To those who want to execute another Palestinian leader

By: Gershon Baskin
Whoever wants to execute Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, is calling for more of the same or perhaps worse. Killing Sinwar may seem like the right thing to do to many Israelis who see him as responsible for killing many more Israelis, but if there is one thing we should definitely know beyond a shadow of a doubt, it is that executing him will lead to more Israelis being killed. When more Israelis are killed, we can be 100% sure that more Palestinians will be killed. We've been there and done that many times before.
The public knows little about Yahya Al-Sinwar or Abu Ibrahim as he is known in Palestine. Sinwar was born in Khan Yunis in 1964. His family hails from what is now Ashkelon. He studied at a United Nations refugee school and continued his studies to complete a bachelor's degree in Arabic language studies from the Islamic University of Gaza. He was arrested in 1988 for killing four Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel and sentenced to four life sentences. He was in prison for 22 years before he was released in the Shalit deal. In 2006, Sinwar played a key role in drafting and supporting the National Reconciliation Document for prisoners by Palestinian political detainees in Israeli prisons (representing Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The "Prisoners' Document" is a revolutionary document because Hamas came out in it mainly to support the two-state solution, and this is what it said: "The Palestinian people in the homeland and diaspora seek to liberate their land and to obtain their right to freedom, return, independence, and exercise their right to self-determination, including the right to establish their own state." The independent city with its capital, Al-Quds Al-Sharif, on all the lands occupied in 1967, securing the right of return for refugees and liberating all prisoners and detainees based on the historical right of our people on the land of our fathers and grandfathers and on the basis of the United Nations Charter, international law and international legitimacy.
Moreover, Hamas agreed at that time to limit the resistance to the areas beyond the Green Line and not to Israel itself: "The right of the Palestinian people to resist and adhere to the choice of resistance by various means and the concentration of resistance in the region." The territories occupied in 1967, in addition to political work, negotiations, diplomatic work, the continuation of the popular and mass resistance against the occupation in its various forms and policies, and ensuring the existence of broad participation by all sectors and the masses in the popular resistance.
During the negotiations for the Shalit deal, Sinwar's name was not contested by the Israeli security authorities who were responsible for approving each name on the list. Sinwar's hands were not "stained" with "Jewish blood" because he killed Palestinians. Moreover, Israel understood that Sinwar's support for the deal was important for Hamas to agree to it because Sinwar was seen as one of the most important Hamas leaders in prison. Sinwar had to ensure the support of all Hamas prisoners, including those who were not on the list.
There have been many arguments within the Israeli security establishment over the years as to whether Sinwar was a pragmatist or an ideologue and extremist. Most of the time, the majority of experts conclude that he is a pragmatist. This is what the Egyptian and Qatari intelligence interlocutors told Israel as well. Sinwar led the resistance within Hamas to realign with Iran rather than seek the support of more moderate Sunni Arab states. When cease-fire agreements were concluded through Egyptian mediation, Sinwar generally demonstrated a willingness and ability to abide by the agreements. Egyptian intelligence officers who meet with Sinwar regularly have found him pragmatic about abiding by cease-fire agreements, rebuilding Gaza, and making sure that Hamas does not conduct any activity in the Sinai, under Egyptian sovereignty.
Sinwar has grown beyond the role of Hamas leader in Gaza. Sinwar seems to see himself today as a Palestinian national leader and his fears go beyond easing the blockade on Gaza. Sinwar realized that the focal point for unifying Palestinian public opinion was Al-Aqsa. He knows that by focusing on the deteriorating status quo at Al-Aqsa, which has allowed increasing numbers of right-wing religious Jews to enter the Al-Aqsa compound, he has been able to exploit the rallying call for all Palestinians and Muslims under the banner first used by Hezbollah. Historic Mufti Haj Amin Al-Hussein "Al-Aqsa is in danger". Sinwar does not see his role in merely easing the siege on Gaza and improving the economic situation there. Sinwar himself cares about East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and even the Palestinian citizens of Israel. For the past seven years, he has been almost completely consistent in the negotiations for the return of the bodies of Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul and the presumed living Israelis - Abra Mengistu and Hisham El-Sayed. Israel attempted to "broaden the pie" of issues in the prisoner negotiations. Including easing the blockade, electricity, water, movement of Gazans out of Gaza, and more. Sinwar refuses to combine the release of prisoners from all other issues. This makes such negotiations almost impossible due to his demand for religious Palestinian prisoners who have murdered Israelis and Israel's refusal to do so.
I have always advocated the policy of trying to speak directly with Sinwar, not through Egypt or Qatar. One of the main reasons for any discussion about the prisoners, the future of Gaza, or the entire Palestinian issue is due to the deep mistrust between the two sides. This mistrust is not wrong - there are many reasons why both sides may not trust the other. Creating even the beginning of trust between the two sides is essential and is the most realistic thing to do. In May 2017, Hamas amended its charter, which was heavily "anti-Semitic" and clearly stated in the movement's goals to destroy the entire State of Israel. The amended charter apparently separated Hamas from the Muslim Brotherhood - which is Egypt's demand, and also stated that they would accept a Palestinian state within the June 4, 1967 borders. They said they would not recognize Israel even with a state in the West Bank and Gaza, but the amended charter It was a big step in the right direction. It is believed that Sinwar was a key figure in drafting the charter and lobbying for its acceptance within the ranks of Hamas. Sinwar is not the only player in Hamas' decision-making process. He is powerful but also has more extreme powerful people in his decision-making circle. I think there is a possibility to engage directly with Sinwar. It will not be done through public diplomacy, although some positive statements by some Israelis, in the political and security arenas would be helpful. From the point of view of Israel's interests, in the short and medium term, dealing with Sinwar is a wiser political strategic choice than killing him. More targeted killings, another war with the Palestinians, closures and blockades will not change the basic harmful parameters of this conflict. Reaching out, talking, building trust, and negotiating is probably the only way out of this conflict. Israel will not be able to get rid of Hamas by force. In fact, the harder Israel hits Hamas, the stronger it becomes. Isn't it time to try something new?