition parties.

5- Young men from the security services decided to rebel against the Dayton Doctrine, which deluded them that security coordination and suppression of activists and opponents of the authority achieve security and safety and bring the desired Palestinian state closer, but they discovered that what they are doing serves the occupying state more than it serves the Palestinian people.

6- Some families, clans and class of beneficiaries of the occupation who feel that the authority threatens their influence and interests.

7- And there are those who were formed by Israel to form the village associations again.

8- There are those who owe loyalty to Jordan and their loyalty to Jordan is stronger than their loyalty to Palestine.

9- And do not forget the criminals, thieves and bandits concerned with chaos, because it facilitates their criminal work.

10- In addition to spies and agents of Israel working in secret or under various names, we may find some of them in civil society institutions and within the authority itself.

If Israel is reducing the powers of the PA and its areas of influence and is trying to weaken it by various means and does not trust it despite all the political flexibility and security coordination provided by the PA leadership... Will it trust the opponents of the PA and this is their situation? Is it possible to grant them powers and the possibility of working that serve the national interest more than it granted the Liberation Organization and the national authority emanating from it?

There are those who compare, in the context of defending the national authority, between what was happening in Gaza before the Hamas coup and what is happening in the West Bank these days, and we believe that the comparison is relatively correct in one aspect, which is the weakening of the national authority. Israel is ready to leave the Strip, and Hamas was ready to take it. As for the West Bank, Israel will not allow any Palestinian national party to control the West Bank, because in its eyes, the West Bank is an essential part of their alleged state.

This does not mean sticking to power and defending it in its current situation, whether it is unjust or oppressed. Rather, we call for rational thinking for the sake of the national interest, away from the calculations of Arab and regional countries and those with foreign agendas, especially since the Palestinians’ experience with these countries and agendas throughout the decades of the history of the Palestinian cause was painful, and nothing will change it. Something about the slogans and ideologies raised by these parties, and we should also take advantage of what happened to the first uprisings in 1987 and the second in 2000, and how the absence of a vision and a unified national strategy led to the lack of practical political achievements.

On the other hand, the Palestinian leadership is required to work hard for the transition from the authority to the state, while we are aware of the legal and practical challenges and difficulties of this transition. All the Palestinian people, and in order for it to be so, it must be in the context of a national consensus, or the matter must be done through a popular referendum. We believe that the issue deserves discussion in the (reconciliation) meetings in Algeria, which, although we are not optimistic about achieving important breakthroughs, we hope that it will go beyond the frivolous dialogues that took place over the years in Cairo and other Arab and foreign capitals.