Diplomatic Opportunities and Complex Obstacles: Can Israel Succeed in Concluding a Peace Agreement with Lebanon?

Political and academic circles in Israel are increasingly focusing on the possibility of concluding a settlement agreement with Lebanon and Syria, in an attempt to exploit major regional transformations. The occupation seeks to leverage the growing internal criticism directed at Hezbollah as a political opportunity that has not been available for decades, despite the understanding that the available time may be short before forces opposing any agreement regain their influence.

Professor Eli Foda and researcher Yogev Elbaz believe that the convening of the second round of talks in Washington, coinciding with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, represent two unexpected outcomes of the ongoing war. These developments open a new diplomatic door for Israel, especially since the decades-long Syrian dominance over Lebanon was the biggest obstacle to any previous rapprochement.

Research sources clarified that the political history of the region has proven the impossibility of reaching an agreement in Lebanon without prior arrangements with the Syrian side. With the previous Syrian withdrawal, Hezbollah, supported by Tehran and Damascus, became the strongest actor in the Lebanese arena. However, the rise of a new regime in Syria and the current weakness of the party have created a political vacuum that Israel is trying to exploit.

The first obstacle to this path is the failure to implement the exceptional decisions taken against Hezbollah's influence and the Iranian presence in Lebanon. These measures include banning the activities of the Revolutionary Guard and canceling visa exemptions for Iranians, as well as expelling the Iranian ambassador, steps that have so far remained ink on paper without real implementation mechanisms.

The second obstacle is reflected in the nature of the internal Lebanese discourse, where rejection of Hezbollah's behavior is escalating among various Christian and Sunni sects, and even within some Shiite circles. This sharp division reflects the extent of discontent with dragging the country into military confrontations that led to widespread destruction, making any official decision towards Israel fraught with the risks of internal explosion.

The crushing economic and social crisis comes as a third obstacle, further complicating the already exhausted Lebanese scene since the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut port explosion. These successive crises have left the Lebanese state in a state of extreme fragility, weakening its ability to make fateful decisions or enter into long-term international commitments that require internal stability.

The fourth obstacle is related to the structure built by Hezbollah as a state within a state, where it has established economic, educational, and social institutions completely independent of legitimate institutions. This parallel network, which includes schools, gas stations, and commercial chains, has made the party a de facto authority that is difficult to dismantle or replace with official state institutions in a short time.

Data indicates that financial differences played a crucial role in the loyalties of members, as the salary of a party member reached $1,500, which is ten times the salary of a Lebanese army officer. However, the party today faces a suffocating financial crisis that has made it unable to fulfill these obligations or compensate its displaced supporters, which weakens its organizational cohesion.

Naturally, Hezbollah strongly opposes any political settlement, using rhetoric that reminds Lebanese of the pains of the 15-year civil war. These veiled threats raise widespread concern among various Lebanese components, who wonder whether the price of an agreement with Israel will lead to the country sliding into a new armed sectarian conflict.

The idea of negotiating with Israel, which was previously a point of consensus on rejection, today raises fears of the disintegration of the Lebanese army along sectarian lines. The current army appears too weak to enforce government decisions to disarm the party, and there is a real fear of a repeat of the scenario of military institutions collapsing, as happened in the 1980s.

Israel realizes that the success of any diplomatic opportunity depends on dealing with the fragile political fabric in Lebanon, which requires searching for communication channels that go beyond traditional allies. While the focus was previously on the Maronites, Israeli circles see the need to open up to Sunnis, Druze, and even Shiite figures opposed to the party's approach.

Israeli sources summarize the challenges in three main dilemmas: first, identifying the party capable of actually disarming the party and dismantling its civilian system. Second, how to fortify any agreement against internal undermining attempts that may be led by parties linked to the Iranian axis, as happened in previous historical experiences that failed to endure.

The third dilemma concerns security guarantees for northern settlers, given Lebanon's demand for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the internationally recognized borders. This demand places the Israeli government before the challenge of balancing security demands with the political requirements of any lasting and comprehensive peace agreement with the Lebanese side.

In conclusion, these readings show that international promises of an imminent peace are merely a path fraught with risks and subjective and objective obstacles. With a right-wing government in Israel inclined to impose conditions by force, the question remains about the realism of achieving a real diplomatic breakthrough amidst these intertwined complexities.

Any agreement with Lebanon faces three main obstacles: who will disarm the party, how to deal with those who undermine the agreement, and ensuring the security of northern settlers.